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This book explores what international and EU law require from the national asylum 
judge with regard to the required intensity of the judicial scrutiny to be applied, and with 
regard to evidentiary issues, such as the standard and burden of proof, the assessment 
of credibility, the required level of individualisation, the admission and evaluation of 
evidence, opportunities for presenting evidence and time limits for submitting evidence. 
To that end, an analysis is made of the provisions on national (judicial) proceedings 
contained in the Refugee Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the UN Convention against Torture, the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and a number of secondary EU 
law instruments, such as the EU Qualification Directive and the EU Asylum Procedures 
Directive, with a particular focus on issues of evidence and judicial scrutiny. In addition, 
the assessment as performed by the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee 
against Torture and the European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning the 
expulsion of asylum seekers is analysed, again with a particular focus on issues of 
evidence and judicial scrutiny.
This research has revealed that international and EU law contain many specific 
standards on the intensity of judicial scrutiny to be applied by national asylum courts, as 
well as standards on evidence. It has also revealed that it has become in fact impossible 
for national asylum courts to ignore or discard these standards, as that would amount 
to a breach of Articles 18, 19 and 47 of the EU Charter on fundamental rights and thus a 
violation of primary binding EU law. An important common denominator following from 
international and EU law is that national asylum courts must perform an independent, 
impartial and rigorous national judicial scrutiny of asylum refusals. Independent, 
impartial and rigorous national judicial scrutiny implies, inter alia, that national courts 
examine evidence submitted by applicants in a careful and serious manner. It also 
requires that national courts are able to make an independent and fresh determination 
of the disputed facts and that - if necessary in order to clarify the facts - these courts 
undertake judicial investigations. 
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 ‘Insufficient facts will often result in the judge having to assess the reliability of the account 
given by the person concerned. Bearing in mind the subjective elements which are inherent in 
making such an assessment, judges will to a certain extent, in an area where the most 
fundamental human rights are at stake, find themselves on thin ice. Given what is at stake, a 
conclusion that an asylum-seeker’s account is not credible should therefore be based on a 
thorough investigation of the facts and be accompanied by adequate reasoning.’ 
 
Judge Thomassen of the European Court of Human Rights in her concurring opinion to Said 
v. the Netherlands (2005). 
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Preface 
 
Two judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) formed the 
immediate reason for my embarking upon this research project. These were the 
judgments in the cases of Said v. the Netherlands (ECtHR, Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 
2005, Appl. No. 2345/02) and Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands (ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. 
the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04). In both cases, the District Court 
of Amsterdam, where I had just started working as an immigration and asylum judge, 
functioned as the national first instance court. In both cases it approved the stance of 
the administration that there was no reason to grant asylum protection to the 
individuals concerned. The ECtHR reached the opposite conclusion and assumed in 
both cases that there were substantial grounds for believing that upon expulsion there 
was a real risk that the individuals would be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or 
degrading treatment in their country of origin and that, as a result, their expulsion 
would lead to a violation of Article 3 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
(ECHR). 
There were clear signs that the ECtHR was dissatisfied with the level of judicial 
scrutiny offered at national level in the Netherlands. This worried and troubled me. 
Together with a colleague from the Amsterdam Court, I analysed a number of the 
ECtHR’s well-known judgments in expulsion cases concerning asylum seekers to find 
out in a more precise way how this international Court assessed the risk. We dis-
covered significant differences between the judicial practice applied at an interna-
tional level and our own national judicial practice. First, the intensity or thoroughness 
of the judicial scrutiny seemed to be different. Second, issues of evidence, such as the 
admission and evaluation of evidence, were approached and resolved in very different 
ways at international and national level. This small-scale investigation made me very 
anxious to find out in a more precise way what lessons on both aspects – intensity of 
judicial scrutiny and evidence – could and should be drawn from the ECHR. I also 
became anxious to find out whether other relevant international treaties and EU 
asylum law contained concrete instructions on evidentiary issues and on judicial 
scrutiny. That is how the idea to embark upon this research project was born.  
In 2007, I was invited to a seminar on the EU Family Reunification Directive in 
Nijmegen organised by the Centre for Migration Law (CMR) to speak as a national 
judge about the application of the Directive in national Dutch case law. It was there 
that I met Elspeth Guild and Kees Groenendijk, and we first spoke about my plan 
for a PhD project on evidence and judicial scrutiny in international and European 
asylum law. They reacted with great enthusiasm and felt that a book on this topic 
would be very welcome. It was soon after these meetings that I handed in a concrete 
plan to Elspeth and Kees and that we started working on the project. 
I wish to express my deep gratitude to Elspeth Guild and Kees Groenendijk for 
supervising, coaching and inspiring me throughout the entire research process. The 
beginning was not easy as I was accustomed to thinking, working and writing as a 
judge, and academic writing was a completely new challenge for me. But our confi-
dence grew with each new chapter I handed in. Thanks to the constructive criticism I 
received from Elspeth and Kees, every supervision meeting gave me great inspiration 
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and new energy to go on and to restructure and rewrite the chapters of this book 
time and again. I learned so many different things during the process of writing this 
book, both as a PhD student and as a judge. I discovered vast bodies of case law 
which I had, in fact, not been very familiar with before: the case law of the Human 
Rights Committee, the Committee against Torture and the Court of Justice of the 
European Union. I learned how to work with extensive EU law data bases such as 
EUR-lex and PreLex. I learned a lot about the relationship between international and 
European asylum law and I discovered the impact of EU law on national asylum 
procedures and court proceedings in particular. 
I want to say a sincere thank you to Carla Eradus, President of the District Court 
of Amsterdam, for making it possible to combine my work as a judge with writing 
this book, and to all my colleagues in the administrative law section and the criminal 
law section of the District Court of Amsterdam for expressing their interest in my 
research work and supporting me from beginning to end. 
Marcelle Reneman, Karen Geertsema and Hannah Helmink, thank you so much 
for commenting on earlier versions of many chapters and for our numerous interest-
ing meetings on procedural issues. Many thanks also go to René Bruin who critically 
commented on an earlier version of the chapter on the United Nations Convention 
against Torture, to Kees Wouters who commented on earlier versions of the Intro-
duction and who helped me out a number of times when I could not find certain 
UNHCR documents on RefWorld, and to Hermine Masmeyer who commented on 
earlier versions of the chapter on the ECHR and the chapter on European Union 
asylum law. 
Henja Korsten, thank you for helping me to become familiar with EUR-lex, the 
Legislative Observatory, PreLex and the digital public register of the Council of the 
European Union. I also wish to thank Beverley Slaney for her editorial work, Carolus 
Grütters and Aslan Zorlu for helping me to make the index and Hannie van de Put 
for making the layout. 
I am grateful to the members of the manuscript committee, professors Ashley 
Terlouw, Roel Fernhout and Egbert Myjer for reviewing the manuscript and 
providing valuable comments. 
Finally I wish to thank my beloved husband, Siros, and our dear little sons, Nour 
and Aziz, for loving and supporting me all the way. Without your energy I would not 
have been able to complete this work. Mom and sisters, special thanks also to you for 
your love and interest in my work. A very special thanks to my sister Suzan for 
making the cover illustration. Dad, you are no longer here on earth, but I hope that, 
in Heaven, you will be a little bit proud of my book. 
Every week individuals who are in the most vulnerable and difficult circum-
stances, far away from their homes and home countries, appear before me as a 
national judge. It is these people who continually remind me that an independent, 
impartial, fair and thorough judicial investigation and hearing is a crucial human right, 
and that national judges are the primary guardians of it. 
 
2006  2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Mexico City Nijmegen Amsterdam Tun Fun Paris Amsterdam Den Bosch 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1  Research context and reasons 
Every judge who has worked in a court for a number of years will admit that facts 
and evidence play a crucial role in judicial investigations and judicial decision making. 
This not only goes for criminal law and civil law, but certainly also for administrative 
law. In individual cases before the court, judges apply legal norms to the established 
facts. To be able to do this, they must first obtain clarity about the facts. This is not 
problematic when the parties to the case do not argue about the facts. In many cases, 
however, the parties disagree about what actually happened. In such cases, the first 
step in the judicial investigative and decision making process is determination of the 
facts. At this stage, the judge will determine the facts, on the basis of the statements 
by the parties and, possibly, other available evidence. 
In asylum1 cases, determination of the facts is a particularly difficult task. The 
question which has to be answered is whether a risk exists that the individual will be 
persecuted or ill-treated in the future, upon expulsion to the country of origin. As we 
can never predict what will happen in the future, the assessment of a future risk is 
inherently a very difficult task.2 At the same time, much is at stake in asylum cases: 
the expulsion of an individual who fears that, in his or her country of origin, his or 
her life or safety will be at risk. 
There are more particularities which make determination of the facts in asylum 
cases an extremely difficult job. The facts, as related by the asylum seeker, have most-
ly happened in a country far away from decision makers and judges in the country of 
refuge. In addition to this, there is often not much direct evidence corroborating the 
statements by the asylum seeker. As a result, the reliability and credibility of the flight 
narrative become very important. Bearing in mind the subjective elements which are 
inherent in making an assessment of the credibility and reliability of an asylum seeker, 
judges – and, of course, administrative decision makers as well – will find themselves 
on thin ice, in an area where the most fundamental human rights are at stake.3 
The immediate reason for my embarking upon this research was formed by two 
judgments of the ECtHR: Said v. the Netherlands (2005)4 and Salah Sheekh v. the Nether-
lands (2007).5 These two judgments clearly demonstrated that the national court and 
the international court (the ECtHR) are sometimes miles apart when it comes to de-
termining the facts and assessing the risk in asylum cases. In both cases, the District 
Court of Amsterdam, where I had just started working as an immigration and asylum 
judge, functioned as the national first instance court. In both cases, this national court 
                                                        
1 By ‘asylum’ I mean the protection offered to a non-citizen on account of a threat abroad, by a state, 
within the territory of that state. See Battjes 2006, p. 6.  
2 See in the same vein Wouters 2009, p. 26. 
3 Concurring opinion of European Court of Human Rights Judge Thomassen to the judgment in the 
case of Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02. 
4 ECtHR, Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02. 
5 ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04. 
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approved the stance of the administration that there was no reason to grant asylum to 
the individuals concerned. In both cases, the ECtHR determined the facts and assess-
ed the risk in a completely different way and assumed that there were substantial 
grounds for believing that upon expulsion there was a real risk that the individuals 
would be subjected to torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment in their coun-
try of origin, resulting in the determination that their expulsion would lead to a viola-
tion of Article 3 ECHR. The ECtHR based its ruling in both judgments on substan-
tive grounds. At the same time, there were clear signs that the ECtHR was dissatis-
fied with the level of judicial scrutiny offered at national level in the Netherlands. In a 
concurring opinion to Said v. the Netherlands (2005), Judge Thomassen expressed the 
view that no serious investigation had been carried out by the Netherlands authorities 
(administrative and judicial). To illustrate this, Thomassen pointed to the fact that the 
District Court of Amsterdam had not investigated the identity documents presented 
by the claimant during the court proceedings and had refused to hear Mr. Khalifa, a 
witness, put forward by the claimant, as it had already found the flight narrative in-
credible.6 
In Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands (2007), the ECtHR declared the complaint ad-
missible although the claimant had failed to lodge a higher appeal against the Amster-
dam Court’s judgment to the Council of State and had, thus, failed to exhaust na-
tional legal remedies before applying to the ECtHR, as required by Article 35, first 
paragraph, ECHR.7 By declaring the complaint admissible, the ECtHR conveyed the 
message that further appeal to the Council of State constituted no effective national 
remedy. Although this conclusion rested on substantive reasons8 the judgment in 
Salah Sheekh contained a suspiciously elaborate explanation on how the ECtHR itself 
determines the facts and assesses the risk of a breach of Article 3, arousing the im-
pression that the Court wished to set an example for national courts. 
This dissatisfaction with the level of judicial scrutiny offered at national level in 
the Netherlands deeply troubled me. Together with a colleague from the Amsterdam 
Court, Willem van Bennekom, I analysed a number of well-known judgments of the 
ECtHR in expulsion cases concerning asylum seekers to find out in a more precise 
way how the ECtHR assessed the risk.9 We discovered significant differences 
                                                        
6 Concurring opinion of European Court of Human Rights Judge Thomassen to the judgment in the 
case of Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02. 
7 Article 35, first paragraph, ECHR stipulates: ‘The Court may only deal with the matter after all 
domestic remedies have been exhausted, according to the generally recognised rules of international 
law, and within a period of six months from the date on which the final decision was taken.’ 
8 The ECtHR found that further appeal to the Council of State did not constitute an effective remedy 
as it stood virtually no prospect of success, given the constant jurisprudence of the Council of State 
on the individualisation requirement for assuming an Article 3-risk and on internal protection 
alternatives in Somalia, see ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 
1948/04, paras. 123 and 124. 
9 These judgments were: Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89; Vil-
varajah and others v. the UK, 30 October 1991, Appl. Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87 
and 13448/87; Chahal v. the UK, 15 November 1996, Appl. No. 22414/93; Ahmed v. Austria, 17 
December 1996, Appl. No. 25964/94; Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, 19 February 1998, Appl. No. 
25894/94; Jabari v. Turkey, 11 July 2000, Appl. No. 40035/98; Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. 
No. 45276/99; Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic, 6 February 2003, Appl. Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99; 
→ 
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between the judicial scrutiny applied at international level and our own national 
judicial review. First, the intensity10 or thoroughness of the judicial scrutiny was very 
different. It seemed that the ECtHR, fully independently and on its own account, 
determined the facts and assessed the risk, whereas national asylum courts in the 
Netherlands had to pay deference to the position taken by the administration 
concerning the credibility of the past facts as stated by the asylum seeker. Second, 
issues of evidence, such as the admission and evaluation of evidence, were ap-
proached and resolved in very different ways at the international and the national 
level. The main results of this small-scale investigation conducted in early 2007 are 
summarised below. 
 
Results of the analysis conducted in early 2007: differences between the judicial review at national 
level in the Netherlands at that time, and the judicial scrutiny performed by the ECtHR 
 
The scrutiny conducted by the ECtHR in the cases researched in January 2007 was 
characterised by full, rigorous and ex nunc fact finding and risk assessment. This en-
tailed, among other things, full judicial review of flight narrative credibility,11 active 
use of investigative powers by the ECtHR whenever this was deemed necessary12 and 
flexibility in accepting and using evidence that had not been presented earlier during 
the procedure in the respondent State party.13 More in general, we discovered that the 
ECtHR took a highly material approach towards the evidence presented by the 
                                                        
Thampibillai v. the Netherlands, 17 February 2004, Appl. No. 61350/00; Venkadajalasarma v. the Nether-
lands, 17 February 2004, Appl. No. 58510/00; Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005, 
Appl. Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99; Müslim v. Turkey, 26 April 2005, Appl. No. 53566/99; Said v. 
Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02; N. v. Finland, 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02; Bader 
and Kanbor v. Sweden, 8 November 2005, Appl. No. 13284/04; D. and others v. Turkey, 22 June 2006, 
Appl. No. 24245/03; Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04. 
10  The intensity of judicial scrutiny relates to how thorough or rigorous the court examines a certain 
issue. The intensity of judicial scrutiny concerns the question whether the court pays deference to 
(part of) the administrative decision or, instead, carries out its own rigorous assessment.  
11 This means that the Court determines whether the Court itself finds the account by the claimant 
credible or not. Elements of this assessment are whether the account is consistent and is in line with 
information about the country of origin, and with circumstantial evidence if presented or available. 
Part of the assessment is also the question of whether the claimant has convincingly rebutted the 
stance of the administration that his or her account is not credible. An assessment of flight narrative 
credibility was made, for example, in ECtHR, Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 
15576/89; ECtHR, Hilal v. the United Kingdom,6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99; ECtHR, Said v. the 
Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02; ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 
38885/02. 
12 An example of the use of the investigative power to hear witnesses in order to assess the credibility 
of the flight narrative of the claimant is ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02. In 
almost all the cases we examined we found that the ECtHR not only relies on information on the 
situation in the country of origin presented by the claimant, but also obtains information from dif-
ferent sources propriomotu. An example is ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, 
Appl. No. 1948/04, in which case the ECtHR obtained large quantities of information on the situa-
tion in Somalia. 
13 A good example of the acceptance of new evidence that had not been presented earlier during the 
procedure in the Netherlands, is ECtHR, Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02, see 
paras. 27-30 of the judgment. 
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parties and obtained proprio motu. The evidence was weighed and assessed in order to: 
1) obtain a complete picture of what had happened to the claimant in the past; and 2) 
make a sound assessment of the risk the claimant might run upon expulsion to his or 
her country of origin or to another State. We did not come across any examples of 
judgments where evidence had been discarded, without any material consideration, 
on formal grounds, such as the ground that it had been presented too late, or that the 
evidence did not stem from an objective source (family members’ witness state-
ments). 
We found that, compared to the review in Strasbourg, the national judicial review 
in asylum cases in the Netherlands was different in a significant number of ways. 
First, judges only marginally reviewed the administrative stance on flight narrative 
credibility as far as the related facts in the past were concerned. This doctrine had 
been introduced by the case law of the Administrative Litigation Division of the 
Council of State14 (hereafter: Council of State).15 This doctrine implied that, when 
assessing flight narrative credibility as far as the facts in the past were concerned, the 
yardstick was not the opinion of the judge, but the question of whether there was 
reason to rule that the administration could not reasonably have come to its finding 
on credibility of the flight narrative. Second, according to the case law of the Council 
of State, first instance judges were not always allowed to use the investigative powers 
they possessed under the General Administrative Law Act.16 The idea behind this was 
that it was the task of the asylum seeker to present the facts and the evidence and it 
was not up to the judge to help him or her in fulfilling this task. Third, the pos-
sibilities for ex nunc judicial review were limited at the time when this research was 
embarked upon (January 2007). Article 83 of the Dutch Aliens Act 2000 stipulated 
that, in considering the case, the court took into account relevant facts and circum-
stances that arose after the administrative decision, unless by doing so the course of 
the proceedings would be unduly hampered or the decision in the case would be in-
tolerably delayed. In case law, however, strict criteria had been developed for the ap-
plication of Article 83. When, at the judicial review stage, the asylum seeker brought 
forward evidence that had not been presented earlier to the administration, this 
                                                        
14 The Administrative Litigation Division of the Council of State (Council of State) functions as the 
highest Court of Appeal in asylum cases. A higher appeal against judgments of the District Court 
can be lodged to the Council of State. 
15 See, for example, the judgments of the Council of State of 3 July 2002, AB 2002, 242, 15 November 
2002, AB 2003, 96, 27 January 2003, AB 2003, 286, 28 December 2005, AB 2006, 96. 
16 See, for example, the judgment of the Council of State of 28 December 2005, AB 2006, 96. In the 
case underlying the judgment the flight narrative of an asylum seeker was found not credible by the 
administration because the alleged Sierra Leonean nationality was doubted on the basis of a linguistic 
report stating that the asylum seeker did not speak any Krio. On the basis of Article 8:47 of the 
General Administrative Law Act, the Court appointed a second linguist in order to obtain a second 
opinion. On appeal, the Council of State ruled that the Court had exceeded its powers and annulled 
this judgment. The reason for this ruling was that it is the asylum seeker who has to make his or her 
account plausible vis-à-vis the administration. Therefore, it is also the task of the asylum seeker to 
submit a second language opinion where the administration has based its findings on the opinion of 
a qualified language expert. 
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evidence needed to fulfil a number of strict criteria before the judge could take it into 
consideration.17 
Fourth, we discovered that in the national judicial review procedure, evidence 
presented by the asylum seeker in the form of witness statements was approached 
first and foremost in a formal, and not material, way. The question of whether or not 
the information came from an objective source, and the procedural stage at which the 
evidence was presented, determined to a large extent whether or not the evidence 
would be taken into consideration by the judge.18 Statements from family members, 
third private persons and certain organisations were not seen as ‘evidence coming 
from an objective source’ and were, for that reason, not considered, weighed and 
assessed materially, but discarded on the ground that they were not from an objective 
source.19 It is interesting to mention here that in the case of Said v. the Netherlands 
(2005), the District Court of Amsterdam deemed it unnecessary to hear the witness 
named by Said for the reasons that the applicant’s account was neither credible nor 
plausible.20 
The ECtHR’s judgment in N. v. Finland (2005)21 provided a very clear illustration 
of the contrast as far as the use of investigative powers and the approach towards 
evidence was concerned. The ECtHR proprio motu decided to take oral evidence in 
Finland. With that purpose, a fact-finding mission was organised. Several representa-
tives from the Finnish Government, the counsel and advisers of the applicant were 
                                                        
17 Article 83 of the Aliens Act 2000 concerns both ‘facts’ and ‘evidence sustaining alleged facts’. In 
steady case law it has been ruled that this Article concerns facts or circumstances that occurred after 
the administrative decision. It also covers facts or circumstances that existed before the administra-
tive decision was taken, as well as evidence sustaining those facts and evidence containing a date 
preceding the administrative decision that could and should not have been presented before the 
administrative decision was taken. This test is rarely passed, in general, it is said that the asylum 
seeker should have mentioned the facts or should have submitted the evidence at an earlier stage. 
See, for example, the judgments of the Council of State of 8 August 2003, JV 2003/439. Further-
more, evidence needs to meet a number of strict formal requirements: documents have to be ori-
ginal, for otherwise authenticity cannot be established (see, for example, the judgment of the Council 
of State of 19 February 2003, 200206080/1), documents have to be dated, otherwise it cannot be 
established that the document concerns a new fact, that is, a fact which came up after the admi-
nistrative decision (see, for example, the judgment of the Council of State of 15 January 2003, JV 
2003, 83), documents have to be translated (see, for example, the judgment of the Council of State 
of 30 August 2002, JV 2002, 357), and documents have to come from an objective source (for 
example, a family member is not an objective source, see judgment of the Council of State of 6 
August 2003, JV 2003, 159). See also judgment ofthe Council of State of 2 March 2007, 
200606382/1/v. In this judgment, it was ruled that the medical report from a doctor working for 
Amnesty International was not a ‘fact’ in the sense of Article 83 of the Aliens Act, because the 
doctor had based his medical assessment on the account of the asylum seeker. The doctor working 
for Amnesty International was, in other words, not an ‘objective source’. 
18 Survey of jurisprudence of the Newsletter on Asylum and Refugee Law of June 2006 (Rechtspraakoverzicht 
NAV, nr. 3 June 2006), p. 179 and further. 
19 For an example of judicial appreciation of statements made by family members of the asylum seeker, 
see the judgment of the Council of State of 7 November 2003, nr. 200305086/1, JV 2004, 16; for an 
example of statements of third private persons, see the judgment of the Council of State of 19 
February 2002, nr. 200200390/1; for an example of statements of organisations, see the judgment of 
the Council of State of 3 March 2006, nr. 200510175/1, JV 2006, 155.  
20 See ECtHR, Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02, para. 16. 
21 ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02. 
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heard. Testimony was taken from the applicant, his common-law wife, a person who 
had worked for the same organisation as the applicant, and the Head of the Africa 
Section in the Directorate of Immigration.22 
Fifth, we found that, in the national judicial review proceedings, country of origin 
information compiled by the national Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs was given 
considerably more weight than country of origin information stemming from reputa-
ble human rights organisations, such as the UNHCR, Amnesty International and Hu-
man Rights Watch. Country of origin information from the Dutch Ministry of For-
eign Affairs was regarded as expert information. Because of this status, the State Sec-
retary of Justice could, in principle, rely on this information, unless there were con-
crete reasons for doubting the veracity or the completeness of the country informa-
tion. Such concrete reasons were not readily assumed. 
 
The discovered significant differences between the judicial scrutiny applied at inter-
national level by the ECtHR and the national judicial review in the Netherlands 
seemed problematic to me. These differences seemed to run counter to the notion of 
subsidiarity, meaning that citizens should be able to vindicate their rights in the na-
tional courts and that, however well organised, international protection of human 
rights can never be as effective as a well-functioning national system of protection.23 
If national judicial proceedings offer fewer safeguards compared to the proceedings 
before the ECtHR, it will always make sense for individuals to apply to the ECtHR. 
This would clearly run counter to the subsidiary nature of the Convention system. In 
Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands (2007), the ECtHR was particularly clear that in cases 
concerning expulsion or extradition involving an Article 3-claim rigorous scrutiny is 
needed. As the considerations in the judgment were so elaborate on this point, the 
judgment gave the impression that the ECtHR had specifically and critically reacted 
to the (partially) marginal judicial review applied by the asylum courts in the Nether-
lands and that the ECtHR had wanted to remind national courts of its subsidiary 
nature.24 
The idea that different standards were problematic was not shared by everyone, 
though. At the time when this research was embarked upon, the highest national 
asylum court in the Netherlands, the Council of State took the position that different 
standards at national and international judicial level were acceptable.25 In support of 
this position, it was argued that the position of national courts was different from 
that of the ECtHR, as national courts operated within a framework of checks and 
balances with the national executive and legislative powers. In discussions about this 
dilemma at the District Court of Amsterdam, the term ‘national procedural autono-
                                                        
22 See ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02, paras. 7-9 and 77-116. 
23 Barkhuysen 1998, p. 12 and 13. See also the annual report for 2006 of the ECtHR, p. 30. 
24 ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04, para. 136; Wouters 
2009, p. 339. 
25 See the judgment of the Council of State of 5 June 2006, 200602132/1 and 200602135/1, para. 2.6; 
it was stated that the immigration judge in the Netherlands is not obliged to review the administra-
tive stance on flight narrative credibility in the same way as the ECtHR investigates whether or not 
the Netherlands have violated their treaty obligation under Article 3. 
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my’ was often used, but nobody knew exactly whether and to what extent that con-
cept would sufficiently justify the discovered differences. 
Thus, the small-scale investigation, conducted in early 2007, made me anxious to 
find out in a more precise way what lessons on both main aspects – intensity of judi-
cial scrutiny and evidence – could and should be drawn from the ECHR and from 
other international asylum law and EU asylum law. I also wanted to find a more 
precise answer to the question whether the discovered differences in judicial scrutiny 
offered at international and at national level could or could not continue to exist. My 
anxiety became even stronger when I shared the results of the small-scale investiga-
tion with some of my colleagues in the International Association of Refugee Law 
Judges (IARLJ) and found out that it was not only in the Netherlands that national 
courts encountered the problems described above, but that similar issues with regard 
to the intensity of judicial scrutiny and evidence also existed in a number of other EU 
countries.26 I realised that the problems I had encountered as a national judge in fact 
also occurred in other EU countries and that solutions to these problems might be of 
interest to national asylum judges throughout the EU. That is how the idea of em-
barking upon this research project was born.  
1.2  Research questions 
The main objective of this research is to explore what international and EU asylum 
law require from the national judge with regard to: 
- the required intensity of the judicial scrutiny to be applied 
- evidentiary issues, such as the standard and burden of proof, the admission and 
evaluation of evidence and time limits for submitting evidence. 
 
The research questions are: 
- Which provisions of international and EU (asylum) law regulate national judicial 
asylum proceedings?  
- Do the provisions regulating national judicial asylum proceedings contain con-
crete norms about the required intensity of judicial scrutiny to be offered at na-
tional level? 
- Do these provisions contain concrete norms on evidentiary issues such as the 
standard and burden of proof, the admission and evaluation of evidence and time 
limits for submitting evidence?  
                                                        
26 First instance judges from a number of other EU countries, for example Poland and Belgium, 
mentioned during IARLJ meetings that they encountered (some of) the problems described. See also 
Reneman 2012, p. 259. As to Belgium, however, Constitutional Court Judge Marc Bossuyt has 
expressed fierce criticism on the ECtHR in a number of publications (see, for example, Bossuyt 
2012). To his mind, the ECtHR acts too often as a first instance asylum court with full factual 
jurisdiction, whereas it should play a much more subsidiary role. From ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 
March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, it appears that in the past, judges in the UK experienced (some 
of) the problems described; this seems to have been solved by now as they apply ‘the most anxious 
scrutiny’ in cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers. Reference is made to chapter 7, 
section 7.3.4.  
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- What standards and principles do the international courts and treaty monitoring 
bodies apply concerning judicial scrutiny and evidence? 
- Are these standards and principles normative or binding for national asylum 
courts? 
- How do the found norms (inter) relate, and what should be done if there is diver-
gence or conflict ? 
 
To find answers to the fourth question on the standards and principles applied by the 
international courts and treaty monitoring bodies, eleven aspects of evidence and 
judicial scrutiny are used as a research tool. These aspects are mentioned below: 
- Standard of proof: what is the standard or criterion used to measure whether 
there is a risk of refoulement?  
- Burden of proof: who has to prove that the standard is met?  
- Relevant facts and circumstances: what kind of facts and circumstances are nec-
essary to conclude that a risk exists? 
- Required degree of individual risk: to what degree must an applicant be singled 
out ?  
- Credibility assessment: Does the international court or supervisor independently 
and on its own account assess the credibility? How does the international court 
or supervisor assess the credibility of the claimant’s statements?  
- Admission of evidence, sources of evidence, minimum quantity and quality of 
evidence: what means and sources of evidence can be brought in to substantiate a 
claim or to refute a claim? How much evidence is required to corroborate the ap-
plicant’s statements? What quality of evidence is required? 
- Appreciation and weighing of evidence: how are different types of evidence 
weighed and appreciated? Is there a certain hierarchy in the appreciation of evi-
dence, in the sense that certain sources are given more value than others? 
- Opportunities for presenting evidence: do both parties have the same oppor-
tunities and chances to present evidence and to react on the evidence presented 
to the other party? 
- Judicial application of investigative powers: does the international court or super-
visor apply investigative powers (of its own motion or otherwise)? In what kinds 
of situations does this happen? 
- Time limits for the presentation of statements and evidence: at what moment in 
the proceedings must the claimant submit the relevant statements and corrobo-
rating evidence? 
- Point in time for the risk assessment: at what point in time does the international 
court or supervisor assess the risk?  
1.3  Sources and methodology 
This research includes three global human rights treaties, established within the 
framework of the United Nations. These are the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees and the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Conven-
tion or RC, 1951, and the Refugee Protocol or RP, 1967), the International Covenant 
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on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR, 1966) and the Convention against Torture 
(CAT, 1984). In addition, this research embraces one regional human rights treaty, 
being the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Funda-
mental Freedoms (ECHR, 1950). It also includes European Union primary legislation 
on asylum, comprising provisions in the Treaty on the European Union (TEU), the 
Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) and the Charter of Fun-
damental Rights of the European Union, and a number of secondary law instru-
ments, such as the EU Qualification Directive27 and the EU Procedures Directive.28 
Literature of eminent scholars and UNHCR documentation29 formed the main 
source of interpretation of the RC. For the chapter on the ECHR, the case law of the 
ECtHR30 formed the prime source, and, of course, literature was used as well. The 
views of the Human Rights Committee (HRC) and the Committee against Torture 
(ComAT)31 were the main sources of research for the chapters on the ICCPR and the 
CAT. Literature was used in addition to that source. Finally, for the chapter on EU 
asylum law, I used literature and judgments of the Court of Justice of the EU 
(CJEU).32 For the analysis of the relevant provisions in secondary EU asylum law I 
traced the history of these provisions. For this purpose I used EUR-lex,33 the Legis-
lative Observatory,34 PreLex35 and the digital public register of the Council of the 
European Union,36 which all constitute extensive EU law databases.  
                                                        
27 Council Directive 2004/83 on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country 
nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection 
and the content of the protection granted. 
28 Council Directive 2005/85 on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting and 
withdrawing refugee status. 
29 I used the list provided by Wouters 2009, pp. 601-605 and pp. 624-625, and RefWorld, the UNHCR 
internet database (http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld) to find UNHCR documents 
containing guidelines on national judicial asylum proceedings. 
30 To find case law of the ECtHR, I used the Court’s database Hudoc (reachable via www.coe.int), the 
list of cases provided by Wouters 2009, pp. 607-613, the list provided by Mole 2008 and the 
UNHCR Manual on Refugee Protection and the ECHR (http://www.unhcr.org/3ead312a4.html); I 
also used case law I obtained in my capacity as a judge at the Court of Amsterdam.  
31 To find the case law of both Committees I used the SIM database (http://sim.law.uu.nl), RefWorld 
(the UNHCR internet database) the lists provided by Wouters 2009, pp. 613-618 and the case law I 
obtained as a judge. 
32 I used the CURIA database of the Court of Justice of the EU (http://curia.europa.eu) and the EUR-
lex database (http://eur-lex.europa.eu) to find case law of the Court of Justice of the EU. I obtained 
much case law of the Court of Justice of the EU on the principle of effective judicial protection 
during a conference on this subject of the Academy of European Law (ERA, https://www.era.int) 
held in Paris in February 2010. 
33 http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/index.htm.  
34 http://www.europarl.europa.eu/oeil/index.jsp.  
35 http://ec.europa.eu/prelex/apcnet.cfm.  
36 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=245&lang=en.  
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1.4  Methods and rules of interpretation 
The treaty provisions are analysed with the aid of the general rules of interpretation 
laid down in Articles 31 and 32 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VTC). 
Article 31 stipulates:  
 
‘1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be 
given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the light of its object and purpose.  
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall comprise, in addition to 
the text, including its preamble and annexes:  
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all the parties in connection 
with the conclusion of the treaty;  
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion 
of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to the treaty. 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or 
the application of its provisions;  
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of 
the parties regarding its interpretation;  
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties.  
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the parties so intended.’ 
 
And Article 32 stipulates: 
 
‘Recourse may be had to supplementary means of interpretation, including the preparatory 
work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion, in order to confirm the meaning re-
sulting from the application of article 31, or to determine the meaning when the interpretation 
according to article 31:  
(a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or  
(b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.’ 
 
For the interpretation of the relevant provisions of the ECHR, account has been 
taken of the relevant specific principles of interpretation developed by the ECtHR, 
including the principle that rights must be interpreted in such a way that they are 
practical and effective,37 the notion that rights must be interpreted in a liberal way 
and restrictions in a narrow way,38 the idea that the ECHR is a living instrument, to 
be interpreted in the light of present-day conditions,39 the principle that treaty provi-
sions must be interpreted in such a way that they are internally consistent and coher-
ent,40 and finally, the notion that treaty concepts must be interpreted autonomously.41 
                                                        
37 See, for example, ECtHR, Soering v. the UK, 7 July 1989, Appl. No. 14038/88, para. 87. 
38 See, for example, ECtHR, Stoll v. Switzerland, 10 December 2007, Appl. No.69698/01, para. 61. 
39 ECtHR, T. and V. v. the UK, 16 December 1999, Appl. No. 24724/94, para. 70. 
40 This principle establishes that the ECHR must be read as a whole. See, for example, ECtHR, Klass v. 
Germany, 6 September 1987, Appl. No. 5029/71, para. 68. 
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I refer to Dembour (2006), Wouters (2009) and Rietiker (2010) for more detailed de-
scriptions of these principles.42 Just as the ECtHR has done in relation to the ECHR, 
the Human Rights Committee (HRC) has made clear that the ICCPR should be 
interpreted as a living instrument and the rights protected under it should be applied 
in context and in the light of present-day conditions.43 
For the interpretation of EU asylum law, the methods of interpretation of the 
CJEU are used. This approach deviates from the rules in the VTC. The CJEU bases 
its interpretation of EU law on wording, context (the preamble and documents or 
instruments explicitly referred to) and purpose, whereby interpretation of wording 
and context are supplementary to the purpose of the treaty or the instrument as a 
whole.44 The preparatory works (legislative history) play a role as a supplementary 
means of interpretation of secondary Union law.45 According to the Court of Justice 
of the EU, when interpreting Union law, national courts must take into account the 
different language versions; the various language versions must be interpreted uni-
formly, and in the case of divergence, the provision in question must be interpreted 
by reference to the purpose and general scheme of the rules of which it forms part.46 
In this study, the treaties and instruments investigated are approached dynamic-
ally, for the following reasons. Multilateral treaties are normally meant and concluded 
for a long period. When interpreting their provisions it is, therefore, not very logical 
to cling strictly to (only) the circumstances prevailing at the time of conclusion. Par-
ticularly human rights treaties are meant to be living instruments which are to be in-
terpreted according to present-day conditions.47 Article 31, third paragraph, Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties (VTC) also offers support for a dynamic interpre-
tation of treaty provisions as it mentions subsequent agreements and practice as in-
struments of treaty interpretation.48 The ICJ also interprets treaty provisions dyna-
mically.49 
                                                        
41 Under the ‘autonomous concepts doctrine’, it is up to the ECtHR only, and not up to the States 
parties to the ECHR, to define core concepts such as ‘criminal charge’, ‘possessions’, ‘victim’, 
‘home’. See, for example, ECtHR, Engel and others v. the Netherlands, 8 June 1976, Appl. Nos. 5100/71, 
5101/71, 5102/71, 5354/72, 5370/72.  
42 Dembour 2006, pp. 21-22, Jacobs & White 2006, pp. 38-55, Wouters 2009, pp. 199-202, Rietiker 
2010, pp. 245-277. In the list of principles mentioned here I do not mention the proportionality 
principle and the doctrine on the margin of appreciation as they are not relevant for (non-medical) 
asylum cases. 
43 HRC, Judge v. Canada, 13 August 2003, No. 829/1998, para. 10.3, last sentence. 
44 The first clear example of a judgment in which the Court of Justice of the EU used this approach to 
interpretation is the judgment in the case of Van Gend en Loos, 5 February 1963, C-26/62, p. 3. 
45 Battjes 2006, pp. 44 and 45. 
46 See, for example, the judgment of the Court of Justice of the EU in the case of Srl CILFIT and 
Lanificio di Gavardo SpA, 6 October 1982, C-283/81, para. 18.  
47 The ‘living instrument’ notion has mainly been developed in the case law of the ECtHR, see, for 
example, ECtHR, Selmouni v. France, 28 July 1999, Appl. No. 25803/94, para. 101, but is also present 
in the case law of the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR, see, for example, HRC, Judge v. 
Canada, 13 August 2003, Com. No. 829/1998, para. 10.3, last sentence. 
48 Article 31(3) of the VTC stipulates: ‘There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) 
any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the ap-
plication of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which estab-
→ 
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The treaties and instruments investigated in this study are, furthermore, ap-
proached holistically. They are seen as interdependent and interrelated, in conformity 
with the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, as adopted by the United 
Nations World Conference on Human Rights on 25 June 1993,50 and in conformity 
with Article 31, third paragraph, sub c VTC, which states, in short, that any relevant 
rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties may be taken 
into account when clarifying a treaty.51 An integrated approach is also called for by 
Article 78 TFEU, which stipulates, in short, that the secondary EU asylum instru-
ments must be in accordance with the international treaties investigated in this 
study.52 The treaties and instruments explored in this study can thus not be seen sepa-
rately, but should, rather, be seen as complementary and mutually influencing each 
other.53 
1.5 Structure of the book 
After this introduction, five separate chapters analyse the content of the relevant 
provisions in international and EU law. The chapters work their way down from the 
universal level to the regional level and, finally, the level of the EU. Chapter 2 covers 
the RC, followed by the ICCPR in chapter 3 and the CAT in chapter 4. Chapter 5 is 
dedicated to the ECHR. Chapter 6 deals with EU asylum law. The chapters 3 
(ICCPR), 4 (CAT) and 5 (ECHR) follow by and large the same structure, because 
these treaties have similar individual complaint mechanisms and also similar provi-
sions on national proceedings. Chapter 7 draws the link between the international and 
EU law standards on evidence and judicial scrutiny and national asylum courts. It at-
tempts to integrate the different international and EU law standards on national judi-
cial scrutiny and on evidence. It also raises and tries to answer the question of wheth-
                                                        
lishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international 
law applicable in the relations between the parties.’ 
49 ICJ, Legal consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion), 21 June 
1971, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16 para. 53. The ICJ stated here that an international instrument has to 
be interpreted and applied within the entire legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation. 
50 United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, Vienna Declaration and Programme of Ac-
tion, 25 June 1993, ILM(32) 1993, p. 1661, para. 5, VN Doc. A/CONF.157/ 23(1993), para.5. 
51 Article 31(3) of the VTC stipulates: ‘There shall be taken into account, together with the context: (a) 
any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the 
application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which es-
tablishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of interna-
tional law applicable in the relations between the parties.’ 
52 Article 78, first paragraph, TFEU, states: ‘The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, 
subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any 
third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle 
of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 
and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.’ 
53 See for the same stance Wouters 2009, p. 526; United Nations World Conference on Human Rights, 
Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action, 25 June 1993, ILM(32) 1993, p. 1661, para. 5, VN 
Doc. A/CONF.157/23 (1993), para.5. 
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er the standards on evidence and judicial scrutiny as applied by the international 
supervisors and courts are binding on national asylum courts and whether national 
asylum courts can choose, from among the international supervisors, a ‘best role 
model’. The question of what to do in case of conflicting or diverging standards is 
addressed as well. 
Chapter 8 pays separate attention to three special types of national asylum court 
proceedings and the positions of the international supervisors on these proceedings. 
The three special types of proceedings concern Dublin cases, repeat cases and fast-
track proceedings. Dublin cases concern those cases in which an asylum application 
was decided upon on the basis of the EU Dublin Regulation 2003/343/EC.54 The 
EU Dublin Regulation provides criteria for establishing which Member State is re-
sponsible for the examination of an asylum application submitted in one of the Mem-
ber States. The Regulation is based on the ‘single application’ principle which pro-
hibits a person from applying for asylum in more than one country. Based on the 
criteria laid down in the Regulation, Member States may decide not to examine an 
asylum application and to refer the asylum applicant to the authorities of another 
Member State. Repeat cases concern those cases in which a claimant lodged a second 
(or third or fourth et cetera) asylum application after he or she received a negative deci-
sion on a first application, often with the aim of submitting new evidence corroborat-
ing the claim for protection. Fast-track proceedings are proceedings in which shorter 
than normal time limits (and sometimes also other special rules) apply, created with 
the aim of quickly and more efficiently processing asylum claims and asylum appeals. 
In the Epilogue at the end of this book, the main highlights of this study are re-
visited and some concluding remarks are made. 
1.6 Limitations of the research 
This study focuses on issues of judicial scrutiny and issues of evidence in asylum 
court proceedings. This book is not a comprehensive analysis of the prohibitions on 
refoulement contained in the different instruments of international asylum law and EU 
asylum law. For such an analysis I refer to Wouters’ work.55 
Another limitation of this study is that it is very much EU focused. The problems 
that formed the research context and reason occurred in the Netherlands and, ac-
cording to judges in the International Association of Refugee Law Judges, are also 
present in some other EU countries. The treaties and instruments included in this 
study are those that are relevant for asylum courts within the EU. As it was my in-
tention to conduct this research mainly for judges and other legal practitioners in the 
                                                        
54 Council Regulation 2003/343/EC of 18 February 2003, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third country national, OJof the EU L 50, 25 February 2003, pp. 1-10, last 
amended by OJ of the EU L 304, 14 November 2008, p. 83. 
55 Wouters 2009. 
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EU, I decided not to investigate regional asylum treaties in force outside Europe, 
such as the Convention on Refugee Problems in Africa.56 
Excluded from this study is the question of the suspensive effect of judicial re-
view. Although this is a very important issue, suspensive effect, or the absence of it, is 
often a question of legislation and is an issue which is to be distinguished from ques-
tions of evidence and judicial scrutiny. It is a complex issue which merits separate 
PhD research by itself. This research has been undertaken by Rieter and I refer to her 
book for those interested in this specific issue.57 
Also excluded are so-called medical asylum cases, cases in which seriously ill in-
dividuals claim asylum abroad because they fear death due to the absence of medical 
care facilities in their home countries. To my mind, these medical cases are so specific 
and differ so much from normal asylum cases that they merit separate research.  
Another limitation is that there is no particular or separate focus on cases con-
cerning the cessation of earlier granted refugee status, or the exclusion from refugee 
status of certain categories of individuals, such as war criminals. Additionally, in this 
investigation I did not search for special rules for particularly vulnerable groups of 
asylum seekers, such as minors. Such special categories of cases would, in my opin-
ion, merit separate comprehensive research. 
Case law and literature up to 1 January 2012 have been included in this research. 
Judgments of the ECtHR and the CJEU with particular relevance for this study, 
issued in the course of 2012, have also been included. 
1.7 State of the Art 
In 1995, Boeles completed his dissertation entitled ‘Fair immigration proceedings in 
Europe’; his book with the same title was published in 1997. The central question 
posed in his research was what obligations international law imposes on national 
remedies by means of proceedings in immigration affairs.58 Compared to Boeles’ re-
search, this work is narrower in three ways. First, it covers asylum only. Second, it 
focuses on the judicial work and not primarily the administrative asylum procedure. 
Third, Boeles’ research tool or criteria used to study the norms are broader than the 
list of aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny used as a research tool in this book. 
The aspects used in this research in fact form more elaborated aspects of the fifth 
criterion used by Boeles: the procedure for the establishment of the facts and the 
court’s margin of appreciation. 
In 1997, Tom Barkhuysen completed his research on Article 13 ECHR. His book 
entitled ‘Article 13 ECHR: effective domestic legal protection against violations of 
human rights’ was published in 1998. Barkhuysen’s work constitutes an in-depth in-
vestigation into the history, scope and content of Article 13 ECHR, and the relation-
ship between Article 13 and other provisions on proceedings and the material rights 
                                                        
56 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) adopted this Convention in 1969. The Convention is 
available at the site of the OAU: http://www.africa-union.org.  
57 Rieter 2010. 
58 Boeles 1997, p. 3. 
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contained in the ECHR.59 The current research is broader in the sense that it encom-
passes more legal instruments and more provisions from these instruments. It is, 
however, narrower in terms of subject matter: this research focuses on judicial asylum 
proceedings only. 
In 2005, Hemme Battjes completed his research entitled ‘European Asylum Law 
and International Law’; his book with the same title appeared in 2006. In this com-
prehensive work, Battjes describes and analyses the EU measures which together 
make up the Common European Asylum System (CEAS). Battjes focuses on the 
relationship between this EU body of law and international asylum law. In his work, 
he describes and analyses the material and procedural rights and obligations laid 
down in the EU measures, and compares them to those set out in the RC, and to 
those flowing from the prohibitions on refoulement contained in the CAT, the ECHR, 
the ICCPR and international custom and principles recognised by civilised nations.60 
Some of the research questions I attempt to answer are discussed by Battjes as well, 
but Battjes does not go into great detail as far as judicial handling of evidence is 
concerned. 
In 2009, Kees Wouters completed his research entitled ‘International legal stan-
dards for the protection from refoulement’. In this comprehensive study, Wouters ana-
lyses the exact scope and content of the refoulement prohibitions contained in the RC, 
the ICCPR, the CAT and the ECHR and compares these prohibitions with each 
other. Wouters’ work focuses on the scope and content of the mentioned prohibi-
tions and the responsibilities of States deriving from them. Wouters’ work and this 
research have some overlap. In Wouters’ work, however, issues of facts and evidence 
form minor parts of a large comprehensive study into the content of the prohibitions 
on refoulement. As this research focuses only on issues of evidence and judicial scru-
tiny, these issues are studied in a more detailed and profound way. 
In 2012, Marcelle Reneman completed her research entitled ‘EU asylum proce-
dures and the right to an effective remedy’. Marcelle and I met in 2007 when we both 
had just embarked upon our research projects. We decided to meet on a regular basis 
to discuss procedural issues and read and review draft chapters. Our ‘Procedural 
issues Club’ was enlarged in 2008 when researchers Hannah Helmink and Karen 
Geertsema joined in. Reneman’s work and this study have some overlap as Reneman 
also covers issues of evidence and issues of intensity of judicial scrutiny. However, 
Reneman’s work is broader and covers also other aspects of asylum procedures, such 
as the right to remain on the territory of the EU Member States and the right to be 
heard on asylum motives. As opposed to Reneman’s work, which also encompasses 
the work of the (administrative) determining authority, this study focuses on the daily 
work of judges and addresses only two categories of issues in detail: issues of evi-
dence and issues of judicial scrutiny. 
 
                                                        
59 Barkhuysen 1998, pp. 1-16. 
60 Battjes 2006, pp. 1-57. 
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Chapter 2: The 1951 Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (RC) and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status 
of Refugees1 
2.1  Introduction 
The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention or RC) 
was signed in Geneva on 28 July 1951 and it entered into force on 22 April 1954.2 
On 31 January 1967, a Protocol which amended and supplemented the Refugee 
Convention was signed in New York (the Refugee Protocol or RP). The Refugee 
Protocol entered into force on 4 October 1967.3 States parties to the Refugee Proto-
col undertake to apply Articles 2 to 34 Refugee Convention without the temporal and 
optional geographical limitation contained in Article 1A(2) and Article 1B Refugee 
Convention. Pursuant to Article 1A of the Refugee Convention, the term refugee 
shall apply to any person who fulfils the criteria of the refugee definition contained in 
Article 1A(2), but only as a result of events occurring before 1 January 1951. This 
temporal limitation was based on the idea that the RC was primarily meant to alle-
viate pain as a result of past events, not future events, and out of fear that without 
such a restriction the RC would create a carte blanche for all future situations.4 How-
ever, Article 1(2) of the Refugee Protocol removes this limitation;5 a very important 
development because it detaches the Refugee Convention from the Second World 
War and the Cold War and gives it, instead, a timeless character. It can be said, 
therefore, that the history of the RC does not support the idea that this treaty does 
not suit the needs of today’s world.6 Article 1(B) Refugee Convention gives States 
parties the choice to understand ‘events before 1 January 1951’ in Article 1(A) either 
as events occurring in Europe or events occurring in Europe or elsewhere; Article 
1(3) of the Refugee Protocol stipulates, however, that the Protocol shall be applied 
without any geographical limitation, without, however, affecting existing declarations 
                                                        
1 See the following literature for comprehensive general descriptions and analyses of the history and 
working of the RC and the refugee definition (see bibliography for full titles): Bem 2007, Van 
Bennekom & Van der Winden 2011, Boeles 1997, Boeles 2009, Fernhout 1990, Goodwin-Gill 1998, 
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, Grahl-Madsen 1963, Grahl-Madsen 1966-1972, Hathaway 2005, 
Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 2005, Wouters 2009. See also Zwaan 2005 for an analysis of the role of 
the RC and the UNHCR in EU asylum law. I also refer to the special edition on the Refugee Con-
vention of A&MR (Asylum and Migration Law) of 2011, No. 5/6. 
2 UNTS No. 2545, Vol. 189, p. 137. 
3 UNTS No. 8791, Vol. 606, p. 267. 
4 Van Bennekom 2011, p. 203. 
5 Article 1(2) of the Refugee Protocol stipulates: ‘For the purpose of the present Protocol, the term 
“refugee” shall, except as regards the application of paragraph 3 of this article, mean any person 
within the definition of article I of the Convention as if the words “As a result of events occurring 
before 1 January 1951 and...” and the words “...as a result of such events”, in article 1 A (2) were 
omitted.’ 
6 Van Bennekom 2011, p. 203. 
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made by States parties.7 This is also an important amendment as it has made the 
Refugee Convention a truly universal instrument. 
At the moment of completion of this book, 141 States, including all 27 Member 
States of the EU,8 had ratified both the Refugee Convention and the Refugee Proto-
col.9 
2.1.1 The RC’s place in international and EU asylum law 
The Refugee Convention is the only universal treaty on refugee protection. It is also 
the cornerstone of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) which has been 
developed since the entering into force on 1 May 1999 of the Treaty of Amsterdam 
which made the EU competent in the field of asylum and immigration (see Chapter 
6). The EU Charter of Fundamental Rights stipulates in Article 18 that the right to 
asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Refugee Convention 
and the Refugee Protocol. Article 78 TFEU stipulates that the EU asylum instru-
ments must be in accordance with the Refugee Convention (as well as other relevant 
treaties). Many of the secondary EU asylum instruments explicitly reaffirm that the 
Refugee Convention is the cornerstone of the CEAS. For example, the Preamble to 
the EU Qualification Directive stipulates that  
 
‘The Geneva Convention and Protocol provide the cornerstone of the international legal re-
gime for the protection of refugees.’10 
 
And the Preamble to the EU Dublin Regulation states that  
 
‘The European Council, at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999, agreed 
to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on the full and in-
clusive application of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 July 
1951, as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, thus ensuring that no-
body is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-refoulement (…).’11 
 
The notion that the Refugee Convention and the Refugee Protocol constitute the 
cornerstone of the CEAS has been explicitly reaffirmed by the Court of Justice of the 
                                                        
7 Article 1(3) of the Refugee Protocol. 
8 The number of Member States mentioned here, 27, reflects the situation on 31 December 2012; see 
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_nl.htm. 
9 See http://www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/3b73b0d63.pdf and the UNHCR Statement 
on the right to an effective remedy in relation to accelerated asylum procedures, May 2010, to be 
found at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bf67 fa12.pdf. 
10 Preamble (3) to Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of 
third country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need interna-
tional protection on the content of the protection granted, OJ of the EU L 304, 30 September 2004, 
pp. 12-23, last amended by OJ of the EU L 204, 5 August 2005, p. 24. 
11 Preamble (2) to Regulation 2003/343/EC of 18 February 2003, establishing the criteria and mecha-
nisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in 
one of the Member States by a third country national, OJ of the EU L 50, 25 February 2003, pp. 1-10, 
last amended by OJ of the EU L 304, 14 November 2008, p. 83. 
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EU in a number of judgments, for example, Abdulla (2010), Bolbol (2010) and B and D 
(2010).12 
Together with the definition of refugee in Article 1 A (2), the prohibition on 
refoulement contained in Article 33 forms the core of the Refugee Convention. Under 
Article 1 A (2), refugees may be identified according to four characteristics: 
1)  they are outside the country of their nationality or the country of their former 
habitual residence;  
2)  they are unable or unwilling to avail themselves of the protection of this country 
or to return to it;  
3)  this impossibility or unwillingness is due to well-founded fear of persecution; and  
4)  this persecution is based on race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular 
social group or political opinion.13 
 
According to Article 33, a refugee may not in any manner whatsoever be expelled or 
returned to the frontiers of territories where his or her life or freedom would be 
threatened on account of his or her race, religion, nationality, membership of a par-
ticular social group or political opinion. According to the second paragraph of Article 
33, refugees whom there are reasonable grounds for regarding as a danger to the se-
curity of the host country or who constitute a danger to the community of that coun-
try are not protected.  
This book focuses on issues of evidence and judicial scrutiny in asylum court 
proceedings. It is not a comprehensive analysis of the prohibitions on refoulement con-
tained in international asylum law. For that reason, the different components of the 
refugee definition and the prohibition on refoulement will not be analysed any further 
here. Other authors have done this extensively before.14 
2.1.2 Supervisory mechanisms 
2.1.2.1 The ICJ 
According to Article 38 Refugee Convention, disputes between States concerning its 
interpretation and application can be lodged to the International Court of Justice 
                                                        
12 CJEU, Abdulla, 2 March 2010, C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, paras. 52 and 53. The 
EU Court of Justice ruled that ‘the Geneva Convention is the cornerstone of the international legal 
regime for the protection of refugees (…). Therefore, the provisions of the Qualification Directive 
must be interpreted in the light of the general system and the purpose of the Directive, taking into 
account the Geneva Convention and other relevant treaties mentioned in Article 63, para. 1, sub 1, 
EC. This was repeated in the judgments of the CJEU in Bolbol, 17 June 2010, C-31/09, para. 37 and 
B and D, 9 November 2010, C-57/09 and C-101/09), para. 77. See also Van Bennekom 2011, p. 204, 
and Westerveen 2011, p. 215. 
13 Article 1 A (2) of the Refugee Convention. 
14 See for extensive analyses of the elements of the refugee definition Grahl-Madsen 1966-1972, vol. 1, 
pp. 173-220, Fernhout 1990, pp. 52-124, Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 2005, pp. 23-64, Goodwin-Gill 
1998, pp. 32-80, Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, pp. 63-131, Wouters 2009, pp. 56-113, Van 
Bennekom & Van der Winden 2011, pp. 155-182. See also Bem 2007 for a thorough analysis of how 
the Dutch and American courts defined the refugee in the period 1975-2005. 
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(ICJ).15 According to Article 34(1) of the Statute of the ICJ, only States, and not 
individuals, can bring cases before it. To date no case regarding the Refugee Conven-
tion has ever been brought before the ICJ.16 
2.1.2.2 The UNHCR 
The Refugee Convention does not establish a monitoring court or body of its own to 
which individual complaints can be brought. However, there is an international 
supervisory body which monitors and supervises the application of the Refugee Con-
vention by States: the UNHCR.17 According to the Preamble of the Refugee Conven-
tion, ‘the UNHCR is charged with the task of supervising international conventions 
providing for the protection of refugees (…)’. In addition to the Preamble, Article 35, 
first paragraph, stipulates that States parties to the Convention undertake to co-op-
erate with the Office of the UNHCR in the exercise of its functions, and shall in 
particular facilitate its duty of supervising the application of the provisions of the 
Refugee Convention.18 The UNHCR’s supervisory responsibility has also been re-
flected in EU primary and secondary law.19 
The RC does not give the UNHCR the power to issue binding decisions on in-
terpretation of its provisions. Nor does it create a mechanism by which the UNHCR 
can enforce adherence to the Convention by States. The absence of a possibility for 
the UNHCR to issue binding opinions on non-compliance with the RC by States and 
to receive individual complaints, make its supervisory and enforcement mechanisms 
rather weak.20 As a consequence, in literature different opinions are defended on the 
question of how much legal weight is to be attached to the UNHCR’s opinions. 
Battjes (2006), who refers to Spijkerboer and Vermeulen (2005), states that the 
UNHCR’s opinions are a subsidiary means of interpretation and that their relevance 
depends on their quality of reasoning.21 Wouters (2009) mentions Battjes’ opinion 
and, just like Battjes, points out the problem that the UNHCR lacks an enforcement 
power or tool. According to Wouters, however, the UNHCR’s opinions are authori-
tative, have global scope and are accepted as important sources of interpretation by 
                                                        
15 In Article IV of the Refugee Protocol the jurisdiction of the ICJ is foreseen as well. 
16 Zwaan 2005, p. 37, Battjes 2006, p. 19, Wouters 2009, p. 14, Van Bennekom 2011, p. 204. See also 
the digital register of contentious cases of the ICJ at http://www.icj-cij.org, last visited on 31 De-
cember 2012. 
17 The UNHCR was established in 1949 by the UN General Assembly. UN GA res. 319 (IV), 3 De-
cember 1949. 
18 The supervisory role of the UNHCR is also laid down in Article II(1) of the Refugee Protocol and in 
Article 8 of the UNHCR Statute. See for a more extensive analysis of the supervisory role of the 
UNHCR: Takahashi 2001, Türk 2002, Zwaan 2005, pp. 4-8. 
19 See, for example, Recital 15 of the EU Qualification Directive which states that consultations with 
the UNHCR ‘may provide valuable guidance for Member States when determining refugee status 
according to Article 1 of the Geneva Convention’ and Article 21, first paragraph, sub c, of the EU 
Procedures Directive which stipulates that Member States shall allow the UNHCR to ‘present its 
views, in the exercise of its supervisory responsibilities under Article 35 of the Geneva Convention, 
to any competent authorities regarding individual applications for asylum at any stage of the proce-
dure.’ 
20 Takahashi 2001, Türk 2002, Wouters 2009, pp. 39-44, Westerveen 2011, p. 213. 
21 Battjes 2006, p. 20. 
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States parties.22 Although conscious of the criticisms expressed by many over the 
functioning of the UNHCR, in this research its opinions are considered to be highly 
relevant and authoritative. First, because of the explicit recognition in the Refugee 
Convention and the CEAS of the UNHCR as supervisor over the application of the 
RC. Recognition of the UNHCR’s supervisory role in the CEAS implies that EU 
Member States are highly conscious of, and respect, its supervisory power.23 Second, 
as will be demonstrated in more detail below in Part 2 of this chapter, the ECtHR, as 
well as the Advocates-General of the Court of Justice of the EU, treat the UNHCR’s 
opinions as highly relevant and authoritative.24 
In 1979, the UNHCR issued the ‘Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for de-
termining Refugee Status under the 1951 Convention and the 1967 Protocol relating 
to the Status of Refugees’ (hereafter: the UNHCR Handbook). The Handbook con-
tains guidelines on how to determine who is a refugee, including a number of proce-
dural guidelines with particular relevance for this research. According to paragraph V 
of the foreword to the Handbook, these guidelines are based on the practice of 
States, exchanges of views between the UNHCR and the competent authorities of 
Contracting States and the views of scholars. The Handbook is an important source 
of guidance for interpreting and applying the Refugee Convention25 for ‘government 
officials concerned with the determination of refugee status.’26 Taking into account 
that Article 21 of the EU Procedures Directive stipulates in its first paragraph at sub 
c that the UNHCR is entitled ‘to present its views (…) to any competent authorities 
regarding individual applications for asylum at any stage of the procedure’,27 it must 
be assumed that the guidelines issued by the UNHCR address not only first instance 
administrative decision makers, but certainly also the judiciary.  
As well as the Handbook, the UNHCR has issued many other documents con-
taining guidelines, including the so-called ‘Guidelines on International Protection’, 
amicus curiae briefs or advisory opinions in national and international proceedings, dis-
cussion papers under the heading ‘Legal and Protection Policy Research Series’ and 
working papers under the heading ‘New Issues in Refugee Research’.28 
                                                        
22 Wouters 2009, p. 38. 
23 In the same vein: Zwaan 2005, p. 27. 
24 The ECtHR speaks of the UNHCR as an organisation whose independence, reliability and objec-
tivity are beyond doubt. See, for example, admissibility decision K.R.S. v. UK, 2 December 2008, 
Appl. No. 32733/08, p. 16. See for an example of a judgment in which the ECtHR attaches great 
weight to the opinion of the UNHCR Jabari v. Turkey, 11 July 2000, Appl. No. 40035/98, para. 41. 
See also the opinion of A-G with the CJEU Sharpston delivered on 4 March 2010 in Case C-31/09 
of Bolbol v. Bevándorlási és állampolgársági Hivatal, para. 16, in which this A-G stated that she intended 
to treat the UNHCR information as an unofficial amicus curiae brief. 
25 Hathaway 2005, pp.114-118, Battjes 2006, p. 20, Wouters 2009, p. 43.  
26 UNHCR Handbook, Foreword, para. VII. 
27 The supervisory role of the UNHCR is also laid down in a number of provisions contained in other 
EU asylum directives with less relevance for this research as they do not primarily concern the rela-
tionship between the UNHCR and national courts. Zwaan 2005 provides a list of these provisions 
on pp. 84-88; see also the table in Zwaan 2005 on pp. 26-27.  
28 Wouters 2009 contains a list of UNHCR documents with relevance for interpretation of the Refugee 
Convention on pp. 601-605.  
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2.1.2.3 The ExCom 
In 1958 the Executive Committee of the UNHCR programme (ExCom) was estab-
lished.29 The ExCom consists of representatives of the Member States of the United 
Nations Organisation who meet annually in plenary sessions, with regular smaller 
meetings of its Standing Committee in between, to discuss, among other things, the 
legal activities of the UNHCR. Its findings and recommendations are laid down in 
so-called Conclusions. These Conclusions are not legally binding, as neither the Refu-
gee Convention nor any other treaty has conferred law-making competence on the 
ExCom. The ExCom Conclusions No. 8, 65, 71, 74, 81, 82 and 103 contain recom-
mendations on procedures and mention that ‘refugee status determination procedures 
must be accessible, fair and efficient’. It is, however, not explained any further what is 
meant by this. The ExCom Conclusion No. 8, (XXVIII), 1977, para. (e) (vi)) contains 
a ‘right to appeal to either an administrative or judicial authority’, but it is not further 
explained what kind of appeal is required.30 As the ExCom Conclusions are rather 
unspecific on the subject of this study, they will not be used any further here. 
2.1.2.4 The Court of Justice of the EU (CJEU) 
Under Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU is fully competent to rule on the validity of the 
EU secondary asylum instruments and on the interpretation of primary and second-
ary EU law on asylum. In this way, the Court is in a position which entitles it to ex-
plain provisions of the EU Qualification Directive31 which are in turn explanations of 
provisions of the Refugee Convention.32 Although at the moment of completion of 
this book the number of judgments concerning asylum was still rather limited,33 the 
                                                        
29 The ExCom was established by resolution 672 (XXV) on 30 April 1958 of the Economic and Social 
Council of the United Nations. 
30 See ExCom Conclusion No. 8, (XXVIII), 1977, para. (e); ExCom Conclusion No. 65 (XLII), 1991, 
para. (o); ExCom Conclusion No. 71 (XLIV), 1993, para. (i); ExCom Conclusion No. 74 (XLV), 
1994, para. (i); ExCom Conclusion No. 81 (XLVIII), 1997, para. (h); ExCom Conclusion No. 82 
(XLVIII), 1997, para. (d) (iii); ExCom Conclusion No. 103 (LVI), 2005, para. (r). 
31 Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third country na-
tionals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international protection on 
the content of the protection granted, OJ of the EU L 304, 30 September 2004, pp. 12-23, last 
amended by OJ of the EU L 204, 5 August 2005, p. 24. 
32 Westerveen 2011, p. 215. 
33 The judgments issued up to 31 December 2012 by the CJEU on preliminary questions in asylum 
cases are: Petrosian and others, 29 January 2009, C-19/08, Elgafaji, 17 February 2009, C-465/07, 
Abdulla and others, 2 March 2010, C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08, C-179/08, Bolbol, 17 June 2010, C-
31/09, B and D, 9 November 2010, C-57/09 and C-101/09, and Brahim Samba Diouf, 28 July 2011, 
C-69/10; N.S. and Others, 21 December 2011, C-411/10 and C-493/10; Migrationsverk Sweden v. 
Nurije, Valdrina and Valdri Kastrati, 3 May 2012, C-620/10; Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y. and Z., 5 
September 2012, C-71/11 and C-99/11; M.M. v. Ireland, 22 November 2012, C-277/11. In addition, 
of relevance to the field of asylum are two other judgments, being Parliament v. Council, 6 May 2008, 
C-133/06, concerning an application by the European Parliament for the annulment of Articles 
29(1) and (2) and 36(3) of the EU asylum Procedures Directive, concerning safe countries of origin 
and safe third countries, and European Commission v. Ireland, 7 April 2011, C-431/10, concerning an 
action for failure by Ireland to implement Procedures Directive 2005/85/EC. The CJEU ruled that 
Ireland had failed to implement the Directive. 
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CJEU will be playing an increasingly important role in interpreting the Refugee Con-
vention.34 A more extensive analysis of the judgments of the CJEU relevant for this 
research is made in Chapter 6 on EU asylum law. 
2.1.3 Provisions on proceedings 
The Refugee Convention contains a number of provisions on national proceedings. 
These are Article 16 on access to courts and Article 32 on expulsion and the pro-
cedure to be followed in cases of expulsion. Article 35 on co-operation of national 
authorities with the UNHCR is also relevant: as we will see in section 2.5, informa-
tion from the UNHCR may serve as an important source of evidence in asylum court 
proceedings. The content of these three provisions will be explored in this chapter. 
2.1.4 Chapter outline 
The next sections of this chapter discuss and analyze the RC’s provisions on national 
proceedings – Articles 16 and 32 – and what these provisions say with regard to the 
required intensity of judicial scrutiny and the evidentiary issues in national asylum 
proceedings. The requirement of access to courts in Article 16 is discussed in section 
2.2. In section 2.3, attention is paid to the procedural rights in expulsion cases under 
Article 32. Different views will be discussed on the applicability of both provisions to 
contemporary court proceedings concerning asylum. After that, the content of both 
provisions is addressed. In section 2.4, it will be demonstrated that these two provi-
sions can be read and interpreted with the aid of the UNHCR’s positions on the 
eleven aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny in national asylum proceedings. Sec-
tion 2.5 pays attention to the co-operation requirement in Article 35 and its impli-
cations for national asylum courts. Final concluding remarks are made in section 2.6. 
2.2  Article 16: access to courts  
2.2.1  Applicability 
Article 16 stipulates: 
 
‘1. A refugee shall have free access to the courts of law on the territory of all Contracting 
States. 
2. A refugee shall enjoy in the Contracting State in which he has his habitual residence the 
same treatment as a national in matters pertaining to access to the Courts, including legal as-
sistance and exemption from cautio judicatum solvi.35 
                                                        
34 See also Zwaan 2005, p.1: ‘For the first time an international court will not only be competent but 
also most likely requested to decide cases with direct implications for the interpretation of provisions 
of the Refugee Convention.’ See also Van Bennekom 2011, p. 204, and Westerveen 2011, p. 215. 
35 ‘Cautio judicatum solvi’ is the security for costs which foreigners sometimes have to furnish for the 
costs of the other party in civil proceedings provided the plaintiff loses the lawsuit. 
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3. A refugee shall be accorded in the matters referred to in paragraph 2 in countries other than 
that in which he has his habitual residence the treatment granted to a national of the country of 
his habitual residence.’ 
 
Opinions differ as to the question of whether Article 16 applies to judicial review or 
appeal proceedings concerning the determination of refugee status and the expulsion 
of failed asylum seekers. The text of Article 16 (the French text speaks of ‘libre et 
facile accès devant les tribunaux’) and the preparatory works do not provide an an-
swer to this question.36 The fact that the preparatory works do not mention refugee 
status determination proceedings should be seen in the light of the circumstances 
existing at the time when the Refugee Convention was drawn up. At that time, na-
tional asylum court proceedings as we know them nowadays were practically non-
existent in many States parties to the Convention. To illustrate this: in the Nether-
lands, no developed national procedure for refugee status determination, including a 
judicial appellate system, existed before 1975; in the UK, it was in 1980 that changes 
were made to the so-called Immigration Rules with the specific aim of refugee status 
determination, and it was not until 1993 that a national asylum appeals system was set 
up.37 The fact that the text of the second paragraph of Article 16 mentions an exemp-
tion from cautio judicatum solvi indicates that the drafters (primarily) had civil proceed-
ings in mind. The preparatory works speak of a ‘right to sue and be sued’ and contain 
some indications that the drafters indeed had mainly civil proceedings in mind when 
drawing up Article 16; examples of court proceedings mentioned in the preparatory 
works are an ‘action to secure a divorce’ and ‘actions to recover a debt’.38 
In literature different answers are given to the question of whether or not Article 
16 applies to judicial proceedings against a negative administrative decision on an 
asylum request. In earlier literature, this question is not addressed explicitly; Grahl-
Madsen (1966-1972) and Swart (1987) do not raise it.39 In more recent literature dif-
ferent stances are voiced. According to Fernhout (1990), it follows from Article 16 
that ‘a national court shall be available, also in every case in which a provision from 
the Convention is to be applied’. To support his opinion, he refers to examples of the 
early jurisprudence of the Dutch Council of State in which Article 16 was applied to 
asylum proceedings (see section 2.2.2).40 Spijkerboer & Vermeulen (1995) consider 
Article 16 to be applicable to asylum proceedings; they do not repeat this opinion, 
however, in their work of 2005.41 Boeles (1997) considers Article 16 of paramount 
importance for asylum proceedings. To support his stance, he points to the place of 
Article 16 in the chapter on ‘juridical status’ and argues that it follows from the con-
text of the RC that Article 16 is applicable to matters of inclusion and refoulement, as 
                                                        
36 Travaux Préparatoires, UN Doc. E/AC.32/2, Weis 1995, p. 131. 
37 Zwaan 2003, pp. 87-89; Shah 2005, p. 2. 
38 See UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.11, at 7 and UN Doc. A/CONF.2/SR.8, at 12. 
39 Grahl-Madsen 1966-1972, first volume, pp. 33-35. Grahl-Madsen discusses the historical 
background of Article 16. His second volume contains some brief pieces on procedural aspects but 
does not contain any comments on Article 16. Swart 1987does not explicitly discuss Article 16. 
40 Fernhout 1990, pp. 192 and 234-240. 
41 Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 1995, pp. 379-384. 
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such matters affect the refugee’s juridical status. Boeles also points to the principle of 
effectiveness and argues that, if Article 16 is to lead to effective protection for 
refugees against refoulement, then that provision must also be considered to oblige the 
Contracting States to guarantee free access to the courts in all those cases in which 
the refugee status or the threat of refoulement is involved.42 In addition to these two ar-
guments, Boeles, like Fernhout, points to the jurisprudence of the national courts in 
Belgium and the Netherlands in which it was accepted that Article 16 applies to dis-
putes concerning the application of the Refugee Convention. Hathaway (2005) states 
that ‘in principle, Article 16(1) governs when refugees seek to litigate their Con-
vention rights or any other rights before national courts’ and ‘the efforts of an in-
creasing number of countries to deny access to their courts to refugees seeking re-
view or appeal of a negative assessment of refugee status are prima facie incompatible 
with Article 16 RC.’43 Wouters (2009) refers mainly to Boeles and states that Article 
16 is applicable to all refugees, including refugee claimants.44 
A different stance is taken by Battjes (2006): as Article 16 only speaks of access 
to courts and is silent about the type of proceedings and the kind of dispute, Battjes 
assumes that this provision has no implications for judicial asylum proceedings.45 
The UNHCR Handbook does not make clear whether or not the UNHCR con-
siders Article 16 to be applicable to appeal procedures against negative administrative 
decisions on asylum requests. Para. 12(ii) of the Handbook stipulates that ‘the pro-
visions of the Refugee Convention (…) that define the legal status of refugees and 
their rights and duties in their country of refuge (…) have no influence on the pro-
cess of determination of refugee status (…)’. This leaves undecided whether or not 
the right to free access to a court applies in the appeal stage. 
Following the majority of the scholars mentioned above, I consider it more 
logical to assume that Article 16 does indeed apply to contemporary judicial asylum 
proceedings. The argument given by Battjes is, in my view, not very convincing. 
Battjes says in fact that Article 16 is not applicable to proceedings and disputes which 
are not explicitly mentioned. As the text of Article 16 does not give any examples of 
proceedings and disputes, this would mean that Article 16 would never apply. Boeles’ 
argument of the place of Article 16 in the Convention is convincing, but there are still 
some other good arguments in favour of assuming applicability. Multilateral treaties 
are normally meant and concluded for a long period. When interpreting their provi-
sions it is, therefore, not very logical to cling strictly to (only) the circumstances pre-
vailing at the time of conclusion. Particularly human rights treaties are living instru-
ments which are to be interpreted according to present day conditions.46 Article 31, 
third paragraph, VTC also offers support for a dynamic interpretation of treaty 
                                                        
42 Boeles 1997, pp. 71-77. 
43 Hathaway 2005, pp. 644-647. 
44 Wouters 2009, p. 174. 
45 Battjes 2006, p. 319. 
46 The ‘living instrument’ notion has mainly been developed in the case law of the ECtHR, see, for ex-
ample, ECtHR, Selmouni v. France, 28 July 1999, Appl. No. 25803/94, para. 101. It is also present in 
the case law of the Human Rights Committee under the ICCPR. See, for example, HRC, Judge v. 
Canada, 13 August 2003, Com. No. 829/1998, para. 10.3, last sentence. 
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provisions as it mentions subsequent agreements and practice as instruments of treaty 
interpretation.47 The ICJ also interprets treaty provisions dynamically.48 Finally, as 
was pointed out in Chapter 1, it is a general principle of interpretation that human 
rights should be interpreted liberally in view of individual human rights protection.49 
2.2.2 Equal treatment 
It follows from the text of Article 16, the travaux préparatoires, early case law and litera-
ture that Article 16 is primarily a non-discrimination or equal treatment provision, 
meaning that it entails that refugees should not be required to meet extra, or more 
stringent, admissibility conditions which do not apply to nationals in similar court 
proceedings. Article 16 is a response to the widespread European practice during the 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries of excluding foreigners from access to courts 
and, as a result, from judicial protection.50 Good examples may be drawn from older 
jurisprudence of the Dutch Council of State in which it was inferred from Article 16 
that refugees staying in the Netherlands should receive equal treatment as Dutch citi-
zens as far as access to the Council of State was concerned, on the basis of the for-
mer Administrative Litigation Act.51 For example, in its judgment of 10 April 1979, 
the Council of State ruled that Article 34, paragraph b, of the former Dutch Aliens 
Act was incompatible with Article 16. The national provision stipulated that there 
was only a right of appeal to the Raad van State from a negative decision of the admin-
istration on a request for reconsideration if the refugee had had his or her habitual 
residence in the Netherlands for one year on the date of the administrative decision, 
whereas this limitation did not apply to persons who wished to appeal to the Council 
of State, on the basis of the former Administrative Litigation Act, from other admin-
istrative decisions.52 
Grahl-Madsen (1966-1972), Boeles (1997) and Hathaway (2005) read Article 16 
in the same way: the meaning of Article 16 is to make sure that the right nationals of 
                                                        
47 Article 31, third paragraph, of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties stipulates: ‘There shall 
be taken into account, together with the context: (a) any subsequent agreement between the parties 
regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; (b) any subsequent 
practice in the application of the treaty which establishes the agreement of the parties regarding its 
interpretation; (c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the par-
ties.’ 
48 ICJ, Legal consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South 
West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970) (Advisory Opinion), 21 June 
1971, ICJ Reports 1971, p. 16, para. 53. The ICJ stated here that an international instrument has to 
be interpreted and applied within the entire legal system prevailing at the time of interpretation. 
49 Wouters 2009, p. 13. 
50 Grahl-Madsen 1966-1972, Vol. I, pp. 33-35; Hathaway 2005, pp. 644-647. 
51 Wet AROB: Wet van 1 mei 1975, Stb. 284, houdende regels betreffende beroep op de Raad van 
State tegen overheidsbeschikkingen. 
52 Judgment of the Council of State of 10 April 1979, RV 1979, no. 3. See also the judgments of the 
Council of State of 20 December 1977, RV 1977; 13 July 1979, RV 1979, no. 9; and 20 December 
1979, RV 1979, no. 13. Interestingly, in the judgment of 20 December 1977, the Council of State 
implicitly considered the national provision at variance with Article 16(1) of the RC, whereas in the 
later judgments of 1979 it was explicitly ruled that the national provision was non-compliant with 
Article 16(2). 
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a country possess to bring a case to court also works for refugees. Article 16, there-
fore, requires that obstacles which are particularly felt by refugees are to be removed 
so that they have real, and not illusive, access to courts, just like nationals. Examples 
of such obstacles are financial barriers and obstacles to obtaining legal aid. Grahl-
Madsen also makes clear that Article 16 should be read in conjunction with Article 
29, stipulating that the Contracting States shall not impose upon refugees duties, 
charges or taxes, of any description whatsoever, other or higher than those which are 
or may be levied on their nationals in similar situations.53 
On the basis of the text and the mentioned case law and literature, it may be 
argued that shorter time limits for bringing an appeal against a negative administrative 
decision on an asylum application to court (compared to other administrative ap-
peals) are incompatible with Article 16 Refugee Convention. Such shorter time limits 
are, in fact, more stringent admissibility conditions which do not apply to nationals in 
administrative court proceedings. Such shorter time limits for lodging an appeal exist 
in a number of EU Member States, for example, the Netherlands, France, Germany, 
the Czech Republic and Slovenia.54 The EU Procedures Directive leaves the Member 
States discretion as to the determination of time limits for bringing appeals to court 
in Article 39, second paragraph. However, this provision does not give them leeway 
to set shorter time limits for asylum cases as Article 78 TFEU requires that European 
asylum law is in accordance with the Refugee Convention and Preamble 2 to the Pro-
cedures Directive stipulates that the asylum system of the EU is based on the full and 
inclusive application of the Refugee Convention. 
2.3  Procedural rights in expulsion cases: Article 32 
2.3.1  Applicability 
Article 32 stipulates: 
 
‘1. The Contracting States shall not expel a refugee lawfully in their territory save on grounds 
of national security or public order. 
2. The expulsion of such a refugee shall be only in pursuance of a decision reached in accord-
ance with due process of law. Except where compelling reasons of national security otherwise 
require, the refugee shall be allowed to submit evidence to clear himself, and to appeal to and 
be represented for the purpose before a competent authority or a person or persons specially 
designated by the competent authority. 
                                                        
53 Grahl-Madsen 1966-1972, Vol. I, p. 33; Boeles 1997, pp. 71-77, 80-81; Hathaway 2005, pp. 906-913. 
54 In the Netherlands, the time limit for lodging an appeal to the court of first instance in adminis-
trative law cases is six weeks, whereas in asylum cases this time limit is only one or four weeks (Ar-
ticle 6:7 Algemene wet bestuursrecht (General Administrative Law Act), and Article 69, paras. 1 and 
2 Vreemdelingenwet (Aliens Act)); shorter time limits also apply in many other EU countries, for 
example France, Germany, the Czech Republic, Slovenia (information was obtained from colleagues 
in the International Association of Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ)). 
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3. The Contracting States shall allow such a refugee a reasonable period within which to seek 
legal admission into another country. The Contracting States reserve the right to apply during 
that period such internal measures as they may deem necessary.’ 
 
The text of this provision makes clear that States parties to the Refugee Convention 
are limited in their right to expel a refugee lawfully in their territory on both substan-
tive grounds (national security or public order) and procedural grounds; procedurally, 
expulsion can only take place after a decision has been taken in accordance with due 
process of law. Grahl-Madsen (1963) explains the reason for drawing up and in-
cluding this provision in the Refugee Convention by referring to the habit of certain 
States in the early years of the twentieth century of expelling refugees and pushing 
those so expelled across the frontier to a neighbouring country. This practice caused 
hardship to the refugees, who were often pushed back and forth between two or 
more countries and punished each time for illegal entry. It also caused considerable 
inconvenience for the countries into whose territory the expelled refugees were sent. 
It was, therefore, natural that the expulsion of refugees became a matter of concern 
to the international community.55 
Does Article 32 apply to contemporary judicial proceedings concerning refugee 
status determination and refoulement? The text of Article 32 and the preparatory works 
do not provide an answer to this question, which is logical as national court proceed-
ings concerning asylum as we know them nowadays were practically non-existent in 
many States at the time when the RC was drafted. Literature is, again, divided over 
this question. Grahl-Madsen (1966-1972) does not link Article 32 to asylum court 
proceedings.56 Fernhout (1990) does not discuss the meaning of Article 32 in his 
work. Boeles (1997), Hathaway (2005) and Wouters (2009) are of the opinion that 
Article 32 rights inhere in all refugees ‘lawfully in a state party’s territory’, including 
those awaiting the results of their status verification inquiry.57 Boeles and Hathaway 
refer to the history of negotiations on the personal scope of Article 32, which shows 
that the text ‘lawfully in the territory’ was adopted on second reading at the Con-
ference of Plenipotentiaries immediately after attention had been drawn by the Swe-
dish delegate to the fact that there was a discrepancy between the English language 
version (‘lawfully admitted’) and the French language version (‘residant regulièrement’) 
and that, therefore, the personal scope of Article 32 needed clarification. It was then 
decided to drop the words ‘admitted’ and ‘residant’ and, by doing so, to lessen the at-
tachment to the country of asylum. Hathaway and Boeles infer from this that the 
drafters had a broad interpretation of the personal scope of Article 32 in mind.58 To 
the contrary, Battjes (2006) and Goodwin-Gill & McAdam (2007) state that the 
benefit of Article 32 is limited to refugees who enjoy what might be called ‘resident 
status’ in the State in question. This means that Article 32 only applies to recognised 
refugees and that the provision is only relevant for the withdrawal of an awarded 
                                                        
55 Grahl-Madsen 1963, pp. 185-186. 
56 See Grahl-Madsen 1972, second volume, pp. 344-389. 
57 Boeles 1997, p. 78, Hathaway 2005, pp. 666-669, Wouters pp. 176, 177. 
58 See for this change in text the Travaux Préparatoires, UN Doc. E/AC.32/SR.42, pp. 11-36. 
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asylum-related residence permit and the decision to expel a recognised refugee.59 
Battjes’ argument for this line of reasoning is that considering Article 32 applicable 
would render Article 33 superfluous. 
In my opinion, it makes more sense to consider Article 32 RC applicable to con-
temporary asylum court proceedings concerning status determination and refoulement. 
The argument of the history of this provision, referred to by Boeles and Hathaway, is 
convincing. Other arguments were mentioned above in section 2.2.1 when discussing 
the applicability of Article 16. Battjes’ argument that considering Article 32 applicable 
would render Article 33 superfluous is not very convincing as both these provisions 
differ in many ways, so that it is difficult to see how one of them could become su-
perfluous. To mention just a few differences, Article 33 protects from removal to 
territories where there is a threat to life or freedom, whereas Article 32 protects from 
removal to any territory, including safe countries, and Article 32 provides explicit 
procedural safeguards, unlike Article 33.60 
2.3.2  Due process of law 
‘Due process of law’ includes, according to the second sentence of the second para-
graph, at least three rights: the right of the refugee to submit evidence to clear himself 
or herself, the right to appeal the decision on expulsion to a competent authority and 
the right to be represented before this appellate body. These three rights may be con-
strained to the extent required by compelling reasons of national security. We do not 
find any further explanation of the term ‘due process of law’ in the RC itself, or in the 
preparatory works. Weis (1995) comments that the term ‘due process of law’ stems 
from Anglo-Saxon law and that the term has a procedural and a substantial aspect. 
Procedurally, it means a decision reached in accordance with a procedure established 
by law, and containing the safeguards which the law provides for the class of cases in 
question, in particular equality before the law and the right to a fair hearing. Sub-
stantially, it means that the decision must be based on law, that it may not be un-
reasonable, arbitrary or capricious and must have a real and substantive relation to its 
object.61 Boeles (1997) considers ‘due process of law’ to include a number of mini-
mum requirements. These are: 1) knowledge of the decision against one; 2) an oppor-
tunity to submit evidence to rebut the decision; and 3) the right to appeal against an 
adverse decision before an impartial authority independent of the initial decision-
making body.62 
According to Hathaway (2005), the right to appeal does not necessarily entail an 
appeal to a court. Originally, there was an intention within the drafting committee to 
entrust all expulsion cases to the courts. In the course of the debates and negotiations 
it became clear, however, that most governments were unwilling to guarantee judicial 
oversight of refugee expulsion. According to Hathaway, the right to appeal must be 
understood in such a way that it provides a right to appeal to an authority of some 
                                                        
59 Battjes 2006, pp. 360-361, 462-463; Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, p. 263. 
60 Wouters 2009, pp. 176-177. 
61 Weis 1995, p. 322. 
62  Boeles 1997, p. 79. 
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seniority which is not connected to the body or person who took the initial decision 
on expulsion. This appellate authority should be explicitly empowered to take ac-
count of all the circumstances of the case so as to ensure a meaningful legal check on 
the powers of the administration. The right to submit evidence encompasses any 
evidence to clear oneself and not just evidence against the expulsion, and the person 
or body considering the appeal against expulsion must consider evidence relevant to, 
for example, a criminal conviction underpinning the expulsion order, rather than lim-
iting itself simply to the consideration of evidence about the propriety of the expul-
sion order itself. The right to be represented entails a right to be represented on the 
review, it does not mean a right to legal counsel or to the appointment of an attorney. 
According to Hathaway, as well as these three rights, ‘due process of law’ embraces a 
duty to respect a range of technical, procedural requirements associated with basic 
fairness, such as suspension of the expulsion while the case is sub judice.63 Goodwin-
Gill & McAdam (2007) mention the three requirements also listed by Boeles and 
mention, as a fourth requirement, reasoned negative decisions.64 
2.4  Articles 16 and 32: the UNHCR’s position on evidence and judicial 
scrutiny 
The UNHCR Handbook and many other UNHCR documents contain guidelines for 
the assessment of asylum applications. These guidelines are meant ‘for the guidance 
of government officials concerned with the determination of refugee status’.65 
Among them are also specific guidelines on evidence and judicial scrutiny. Taking 
into account that Article 21 of the EU Procedures Directive stipulates under 1(c) that 
the UNHCR is entitled ‘to present its views, in the exercise of its supervisory respon-
sibilities under Article 35 of the Geneva Convention, to any competent authorities re-
garding individual applications for asylum at any stage of the procedure’,66 it may 
safely be assumed that the guidelines issued by the UNHCR address not only first 
instance administrative decision makers, but certainly also national asylum courts. 
The UNHCR has issued specific and concrete guidelines on almost all of the eleven 
aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny covered by this study. Articles 16 and 32 may 
be interpreted with the aid of these guidelines. Such an interpretation significantly 
broadens the content of Article 16 and implies that Article 16 is more than just a pro-
hibition on more stringent admissibility conditions and embraces not only the right to 
enter the court building and appear before a judge, but also the right to material 
judicial protection. Such a broader interpretation of Article 16 would be well in line 
                                                        
63 Hathaway 2005, pp. 670-677. 
64 Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, p. 523. In other literature, the meaning of ‘due process of law’ is 
not addressed extensively. For example, Fernhout 1990, Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 2005, Battjes 
2006 and Wouters 2009 do not extensively discuss the meaning of ‘due process of law’. 
65 UNHCR Handbook, Foreword, para. VII. 
66 The supervisory role of the UNHCR is also laid down in a number of provisions contained in other 
EU asylum directives with less relevance for this research as they do not primarily concern the rela-
tionship between the UNHCR and national courts. Zwaan 2005 provides a list of these provisions 
on pp. 84-88; see also the table on pp. 26-27.  
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with the ECtHR’s case law on the requirement of access to an independent and im-
partial tribunal flowing from Article 6 ECHR, under which requirement the ECtHR 
has developed a doctrine on the required intensity of national judicial scrutiny. (See 
Chapter 5, sections 5.4 and 5.5.) A broad interpretation would also be in line with the 
fact that the European Convention on Establishment (1955),67 which was drafted in 
the same period as the Refugee Convention, contains similar rules regarding access to 
court in Articles 7, 8 and 9, and in Article 7 explicit mention is made of ‘judicial pro-
tection’.68 
2.4.1  Standard of proof 
The UNHCR takes the stance that it must be established, to a reasonable degree (italics 
by author) that, upon expulsion, the claimant’s life or freedom would be threatened, 
in other words, that he or she would be persecuted, on account of one of the per-
secution grounds.69 In its Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims70 
the UNHCR has made clear that the determination of refugee status does not pur-
port to identify refugees as a matter of certainty, but as a matter of likelihood. It is 
not required to prove well-foundedness conclusively beyond doubt, or even that per-
secution is more probable than not. To establish ‘well-foundedness’, persecution 
must be proved to be reasonably possible.71 
2.4.2 Burden of proof 
The UNHCR has stated that, in accordance with the general legal principle that the 
burden of proof lies on the person submitting a claim, the relevant facts have to be 
furnished in the first place by the applicant. While the burden of proof, in principle, 
rests on the applicant, the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant facts is shared 
between the applicant and the examiner. In some cases, it may be for the examiner to 
use all the means at his or her disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support 
of the application.72 This means that, in some cases, the examiner – whether the first 
                                                        
67 See on this Convention Boeles 1997, pp. 329-339. 
68 Article 7 of the European Convention on Establishment stipulates: ‘Nationals of any Contracting 
State shall enjoy in the territory of any other Party, under the same conditions as nationals of the 
latter Party, full legal and judicial protection of their persons and property and of their rights and 
interests. In particular, they shall have, in the same manner as the nationals of the latter Party, the 
right of access to the competent judicial and administrative authorities and the right to obtain the 
assistance of any person of their choice who is qualified by the laws of the country.’ Grahl-Madsen 
also refers to these Articles in the European Convention on Establishment in his analysis of the 
meaning of Article 16 Refugee Convention. See Grahl-Madsen 1966-1972, Volume I, pp. 33-35. 
69 UNHCR Handbook, paras. 42 and 51, Wouters 2009, p. 93, p. 549: there must be a ‘serious possi-
bility’ that the claimant’s life or freedom would be threatened on account of one of the persecution 
grounds. 
70 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims of 16 December 1998, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3338.html, last visited on 23 August 2011. 
71 Ibidem, paras. 2 and 17. 
72 Paras. 195 and 196 of the UNHCR Handbook; Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims of 
16 December 1998, para. 6. See also para. 19 in the Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the 
Netherlands, available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f5e484.html, last visited on 23 
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instance administrative organ or the court on appeal or both – need(s) to actively 
search for evidence. This holds true particularly where there is not much public in-
formation available on the situation in the country of origin.73 Importantly, the refu-
gee claimant does not have the specific burden of proof as to the reasons for which 
he or she may be persecuted: it is for the examiner, when investigating the facts of 
the case, to ascertain the reasons for the persecution and to see whether these reasons 
match the grounds mentioned in the RC.74 
A principle alleviating the burden of proof can be found in paragraph 45 of the 
UNHCR Handbook. This provision states that  
 
‘It may be assumed that a person has well-founded fear of being persecuted if he has already 
been the victim of persecution for one of the reasons enumerated in the 1951 Convention.’ 
 
According to this principle, persecution in the past is a serious indication of the 
applicant’s well-founded fear of persecution in the future. 
2.4.3 Relevant facts and circumstances 
The UNHCR has made clear that, on the one hand, personal circumstances, and on 
the other hand, elements concerning the situation in the country of origin are rele-
vant. The applicant’s personal circumstances include his or her background, expe-
riences, personality, membership of a particular racial, religious, national, social or po-
litical group and any other personal factors which could expose him or her to perse-
cution. Important personal circumstances are, for example, whether the applicant has 
previously suffered persecution or other forms of mistreatment; persecution ex-
perienced by relatives or friends of the applicant; persecution experienced by those 
persons in the same situation as the applicant; holding and expressing opinions not 
tolerated by the authorities which are critical of their policies or methods; unlawful 
departure or unauthorized stay in another country; desertion or draft-evasion for gen-
uine political, religious or moral convictions; associating, in the country where asylum 
is requested, with refugees already recognised, expressing political views in the coun-
try where asylum is requested, and whether such actions have come to the notice of 
the authorities.75 
Also relevant are personal experiences, such as arrest, detention, criminal charges, 
communication possibilities with one’s lawyer, and, in general, experiences that make 
a person known and/or vulnerable.76 
The applicant’s statements must be viewed in the context of the relevant back-
ground situation, meaning the situation in the country of origin.77 Relevant elements 
                                                        
August 2011. The case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands brought to the ECtHR ended in a decision of 
31 January 2008, Appl. No. 31252/03, to strike the application out of the list as, pending the 
proceedings on her asylum application, she was allowed to stay in the Netherlands. 
73 Hoeksma 1990, p. 72. 
74 UNHCR Handbook, paras. 66 and 67. See also Wouters 2009, p. 97. 
75 UNHCR, Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims of 16 December 1998, para. 19, 
UNHCR Handbook, paras. 41, 43, 45, 80-82, 96, 169. 
76 Wouters 2009, p. 547. 
RC 
 
 
 
33 
concerning the situation in the country of origin include, for example, whether or not 
the country in question is party to international human rights treaties, a poor human 
rights situation and record or even gross violations of fundamental human rights, leg-
islation imposing penal prosecution for a Convention ground, legislation imposing 
penalties on unlawful departure or unauthorized stay in another country (penalties for 
Republikflucht), disproportionately severe punishment on account of a Convention 
ground for desertion or draft-evasion, serious racial or religious or other discrimina-
tion, absence of protection by the authorities in cases of persecution committed by 
the local populace, the (non-)existence of an internal protection alternative, meaning 
an area inside the country of origin, not being the original place of residence, which is 
practically, legally and safely accessible to the person concerned, where this person 
has no risk of being subjected to persecution.78 
Importantly, the UNHCR has made clear that the particular facts and circum-
stances of the case – both individual and concerning the country of origin – have to 
be seen in conjunction, and not in isolation.79 Where isolated facts are insufficient to 
conclude that an applicant is a refugee, all the facts seen in conjunction may well lead 
to the opposite conclusion. 
2.4.4  Required degree of individual risk 
The Handbook distinguishes two main kinds of situations: the situation in which 
refugee status is determined on an individual basis and the situation in which group 
determination takes place whereby each member of the group is prima facie regarded 
as a refugee, which presumption can be rebutted on specific individual grounds. The 
first situation – individual status determination – is envisaged in paragraph 45 of the 
Handbook, which stipulates that an applicant for refugee status must normally show 
good reason why he or she individually fears persecution.80 
Individual status determination does not mean, however, that an applicant must 
show that he or she, and only he or she, is singled out. The idea that refugee status 
determination requires a very high degree of individual risk (this applicant and only 
this applicant is targeted) has no basis in the RC.81 The literal meaning of ‘well-
founded fear’ does not point to such a requirement. The persecution grounds of race, 
nationality, and social group, rather, point in the opposite direction as they imply 
affiliation to a certain group. The experiences of others who are related or in a similar 
                                                        
77 UNHCR Handbook, para. 42. 
78 UNHCR, Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims of 16 December 1998, para. 19, 
UNHCR Handbook, paras. 43, 54, 55, 57, 61, 65, 68, 72, 74, 97-100, 169; see on the (non-)existence 
of an internal protection alternative Wouters 2009, pp. 104-110 and 556-559. 
79 See Hoeksma 1990, pp. 123 and 138. The need to approach facts and circumstances not in an 
isolated manner but rather in a holistic way is also expressed in the UNHCR Handbook, paras. 43 and 
55, which state that ‘all these factors, e.g. a person’s character, his background, his influence, his 
wealth or his outspokenness, may lead to the conclusion that his fear of persecution is “well-
founded”’, and ‘where measures of discrimination are in themselves not of a serious character, they 
may nevertheless give rise to a reasonable fear of persecution if they produce, in the mind of the 
person concerned, a feeling of apprehension and insecurity as regards his future existence.’ 
80 UNHCR Handbook, para. 45. 
81 See Battjes 2011, p. 20, who refers to Spijkerboer 2005 and Durieux 2008. 
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position, such as family members or fellow political activists, may well indicate the 
existence of a risk of being persecuted for the applicant concerned.82 In other words, 
the risk does not necessarily need to be based on personal experiences of the 
applicant demonstrating that he or she has been singled out.  
The second situation – group determination – is envisaged in paragraph 44 of the 
Handbook, stating:  
 
‘While refugee status must normally be determined on an individual basis, situations have also 
arisen in which entire groups have been displaced under circumstances indicating that mem-
bers of the group could be considered individually as refugees. In such situations, the need to 
provide assistance is often extremely urgent and it may not be possible for purely practical 
reasons to carry out individual determination of refugee status for each member of the group. 
Recourse has therefore been had to so-called “group determination” of refugee status, whereby 
each member of the group is regarded prima facie (i.e. in the absence of evidence to the con-
trary) as a refugee.’83 
 
For individuals belonging to a group that is targeted as a whole it is not necessary to 
be further singled out. To put it differently, in the words of Grahl-Madsen: once a 
person is subjected to a measure of such gravity that we consider it ‘persecution’, that 
person is persecuted in the sense of the Convention, irrespective of how many others 
are subjected to the same or similar measures.84 
The scale of violence in a country must be very grave for the UNHCR to assume 
that certain groups have been targeted and that group determination is the more 
appropriate method.85 Some examples of situations in which it assumed that certain 
groups were targeted and that group determination seemed more appropriate are the 
armed conflicts in Iraq and Somalia. In the Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the 
International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-seekers of August 2007, the UNHCR 
stated that this armed conflict was victimising specific groups and that members of 
such groups did not need to be singled out or individually targeted.86 And in the 
Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-
seekers from Somalia of May 2010, the UNHCR stated that it encouraged the 
adoption of a group-based protection approach where individual refugee status de-
termination would exceed local capacities.87 
                                                        
82 UNHCR Handbook, para. 43. 
83 Ibidem, para. 44. 
84 Grahl-Madsen 1966, p. 213. See also Goodwin-Gill 1998, pp. 76, 77, Wouters 2009, p. 87. 
85 See, for the same conclusion, Wouters 2009, p. 88, who states that ‘the UNHCR seems to think that 
such a situation will not easily emerge’. 
86 Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Iraqi Asylum-seekers of August 2007, 
p. 134. These guidelines can be found at: www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/46deb05557.html, last 
visited on 23 August 2011. 
87 Eligibility Guidelines for Assessing the International Protection Needs of Asylum-seekers from Somalia of May 
2010, p. 9. These guidelines can be found at: www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4be3b9142.pdf, last 
visited on 23 August 2011. 
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2.4.5  Credibility assessment 
The UNHCR has stated that general, or overall, credibility is required. This means 
that the applicant’s statements must generally be coherent and plausible, and must 
not run counter to generally known facts. Where the adjudicator considers that the 
applicant’s story is, on the whole, coherent and plausible, any element of doubt 
should not prejudice the applicant’s claim; that is, the applicant should be given the 
‘benefit of the doubt’.88 In assessing the credibility of a claimant, consideration must 
be given to the fact that a person who, because of his or her experiences, is in fear of 
the authorities of his or her own country, may be afraid to speak freely and give a full 
and accurate account of his or her case to the authorities of the country in which he 
or she has requested asylum. Due to the intensity of past events, or due to time lapse, 
the applicant may not be able to remember all factual details or to recount them ac-
curately or may confuse them; thus he or she may be vague or inaccurate in providing 
detailed facts. Inability to remember or provide all dates or minor details, as well as 
minor inconsistencies, insubstantial vagueness or incorrect statements which are not 
material may be taken into account in the final assessment on credibility, but should 
not be used as decisive factors.89 
Absence of corroborative evidence supporting the statements of the applicant 
does not automatically make these statements incredible. Given the special situation 
of asylum seekers, they should not be required to produce evidence supporting every 
single statement made. Many asylum seekers have valid reasons for the absence of 
documents or reliance on fraudulent documents, for example, because they were 
forced to leave their countries without documents or they have been compelled to 
protect the identity of the individuals who assisted them in reaching the country of 
asylum. The absence of corroborative documents should not prevent the claim from 
being accepted if such statements are consistent with known facts and the general 
credibility of the applicant is good.90 
In its Submission to the ECtHR in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands 
(2005),91 the UNHCR made clear that there was no justification for imposing a strict-
er credibility standard (stricter than the standard of general credibility) in cases where 
corroborating evidence was totally absent. It criticised Dutch jurisprudence, which 
imposed a stricter credibility standard – being that the flight narrative has to be posi-
tively persuasive – in a large majority of asylum cases where the applicant had not 
submitted all documents necessary for the assessment of the claim and the lack of 
documentation had not been attributable to him or her.92 The UNHCR has expressed 
                                                        
88 UNHCR Handbook, paras. 197, 204, UNHCR, Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims of 
16 December 1998, paras. 11, 12. 
89 UNHCR Handbook, para. 198, UNHCR, Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims of 16 
December 1998, para. 9. Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands, para. 21. 
90 UNHCR, Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims of 16 December 1998, para. 10. 
91 See note 71 above. 
92 Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands,paras. 25-27. In the Submission reference is 
made to a number of judgments of the Council of State in which this stricter credibility standard is 
applied, among them the judgments of 27 January 2003, 200206297/1, JV 2003/103 and 11 August 
2003, 200304080/1, JV 2003/441. At the moment of completion of this book, application of the 
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deep concern over this practice in the Netherlands, which appears to be the rule 
rather than the exception, for two reasons. First, too much corroborative evidence is 
demanded from the asylum seeker. The strict application of the requirement for doc-
umentary proof of identity, nationality, travel route and reasons for leaving the coun-
try does not take sufficient account of the special situation of asylum-seekers. Second, 
a too strict and, therefore, incorrect credibility standard is applied when corroborative 
evidence on one of the four mentioned elements is absent and the asylum seeker is, 
as a result, deemed to be ‘without documents’. The UNHCR stresses that lack of 
documentation does not in itself render a claim abusive and that many asylum seekers 
have valid reasons for the absence of documents, for example because they were 
forced to leave their countries without documents or they have been compelled to 
protect the identity of the individuals who assisted them in reaching the country of 
asylum. According to the UNHCR, there is no justification for imposing a higher 
credibility standard in such cases.93 
The UNHCR has on numerous occasions expressed its opinion that judges 
dealing with asylum cases should be able to obtain a personal impression of the ap-
plicant and that appeal or review proceedings should involve points of fact and 
points of law.94 It considers necessary that national courts independently and of their 
own account assess the credibility of the statements by the asylum seeker. Indeed, in 
its Submission to the ECtHR in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands (2005), the 
UNHCR stressed that a meaningful appeal was a fundamental requirement in the 
context of refugee status determination, where the consequences of an erroneous de-
cision could be particularly serious. The Submission explained that a ‘formal recon-
sideration’ as mentioned in ExCom Conclusion No. 8 implied a completely new con-
sideration of the case on appeal, both on facts and on law, meaning full judicial re-
view. It criticised the limitations in the scope of judicial review in the Netherlands, in 
particular the fact that the judicial appeal authorities did not have the authority to 
fully examine the credibility assessment of the asylum seeker’s account made by the 
administrative authority (the Immigration and Naturalisation Service, IND).95 
It is, finally, important to mention here that in September 2011, UNHCR started 
working on guidelines for credibility assessment under the name Credo – Improving 
Credibility Assessment in EU asylum procedures. Within the framework of this pro-
ject UNHCR works together with the Helsinki Committee and the IARLJ. At the 
                                                        
stricter credibility standard in cases where the asylum seeker is held to be attributably without docu-
ments was still the prevailing jurisprudential line in the Netherlands. See for a more detailed descrip-
tion Van Bennekom & Van der Winden 2011, pp. 287-308. 
93 See paras. 25-27 in the Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands. 
94 To mention just a few examples, see UNHCR, Global Consultations on International Protection/Third 
Track: Asylum Processes (Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures), 31 May 2001, EC/GC/01/12, available at: 
www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3b36f2fca.html, last visited 23 August 2011, paras. 43 and 41; 
Submission by the UNHCR in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands – Appl. No. 31252/03, May 
2005, www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f5e484.html, last visited 23 August 2011, paras. 31-42; 
UNHCR comments on the European Commission’s proposal for a Directive of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards on procedures in Member States for granting 
and withdrawing international protection (COM(2009)554, 21 October 2009), available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4c63ebd32.pdf, last visited 23 August 2011, p. 40, 41. 
95 See para. 32 in the Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands. 
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moment of completion of this study, these guidelines were not ready but expected to 
appear in March 2013.96 
2.4.6  Admission of evidence, means and sources of evidence, minimum 
quantity and quality of evidence 
2.4.6.1  Admission of evidence, means and sources of evidence 
The asylum seeker should submit ‘any available evidence’. The UNHCR Handbook 
states that the applicant should make an effort to support his or her statements by 
any available evidence and give a satisfactory explanation for any lack of evidence.97 
The UNHCR’s Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands (2005) men-
tioned, as examples of evidence, documents or the testimony of witnesses who could 
support the applicant’s claim for refugee status or who had expertise on relevant 
country conditions.98 The principle that any available evidence should be brought in 
to support statements, arguably, implies, first of all, that evidence, in order to be ad-
mitted to the procedure, does not necessarily need to have a particular form. Written 
but also oral evidence (witness statements) must, in principle, be allowed into the 
procedure and examined. Secondly, it entails that evidence may not be excluded too 
easily from the examination on the single ground that the source is not reliable, with-
out materially considering its content. Documentary evidence, first of all, comprises 
documents corroborating statements regarding identity (such as a passport, identity 
card, military service card) and flight narrative (for example, arrest warrants, medical 
reports stating that scars are the result of torture, letters from political organisations 
confirming membership).99 The UNHCR is of the opinion that any documentary evi-
dence submitted in an attempt to support statements must be examined seriously; 
when it is clear, however, that forged documents have been submitted, then such evi-
dence may be discarded on the ground that it is false or forged.100 
As well as this individual evidence, information on the country of origin plays an 
important role, which, logically, follows from the principle that statements must be 
viewed in the context of the relevant background situation, meaning the situation in 
the country of origin.101 In its submissions, the UNHCR refers to country reports 
from a wide variety of sources. Particularly often reference is made to reports drawn 
up by UN bodies and organisations, including the UNHCR itself. Also used are re-
ports by non-governmental organisations, such as Amnesty International and Human 
Rights Watch. Country reports issued by foreign affairs ministries are also a much 
used source.102 
                                                        
96 See http://helsinki.hu/en/credo-improving-credibility-assessment-in-eu-asylum-procedures. 
97 UNHCR Handbook, para. 205. 
98 See para. 19 in the Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands. 
99 The examples of individual documentary evidence considered as relevant and important evidence by 
UNHCR are drawn from Hoeksma 1990. 
100 See, for, example, the Submission of the UNHCR in Hoeksma 1990 on pp. 261-269. 
101 UNHCR Handbook, para. 42. 
102 The examples of sources of country of origin information are drawn from the UNHCR’s Submis-
sions to the ECtHR in different cases. See below notes 122-128, and from Hoeksma 1990. 
Chapter 2 
 
38 
 
2.4.6.2  Minimum quantity and quality of evidence 
The UNHCR has often underlined that, as far as evidence is concerned, refugee 
claims are unlike criminal and civil cases. Due to the special and difficult evidentiary 
position of the applicant for asylum, the requirement of evidence should not be ap-
plied too strictly.103 Due to this principle, it is not allowed to require evidence of 
every single statement. It must always be remembered that it is often difficult for asy-
lum seekers to provide evidence in relation to key facts or their personal history and 
that they often have valid reasons for the absence of documents. This implies, first of 
all, that administrative decision makers and judges will always have to ask specifically 
why evidence is lacking. Secondly, it implies that they will often have to conclude, in a 
spirit of justice and understanding,104 that the reasons for the absence of evidence are 
valid and that this absence may, therefore, not be held against the applicant. The 
complete absence of supportive evidence does not automatically mean that the claim 
is unmeritorious; the UNHCR has stressed that the adjudicator will often need to de-
pend entirely on the oral statements by the applicant and make an assessment in light 
of the objective situation in the country of origin. Reference is made to the 
UNHCR’s Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands (2005), which was 
described above in section 2.4.5.105 
2.4.7  Appreciation and weighing of evidence 
To the best of my knowledge the UNHCR has so far not issued any explicit position 
on this aspect. 
2.4.8 Opportunities for presenting evidence and reacting to evidence 
The UNHCR takes the stance that information used as a basis for decisions should 
be similarly available to the asylum seeker and his or her legal adviser or counsellor, 
and should, further, be subject to the scrutiny of review or appeal authorities (nation-
al courts). Information and its sources may only be withheld under clearly defined 
conditions, where disclosure of sources would seriously jeopardize national security 
or the security of the organisations or persons providing information.106 
The UNHCR has addressed the issue of secret evidence in more detail within the 
context of exclusion from refugee protection on the basis of Article 1F of the RC. 
According to the UNHCR such exclusion should not be based on sensitive evidence 
that cannot be challenged by the individual concerned. It accepts, however, that ex-
                                                        
103 UNHCR Handbook, paras. 196, 197, 203; Report of July 2003 ‘Implementation of the Aliens Act 
2000 in the Netherlands, UNHCR’s Observations and Recommendations’; UNHCR, Note on Burden 
and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims of 16 December 1998, paras. 10, 20, 22. See also paras. 25-27 in 
the Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands. 
104 UNHCR Handbook, para. 202. 
105 See paras. 18-27 in the Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands. 
106 UNHCR, Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures: A Non-Exhaustive Overview of Applicable International Stan-
dards, 2 September 2005, www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/432ae9204.html, last visited 23 August 
2011, pp. 5 and 6. 
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ceptionally, anonymous evidence may be relied upon, but only where this is absolute-
ly necessary to protect the safety of witnesses and the asylum seekers’s ability to 
challenge the substance of the evidence is not substantially prejudiced. Furthermore, 
the UNHCR has stated that where national security interests are at stake, these may 
be protected by introducing procedural safeguards which also respect the asylum 
seeker’s due process rights.107  
2.4.9 Judicial application of investigative powers 
The UNHCR has taken the position that, in some cases, it may be for the adminis-
trative and judicial examiner to use all the means at his or her disposal to produce the 
necessary evidence in support of the application.108 As has been said above, the 
UNHCR has, on numerous occasions, expressed its opinion that judges dealing with 
asylum cases should be able to examine points of fact and points of law and that on 
appeal, a fresh consideration of the case, both on facts and on law, should take 
place.109 In its document ‘Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative Analysis and 
Recommendations for Law and Practice – Detailed Research on Key Asylum Pro-
cedures Directive Provisions’ (2010), the UNHCR explicitly recommended that the 
appeal body should have fact-finding competence, in order to fulfil the requirement 
of rigorous scrutiny established in international human rights law (see Chapter 5).110 
2.4.10 Time limits for the presentation of statements and evidence 
In the UNHCR’s opinion, it is the applicant’s duty to submit all available evidence 
supporting his or her claim as early as possible. It also stresses, however, that failure 
to fulfil this obligation may be for a variety of reasons. The applicant may, for ex-
ample, not have been aware of the evidence, or it may not have been available to him 
or her. To avoid any erroneous decision, the appeal authorities should have an op-
portunity either to take evidence into consideration which was not submitted earlier, 
or to refer the case back to the first instance authority for such a review. No case 
should be rejected solely on the basis that the relevant information was not presented 
or documents were not submitted earlier. To ignore evidence which supports the 
essence of the claim would be in breach of the 1951 Convention and may, depending 
on the specific circumstances of the case, lead to a violation of the non-refoulement 
principle.111 
                                                        
107  UNHCR, Guidelines on International Protection No. 5: Application of the Exclusion Clauses: Article 1F of the 
1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (HCR/GIP/03/05) 4 September 2003, para. 36. 
108 UNHCR Handbook, paras. 195, 196. 
109 See note 95 above. 
110  UNHCR, Improving Asylum Procedures: Comparative Analysis and Recommendations for Law and Practice - 
Detailed Research on Key Asylum Procedures Directive Provisions (2010), available at: http://www. 
unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?docid=4bab55752, last visited 23 August 2011, 
pp. 89, 90. 
111 See para. 41 in the Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands. 
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2.4.11 Point in time for the risk assessment 
The UNHCR has underlined the necessity for an examination at the time of appeal of 
the question of whether or not expulsion breaches the prohibition on refoulement.112 In 
other words, the risk must always be assessed ex nunc.113 
2.5 The requirement of co-operation with the UNHCR 
Article 35 stipulates: 
 
‘Article 35: Co-operation of the national authorities with the United Nations  
1. The Contracting States undertake to co-operate with the Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, or any other agency of the United Nations which may succeed it, 
in the exercise of its functions, and shall in particular facilitate its duty of supervising the appli-
cation of the provisions of this Convention.  
2. In order to enable the Office of the High Commissioner or any other agency of the United 
Nations which may succeed it, to make reports to the competent organs of the United Na-
tions, the Contracting States undertake to provide them in the appropriate form with informa-
tion and statistical data requested concerning:  
(a) the condition of refugees,  
(b) the implementation of this Convention, and  
(c) laws, regulations and decrees which are, or may hereafter be, in force relating to refu-
gees.’114 
 
As the text makes clear, Article 35 is about two things: an obligation for states to co-
operate with the UNHCR, and the supervisory role of the UNHCR.115 
2.5.1  The UNHCR and national courts 
Türk (2002), Zwaan (2005) and Bruin (2011) distinguish different models of partici-
pation by the UNHCR in national asylum proceedings: 
a.  Status determination: the UNHCR makes the decision of who is a refugee. 
b.  Membership of the national committee or commission responsible for status 
determination. 
c.  Advising and consulting the national administrative and judicial authorities. 
 
                                                        
112 See, for example, Hoeksma 1990, p. 49; UNHCR comments on the European Commission’s pro-
posal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on minimum standards on pro-
cedures in Member States for granting and withdrawing international protection (COM(2009)554, 21 
October 2009), at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4c63ebd32.pdf, p. 40, 41. 
113 See also Wouters 2009, pp. 552, 553. 
114 The supervisory role of the UNHCR is also laid down in Preamble para. 6 of the Refugee Con-
vention, Article 8 of the UNHCR Statute and Article II of the Refugee Protocol. 
115 Bruin 2011, p. 243. 
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The first two models nowadays occur only exceptionally in Europe.116 The focus 
below will, therefore, be on the advisory and consulting role of the UNHCR in rela-
tion to national courts. Article 21 of the EU Procedures Directive stipulates in its first 
paragraph at sub c that the UNHCR is entitled ‘to present its views, in the exercise of 
its supervisory responsibilities under Article 35 of the Geneva Convention, to any 
competent authorities regarding individual applications for asylum at any stage of the 
procedure’.117 This provision entails that the UNHCR is entitled to make submissions 
to national courts in the form of amicus curiae briefs, statements or letters.118 National 
courts cannot refuse the UNHCR leave to intervene with reference to national law. 
ExCom has made clear in its Note on International Protection of 2 July 2003 that it 
considers Article 35 RC very important and that ‘amicus curiae briefs and court 
submissions represent valuable tools to promote the proper interpretation of national 
and international refugee law’.119 Article 21 of the EU Procedures Directive cannot 
be seen in isolation from Articles 8, second paragraph, sub b, and 38, of that Direc-
tive, which concern the administration (not national courts) but also concern the ad-
visory role of the UNHCR and stipulate, in short, that decision makers in asylum 
cases must have access to and gather accurate actual information from different 
sources, including the UNHCR, about the general situation in the countries of origin, 
and that the UNHCR information must also be taken into account in decision 
making concerning the revocation of refugee status.120 
UNHCR submissions may enter the national court proceedings via different pos-
sible routes: 
1.  The UNHCR of its own motion approaches the court and submits a view re-
garding a particular aspect of a pending case, or an integral view on the question 
of whether or not the asylum seeker is a refugee and would, consequently, run 
the risk of being persecuted upon expulsion to the country of origin.  
                                                        
116 Türk 2002, p. 17, Zwaan 2005, p. 51, Bruin 2011, pp. 242, 243. 
117 The supervisory role of the UNHCR is also laid down in a number of provisions contained in other 
EU asylum directives with less relevance for this research as they do not primarily concern the rela-
tionship between the UNHCR and national courts. Zwaan 2005 provides a list of these provisions 
on pp. 84-88; see also the table on pp. 26-27.  
118 Türk 2002, p. 11, Zwaan 2005, p. 7, Wouters 2009, p. 41. 
119 A/AC.96/975, 2 July 2003, para. 45. 
120 EU Directive 2005/85 of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, OJ of the EU L 326, 13 December 2005, p. 13-34. 
Article 8, second paragraph, sub b, stipulates: ‘Member States shall ensure that decisions by the de-
termining authority on applications for asylum are taken after an appropriate examination. To that 
end, Member States shall ensure that: (b) precise and up-to-date information is obtained from va-
rious sources, such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), as to the 
general situation prevailing in the countries of origin of applicants for asylum and, where necessary, 
in countries through which they have transited, and that such information is made available to the 
personnel responsible for examining applications and taking decisions.’ Article 38 stipulates in the 
first paragraph: ‘Member States shall ensure that, where the competent authority is considering with-
drawing the refugee status of a third country national or stateless person in accordance with Article 
14 of Directive 2004/83/EC, the person concerned shall enjoy the following guarantees: (c) the 
competent authority is able to obtain precise and up-to date information from various sources, such 
as, where appropriate, from the UNHCR, as to the general situation prevailing in the countries of 
origin of the persons concerned.’ 
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2a.  One of the parties brings in general information compiled by the UNHCR, that 
is, information which was not specifically compiled for a particular pending case, 
for example, country of origin reports or UNHCR guidelines. 
2b.  One of the parties brings in a view by the UNHCR on the question of whether 
or not the asylum seeker is a refugee. 
2c.  (One of) the parties asks the court to invite the UNHCR to participate in court 
proceedings as an expert or as a witness regarding a particular aspect of the pend-
ing case. 
3a.  The court decides of its own motion to use general written information compiled 
by the UNHCR, for example, country of origin reports or UNHCR guidelines. 
3b.  The court decides of its own motion to invite the UNHCR to submit a view on 
the question of whether or not the asylum seeker is a refugee.121 
3c.  The court decides of its own motion to invite the UNHCR to submit a view on a 
particular aspect of a case as an expert or witness, either in writing or orally dur-
ing court hearings. 
 
In order to provide national asylum courts with concrete examples of how co-opera-
tion with the UNHCR can take place, the next section will analyse how the two inter-
national Courts in the European Union, the ECtHR and the CJEU, co-operate with 
the UNHCR. 
2.5.2  The ECtHR and the UNHCR 
Zwaan (2005) provides a list of judgments and decisions of the ECtHR in which the 
UNHCR is mentioned.122 In at least the following final cases the UNHCR filed case-
specific submissions to the ECtHR:123 
- T.I. v. the United Kingdom (2000), a case concerning (the operation and application 
of) the Dublin Convention124 (see Chapter 7);125 
                                                        
121 In the past, the Dutch Council of State used to invite the UNHCR representative in the Netherlands 
to submit its view, during a hearing open to the public, in every single asylum case coming before it. 
In the period between 1976 and 1994 the Raad van State functioned as the court of first instance 
performing judicial review in asylum cases. The old practice of inviting the UNHCR to submit its 
view in every asylum case was not taken up again in 2001, the year in which – after a period of ab-
sence of jurisdiction – the Council of State became the higher appeal instance in asylum cases. 
Hoeksma (former legal advisor of the UNHCR branch office in the Netherlands) has collected 
UNHCR Submissions to the Council of State in his book ‘De Menselijke maat, zienswijzen in 
asielzaken’ of 1990, see bibliography. 
122 Zwaan 2005, pp. 97-146. 
123  See also Westerveen 2011, p. 214. 
124 At the time of this case, the predecessor of the EU Dublin Regulation (Regulation 2003/ 343/EC of 
18 February 2003, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State re-
sponsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the Member States by a third coun-
try national, OJ of the EU L 50, 25 February 2003, pp. 1-10, last amended by OJ of the EU L 304, 14 
November 2008, p. 83), was in force, being the Dublin Convention (Convention determining the 
State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one of the Member States of the 
European Communities, 15 June 1990). 
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- K.K.C. v. the Netherlands (2001), in which the ECtHR granted leave to the 
UNHCR to submit a written intervention and specifically requested that its sub-
mission should address the practical and legal situation of displaced persons from 
Chechnya in the Russian Federation;126 
- Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands (2008), in which case the UNHCR made a submis-
sion in order to assist the ECtHR in clarifying the appropriate standard and bur-
den of proof in asylum cases as well as the scope of judicial review, in particular 
in relation to credibility issues (see above 2.4.2 and 2.4.5);127 
- Saadi v. the United Kingdom (2008), in which the UNHCR expressed its stance on, 
inter alia, the legal status of asylum seekers pending the processing of an asylum 
claim;128 
- Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey (2009), discussed in more detail below;129 
- M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (2011), a case concerning the operation and appli-
cation of the EU Dublin Regulation (see Chapter 7);130 
- Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy (2012), which submission addressed the practice and 
justification of ‘push-back’ operations, that is interception and return of asylum 
seekers at sea by the Italian government, the situation and legal status of asylum 
seekers and refugees in Libya, and the extra-territorial scope of the principle of 
non-refoulement and pursuant legal obligations concerning the rescue and intercep-
tion of people at sea.131 
 
The cases mentioned by Zwaan and those listed above may serve as examples to 
national courts in three ways. First, they illustrate what kind of information the 
UNHCR submitted. Second, they show how this information entered the ECtHR’s 
proceedings and whether the initiative was taken by the UNHCR, a party to the case, 
or the ECtHR. In principle, the UNHCR’s views may enter the proceedings before 
                                                        
125 ECtHR, T.I. v. the UK, admissibility decision, 7 March 2000, Appl. No. 43844/98; the UNHCR Sub-
mission can be found at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/42f7737c4, last visited 23 August 
2011. 
126 ECtHR, K.K.C. v. the Netherlands, admissibility decision, 3 July 2001, Appl. No. 58964/00; the 
UNHCR Submission can be found at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/ 42f774674.pdf, last 
visited 23 August 2011. 
127 ECtHR, Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands, 31 January 2008, Appl. No. 31252/03, decision to strike the 
application out of the list; the UNHCR Submission can be found at http://www.unhcr.org/ref-
world/docid/454f5e484.html, last visited 23 August 2011. 
128 ECtHR, Saadi v. the UK, 29 January 2008, Appl. No. 13229/03; the UNHCR Submission can be 
found at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/47c520722.pdf, last visited 23 August 2011. 
129 ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 2009, Application No. 30471/08. Bruin 
and Reneman have extensively commented on this judgment in NAV, No. 6 of December 2009; the 
UNHCR Submission can be found at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4991ad9f2.html, last 
visited 23 August 2011. 
130 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09. See for a detailed analysis 
of this case Van Bennekom & Van der Winden 2011, pp. 99-103, and Battjes 2011. The UNHCR 
Submission can be found at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c19e7512.html, last visited 23 
August 2011. 
131 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09. The UNHCR Submis-
sion in this case can be found at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4d92d2c22.html, last 
visited 19 December 2012. 
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the ECtHR via the same routes as those described above, the only difference being 
that the UNHCR has no right of intervention before the ECtHR but needs to be 
granted leave to intervene.132 Third, these cases illustrate how the ECtHR weighed 
and appreciated the information submitted by the UNHCR. A good illustration of all 
three questions is the case of Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey (2009).133 The case 
concerned two Iran ian applicants who were former members of the Iranian People’s 
Mojahedin Organisation (PMOI). They were recognised as refugees by the UNHCR 
while they were staying in Iraq. After leaving the PMOI, they went to the Temporary 
Interview and Protection Facility, a camp created by the United States forces in Iraq, 
subsequently named the Ashraf Refugee Camp. In April 2008, the Ashraf Refugee 
Camp was closed down and the applicants, along with other former PMOI members, 
were transferred to northern Iraq. After this, on an unspecified date, the applicants 
arrived in Turkey, with the aim of contacting the UNHCR in Turkey and asking it to 
process their (resettlement) cases. The Turkish authorities arrested them and deport-
ed them back to Iraq, after which they immediately re-entered Turkey. The authori-
ties then attempted to deport them once again, to Iran this time. The ECtHR assess-
ed the risk the applicants would run if expelled to Iraq and the risk they would run if 
expelled to Iran. In this assessment, the ECtHR used three different types of 
UNHCR information which entered the proceedings in three different ways. 
First, the ECtHR invited the UNHCR to submit a written intervention as a third 
party. The Chamber President gave it leave to intervene in the written procedure as a 
third party under Article 36(2)ECHR and Rule 44(2) of the Rules of Court.134 The 
Court specifically requested that the UNHCR’s submission should address a number 
of specific questions, inter alia the procedural rules and principles governing its refu-
gee status determination in Turkey, the situation and legal status of asylum seekers 
and refugees in Turkey, and the relationship between the UNHCR in Turkey and the 
Turkish national authorities.135 
Second, the applicants brought in UNHCR information, being a Report by the 
UNHCR Resettlement Service of February 2008, entitled ‘Information Regarding 
Iranian Refugees in the Temporary Interview Protection Facility (ex-TIPF/ARC) at 
Al-Ashraf, Iraq’.136 The applicants also relied on the refugee status determination 
made by the UNHCR while they were living in Iraq.137 Third, the ECtHR, of its own 
motion, decided to bring in and use general UNHCR information: its press release 
                                                        
132 See Article 36, second paragraph, ECHR. The President of the Chamber may, in the interests of the 
proper administration of justice, invite, or grant leave to, any person concerned who is not the ap-
plicant, to submit written comments, or, in exceptional cases, to take part in a hearing. See also Rules 
1(o), 34 paras. 4, 44 and 77 para. 3, Rules of Court. The Rules of Court do not provide a right of in-
tervention. The invitation or grant of leave to organisations to intervene is made in the event that 
such an organisation can establish an interest in the outcome of the case and contribute information 
or argumentation of use to the Court during the consideration of the case. See Zwaan 2005, p. 39. 
133 ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 2009, Application No. 30471/08. 
134  Ibidem, para. 5. 
135 See the Submission by the UNHCR in the case of Abdolkhani & Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 
2009, Appl. No. 30471/08, p. 1. 
136  ECtHR, Abdolkhani & Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 2009, Appl. No. 30471/08, para. 46. 
137  Ibidem, paras. 66 and 67. 
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issued on 25 April 2008 stating: ‘UNHCR deplores refugee expulsion by Turkey 
which resulted in four deaths’.138 
The ECtHR used these three types of UNHCR information, as well as other 
sources containing country of origin information and other, more individual, evi-
dence, to assess the risk. It gave considerable weight to the different documents sub-
mitted by or compiled by the UNHCR, considering that: 
 
‘The UNHCR submitted that former PMOI refugees faced further security risks in Iraq in ad-
dition to being affected by the general conditions of insecurity in the country. (…) The Court 
finds the UNHCR’s concerns reasonable having regard, in particular, to the fact that Iraq is not 
a party to the 1951 Geneva Convention. (… ) Given that the applicants’ deportation to Iraq 
would be carried out in the absence of a legal framework providing adequate safeguards against 
risks of death or ill-treatment in Iraq and against the applicants’ removal to Iran by the Iraqi 
authorities, the Court considers that there are substantial grounds for believing that the ap-
plicants risk a violation of their rights under Article 3 of the Convention if returned to Iraq.’139 
 
Particularly interesting is the weight the ECtHR attached to information from the 
UNHCR in the assessment of the risk upon expulsion to Iran. It referred to infor-
mation from different sources and considered that it was, in fact, unclear what conse-
quences expulsion to Iran would have, and that, as a consequence, it could not draw 
firm conclusions on the risk of expulsion of the applicants to Iran.140 The ECtHR 
considered it important that the UNHCR never obtained access to returned former 
PMOI members: 
 
‘Nevertheless, it is significant that there is a lack of reliable public information concerning such 
a large group of persons. Furthermore, the Court cannot overlook the fact that the UNHCR 
have not had access to the returnees in Iran, and that the Iranian Government’s promise of 
amnesty for PMOI members has never been realised.’141 
 
The Court also attached considerable weight to the refugee status determination by 
the UNHCR while the applicants were living in Iraq. It considered: 
 
‘The Court must also give due weight to the UNHCR’s conclusions regarding the applicants’ 
claims, before making its own assessment of the risk which the applicants would face if they 
were to be removed to Iran (see Jabari, cited above, § 41, and N.A. v. the United Kingdom, cited 
above, § 122). In this connection, the Court observes that, unlike the Turkish authorities, the 
UNHCR interviewed the applicants and had the opportunity to test the credibility of their 
fears and the veracity of their account of circumstances in their country of origin. Following 
these interviews, it found that the applicants risked being subjected to an arbitrary deprivation 
of life, detention and ill-treatment in their country of origin (see paragraphs 8 and 9 above).’142 
                                                        
138  Ibidem, para. 47. 
139  Ibidem, paras. 71, 86-89. 
140 Ibidem, paras. 78-81. 
141 Ibidem, para. 81. 
142 Ibidem, para. 82. 
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The case of Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey (2009) demonstrates that the ECtHR 
generally gives considerable weight to information submitted by the UNHCR. Other 
judgments confirm this. For example, in K.R.S. v. UK (2008), the ECtHR considered 
that information submitted by the UNHCR is to be regarded as independent, reliable 
and objective.143 In addition to Abdolkhani and Karimnia, there are many other cases in 
which the ECtHR attached great weight to refugee status determinations by the 
UNHCR.144 Information on countries of origin compiled by the UNHCR is also fre-
quently used by the ECtHR (next to other sources) as happened in the case of 
Abdolkhani and Karimnia. The ECtHR tends to give the UNHCR’s information on the 
countries of origin substantial value because of its access to the authorities of the 
country of origin as well as its ability to carry out on-site inspections and assessments 
in a manner which States and non-governmental organisations may not be able to 
do.145 The exact evidentiary value accorded by the ECtHR to the UNHCR’s country 
of origin information is also determined by the specific content of this information: 
the more the information is couched in terms of an Article 3-ECHR risk, the more 
weight the ECtHR tends to give to it, whereas when the UNHCR information fo-
cuses more on general socio-economic and humanitarian conditions in a particular 
country, the ECtHR is inclined to accord less weight to it.146 
2.5.3  The CJEU and the UNHCR 
So far, the UNHCR has had no possibility to intervene of its own accord in cases be-
fore the CJEU. According to Article 40 of the Protocol of the Statute of the CJEU,147 
the right of intervention in cases before the CJEU belongs only to Member States 
and institutions of the EU. The right of intervention is also open to any other person 
establishing an interest in the result of any cases submitted to the Court, save in cases 
between Member States, between EU institutions or between Member States and EU 
institutions. An important limitation is that an application to intervene shall be lim-
ited to supporting one of the parties. A third party wishing to intervene, therefore, 
has to have an interest in the case and has to support one of the parties. All of this 
                                                        
143 See, for example, the admissibility decision of the ECtHR K.R.S. v. UK, 2 December 2008, Appl. 
No. 32733/08, p. 16. 
144 See, in addition to Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey also ECtHR, Jabari v. Turkey, 11 July 2000, Appl. 
No. 40035/98, para. 41; ECtHR, Ayatollahi and Hosseinzadeh v. Turkey, admissibility decision, 23 
March 2010, Appl. No. 32971/98; ECtHR, Charahili v. Turkey, 13 April 2010, Appl. No. 46605/07, 
para. 59; ECtHR, Khaydarov v. Russia, 20 May 2010, Appl. No. 21055/09, para. 109; ECtHR, M.B. and 
others v. Turkey, 15 June 2010, Appl. No. 36009/08, paras. 14 and 33-34; ECtHR, Dbouba v. Turkey, 13 
July 2010, Appl. No. 15916/09, paras. 42, 43. 
145  See, for example, ECtHR, N.A. v. the UK, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, para. 121. 
146 Ibidem, para. 122. See also ECtHR. F.H. v. Sweden, 20 January 2009, Appl. No. 32621/06, para. 92, 
where the ECtHR stated that where reports are focused on general socio-economic and humani-
tarian conditions, it has been inclined to accord less weight to them, since such conditions do not 
necessarily have a bearing on the question of a real risk to an individual applicant of ill-treatment 
within the meaning of Article 3. 
147  Protocol of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EU, 30 March 2010, OJ 2010, C 83/210, 
http://curia.europa.eu under Statute of the Court of Justice of the EU. 
RC 
 
 
 
47 
means that in a large number of cases only Member States or EU institutions can in-
tervene.148 
Under Article 25 of the Protocol of the Statute of the CJEU, the Court may at 
any time entrust any individual, body, authority, committee or other organisation it 
chooses with the task of giving an expert opinion. Under Article 26 of the Protocol 
the Court may hear witnesses. Via these routes the Court is able to invite the 
UNHCR to submit an expert opinion and hear it as a witness in asylum cases. Unlike 
the ECtHR, the CJEU has so far not used these opportunities. And unlike the 
ECtHR, the Court has so far not explicitly referred to UNHCR statements, position 
papers or other UNHCR information.149 
However, what has actually happened and happens in asylum cases before the 
CJEU is that the UNHCR has in fact intervened in an informal and indirect way by 
making a statement or comment in the context of a case pending before the Court 
and issuing such a statement or comment on the internet. In fact, the UNHCR has is-
sued such documents in the context of every asylum case before the CJEU. For ex-
ample, in the context of the case of Brahim Samba Diouf (2011) it issued its Statement 
on the right to an effective remedy in relation to accelerated asylum procedures of 21 
May 2010.150 Advocates-General (A-Gs) take notice of these UNHCR statements and 
also of other documents issued by the UNHCR and refer to them in their opinions 
on the case. In this way, the UNHCR has become an informal amicus of the CJEU.151 
Some examples are provided below to illustrate how this works in practice. 
In his opinion on the case of M. and N. Elgafaji (2008, discussed in Chapter 6),152 
A-G Maduro pointed out that the EU Member States had adopted very different 
refugee protection systems and that certain Member States had provided for a higher 
level of protection than that conferred under Article 3 ECHR. To illustrate this point, 
Maduro referred to the study by the UNHCR entitled ‘Asylum in the European 
Union, A Study of the Implementation of the Qualification Directive’ of November 
                                                        
148  Article 40 of the Protocol of the Statute of the Court of Justice of the EU stipulates: ‘Member States 
and institutions of the Union may intervene in cases before the Court of Justice. The same right 
shall be open to the bodies, offices and agencies of the Union and to any other person which can 
establish an interest in the result of a case submitted to the Court. Natural or legal persons shall not 
intervene in cases between Member States, between institutions of the Union or between Member 
States and institutions of the Union. Without prejudice to the second paragraph, the States, other 
than the Member States, which are parties to the Agreement on the European Economic Area, and 
also the EFTA Surveillance Authority referred to in that Agreement, may intervene in cases before 
the Court where one of the fields of application of that Agreement is concerned.  
An application to intervene shall be limited to supporting the form of order sought by one of the 
parties.’ 
See on the limited possibilities for the UNHCR to participate in proceedings before the ECtHR also 
Zwaan 2005, p. 50 and Pollet 2011, p. 220. 
149 See for the same conclusion Bruin 2011, p. 244. 
150 These statements are readily accessible on RefWorld via the query UNHCR, name of the case, under 
the heading ‘related documents’.  
151 Bruin 2011, p. 244. See on this practice also Pollet 2011, p. 220. 
152 Opinion of A-G Poiares Maduro delivered on 9 September 2008 in Case C-465/07 of M. and N. 
Elgafaji v. Staatssecretaris van Justitie (reference for a preliminary ruling from the Nederlandse Raad van 
State). 
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2007.153 Another example is the A-G’s opinion in the case of Abdulla and others 
(2009).154 A-G Mazák mentioned in his opinion on the case that the referring national 
court had doubts as to exactly which conditions should be met for cessation of 
refugee status under Article 11(e) of Directive 2004/83, and that this doubt had also 
been caused by the fact that the UNHCR’s comments on the provisions of the RC 
governing cessation of refugee status were somewhat unclear. The A-G referred in 
note 7 to the ‘UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: Cessation of Refugee 
Status under Article 1(C) (5) and (6) of the RC’ of 10 February 2003. These UNHCR 
Guidelines stipulate in points 15 and 16 that, in addition to the requirement that the 
fear of persecution has ceased to exist, there is a need for the existence of a function-
ing government and fundamental administrative structures, as evidenced by a func-
tioning system of law and justice, as well as the existence of an adequate infra-
structure to enable residents to exercise their rights, including their right to a basic 
livelihood. This position taken by the UNHCR clearly influenced the A-G’s opinion 
as, in answering one of the posed questions, the A-G stated that, for refugee status to 
cease to exist, there had to be a lasting solution from persecution in the country of 
nationality. To assume this, there had to be an actor of protection which took reason-
able steps to prevent persecution, inter alia, by operating an effective legal system for 
the detection, prosecution and punishment of acts constituting persecution.155 
In her opinion on the case of Bolbol (2010)156 A-G Sharpston made clear how she 
treated the statement issued by the UNHCR specifically in the context of the Bolbol 
case. In her opinion, she stated that:  
 
‘The UNHCR occasionally makes statements which have persuasive, but not binding, force. 
His Office has published various statements which relate to the interpretation of Article 1D of 
the 1951 Convention: a commentary in its Handbook (…), a note published in 2002 (and re-
vised in 2009) and a 2009 statement (also subsequently revised) which relates expressly to Ms 
Bolbol’s case. I intend to treat this last as an unofficial amicus curiae brief.’157 
 
Bolbol concerned a stateless Palestinian who had arrived in Hungary from the Gaza 
Strip. The case hinged on the interpretation of Article 12(1)(a) of EU Council Di-
rective 2004/83, a provision reflecting Article 1D RC which stipulates, in short, that 
the RC does not apply to persons receiving protection from UN organs or agencies 
other than the UNHCR. In her opinion, A-G Sharpston quoted a number of pro-
visions from the UNHCR Handbook and from two UNHCR notes concerning the 
interpretation of Article 1D RC.158 Materially, A-G Sharpston partly agreed and partly 
                                                        
153 To be found at: http://www.unhcr.org/47302b6c2.html, last visited 19 December 2012.  
154 Opinion of A-G Mazák delivered on 15 September 2009 in joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-
178/08 and C-179/08 of Abdulla and others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland. 
155 Opinion of A-G Mazák in joined Cases C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08 of Abdulla and 
others v. Bundesrepublik Deutschland, para. 77. 
156 CJEU, Bolbol v. Bevándorlási és állampolgársági Hivatal, 17 June 2010, C-31/09. Commented on by R. 
Bruin, National Officer UNHCR the Netherlands, in JV 2010, 338. 
157 Opinion of A-G Sharpston delivered on 4 March 2010 in Case C-31/09 of Bolbol v. Bevándorlási és 
állampolgársági Hivatal, para. 16. 
158 Ibidem, paras. 17, 18, 19. 
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disagreed with the UNHCR’s interpretation. Importantly, she motivated her dis-
agreement very carefully.159 The fact that the A-G quoted the UNHCR’s position and 
the fact that she partly agreed with it, and extensively motivated her partial disagree-
ment implied that she regarded the UNHCR’s interpretation as authoritative and at-
tached serious weight to it.  
As a final example, the opinion of A-G Mengozzi of the joined Cases of the Fed-
eral Republic of Germany v. B and D can be mentioned.160 Mengozzi referred numerous 
times to the UNHCR’s Handbook and to its Guidelines of International Protection. 
The case of B. and D. concerned Turkish nationals of Kurdish origin with a past of 
commitment to the right of Kurds to self-determination and of guerrilla fighting for 
that purpose. The case hinged on the interpretation of Article 12(2) (b) and (c) of EU 
Council Directive 2004/83, provisions concerning exclusion from refugee status. 
Mengozzi made clear that he considered it important to take account of the guidance 
that emerged from the various documents issued by the UNHCR.161 
To conclude, it may be said that although the CJEU has so far not explicitly re-
ferred to UNHCR statements, position papers, guidelines or other information, the 
A-Gs de facto treat the UNHCR as an amicus curiae and regard UNHCR information as 
very authoritative. Given the approach of the A-Gs, and given the ECtHR’s approach 
to the UNHCR, it will probably be only a matter of time before the CJEU itself will 
start to make direct use of the UNHCR’s information by, for example, appointing it 
as a witness under Article 26 of the Protocol of the Court or by entrusting it, under 
Article 25 of the Protocol of the Court, with the task of giving an expert opinion. 
Such a development would be all the more logical, given the fact that Article 21, first 
paragraph, at sub c, of the EU Procedures Directive entitles the UNHCR to present 
submissions to national courts. 
2.6  Concluding remarks 
The Refugee Convention, which is the only universal treaty on refugee protection and 
the cornerstone of the CEAS, contains a number of provisions on national (judicial) 
proceedings. These are Article 16 on access to courts, Article 32 on expulsion on 
grounds of national security and public order and the procedure to be followed in 
cases of expulsion, and Article 35 on co-operation of national authorities with the 
UNHCR. In this chapter the content of these provisions has been explored. 
Article 16 RC requires that refugees have free access to national courts. Article 32 
requires that the decision to expel a refugee shall be taken in accordance with due 
process of law. In literature, different positions are taken on the question of whether 
these two provisions apply to contemporary judicial proceedings concerning the de-
termination of refugee status and refoulement. A dynamic and liberal interpretation of 
Articles 16 and 32 leads to the conclusion that both provisions do apply to such 
                                                        
159 Ibidem, paras. 59, 72 and 76. 
160 Opinion of A-G Mengozzi delivered on 1 June 2010 in joined Cases C-57/09 and C-101/09 of Fed-
eral Republic of Germany v. B and D. 
161 Ibidem, paras. 42 and 43. 
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judicial proceedings. Article 16 RC is primarily a non-discrimination provision, mean-
ing that it entails that refugees should not be required to meet extra, or more strin-
gent, admissibility conditions which do not apply to nationals in similar court pro-
ceedings. In a number of EU countries, shorter time limits for lodging an appeal to 
the court apply in asylum cases (compared to other administrative law cases). Shorter 
time limits constitute a more stringent admissibility condition and are incompatible 
with Article 16. In section 2.4 it was argued that Articles 16 and 32 RC may be inter-
preted in the light of the UNHCR’s position on issues of evidence and on judicial 
scrutiny in national judicial asylum proceedings. The investigation has demonstrated 
that the UNHCR has developed concrete standards and principles with regard to ten 
of the eleven aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny. These standards and principles 
are summarised below. 
The standard of proof is that persecution is reasonably possible; it is not required 
to prove well-foundedness conclusively beyond doubt. The burden of proof, in 
principle, rests on the applicant, but the duty to ascertain and evaluate all the relevant 
facts is shared between the applicant and the examiner (the first instance (administra-
tive) decision maker and the court); in some cases, it may be for the examiner to use 
all the means at his or her disposal to produce the necessary evidence in support of 
the application; this means that in some cases it is necessary that the court actively ap-
plies investigative powers to bring in additional evidence. 
Both personal circumstances and elements concerning the situation in the coun-
try of origin are relevant. A number of examples were provided. The particular facts 
and circumstances of the case – both individual and concerning the situation in the 
country of origin – have to be seen in conjunction and approached in a holistic way, 
and not in isolation.  
As far as the required degree of individual risk is concerned, the UNHCR Hand-
book distinguishes two main kinds of situations: the normal situation in which refu-
gee status is determined on an individual basis and the exceptional situation in which 
group determination takes place whereby each member of the group is prima facie 
regarded as a refugee. Neither of these two situations poses a strict requirement of 
being singled out as the risk does not necessarily need to be based on the personal 
experiences of the applicant. For individuals belonging to a group that is targeted as a 
whole it is not necessary to be further singled out.  
Overall credibility is required, not absolute credibility of every single statement, 
the inability to remember or provide all dates or minor details, as well as minor in-
consistencies, insubstantial vagueness or incorrect statements but should not be used 
as decisive factors. It is necessary that national courts independently and on their own 
assess the credibility of the statements of the asylum seeker. 
The requirement of evidence should not be applied too strictly, and it is not al-
lowed to require evidence of every single statement; even the complete absence of 
supportive evidence does not automatically mean that the claim is unmeritorious. It is 
not allowed to impose a stricter credibility criterion than the criterion of overall credi-
bility in cases of complete absence of corroborating evidence. 
Information used as a basis for decisions should be similarly available to the asy-
lum seeker and his or her legal adviser/counsellor, and should, further, be subject to 
the scrutiny of review/appeal authorities. 
RC 
 
 
 
51 
It is the task of the national court to independently establish the disputed facts of 
the case, which includes the possibility to apply investigative powers so as to adduce 
additional evidential materials in order to establish the facts. 
As far as time limits for the presentation of statements and evidence are concern-
ed, the applicant should, in principle, make all the relevant statements and submit all 
the available corroborating evidence as early as possible; however, in order to avoid 
any erroneous decision, the appeal authorities should have an opportunity either to 
take statements and corroborating evidence, which was submitted during the appeal 
stage and not earlier, into consideration or to refer the case back to the first instance 
authority so that this authority can first look at this new evidence; no case should be 
rejected solely on the basis that the relevant information was not presented or docu-
ments were not submitted earlier. 
The risk assessment by the national court should be ex nunc, that is, at the time of 
investigation by the national court. 
Article 35 RC, in conjunction with Article 21, first paragraph, sub c, of the EU 
Procedures Directive, entails that the UNHCR is entitled to make submissions to na-
tional courts in individual asylum appeal cases in the form of amicus curiae briefs, state-
ments or letters. UNHCR submissions may enter the national court proceedings via 
different avenues: on the initiative of the UNHCR, on the initiative of a party to the 
case or by invitation of the national court. On the basis of Articles 16 and 35, seen in 
conjunction, national courts may invite the UNHCR to participate in court proceed-
ings as an expert or witness who can advise the court on a particular aspect of a case 
or submit its opinion on the question of whether or not the claimant is a refugee. In 
order to provide national asylum courts with concrete examples of how co-operation 
with the UNHCR can take place, it was demonstrated how the two international 
Courts in the European Union, the ECtHR and the CJEU, work together with the 
UNHCR. The ECtHR frequently takes into consideration, and attaches significant 
weight to, general information compiled by the UNHCR, such as country reports and 
guidelines, and has in some cases invited it to intervene in the case and bring in a sub-
mission on the specific merits of pending cases or a submission concerning a specific 
question. The case law of the ECtHR clearly illustrates what role the UNHCR and 
information compiled by it may play in court proceedings. This case law may serve as 
a source of inspiration for national courts. Generally, the ECtHR treats the UNHCR 
as an independent, reliable and objective source of information, and attaches signi-
ficant weight to the information it submits, particularly when this information is 
couched in terms of Article 3 ECHR.  
The CJEU has, so far, not explicitly referred to UNHCR statements, position 
papers, guidelines or other information. This may partly be explained by the fact that 
this Court has so far dealt with only a very limited number of asylum cases. Another 
explanation is that the UNHCR has so far had no possibility to intervene of its own 
accord in cases before the CJEU, as Article 40 of the Protocol of the Statute of the 
CJEU bars this. What has actually happened, however, is that the UNHCR has, in 
fact, intervened in an informal and indirect way because Advocates-General have 
treated its statements, position papers, guidelines or other information as information 
submitted by informal amicus curiae. It was made clear that the A-Gs at the CJEU treat 
the UNHCR’s information as highly authoritative. Given the approach of the A-Gs 
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and the ECtHR, and given the fact that the UNHCR is entitled to make submissions 
to national courts, it may be expected that, in the near future, the CJEU will start to 
make direct use of its positions. 
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Chapter 3: The 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR)1 
3.1  Introduction 
The ICCPR was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 16 De-
cember 1966 and it entered into force on 23 March 1976.2 The ICCPR has been rati-
fied by a large number of States: 167.3 They include all 27 Member States of the 
European Union.4 There are two Optional Protocols to the ICCPR. The First Op-
tional Protocol,5 which entered into force on the same date as the ICCPR itself, es-
tablishes an individual complaints mechanism, allowing individuals to complain to the 
Human Rights Committee (HRC) about violations of the ICCPR.6 The First Op-
tional Protocol has 113 parties, including all the EU Member States, except the UK.7 
As the UK is party to the ICCPR itself, this State is bound by it and by the inter-
pretations of treaty provisions given by the HRC, the body created by the ICCPR to 
monitor the compliance of States parties with the treaty provisions. However, as a 
result of the fact that the UK has not ratified the First Optional Protocol, individuals 
in the UK, including asylum seekers, cannot bring communications to the HRC. The 
Second Optional Protocol8 entered into force on 11 July1991. It commits its mem-
bers to the abolition of the death penalty within their borders.9 The Second Optional 
Protocol has 73 States parties, including all 27 EU Member States. 
                                                        
1 See the following literature for more comprehensive descriptions and analyses of the history and 
working of the ICCPR: Van Dijk (and others) 1987, Nowak 1993, McGoldrick 1996, Ghandi 1998, 
Hanski & Scheinin 2003, Carlson& Gisvold 2003, Conte, Davidson & Burchill 2004, Nowak 2005, 
Joseph, Schultz & Castan 2005, Hanski & Scheinin 2007, Steiner, Alston & Goodman 2008. For the 
role of the ICCPR in international asylum law, see in particular Wouters 2009, Chapter 4. 
2 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200 A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171; see http://treaties.un.org under ‘Status of Treaties’.  
3 The number of States Parties mentioned here reflects the situation on 31 December 2012. See: 
http://treaties.un.org and http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/International_Covenant_on_Civil_and_Po-
litical_Rights. 
4 The number of Member States mentioned here reflects the situation on 31 December 2012; see 
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_nl.htm. 
5 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 59, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 302. 
6 Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR stipulates: ‘A State Party to the Covenant that 
becomes a Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive 
and consider communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of 
a violation by that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication 
shall be received by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party 
to the present Protocol.’ 
7 The number of Member States mentioned here reflects the situation on 31 July 2011; see 
http://treaties.un.org. 
8 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 44/128, annex, 44 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 49) at 
207, U.N. Doc. A/44/49 (1989). 
9 Article 1 of the Second Optional Protocol to the ICCPR stipulates that: ‘no one within the 
jurisdiction of a State Party to the present Protocol shall be executed and that each State Party shall 
take all necessary measures to abolish the death penalty within its jurisdiction.’ 
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The ICCPR (1966) is a universal general human rights treaty which, together with 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR, 
1966)10 gives treaty status to human rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights (UDHR, 1948).11 Both these treaties form the core of the internation-
al human rights protection instruments of the United Nations, the so called ‘Interna-
tional Bill of Human Rights’. Unlike the UDHR, the ICCPR and ICESCR are both 
treaties and, therefore, legally binding on the States parties to them. The International 
Bill of Human Rights is further supplemented by a number of specialised treaties es-
tablished within the framework of the United Nations, for example, the Convention 
against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT), investigated in Chapter 4 of this book. 
3.1.1  The ICCPR and asylum 
The ICCPR does not contain a right to asylum.12 Article 7 ICCPR stipulates that no 
one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment and that no one shall be subjected without his or her free consent to medical 
or scientific experimentation. The HRC has interpreted Article 7 in such a way that 
States parties must not expose individuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment upon return to another country by way of 
their extradition, expulsion or refoulement. The first decision on the merits of an indi-
vidual complaint in which the prohibition on refoulement was confirmed by the HRC 
was Kindler v. Canada (1993),13 a case concerning the extradition from Canada of a 
United States citizen who had been convicted in the United States of first degree 
murder and kidnapping. Kindler claimed that he would be put on death row upon ex-
tradition to the US. The HRC found that Kindler’s extradition did not amount to a 
violation of Articles 6 (the right to life) and 7. It considered, in short, that Articles 6 
and 7 did not prohibit the imposition of the death penalty for the most serious 
crimes, that Kindler had been indeed convicted of premeditated murder, a very se-
rious crime, that Kindler was an adult, that the extradition took place after extensive 
proceedings in the Canadian courts, which reviewed all the evidence, that the bilateral 
treaty on extradition between the United States and Canada did not require Canada to 
refuse to extradite or to seek assurances, and, finally, that the case differed very much 
from the Soering case14 decided upon by the ECtHR (see chapter 5, section 5.1.1).15 
The refoulement prohibition elaborated in Kindler was expanded to the situation of 
the expulsion of asylum seekers in the case of A.R.J. v. Australia (1997).16 A.R.J., a 
                                                        
10 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 49, 
U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 993 U.N.T.S. 3, which entered into force on 3 January 1976. 
11 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 217 A (III), U.N. Doc A/810 at 71 (1948). 
12 See, for example, HRC, V.M.R.B. v. Canada, 26 July 1988, No. 236/1987, para. 6.3. 
13 HRC, Kindler v. Canada, 18 November 1993, No. 470/1991.  
14 ECtHR, Soering v. the UK, 7 July 1989, Appl. No. 14038/88. 
15 HRC, Kindler v. Canada, 18 November 1993, No. 470/1991, paras. 14.2-15.3. See also General Com-
ment of the HRC No. 20 on Article 7 (1992), para. 9; General Comment of the HRC No. 31 (2004) 
on general legal obligations imposed on States parties to the Covenant, para. 12. 
16 HRC, A.R.J. v. Australia, 11 August 1997, No. 692/1996. 
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crew member of a vessel of the Iranian Shipping Line, was arrested in Australia for il-
legal importation and possession of two kilograms of cannabis resin. While in prison, 
the author applied for refugee status, which was refused. Before the HRC, A.R.J. 
complained that his deportation to Iran would violate Articles 6 and 7 ICCPR. He 
stated that, because of the drug-related offence committed, he would be subject to 
the death penalty and would be persecuted in Iran.17 Australia stated that it had 
sought independent legal advice through its embassy in Tehran, and that the advice 
given was that it would be very unlikely that an Iranian citizen who had already 
served a sentence abroad for a drug-related offence would be retried and resentenced 
and that, in short, in this case there was no risk of a violation of Article 7.18 The HRC 
found that the author’s allegations that his deportation to Iran would expose him to 
treatment contrary to Article 7 had been refuted by the evidence provided by the 
State party. This evidence had shown that the maximum sentence for trafficking the 
amount of cannabis the author had been convicted of in Australia would be five years 
in Iran, that no arrest warrant was outstanding in Iran, and that there were no pre-
cedents in which an individual in a situation similar to the author’s had faced capital 
charges and been sentenced to death. The HRC found the risk that the author would 
be retried and resentenced, and, as a result, exposed to lashes, not real, as, first, there 
was no evidence of an actual intention on the part of the Iranian authorities to prose-
cute him, and second, there were no similar deportation cases in which prosecution 
had been initiated in Iran.19 After A.R.J. v. Australia (1997), other cases concerning 
the expulsion of asylum seekers reached the HRC. In a limited number of these cases 
the HRC considered the merits.20 In other cases, it declared the communication in-
admissible, mostly for lack of substantiation.21 
The prohibition on refoulement under Article 7 ICCPR is non-derogable. This 
means that even in times of war or other public emergencies, it is not allowed for 
                                                        
17 Ibidem, paras. 3.1, 3.2, 3.3. 
18 Ibidem, paras. 4.6, 4.7. 
19 Ibidem, paras. 6.12-6.15. 
20 HRC, C. v. Australia, 13 November 2002, No. 900/1999 (violation Article 7); HRC, Ahani v. Canada, 
15 June 2004, No. 1051/2002 (violation Article 13 in conjunction with Article 7); HRC, Byaruhanga v. 
Denmark, 9 December 2004, No. 1222/2003 (violation Article 7); HRC, Alzery v. Sweden, 10 Novem-
ber 2006, No. 1416/2005 (violation Article 7, read alone, and in conjunction with Article 2); HRC, 
Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 18 March 2010, No. 1544/2007 (violation Article 7);HRC, Kaba v. 
Canada, 25 March 2010, No. 1465/2006 (violation Article 7); HRC, Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada, 
25 March 2011, No. 1763/2008 (violation Article 7). 
21 Cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers in which the HRC declared the communication 
inadmissible are HRC, Bakhtiyari and Bakhtiyari v. Australia, 6 November 2003, No. 1069/2002; HRC, 
Daljit Singh v. Canada, 28 April 2006, No. 1315/2004; HRC, Dawood Khan v. Canada, 10 August 2006, 
No. 1302/2004; HRC, Jagjit SinghBhullar v. Canada, 13 November 2006, No. 982/2001; HRC, Hamid 
Reza Taghi Khadje v. the Netherlands, 15 November 2006, No. 1438/2005; HRC, Bianca Lilia Londoño 
Soto and others v. Australia, 14 April 2008, No. 1429/2005 (deportation case, the authors had not lodg-
ed an asylum claim at national level but contended that their deportation to Colombia would violate 
Article 7); HRC, Mahmoud Walid Nakrash and Liu Qifen v. Sweden, 30 October 2008, No. 1540/2007; 
HRC, A.C. v. the Netherlands, 22 July 2008, No. 1494/2006; HRC, Moses Solo Tarlue v. Canada, 27 
March 2009, No. 1551/2007. 
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States parties to take measures derogating from it.22 It is also absolute, which means 
that it is not open to the respondent State to claim that its own public interest rea-
sons for deporting the individual outweigh the risk of ill-treatment on his or her re-
turn.23 Because of its absolute and non-derogable character, and because Article 7 is 
not conditioned by the five grounds of persecution contained in Article 1 A (2) RC, 
Article 7 ICCPR, just like Article 3 ECHR, offers broader protection than Article 33 
RC.24 
As this book focuses on issues of evidence and judicial scrutiny in asylum court 
proceedings, but is not a comprehensive analysis of the prohibitions on refoulement 
contained in international asylum law, the concepts of torture and inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment are not analysed further here. Other authors have 
done this before so I refer to them.25 
3.1.2 Supervisory mechanisms 
Article 28 ICCPR establishes an autonomous treaty body which monitors the appli-
cation and implementation of the ICCPR: the Human Rights Committee (HRC).26 
The HRC consists of eighteen members who have to be of high moral standing with 
a recognised competence in the field of human rights. The members serve in their 
personal capacity and not as representatives of their States.27 The HRC is not a court 
or tribunal, but an independent body of experts sui generis, with elements of judicial, 
quasi-judicial, administrative, investigative, inquisitorial, supervisory and conciliatory 
functions.28 
The HRC has three monitoring mechanisms at its disposal to supervise compli-
ance with the ICCPR.29 First, it receives and examines reports from the States parties 
on the steps they have taken to give effect to the rights spelled out in the ICCPR. 
This reporting mechanism is laid down in Article 40 ICCPR.30 The submission of 
                                                        
22 Article 4(2) ICCPR states: ‘No derogation from articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 
18 may be made under this provision.’ General Comment No. 24 (1994), para. 8 states that ‘a State 
may not reserve the right to engage in (…) torture, to subject persons to cruel, inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment (…)’. 
23 General Comment No. 20 (1992), para. 3; General Comment No. 29 (2001), para. 7; HRC, Ahani v. 
Canada, 15 June 2004, No. 1051/2002, para. 10.10. 
24 See Wouters 2009 for a much more detailed material comparison of the prohibitions on refoulement 
on pp. 525-578. 
25 See, for example, Wouters 2009, pp. 377-391. 
26 Article 28 para. 1 ICCPR stipulates: ‘There shall be established a Human Rights Committee (here-
after referred to in the present Covenant as the Committee). It shall consist of eighteen members 
and shall carry out the functions hereinafter provided.’ For an extensive description and analysis of 
the work of the HRC I refer to Dominic McGoldrick’s 1996 book The Human Rights Committee, Its 
Role in the Development of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
27 Article 28, paras. 2 and 3 ICCPR. 
28 McGoldrick 1996, p. 54, Wouters 2009, pp. 364-367. 
29 Human Rights Fact Sheet No. 15 (Rev. 1) ‘Civil and Political Rights: The Human Rights Commit-
tee’; McGoldrick 1996, pp. 50-51; Hanski & Scheinin 2003, pp. 1-24, Carlson & Gisvold 2003, pp. 1-
13; Steiner, Alston & Goodman 2008, Chapter 10. 
30 Article 40, para. 1 ICCPR stipulates: ‘The States Parties to the present Covenant undertake to submit 
reports on the measures they have adopted which give effect to the rights recognized herein and on 
→ 
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country reports is mandatory for States parties to the ICCPR. The HRC examines 
submitted country reports and issues Concluding Observations containing guidelines 
for States parties on how to improve affairs that have been found to be problematic. 
Second, Article 41 ICCPR provides for an optional inter-State complaint mecha-
nism.31 This procedure has not been used so far.32 Third, under Article 1 of the First 
Optional Protocol, the HRC receives and considers individual complaints, known as 
‘communications’, submitted by individuals who claim violations of their ICCPR 
rights by a State party.33 As has been said above, all the EU Member States, except 
the UK, have ratified the first Optional Protocol (see section 3.1 above). The HRC 
gives its decisions on these communications in so-called ‘views.’ 
In addition to the mentioned monitoring functions, the HRC develops and issues 
so-called ‘General Comments’ on particular provisions of the ICCPR to assist States 
parties to give effect to the provisions of the ICCPR by providing greater detail re-
garding the substantive and procedural obligations of States parties. The legal basis of 
this interpretative function of the HRC may be found in Article 28 ICCPR, which 
states that the HRC shall carry out the functions set out in the ICCPR; it may be 
argued that this provision makes the HRC competent to interpret the ICCPR in so 
far as this is required for the performance of its functions.34 In its case law the HRC 
has reaffirmed this interpretative function and stated that  
 
‘Each international treaty has a life of its own and must be interpreted in a fair and just man-
ner, if so provided, by the body entrusted with the monitoring of its provisions.’35 
 
The opinions of the HRC set out in its various documents are not legally binding as 
the ICCPR and the Protocol do not contain a provision like Article 46, first para-
graph, ECHR, which provision stipulates, in short, that the respondent State is 
                                                        
the progress made in the enjoyment of those rights: (a) Within one year of the entry into force of the 
present Covenant for the States Parties concerned; (b) Thereafter whenever the Committee so 
requests.’ 
31 Article 41, para. 1, ICCPR stipulates, inter alia: ‘A State Party to the present Covenant may at any 
time declare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and 
consider communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not ful-
filling its obligations under the present Covenant. Communications under this article may be re-
ceived and considered only if submitted by a State Party which has made a declaration recognizing in 
regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication shall be received by the Com-
mittee if it concerns a State Party which has not made such a declaration.’  
32 Joseph, Mitchell, Gyorki & Benninger-Budel 2006, p. 44; Wouters 2009, p. 365, site HRC: 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/petitions/index.htm#interstate, last visited 15 May 2012. 
33 Article 1 of the First Optional Protocol stipulates: ‘A State Party to the Covenant that becomes a 
Party to the present Protocol recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
communications from individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by 
that State Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant. No communication shall be received 
by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Covenant which is not a Party to the present 
Protocol.’ 
34 Human Rights Fact Sheet No 15 (rev 1): Civil and Political Rights: the Human Rights Committee, 
Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights 2005, p. 24; Wouters 2009, 
p. 365. 
35 See, for example, HRC, J. and others v. Canada, 18 July 1986, No. 118/1982, para. 6.2. 
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obliged to abide by the final judgment of the ECtHR. Unlike the ECHR, the ICCPR 
has no separate body with a practice to keep cases on its agenda until the States con-
cerned have taken satisfactory measures.36 The enforcement procedure under the 
ICCPR is weaker and works in the following way. The Rules of Procedure of the 
HRC stipulate in Rule 101, first paragraph, which forms part of the Rules on indi-
vidual communications, that ‘The Committee shall designate a Special Rapporteur for 
follow-up on Views adopted under article 5, paragraph 4, of the Optional Protocol, 
for the purpose of ascertaining the measures taken by States parties to give effect to 
the Committee’s Views.’ In addition to this mechanism, where it is established in 
views on an individual complaint that a State party has violated its obligations under 
the ICCPR, the HRC often invites the respondent State, in a separate standard con-
sideration at the very end of the views, to inform it of the steps it has taken in ac-
cordance with the observations given in the views. The HRC bases this request on 
Article 2 ICCPR, which obliges the respondent State party to ensure to all individuals 
within its territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognised in the ICCPR 
and to provide an effective and enforceable remedy if a violation has been estab-
lished.37 
Although they are not legally binding, the opinions of the HRC are of a high 
authority, for different reasons. When States ratify or accede to the ICCPR, they un-
dertake to live up to their obligations under this instrument and to honour the deci-
sions of the autonomous body created under it, the HRC. When they ratify the First 
Optional Protocol they recognise the competence of the HRC to establish in individ-
ual complaint cases whether or not there has been a violation of the ICCPR. Deci-
sions of the HRC are mostly made by consensus,38 which increases its credibility and 
authority.39 The HRC has followed its decisions on numerous occasions, and has also 
explicitly stressed that it should ensure consistency and coherence in its jurispru-
dence.40 In structure, the views of the HRC resemble judgments: they provide an 
overview of the positions taken by the parties and include a conclusion on a violation 
or non-violation.41 The HRC also often recommends appropriate remedies. All of the 
mentioned reasons establish that States parties must normally treat HRC opinions as 
authoritative and important.42 Christian Tomuschat, former HRC member, makes 
clear that, in the light of the reasons mentioned, it is not very relevant that the 
decisions of the HRC are not binding. He states: 
                                                        
36 Under the ECHR, the Committee of Ministers performs this function. See Chapter 5, section 5.1. 
37 See, for example, HRC, Judge v. Canada, 13 August 2003, No. 829/1998, para. 13; HRC, Mansour 
Ahani v. Canada, 15 June 2004, No. 1051/2002, para. 13; HRC, Byahuranga v. Denmark, 9 December 
2004, No. 1222/2003, para. 14; Alzery v. Sweden, 10 November 2006, No. 1416/2005, para. 14. 
38 According to Rule 51 of the Rules of Procedure of the HRC, decisions shall be made by a majority 
vote, but a footnote to the Rules adds that the HRC shall make every effort to reach a consensus be-
fore voting. 
39 Wouters 2009, p. 366. 
40 See, for example, HRC, Judge v. Canada, 20 October 2003, No. 829/1998, para. 10.3. 
41 See also Mc Goldrick 1996, who states that the HRC’s views follow a judicial pattern. 
42 Many eminent scholars treat the opinions of the HRC in the same way; see, for example, Boeles 
1997, p. 96, McGoldrick 1996, pp. 151-152, Nowak 1993, p. XXIV, Hathaway 2005, pp. 119-123, 
Goodwin-Gill & McAdam 2007, pp. 305-309, Wouters 2009, p. 365. 
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‘Legally, the views formulated by the HRC are not binding on the State party concerned which 
remains free to criticize them. Nonetheless, any State party will find it hard to reject such find-
ing in so far as they are based on orderly proceedings during which the defendant party had 
ample opportunity to present its submissions. The views of the HRC gain their authority from 
their inner qualities of impartiality, objectiveness and soberness. If such requirements are met, 
the views of the HRC can have far-reaching impact, at least vis-à-vis such Governments which 
have not out rightly broken with the international community and ceased to care anymore for 
concern expressed by international bodies. If such a situation arose, however, even a legally 
binding decision would not be likely to be respected.’43 
3.1.3 Provisions on national proceedings 
The ICCPR contains a number of provisions dealing explicitly with national (judicial) 
proceedings. In this chapter the focus is on those provisions which are relevant for 
national judicial proceedings in asylum cases. These are Article 2, third paragraph on 
the right to an effective remedy; Article 7, which hosts a prohibition on refoulement and 
contains a procedural limb; Article 13 on the expulsion of aliens and the procedure to 
be followed in cases of expulsion; and Article 14, first paragraph, on a fair hearing.  
It may seem odd to investigate Article 14 as the HRC has, so far, been am-
biguous about the question of whether or not this provision applies to national 
proceedings concerning asylum status determination and the expulsion of asylum 
seekers (see section 3.4.1 below). I have, nevertheless, chosen to explore the content 
of Article 14, for the same reasons as those underpinning the choice made in Chapter 
5 to explore Article 6 ECHR. Article 14 is the counterpart in the ICCPR of Article 6 
ECHR, and of Article 47, paragraph 2, of the EU Charter of fundamental rights, 
which will almost always be applicable in asylum cases (see Chapter 6, section 
6.1.3.2). Case law of the HRC under Article 14 ICCPR may – just like the case law of 
the ECtHR under Article 6 ECHR – be used as an additional tool for interpretation 
of Article 47 of the EU Charter. The CJEU has ruled explicitly in a number of cases 
that the ICCPR is one of the international instruments for the protection of human 
rights of which it takes account as a source of inspiration and interpretation.44 Article 
14 is, therefore, a relevant provision, which makes it worthwhile to explore its impli-
cations for the research questions. 
Also explored is Article 5, second paragraph, b, of the First Optional Protocol, 
which requires that applicants should first exhaust effective national remedies before 
applying to the HRC. The reason for including this provision is that the case law 
under this Article – in addition to the jurisprudence on Article 2, third paragraph – 
                                                        
43 McGoldrick 1996, pp. 151, 204, with reference. 
44 Examples in which the Court of Justice of the EU ruled that the ICCPR is one of the international 
instruments for the protection of human rights of which the Court takes account as a source of 
inspiration and interpretation are: Dzodzi, 18 October 1990, C-197/89, para. 68; Grant, 17 February 
1998, C-249/96, para.44. See for a good example of a judgment in which the Court of Justice of the 
EU stressed the special character of the ECHR as a source of inspiration, but at the same time also 
drew on the ICCPR and the International Convention on the Rights of the Child: European Parliament 
v. Council, 27 June 2006, C-540/03, paras. 35-37, 54-57. 
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may help to explain when a national remedy is considered by the HRC to be (in)ef-
fective. 
3.1.4  Chapter outline 
Part 1 of this chapter deals with the ICCPR’s provisions on national proceedings and 
what these provisions say with regard to the required intensity of national judicial 
scrutiny and on evidentiary issues in national asylum proceedings. The provisions on 
national proceedings are first briefly introduced in section 3.2, as it is necessary to 
have some knowledge of the basic requirements under these provisions, before turn-
ing to the context of national asylum court proceedings. After this introduction, 
section 3.3 discusses and analyses how these provisions work in the context of na-
tional asylum court proceedings.  
The focus will then shift towards Article 14, first paragraph, and its implications 
for the required intensity of national judicial scrutiny and for issues of evidence in 
national court proceedings. 
Part 2 of this chapter explores the assessment performed by the HRC in cases 
concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers. The analysis of this assessment in section 
3.5 is made with the aid of the eleven aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny intro-
duced in Chapter 1. Each aspect is discussed in a separate sub-section. In section 3.6, 
final concluding remarks are made. 
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ICCPR, Part 1: 
 
Provisions on national proceedings; issues of intensity of judicial scrutiny 
and evidentiary issues in national judicial proceedings 
3.2  Basics: introduction to the provisions on national proceedings 
3.2.1  Texts of the provisions on national proceedings 
Article 2, third paragraph 3, stipulates: 
 
‘Each State party to the present Covenant undertakes: 
a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are violated shall 
have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has been committed by persons 
acting in an official capacity; 
b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his rights thereto determined 
by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by any other competent 
authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to develop the possibilities of 
judicial remedy; 
c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when granted.’ 
 
Article 7 stipulates: 
 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment. In particular, no one shall be subjected without his free consent to medical or scientific 
experimentation.’ 
 
Article 13 stipulates: 
 
‘An alien lawfully in the territory of a State party to the present Covenant may be expelled 
there from only in pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall, except 
where compelling reasons of national security otherwise require, be allowed to submit the rea-
sons against his expulsion and to have his case reviewed by, and be represented for the pur-
pose before, the competent authority or a person or persons especially designated by the com-
petent authority.’ 
 
Article 14, first paragraph, stipulates: 
 
‘All persons shall be equal before the courts and tribunals. In the determination of any criminal 
charge against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled to 
a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal established by 
law. The press and the public may be excluded from all or part of a trial for reasons of morals, 
public order (ordre public) or national security in a democratic society, or when the interest of 
the private lives of the parties so requires, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of 
the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice; but 
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any judgement rendered in a criminal case or in a suit at law shall be made public except where 
the interest of juvenile persons otherwise requires or the proceedings concern matrimonial 
disputes or the guardianship of children.’ 
 
Article 5, second paragraph, b, of the First Optional Protocol stipulates: 
 
‘2. The Committee shall not consider any communication from an individual unless it has as-
certained that: 
(b) The individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies. This shall not be the rule 
where the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged.’ 
3.2.2 The right to an effective national remedy, the exhaustion rule 
Article 2, third paragraph, accords to individuals a means whereby they can obtain 
relief at national level for violations of their ICCPR rights, before having recourse to 
the HRC. It embodies the general principle of international law that the protection of 
individuals against violations of human rights is primarily a national concern and that 
the machinery of complaint to the HRC is subsidiary to national systems safeguarding 
human rights. Article 2, third paragraph accords a right to an effective remedy to any 
person who tenably asserts (in other words, arguably claims) that a substantive 
ICCPR right has been violated.45 
The preparatory works do not shed much light on the question of what is meant 
by ‘effective remedy’.46 The discussions in the drafting process focused on the 
question of whether only judicial or also administrative and other remedies could 
constitute an ‘effective remedy’. It is clear that the text of the provision is a com-
promise reached after lengthy discussions between the common law and other legal 
traditions.47 From sub b it is clear, though, that effective remedies can be provided by 
competent judicial, administrative, legislative or other competent authorities, but that 
States are obliged to further develop the possibilities of judicial remedies. Judicial 
remedies, thus, have priority, and the HRC has made clear that both Article 2, third 
                                                        
45 Nowak 1993, p. 35, McGoldrick 1996, pp. 279-280, Nowak 2005, p. 67, Wouters 2009, p. 414, 
Boeles 1997, pp. 112-113. 
46 See Bossuyt 1987, pp. 64-73. Bossuyt refers to UN document A/2929, Chapt. V, 14, which states: 
‘An opinion was expressed that there was no need to specify the obligations of States parties in the 
event of a violation of the covenant, since it was obvious that if the States undertook to abide by the 
Covenant, they would have to provide for effective remedies against infringements. It was also likely 
that provisions of that kind might be too broad and sweeping to be of much value. The view was 
accepted, however, that the proper enforcement of the provisions of the covenant depended on the 
guarantees of the individual’s rights against abuse, which comprised the following elements: the pos-
session of a legal remedy, the granting of this remedy by national authorities and the enforcement of 
the remedy by the competent authorities’. 
47 See Bossuyt 1987, p. 67, Nowak 1993, pp. 31-32 and Nowak 2005, pp. 63-64. Nowak mentions that 
whereas the United Kingdom proposed a right to a decision by independent national tribunals ana-
logous to that under Article 14, other States, Continental European as well as Latin American and 
Arab delegations sought to leave the States parties at liberty to entrust political and administrative 
organs with decision-making authority regarding violations of the Covenant.  
ICCPR 
 
 
 
63 
paragraph, and Article 5, second paragraph, sub b, of the Optional Protocol refer in 
the first place to judicial remedies.48 
In accordance with Article 5, second paragraph, of the Optional Protocol, before 
lodging a communication to the HRC, individuals must first exhaust available and ef-
fective national remedies.49 As has been said, the machinery of complaint to the HRC 
is subsidiary to national systems safeguarding human rights and the purpose of Arti-
cle 5, second paragraph, of the Optional Protocol is to afford the respondent State 
party the opportunity of preventing or putting right the violations alleged against it 
before those allegations are submitted to the HRC. The rule in Article 5, second para-
graph, of the Optional Protocol is based on the assumption, reflected in Article 2, 
third paragraph, that there is an effective national remedy available in respect of the 
alleged breach of an individual’s ICCPR rights. The rule of exhaustion of effective 
national remedies does not apply when, in short, there is no effective national reme-
dy. The last sentence of Article 5, second paragraph includes a clause according to 
which inadmissibility is not applicable when national remedies are unreasonably pro-
longed. 
Whether a national remedy is effective must be determined on the basis of con-
crete cases, taking into consideration all relevant circumstances, the respective na-
tional legal system and the special features of the substantive right concerned. Judicial 
remedies are essential in cases of allegations of serious abuse, such as torture and kill-
ing.50 It follows from General Comment No. 31(80) (2004) that, in order to be ef-
fective, the national remedy must be accessible and effective,51 and that allegations of 
covenant violations must be investigated promptly, thoroughly, and effectively 
through independent and impartial bodies, which must be endowed with appropriate 
powers.52 The assessment of the effectiveness of national remedies under Articles 2, 
third paragraph and Article 5, second paragraph, sub b, of the Optional Protocol is 
similar to the appreciation of the effectiveness of national remedies under Article 13 
ECHR.53 
3.2.3 Article 7: prompt, impartial and full investigations 
General Comment No. 20 stipulates that Article 7 should be read in conjunction with 
Article 2, third paragraph, and that Article 7-complaints must be investigated prompt-
                                                        
48 See, for example, HRC, R.T. v. France, 30 March 1989, No. 162/87, para. 7.4; HRC, José Vicente and 
others v. Colombia, 29 July 1997, No. 612/1995, para. 5.2. See also Nowak 1993, p. 59, Boeles 1995, 
pp. 108-109, Nowak 2005, pp. 63-65 and Wouters 2009, p. 412. See also Boeles 1997, p. 109, 
Wouters 2009, p. 413. 
49 See for more detailed information on the requirement of exhaustion of effective domestic remedies 
Nowak 1993, p. 58, McGoldrick 1996, pp. 188-197, Carlson & Gisvold 2003, pp. 15-17, Nowak 
2005, pp. 62-63, Hanski & Scheinin 2003, pp. 20, 21. 
50 HRC, Vicente et al v. Colombia, 29 July 1997, No. 612/95, para. 5.2. 
51 General Comment No. 31(80) (2004), para.15. General Comments of the HRC can be found at: 
www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf, and on www.ohchr.org. See ‘CCPR Human Rights Committee’, ‘Gen-
eral Comments’; see also Wouters 2009, p. 413. 
52 General Comment No. 31(80) (2004), para.15.  
53 See Chapter 5, section 5.2. 
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ly and impartially by competent authorities so as to make the remedy effective.54 In a 
number of cases concerning the torture and disappearance of individuals in dictatorial 
regimes (internal torture or disappearance cases), the HRC has constantly ruled that 
Article 7, seen in conjunction with Article 2, third paragraph, requires from the na-
tional authorities, including national courts, that ‘full investigations’, or ‘full and thor-
ough inquiries’,55 are made. In a significant number of internal torture or disappear-
ance cases the HRC found the inquiries made at national level non-compliant and 
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 2, third paragraph, in conjunction 
with Article 7.56 
3.2.4 Article 13: procedural safeguards for expulsion 
The preparatory works on Article 13 make clear that this provision is about the pro-
tection of aliens against arbitrary expulsion and that Article 13 is based on Article 32 
RC, which provision was discussed in Chapter 2 (section 2.3).57 The drafters of the 
text wished to leave up to the national legislation the question of whether the compe-
tent review authority should be a judicial or an administrative body.58 Indeed, the 
HRC made clear in Maroufidou v. Sweden (1981)59 that Article 13 did not necessarily en-
tail an appeal to a court, but that administrative review was compatible with Article 
13.60 In literature, different opinions are expressed on the question of whether Article 
13 is applicable to contemporary appeal proceedings in asylum cases.61 The question 
of applicability is triggered by the text of Article 13, which speaks of ‘aliens lawfully in 
the territory of a State party’. The debate on this issue resembles the discussion on 
the relevance for asylum appeal proceedings of Article 32 RC, which provision also 
requires lawful presence in the territory of a Contracting State.62 The debate may be 
considered highly theoretical as the HRC normally considers Article 13 applicable to 
cases where the lawfulness of residency is disputed, and the HRC itself has also con-
                                                        
54 General Comment No. 20: Replaces General Comment No. 7 concerning prohibition of torture and 
cruel treatment or punishment (Art. 7): 10/03/92, para. 14. 
55 HRC, Irene Bleier Lewenhoff and Rosa Valino de Bleier v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982, No. 30/1978, para. 
11.1. 
56 See, for example, HRC, Alberto Grille Motta v. Uruguay, 29 July 1980, No. 11/1977; HRC, Delia Saldias 
de Lopez v. Uruguay, 29 July 1981, No. 52/1979; HRC, Hugo Rodriguez v. Uruguay, 19 July 1994, No. 
322/1988; HRC, Bautista v. Colombia, 27 October 1995, No. 563/ 1993. 
57 E/CN.4/SR.106, p.12-13; E/CN.4/SR.153; E/CN.4/SR.154; E/CN.4/SR.316. See also Bossuyt 
1987, pp. 267-276. 
58 A/c.3/SR.959, 960. See also Bossuyt 1987, p. 270, Nowak 1993, p. 229, Nowak 2003, p. 297, 
Carlson & Gisvold 2003, pp. 100-101, Hathaway 2005, pp. 670-677, Joseph, Schultz & Castan 2005, 
p. 381. 
59 HRC, Maroufidou v. Sweden, 9 April 1981, No. 58/79. 
60 See also Nowak 1993, p. 229, Nowak 2003, p. 297, Carlson & Gisvold 2003, pp. 100-101, Hathaway 
2005, pp. 670-677, Joseph, Schultz & Castan 2005, p. 381. 
61 See, for example, Joseph, Schultz & Castan 2005, p. 379. They state that, due to the requirement of 
being lawfully in the territory of a State party, Article 13 is probably of little use to asylum seekers 
who illegally enter a State in search of protection. See for a different opinion Nowak 1993, p. 225 
and Nowak 2005, p. 293.  
62 See for this discussion Chapter 2, section 2.3.1.  
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sidered Article 13 applicable to cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, as 
we will see in more detail below.63 
The text of Article 13 mentions three procedural rights or safeguards:  
- The right to submit the reasons against the expulsion (right to a hearing); 
- The right to have the case reviewed by the competent authority (appeal to a 
higher instance); 
- The right to be represented before the competent authority (right to representa-
tion, not implying the right to legal counsel).64 
 
The preparatory works65 and literature draw a link with the procedural safeguards of 
Article 32, paragraph 2, RC. Nowak (1993) points out that the slight change in word-
ing from ‘to submit the reasons against his expulsion’ (Article 13 ICCPR) to ‘to sub-
mit evidence to clear himself’ (Article 32 RC) did not change the substance of the 
safeguards.66 The comments on the safeguards of Article 32, second paragraph RC in 
Chapter 2 are, therefore, relevant for the interpretation of the safeguards in Article 
13.67 
General Comment No. 15 (27) stipulates in paragraph 10 that 
 
‘An alien must be given full facilities for pursuing his remedy against expulsion so that this 
right will in all the circumstances of his case be an effective one. The principles of Article 13 
relating to appeal against expulsion and the entitlement to review by a competent authority 
may only be departed from when ‘compelling reasons of national security’ so require.’68 
 
The procedural safeguards of Article 13 do not apply where compelling reasons of 
national security require otherwise. According to the case law of the HRC, States 
parties normally have wide discretion in the assessment of whether a case presents 
national security considerations, bringing the exception contained in Article 13 into 
play.69 Joseph, Schultz&Castan (2005) warn that the HRC’s approach severely under-
                                                        
63 The HRC started its jurisprudential line on broad applicability of Article 13 in Maroufidou v. Sweden, 9 
April 1981, No. 58/1979, in which a Greek woman had been granted a residency permit by the Swe-
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held in this case that the applicability of Article 13 was beyond dispute. See Nowak 1993, p. 225 and 
Nowak 2005, p. 293. 
64 See on these procedural rights or safeguards also Nowak 1993, p. 228, Nowak 2003, pp. 297, 298, 
Carlson & Gisvold 2003, p. 100, Joseph, Schultz & Castan 2005, pp. 381-382. 
65 E/CN.4/SR.106, P.12-13; E/CN.4/SR.153; E/CN.4/SR.154; E/CN.4/SR.316. See Bossuyt 1987, 
pp. 267-276. 
66 Nowak 1993, p. 228, Nowak 2003, pp. 297, 298. 
67 See Chapter 2, section 2.3.  
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Committee can be found on the internet at: www.ohchr.org, and on www.ohchr.org. See ‘CCPR 
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69 See, for example, HRC, V.M.R.B. v. Canada, 18 July 1988, No. 236/1987, para. 6.3; HRC, Borzov v. 
Estonia, 26 July 2004, No. 1135/2002, para. 7.3; Mohamed Alzery v. Sweden, 25 October 2006, No. 
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mines the protection offered by Article 13 and potentially invites States parties to 
defend Article 13 breaches with spurious national security claims.70 
3.2.5 Fair trial 
In literature the importance of Article 14 is strongly emphasised.71 In General Com-
ment No. 32,72 the HRC explains the various requirements of Article 14.The first 
requirement flowing from Article 14 is the right to equality before courts and tribu-
nals.73 This encompasses equal access to the courts.74 Equal treatment of individuals 
by the court also means that the law should be applied without discrimination by the 
judiciary.75 
The second requirement following from Article 14 is that courts and tribunals 
must be competent, independent, established by law and impartial.76 Competent and 
established by law means that the jurisdictional power of the court is determined by 
law generally, in advance and independent of the given case. Independence refers to 
the structural relationship between the judiciary and other government structures.77 
The functions and competences of the judiciary and, for example, the executive, 
should be clearly distinguishable and the latter should not be able to control or direct 
the former. Impartiality refers to the relationship between a judge and the matter at 
issue in a specific case; it implies that judges must not harbour preconceptions about 
the matter put before them and must not act in ways that promote the interests of 
one of the parties.78 
The third requirement of Article 14 is that courts and tribunals must hold fair 
hearings. The most important criterion of a fair hearing is the principle of equality of 
arms between the parties, which means that the same procedural rights are to be pro-
vided to all the parties, unless the distinctions are based on law and can be justified 
on objective and reasonable grounds, not entailing actual disadvantage or other 
                                                        
70 Joseph, Schultz & Castan 2005, p. 383. 
71 See, for example, McGoldrick 1996, p. 396, who speaks of ‘a central feature of the rule of law’. 
Carlson & Gisvold qualify Article 14 as a ‘foundation Covenant Article’ necessary for the proper im-
plementation of all basic substantive rights, Carlson & Gisvold 2003, p. 38; Joseph, Schultz & 
Castan state that the right to a fair trial and equality before the courts have historically been regarded 
as fundamental rules of law, Joseph, Schultz & Castan 2005, p. 390. 
72 General Comment No. 32 of 24 July 2007 ‘Equality before the courts and the right to a fair and 
public hearing by an independent court established by law’. This General Comment replaces General 
Comment No. 13 of the HRC. 
73 See General Comment No. 32, paras. 8 and 9; Nowak 1993, p. 239, Carlson & Gisvold 2003, p. 39, 
Nowak 2005, p. 308, Joseph, Schultz & Castan 2005, pp. 396-404. 
74 See, for example, HRC, Oló Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, 20 October 1993, No. 468/1991; HRC, 
Avellanal v. Peru, 28 October 1988, No. 202/1986. 
75 See Nowak 1993, p. 239 and Nowak 2005, p. 308.  
76 See General Comment No. 13, paras. 3 and 4. See on the requisite characteristics of courts Nowak 
1993, pp. 245, 246, McGoldrick 1996, pp. 399-403 and 416, 417, Weissbrodt 2001, pp. 141-145, 
Carlson & Gisvold 2003, pp. 39-40, Joseph, Schultz & Castan 2005, pp. 404-408, Nowak 2005, 
pp. 319-321.  
77 See General Comment No. 32, para. 19. 
78 Ibidem, para. 21. 
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unfairness to the defendant.79 In addition, a fair hearing requires respect for the prin-
ciple of adversarial proceedings, meaning that each party must be given the oppor-
tunity to contest all the arguments and evidence adduced by the other party.80 A fair 
hearing also entails preclusion of reformatio in pejus (a claimant/plaintiff should not, as 
a result of a suit at law, end up worse off than before starting the proceedings) and 
expeditious procedure.81 
Finally, court hearings and judgments should be public. This means, first, that, in 
principle, hearings must be conducted orally and publicly. The text of Article 14, first 
paragraph, makes clear that specific circumstances allow for exceptions to the re-
quirement of an oral public hearing. Even in cases in which the public is excluded 
from the trial, the judgment, including the essential findings, evidence and legal rea-
soning must be made public, except where the interests of juvenile persons otherwise 
requires, or the proceedings concern matrimonial disputes or the guardianship of 
children.82 The requirement of publicity serves to make the administration of justice 
transparent. In other words, justice must not be secret. 
3.2.6 Mutual relationships 
Boeles (1997) and Carlson & Gisvold (2003) have promoted the idea that the dif-
ferent provisions on procedures in the ICCPR do not stand apart, but should be read 
as a whole.83 
It has already been said above that the HRC has made clear in its General Com-
ment No. 20 that Article 7 should be read in conjunction with Article 2, third para-
graph. The procedural limb of Article 7 requires that an effective remedy is available 
for alleged violations of Article 7. The HRC has also made clear that, where judicial 
remedies exist at national level, Article 2, third paragraph, requires that these reme-
dies are in accordance with the safeguards secured by Article 14.84 
General Comment No. 32 states that the procedural guarantees of Article 13 
incorporate the notions of due process reflected in Article 14 and, thus, should be 
interpreted in the light of Article 14. Insofar as national law entrusts a judicial body 
with the task of deciding about expulsions or deportations, the guarantee of equality 
of all persons before the courts and tribunals as enshrined in Article 14, first para-
                                                        
79 See General Comment No. 32, para. 13; see also, for example, HRC, Dudko v. Australia, 23 July 2007, 
No. 1347/2005, para. 7.4. 
80 See, for example, HRC, Jansen-Gielen v. the Netherlands, 3 April 2001, No. 846/1999, para. 8.2. 
81 In the View in the case of Morael v. France, 28 July 1989, No. 207/1986, these aspects of a fair 
hearing were mentioned for the first time; since then they have been repeated in many subsequent 
cases. See on expeditiousness General Comment No. 32, para. 27. 
82 See General Comment No. 32, para. 28, Nowak 1993, pp. 247-253, McGoldrick 1996, pp. 418, 419, 
Weissbrodt 2001, pp. 145, 146, Carlson & Gisvold 2003, p. 42, Nowak 2005, pp. 323-329, Joseph, 
Schultz & Castan 2005, pp. 422-426. 
83 Boeles 1997, p. 106, Carlson & Gisvold 2003, p. 20. 
84 HRC, Singarasa v. Sri Lanka, 21 July 2004, No. 1033/2001, para. 7.4; HRC, Czernin v. Czech Republic, 
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graph, and the principles of impartiality, fairness and equality of arms implicit in this 
guarantee are applicable.85 
Close affinity exists between Articles 2, third paragraph, and 5, second paragraph, 
sub b, of the Optional Protocol. The rule of exhaustion of national remedies does not 
apply when national remedies are not effective, which makes the case law under Ar-
ticle 5, second paragraph, sub b, Optional Protocol directly relevant to the notion of 
an effective remedy contained in Article 2, paragraph 3. 
Finally, the HRC has made clear that, under Article 5, second paragraph, sub b, 
of the Optional Protocol, national remedies must be effective and available, and that 
this entails that procedural guarantees for a fair and public hearing by a competent, 
independent and impartial tribunal must be scrupulously observed.86 To phrase it dif-
ferently, an effective judicial remedy in the sense of Article 5, second paragraph, sub 
b, of the Optional Protocol, and in the sense of Article 2, third paragraph, is a remedy 
which complies with the safeguards of Article 14. 
3.3  The provisions on national proceedings in the context of national 
asylum court proceedings 
3.3.1  Reluctance to critically review national court decisions 
Article 2, third paragraph, read in conjunction with Article 7, requires from the na-
tional authorities, including the national courts that claims for protection are consid-
ered in a thorough and fair manner.87 However, the HRC is generally reluctant to put 
national proceedings to a rigorous test of compliance with this rule. Instead, it seems 
that the HRC almost always assumes that national proceedings are compliant. A 
number of cases are examined below to illustrate this reluctance.  
In the case of Daljit Singh v. Canada (2006), the author claimed that if he were re-
moved to India, Canada would be in violation of Article 7 ICCPR, to the extent that 
he would be subjected to torture, have no possibility of obtaining medical treatment, 
and possibly lose his life. The author claimed, furthermore, that national proceedings 
leading to the removal order violated, inter alia, Articles 2, third paragraph, and 13. He 
asserted that the national authorities had failed to consider carefully the evidence 
submitted in support of his case. According to the author, medical reports and pho-
tographs establishing that he and some of his family members had been victims of 
torture, affidavits from the mayors of the surrounding villages about the problems he 
had had with the police, and a report following an investigation from the Sikh Hu-
man Rights Group into the incidents in question, had not been considered. In addi-
tion, information from other sources on the general human rights situation in India 
                                                        
85 General Comment No. 32, para. 62. Reference is made to HRC Ahani v. Canada, No. 1051/2002, 
para. 10.9; HRC, Everett v. Spain, 9 July 2004, No. 961/2000, para. 6.4; HRC, Taghi Khadje v. Nether-
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had not been considered, including a Human Rights Watch Report, and an academic 
journal. The author also claimed that there was no effective judicial control of the 
administrative decision as applicants must first apply for leave to appeal to the Fed-
eral Court, and, if granted, the Federal Court might only review errors of law.88 
The HRC observed in Daljit Singh that the author had not substantiated how the 
Canadian authorities’ decisions had failed to consider, thoroughly and fairly, his claim 
that he would be at risk of violations of Articles 6 and 7 if returned to India. It con-
sidered this part of the claim inadmissible for this reason. It noted that the Refugee 
Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board, after thorough examination, had 
rejected the author’s asylum application on the basis of lack of credibility of his testi-
mony and supporting evidence and that the rejection of his Pre-Removal Risk As-
sessment application had been based on similar grounds.89 The HRC further noted 
that in both cases applications for leave to appeal had been rejected by the Federal 
Court, and that the author had not shown sufficiently why these decisions were 
contrary to the standard set out above.90 
We find the same reluctance to critically review national (court) proceedings in 
the cases of Dawood Khan v. Canada (2006)91 and A.C. v. the Netherlands (2008). The 
case of A.C. is discussed in more detail because of the serious nature of the proce-
dural complaints brought forward by the author. A.C. claimed that her expulsion to 
Armenia with her children would violate their rights under, inter alia, Article 7. She 
stated that her husband had been killed, and she had been assaulted, threatened and 
raped by police officers, because her husband had made protests against the diversion 
of foreign aid sent to Armenia after the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The Immigra-
tion and Naturalisation Department (IND) rejected the asylum application for lack of 
credibility. This position of the IND was based on a report issued by the Dutch 
Foreign Affairs Department and on the lack of identity papers. The first instance 
court rejected her appeal and the Council of State, the highest court in immigration 
affairs, rejected the author’s higher appeal.92 The author complained before the HRC 
of a violation of the procedural limb of Article 7 (and Article 14). She stated that the 
IND decision had been based solely on the report by the Foreign Ministry and the 
lack of identity papers; this had led the IND to conclude that her account was not 
credible and to dismiss the application without examining the merits. In additional 
submissions to the HRC, the author provided a summary of the Dutch ombudsman’s 
report concerning reports by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs based on investigations 
conducted in the countries of origin of asylum seekers. According to the ombuds-
man’s report, the reliability of these investigations had decreased and it was unrealistic 
to expect from people interrogated that they would report what they knew since they 
were enemies of the state in which they still lived. Based on this, the author argued 
that the State party’s authorities should not have based their decision not to examine 
                                                        
88 HRC, Daljit Singh v. Canada, 30 March 2006, No. 1315/2004, paras. 3.1-3.3. 
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90 Ibidem, para. 2.5. 
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her asylum claim on the merits of such unreliable investigations.93 The author also 
pointed out that the information underpinning the report by the Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the sources of this information had been kept confidential. According to 
her, this had led to an unfair situation, as she could not challenge the credibility of the 
report.94 With regard to the complaint that the procedural limb of Article 7 had been 
violated by the national authorities, the HRC responded as follows: 
 
‘The Committee notes that the State party challenges the admissibility of the entire communi-
cation. With regard to the author’s claim under Article 7, the Committee (…) notes that the 
IND considered and rejected the author’s asylum application for lack of credibility on two oc-
casions, on the second occasion after having received the findings of an investigation that its 
authorities had undertaken in Armenia itself. It further notes that the author’s appeal was con-
sidered and rejected by the Court of The Hague residing in Groningen and then subsequently 
rejected by the “Raad van State”, the Highest Administrative Court of the Netherlands. The 
Committee recalls its jurisprudence that it is generally for the courts of States parties to the 
Covenant to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case, unless it is found that the evalua-
tion was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice. It also recalls that the same juris-
prudence has been applied to removal proceedings. The material before the Committee is in-
sufficient to show that the proceedings before the authorities in the State party suffered from 
any such defects. The Committee accordingly considers that the author has failed to substan-
tiate her claims under Article 7, for purposes of admissibility, and it concludes that this part of 
the communication is inadmissible under article 2 of the Optional Protocol.’95 
 
The HRC’s reluctance to overturn decisions of national courts is linked to the notion 
or principle of primacy for the national courts in reviewing facts, evidence and ap-
plying national law, and, correspondingly, of the subsidiary role of the HRC in this, 
and to the principle of national procedural autonomy. In its decision in the case of 
A.C., and in later jurisprudence, the HRC stated that 
 
‘It is for the national courts to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case.’96 
 
This principle of primacy for the national authorities in the determination of the 
facts, and the corresponding national procedural autonomy, are deeply ingrained in 
the HRC’s case law. They are expressed not only within the framework of the proce-
dural limb of Article 7, but also under Article 14 (see section 3.4.2 below). Ghandi 
(1998), Joseph, Schultz & Castan (2005) and Kjaerum (2010) explain the HRC’s posi-
tion by a number of facts.97 First, the HRC does not operate as an appellate court to 
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which appeals may be taken from a State’s highest national court. Second, the HRC 
receives only written and no oral evidence (see section 3.5.9) and is, therefore, in a 
worse position to determine the facts of cases than national authorities. Third, the 
meeting time of the HRC is very limited, which is difficult to reconcile with the time 
required to assess evidence and to write down an assessment of the presented evi-
dence. The HRC convenes only three times a year for sessions of three weeks’ dura-
tion, normally in March at the United Nations headquarters in New York, and in July 
and November at the United Nations Office in Geneva. The Working Group on 
Communications meets one week prior to the plenary sessions. In this very limited 
timeframe, decisions need to be taken in a large number of individual communica-
tions.98 
3.3.2  ‘Arbitrary evaluation of evidence’ or a ‘denial of justice’ 
It appears from the HRC’s case law that national judicial proceedings cannot be 
qualified as ICCPR-compliant if evidence was evaluated in a clearly arbitrary way or if 
a denial of justice occurred.99 Within the framework of this research, no views have 
been found in which the HRC concluded explicitly that this had happened in the 
national court proceedings. 
3.3.3  Insufficiently thorough investigations at national level 
In one case concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, the HRC concluded that the 
national proceedings had not met the requirement of a thorough and fair examina-
tion, without explicitly using the terms ‘arbitrary evaluation of evidence’ or ‘denial of 
justice’. The case of Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada (2011)100 concerned Christian 
Tamils from Colombo. The authors claimed that after 1999, they found themselves 
caught between the LTTE Tamil Tigers, on one side, and the Sri Lankan police, on 
the other. They were subjected to a series of threats and extortion by the Tigers. In 
particular, because Ms. Joachimpillai originated from Jaffna (North), the Tigers tar-
geted her because they believed she would be likely to be sympathetic to their cause, 
whereas the police targeted her because they presumed she would be sympathetic to 
the Tigers. The authors were twice arrested by the police, on suspicion of lending 
support to the Tigers, in July 2001 and in February 2003. During their detention by 
the police, both were tortured. The authors submitted detailed statements about the 
ways in which they had been tortured.101 
In the national proceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Board (IRB) the 
authors submitted a Diagnostic Interview Report by a psychotherapist, containing a 
diagnosis of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for Mr Pillai, attributed to threats 
by the Tigers to himself and his wife, extortion by the Tigers from himself and his 
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wife, his own and his wife’s arrest, detention and abuse. The report further noted that 
‘the symptoms of PTSD often mimic the behaviours that we associate with shiftiness, 
mendacity or lying’, the differential in apparent power between the Refugee Board 
Commissioners and the applicant might have recalled the torturer-victim relationship 
for the applicant, thus ‘exacerbating the already intense symptoms of anxiety and 
panic.’ According to the report, this could provoke ‘confusion due to extremely ele-
vated autonomic arousal (and) difficulty concentrating’. The report considered it 
crucial that any judgements about the trustworthiness of Mr Pillai’s testimony took 
this into account. Also filed in evidence before the Immigration and Refugee Board 
was a letter from the authors’ doctor, which recommended that Mr Pillai’s wife repre-
sent both of them before the IRB, as she was considered stronger and less trauma-
tized than her husband.102 
The IRB rejected the asylum claim, leave for judicial review by the Federal Court 
was denied, and a Pre-Removal Risk Assessment Application (PRRA) and an applica-
tion for a permanent residence permit on humanitarian and compassionate grounds 
were refused as well.103 In these national proceedings, the authors’ protection claim 
was found incredible for three main reasons. First, it was doubted that Mr Pillai, as he 
had stated, had indeed been the owner of a communication centre between 2001 and 
2003 which was at the source of the authors’ problems. The only document proving 
ownership was a ‘Certificate of Registration of an Individual Business’ dated 23 Janu-
ary 1999. Neither of the authors had been able to give the Communication centre’s 
address. Furthermore, conflicting testimony and evidence had been provided with 
respect to the dates he had travelled to India, Indonesia and the Congo in connection 
with his business. Finally, there were inconsistencies between the information in the 
Personal Information Form and the authors’ testimony before the IRB.104 
In line with its steady jurisprudence, the HRC reiterated that it must pay defer-
ence to the national authorities’ evaluation of the evidence. It continued to note that 
in the national proceedings the authors had not been questioned at all about the 
alleged earlier torture, whereas it appeared from the country reports invoked by both 
parties that torture was widespread in Sri Lanka. The HRC did not use the terms 
‘clearly arbitrary’ or ‘denial of justice’, but from the consideration quoted below it 
became obvious that it was clearly of the opinion that more attention should have 
been paid to the allegations of past torture, and that the failure of the national au-
thorities to do so made the national proceedings defective:  
 
‘The Committee further notes that the diagnosis of Mr Pillai’s post-traumatic stress disorder 
led the IRB to refrain from questioning him about his earlier alleged torture in detention. The 
Committee is accordingly of the view that the material before it suggests that insufficient 
weight was given to the authors’ allegations of torture and the real risk they might face if de-
ported to their country of origin, in the light of the documented prevalence of torture in Sri 
Lanka [19]. Notwithstanding the deference given to the immigration authorities to appreciate 
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the evidence before them, the Committee considers that further analysis should have been car-
ried out in this case. The Committee therefore considers that the removal order issued against 
the authors would constitute a violation of article 7 of the Covenant if it were enforced.’105 
 
This case may indicate that the HRC has begun to steer away from deference to na-
tional procedural autonomy. So far we cannot be sure about this, however, as it is –
apart from the case of Mansour Ahani v. Canada (2004, see next section) – the only 
case concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers in which the HRC explicitly con-
cluded that the national proceedings had been defective. 
3.3.4  Equality of arms, adversariality 
It has been made clear in the previous section that the HRC will not easily conclude 
that the national proceedings did not comply with the ‘thorough and fair examina-
tion’ rule. The case of Mansour Ahani v. Canada (2004)106 demonstrates, however, that 
the HRC found a lack of equality of arms and a lack of adversarial national proceed-
ings a very serious problem, meriting the conclusion that no thorough and fair exami-
nation had taken place at national level.  
In the case of Ahani, the author had been recognized by Canada as a refugee un-
der the RC in 1992. On 17 June 1993, the Solicitor-General of Canada and the Minis-
ter of Employment & Immigration, having considered security intelligence reports 
stating that the author had been trained as an assassin by the Iranian Ministry of In-
telligence and Security, both certified that they were of the opinion that he was inad-
missible to Canada as there were reasonable grounds for believing that he would en-
gage in terrorism, that he was a member of an organization that would engage in ter-
rorism and that he had engaged in terrorism. On the same date the certificate was 
filed with the Federal Court, the author was served with a copy of the certificate and 
taken into mandatory detention, where he remained until his deportation nine years 
later. In 1993, the Federal Court examined the security intelligence reports in camera 
and heard other evidence presented by the Solicitor-General and the Minister, in the 
absence of the plaintiff. The Federal Court provided the author with a summary of 
the information, and offered him an opportunity to respond. Following extensive 
hearings, and after an unsuccessful attempt by the author to challenge the constitu-
tionality of the proceedings before the Federal Court, this Court concluded that the 
national security certificate was reasonable. The evidence included information gath-
ered by foreign intelligence agencies which had been divulged to the Federal Court in 
camera in the author’s absence on national security grounds. The Federal Court also 
heard the author testify on his own behalf in opposition to the reasonableness of the 
certificate.107 
On 12 August 1998, the Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, following rep-
resentations by the author that he faced a clear risk of torture in Iran, determined, 
without reasons and on the basis of a memorandum attaching the author’s sub-
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missions, other relevant documents and a legal analysis by officials, which memo-
randum was not provided to Ahani, that Ahani (a) constituted a danger to the secu-
rity of Canada and (b) could be removed directly to Iran. In June 1999, the Federal 
Court rejected the author’s application for judicial review of the Minister’s decision, 
and the Court of Appeal rejected the author’s appeal. In January 2001, the Supreme 
Court unanimously rejected the author’s appeal, finding that there was ample support 
for the Minister to decide that the author was a danger to the security of Canada. On 
the constitutionality of deportation of persons at risk of harm, the Court referred to 
its reasoning in a companion case of Suresh v Canada108 decided the same day, where it 
held that barring extraordinary circumstances, deportation to torture would generally 
violate the principles of fundamental justice. As Suresh had established a prima facie 
risk of torture, he was entitled to enhanced procedural protection, including provi-
sion of all the information and advice the Minister intended to rely on, receipt of an 
opportunity to address the evidence in writing and to be given written reasons by the 
Minister. In the author’s case, however, the Supreme Court considered that Ahani 
had not cleared the evidentiary threshold required to make a prima facie case and, 
therefore, had no access to these procedural safeguards.109 
Ahani claimed before the HRC to be a victim of violations of, inter alia, Articles 
2, third paragraph, 7, and 13. He argued, inter alia, that both the national proceedings 
on the reasonableness of the national security certificate and the national proceedings 
concerning the planned expulsion violated the procedural requirements of the provi-
sions invoked. 
With regard to the proceedings on the reasonableness of the national security 
certificate, Ahani claimed that in 1993 the Federal Court had not tested the evidence 
which formed the basis of the allegation that he was a national security threat and had 
not heard independent witnesses. The HRC did not follow the author in this com-
plaint. It observed that at the Federal Court’s ‘reasonableness hearing’ on the security 
certification the author had been provided by the Court with a summary redacted for 
security concerns reasonably informing him of the claims made against him. The 
HRC noted that the Federal Court had been conscious of the heavy burden upon it 
to ensure through this process the author’s ability appropriately to be aware of and 
respond to the case made against him, and he had been able to, and had, presented 
his own case and cross-examined witnesses. In the circumstances of national security 
involved, the HRC was not persuaded that this process had been unfair to him. Nor, 
recalling its limited role in the assessment of facts and evidence, did the HRC discern 
on the record any elements of bad faith, abuse of power or other arbitrariness which 
would vitiate the Federal Court’s assessment of the reasonableness of the certificate 
asserting the author’s involvement in a terrorist organization. (…) Accordingly, the 
HRC concluded that the author had not made out a violation of the requirements of 
the invoked provisions.110 
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With regard to the author’s complaint about the unfairness of the national pro-
ceedings concerning expulsion, the HRC noted that the Supreme Court had held, in 
the companion case of Suresh, that the process of the Minister’s determination in that 
case of whether the affected individual was at risk of substantial harm and should be 
expelled on national security grounds had been faulty for unfairness, as Suresh had 
not been provided with the full materials on which the Minister had based his or her 
decision and an opportunity to comment in writing thereon and, further, as the 
Minister’s decision had not been reasoned. The HRC further observed that where 
one of the highest values protected by the Covenant, namely the right to be free from 
torture, was at stake, the closest scrutiny should be applied to the fairness of the pro-
cedure applied to determine whether an individual was at substantial risk of torture. 
The HRC emphasised that this risk was highlighted in this case by its request for 
interim measures of protection. It did not see reasons why Suresh and Ahani should 
be treated differently, and concluded that there had been a violation of Article 13, in 
conjunction with Article 7.111 
The decision in Ahani strongly conveys the message that, in expulsion cases, both 
parties to the case must have equal access to the documents in the case file. The HRC 
seems to be stricter in guarding adversariality and equality of arms than the ECtHR as 
it required in the Ahani decision that all the documents in the file be disclosed to the 
claimant, including those underpinning the allegation that Ahani constituted a threat 
to Canada’s national security. In other words, in Ahani the HRC treated adversariality 
and equality of arms as an absolute right and did not tolerate the assumption that na-
tional security interests justified non-disclosure of part of the evidentiary materials. 
As will be shown in more detail in chapter 5, section 5.5.4, the ECtHR treats adver-
sariality and equality of arms as relative rights and has ruled that non-disclosure of 
evidentiary materials may be justified if this is strictly necessary to preserve the funda-
mental rights of another individual or to safeguard an important public interest, such 
as the protection of national security.112 
3.3.5  Compliance with reasonable national procedural rules 
Article 5, second paragraph, sub b of the Optional Protocol not only requires that 
available national remedies must be exhausted before an applicant applies to the 
HRC, but also that such national remedies are exhausted in a proper way, in accord-
ance with time limits and other procedural rules and formalities of national law. In 
other words, proper and full use and advantage of the remedies available under na-
tional law must be made. Failure to do so leads to inadmissibility before the HRC, 
due to non-exhaustion of national remedies.113 For national courts this entails that 
failure to adhere to national procedural rules, in principle, absolves those courts from 
carrying out an investigation on the merits. The case of Ngoc Si Truong v. Canada 
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(2003)114 may illustrate this. In that case, the author fled Viet Nam in 1978 illegally 
for fear of being drafted into the Vietnamese armed forces in the armed conflict with 
Cambodia. In 1980 (aged 16 years), he arrived in Canada and was granted permanent 
resident status. In 1985 and 1988 the author was convicted of a number of crimes 
(among them assault causing bodily harm) and sentenced to imprisonment. By virtue 
of his criminal offences, the Canadian authorities on 8 July 1992 ordered his deporta-
tion pursuant to the Immigration Act, which requires the deportation of permanent 
residents who have been convicted of serious criminal offences. In 1993, the author’s 
appeal to the Appeals Division of the Immigration and Refugee Board, based on ‘the 
existence of compassionate or humanitarian considerations’, was dismissed. The 
author then sought leave to apply for judicial review to the Federal Court. However, 
his counsel at the time inadvertently failed to request written reasons for the decision 
from the Appeals Division within the 10-day limit provided, and as a result the Ap-
peals Division refused to supply its reasons once requested thereafter. The Federal 
Court dismissed the author’s application for failure to supply an application record 
(including the Appeals Division’s reasons for the decision).115 
The author argued before the HRC that his removal to a country where he al-
legedly had no legal status would amount to cruel, inhuman and degrading treatment 
contrary to Article 7. He submitted that, as a result of his illegal departure from Viet 
Nam and the loss of his Canadian permanent residency status, he had become state-
less. As a result, he would, upon deportation to Viet Nam, be unable to work, reside 
or otherwise enjoy the rights associated with employment. He pointed out that when 
he travelled to Viet Nam in 1991, he had been required to obtain a visa for four 
months and had not been allowed to engage in employment. He submitted that he 
might be imprisoned in a ‘re-education camp’ upon return as a result of his illegal de-
parture and his father’s involvement in the former South Vietnamese Government.116 
The author also claimed before the HRC that his deportation would be arbitrary 
and contrary to Article 13, taken in conjunction with Article 2, third paragraph. The 
Appeals Division’s refusal to issue written reasons for its decision denied him the 
opportunity to challenge the legality of his deportation order in the Federal Court.117 
As regards the proceedings before the Canadian immigration and judicial 
authorities, the HRC noted that the author, aided by counsel, had had a full and inde-
pendent review of the decision by the Appeals Division of the Immigration and 
Refugee Board to deport him. Further judicial appeal had been available under the 
State party’s law, provided that he lodged a timely request for the full decision, and he 
had failed to do so. The HRC recalled its jurisprudence pursuant to which failure to 
adhere to procedural time limits for the filing of complaints amounted to failure to 
exhaust national remedies, and concluded that, as a consequence, it would be inap-
propriate for the author to raise on the merits his subsequent inability, due to in-
advertence, to pursue an effective appeal. The HRC concluded that the author had 
failed to substantiate, for purposes of admissibility, his claim of a violation of Articles 
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2 and 13 of the Covenant. It decided that the communication was inadmissible under 
Article 5, second paragraph, sub b of the Optional Protocol.118 
From the case of Jagjit Singh Bhullar v. Canada (2006)119 it becomes clear that na-
tional procedural rules must be reasonable. After the rejection of the author’s asylum 
claim in Canada, he applied to become part of the Post-Determination Refugee 
Claimants in Canada Class. He was found ineligible on account of late filing. After 
this, he filed two applications for judicial review. Both applications were filed out of 
time (submitted past the deadline for such applications).
120
 Before the HRC, Canada 
disputed the admissibility of the application on the ground that national remedies had 
not been exhausted. The HRC agreed with Canada and stated that  
 
‘The Committee recalls its jurisprudence that authors are bound by procedural rules such as 
filing deadlines applicable to the exhaustion of domestic remedies, provided that the restric-
tions are reasonable. (…) The Committee notes that both applications for judicial review were 
filed out of time by the author and were not subsequently pursued. The author has failed to ad-
vance any reasons for these delays, nor any argument that the specified time limits in question 
were either unfair or unreasonable. It follows that the author has failed to pursue domestic 
remedies with the “requisite diligence” and the communication must be declared inadmissible 
for failure to exhaust domestic remedies.’121 
 
The cases of Ngoc Si Truong v. Canada (2003) and Jagjit Singh Bhullar v. Canada (2006) 
strongly resemble the judgment of the ECtHR in Bahaddar v. Netherlands (1998, see 
chapter 5, section 5.3.2).122 In both Ngoc Si Truong v. Canada and Bahaddar v. Nether-
lands the applicant’s counsel inadvertently failed to take crucial steps in the national 
proceedings, although offered ample opportunity to take such steps, and in both 
cases this was attributed to the asylum seeker. In both cases, the international court 
or international supervisor did not find it problematic that the national court had not 
considered the case on the merits because of non-compliance with national proce-
dural rules. And in both cases, the international court or supervisor declared the claim 
inadmissible for failure to exhaust national remedies. 
In a number of older cases concerning other subject matters (not expulsion of 
asylum seekers), the HRC took a more lenient approach when it was established that 
the author or author’s counsel had made an unsuccessful yet genuine attempt to 
comply with national procedural rules in order to exhaust national remedies. In J.R.T. 
and the W.G. Party v. Canada (1983),123 there was ambiguity ensuing from conflicting 
time limits laid down in national laws. For that reason, non-compliance with the na-
tional time limits was not held against the author and did not lead to inadmissibility 
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for non-exhaustion of national remedies. In Griffin v. Spain (1995)124 the author was 
excused from exhausting national remedies because his failure to do so had resulted 
from the negligence and incompetence of a State-provided lawyer (as opposed to pri-
vately retained counsel). 
3.3.6  National remedy is bound to fail 
It follows from the HRC’s case law under Article 5, second paragraph, sub b, of the 
Optional Protocol that a national remedy is not effective when it offers virtually no 
prospect of success, in other words, is bound to fail. A national remedy may be 
bound to fail when the application of a constant jurisprudential line, developed in 
earlier cases by national courts, to a newly pending case, bars an individual, case-spe-
cific, factual assessment in that pending case. The HRC has ruled in a number of 
cases that authors are not expected to use national remedies in the face of contrary 
superior court precedents. For example, in Länsman et al v. Finland (1994), the HRC 
stated that: 
 
‘Wherever the jurisprudence of the highest domestic tribunal has decided the matter at issue, 
thereby eliminating any prospect of success of an appeal to the domestic courts, authors are 
not required to exhaust national remedies, for the purposes of the Optional Protocol.’125 
 
When we contemplate this HRC case law on the effectiveness of national remedies in 
conjunction with the requirement of a thorough and fair examination of the claim, 
flowing from Article 2, third paragraph, and in conjunction with the procedural limb 
of Article 7, it may be argued that this requirement demands that national courts 
must normally make an individual case-specific factual assessment and must be care-
ful in automatically and mechanically relying on steady jurisprudential lines. 
3.3.7 The provisions on national proceedings in the asylum context: 
interim conclusions 
Under Articles 7 and 2, third paragraph, ICCPR the national authorities are required 
to consider the protection claim thoroughly and fairly. So far the HRC has not 
specified in a detailed way what this requirement of a thorough and fair consideration 
means. The HRC is generally reluctant to put national asylum proceedings, including 
court proceedings, to a rigorous ICCPR-compliance test and does often not respond 
in a meaningful way to specific procedural problems raised by authors of individual 
communications. This reluctance is linked to the fact that it regards the determination 
and evaluation of facts and evidence as matters for the national courts. The HRC 
itself will normally not engage in that. As a consequence, it will not easily find na-
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tional remedies ineffective for reasons having to do with determination of the facts. 
The HRC’s hands-off approach may be explained by its limited investigative possibili-
ties and by the fact that its meeting time is very limited, which is difficult to reconcile 
with the time required to assess evidence and to write down an assessment of the 
presented evidence. The case of Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada (2011),126 in which the 
HRC deemed the national proceedings defective because insufficient attention had 
been paid to statements on past torture, may mark a turning point towards firmer 
monitoring of procedural ICCPR-compliance, but more jurisprudence is to be await-
ed to firmly draw such a conclusion. 
The case of Mansour Ahani v. Canada (2004)127 has shown that the HRC is inci-
dentally prepared to give up its hands-off approach if the national authorities breach-
ed the crucial requirements of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings. The HRC 
found the national expulsion proceedings in Ahani to be defective under Article 13 as 
the Minister did not provide the author with all the materials – including secret infor-
mation that Ahani was a danger to Canada’s national security – on which the expul-
sion decision was based and the national courts did not correct this unfairness in the 
procedure. 
National procedural rules will normally not render national proceedings non-
compliant with the requirement of a thorough and fair examination of the claim, pro-
vided that such rules are reasonable and provided that they are not applied in an auto-
matic and mechanical way. National courts must be careful in automatically relying on 
steady jurisprudential lines. 
3.4  Article 14: intensity of national judicial scrutiny and issues of 
evidence 
3.4.1  Applicability? 
Article 14, first paragraph, stipulates that in the determination of any criminal charge 
against him, or of his rights and obligations in a suit at law, everyone shall be entitled 
to a fair and public hearing by a competent, independent and impartial tribunal estab-
lished by law. The text of Article 14, first paragraph and the preparatory works do not 
explain in detail what is meant by ‘a suit at law’. At the time when the ICCPR was 
drawn up, national asylum court proceedings as we know them nowadays were in 
many States parties to the Covenant practically non-existent.128 The drafters could, 
therefore, not explicitly have had asylum proceedings in mind when defining the 
scope of Article 14. The preparatory works demonstrate that there was much debate 
on the question of whether Article 14 applied to judicial review of administrative ac-
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tions and decisions, and that this question remained unresolved in the end.129 In a 
number of cases, however, the HRC has outlined its view that a ‘suit at law’ can occur 
between an individual and the authorities. Accordingly it has held Article 14, first 
paragraph, to be applicable in a number of cases where the dispute occurred within a 
national setting of administrative law, between an individual and administrative au-
thorities.130 
The HRC has, so far, been ambiguous about the question of whether or not Arti-
cle 14 applies to national proceedings concerning asylum status determination and the 
expulsion of asylum seekers. In V.R.M.B. v. Canada (1988),131 the HRC considered 
that  
 
‘Even if immigration hearings and deportation proceedings were to be deemed as constituting 
“suits at law” within the meaning of article 14 (1) of the Covenant, as the author contends, a 
thorough examination of the communication has not revealed any facts in substantiation of the 
author’s claim to be a victim of a violation of this article. In particular, it emerges from the 
author’s own submissions that he was given ample opportunity, in formal proceedings in-
cluding oral hearings with witness testimony, both before the Adjudicator and before the Ca-
nadian Courts, to present his case for sojourn in Canada.’ 
 
In Williams Adu v. Canada (1997) and Hamid Reza Taghi Khadje v. the Netherlands (2006), 
the HRC ducked the question of the applicability of Article 14 by considering that, 
given the circumstances, there was no need to determine whether the proceedings re-
lating to the asylum applications fell within the scope of Article 14.132 In a number of, 
mostly later, cases it explicitly ruled that proceedings related to an alien’s expulsion, 
the guarantees in regard to which are governed by Article 13, do not fall within the 
ambit of a determination of rights and obligations in a suit at law, within the meaning 
of Article 14, first paragraph.133 In line with this later jurisprudence, General Com-
ment No. 32 states that the guarantee of equal access to courts does not apply to 
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extradition, expulsion and deportation procedures.134 This General Comment also 
makes clear, however, that many of the guarantees of Article 14 form part of Article 
13 as well and are, as such, applicable: 
 
‘The procedural guarantees of Article 13 incorporate notions of due process also reflected in 
Article 14 (…) and thus should be interpreted in the light of this latter provision. Insofar as 
domestic law entrusts a judicial body with the task of deciding about expulsions or deporta-
tions, the guarantee of equality of all persons before the courts and tribunals as enshrined in 
Article 14, paragraph 1, and the principles of impartiality, fairness and equality of arms implicit 
in this guarantee are applicable.’135 
 
The more recent jurisprudence and General Comment No. 32 justify the conclusion 
that Article 14 is, in principle, not applicable to national proceedings concerning asy-
lum and expulsion. However, in Dranichnikov v. Australia (2007)136 the HRC ruled dif-
ferently. The author in this case claimed that the Australian asylum court proceedings 
she went through had not offered her a fair hearing as the Review Tribunal was not 
an independent court and this Tribunal was deliberately delaying the determination of 
her husband’s refugee claim. The HRC found the complaint that the national tribunal 
was not an independent court lacking in substantiation and, therefore, inadmissible. It 
considered the complaint about the delay on the merits, considering that it was con-
cerned about the delay in the determination of the author’s husband’s refugee claim, 
but also that this delay was caused by the totality of the proceedings and not just by 
the Refugee Review Tribunal. As the HRC examined at least one aspect of the Article 
14-complaint on the merits, it did consider Article 14 to be applicable to the national 
asylum court proceedings the author went through.137 Based on the case law discuss-
ed above, the only conclusion we can draw is that the HRC has, so far, been ambi-
guous and inconsistent about the question of whether or not Article 14, first para-
graph, is applicable to national asylum court proceedings. The case of Dranichnikov 
may indicate that the HRC has begun to steer another course. So far we cannot be 
completely sure about this, however, as it has so far not repeated the position taken 
in Dranichnikov in other cases. 
3.4.2 National procedural autonomy 
General Comment No. 32 states in paragraph 26 that 
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‘Article 14 guarantees procedural equality and fairness only and cannot be interpreted as en-
suring the absence of error on the part of the competent tribunal. (…) It is generally for the 
courts of States parties to the Covenant to review facts and evidence, or the application of 
domestic legislation, in a particular case, unless it can be shown that such evaluation or applica-
tion was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a manifest error or denial of justice, or that the court 
otherwise violated its obligation of independence and impartiality.’138 
 
The quoted paragraph from General Comment No. 32 clarifies the division of tasks 
in offering protection of human rights between the HRC and national courts. Ac-
cording to the HRC, it is generally the task of national courts – and not the task of 
the HRC – to review facts, evidence and the application of national law. This is in 
line with the subsidiary role of the HRC, as reflected in Article 2, third paragraph, and 
Article 5, second paragraph, of the Optional Protocol. The task of the HRC is to 
determine whether in a specific case before it ICCPR rights were violated, not to es-
tablish the facts or to apply national law. It follows from this that the HRC will nor-
mally allow national courts considerable leeway in this area. From the description of 
the task of national courts given in General Comment No. 32 – review facts, evi-
dence and the application of national legislation – we may infer that, in the opinion of 
the HRC, national courts must have jurisdiction on points of fact and points of law. 
However, unlike the ECtHR, the HRC has (so far) not developed a full jurisdiction 
doctrine (see chapter 5, section 5.4.1). No views of the HRC have been found in 
which – either under Article 14 or under another provision – it was explicitly stated 
that national courts must have, in principle, full jurisdiction on points of fact and 
points of law and that under particular circumstances less intense forms of judicial 
scrutiny are permitted. 
In a number of views the HRC has made clear that the procedural practice ap-
plied by national courts in order to establish the relevant facts is a matter for those 
courts to determine in the interests of justice. In the case of Anni Äärelä and Jouni 
Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland (2001),139 the authors, reindeer breeders of Sami ethnic origin 
and members of a reindeer herding co-operative, claimed a violation of Article 27 
ICCPR140 because logging and road construction was allowed on the best winter 
lands of the co-operative. In the proceedings before the HRC, the authors claimed a 
violation of Article 14, first paragraph, contending that the Appeal Court had violated 
the principle of equality of arms in allowing oral hearings, while denying an on-site 
inspection. The HRC did not follow the authors in this complaint. It ruled: 
 
‘As to the authors’ claims under Article 14 that the procedure applied by the Court of Appeal 
was unfair in that an oral hearing was granted and an on-site inspection was denied, the Com-
mittee considers that, as a general rule, the procedural practice applied by domestic courts is a 
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matter for the courts to determine in the interests of justice. The onus is on the authors to 
show that a particular practice has given rise to unfairness in the particular proceedings. In the 
present case, an oral hearing was granted as the Court found it necessary to determine the relia-
bility and weight to be accorded to oral testimony. The authors have not shown that this deci-
sion was manifestly arbitrary or otherwise amounted to a denial of justice. As to the decision 
not to pursue an on-site inspection, the Committee considers that the authors have failed to 
show that the Court of Appeal’s decision to rely on the District Court’s inspection of the area 
and the records of those proceedings injected unfairness into the hearing or demonstrably al-
tered the outcome of the case. Accordingly, the Committee is unable to find a violation of Ar-
ticle 14 in the procedure applied by the Court of Appeal in these respects.’141 
 
The HRC has reiterated this principle of national procedural autonomy in many other 
decisions.142 As was made clear above in section 3.3.1, this principle is also applied 
within the context and framework of Article 7. 
General Comment No. 32, and the HRC’s case law in other areas (not asylum) 
make clear that exceptions to the hands-off approach are made where national courts 
evaluated evidence or applied national law in a clearly arbitrary way, made a manifest 
error or denied justice, or where the national court otherwise violated its obligations 
of independence and impartiality.143 As the cases discussed in the next section will 
demonstrate, the HRC finds a lack of equality of arms and a lack of adversariality in 
the national proceedings a serious problem, meriting the conclusion that no fair pro-
ceedings in the sense of Article 14 have taken place. This jurisprudential line mirrors 
the HRC’s stance on Articles 7 and 13 in the case of Mansour Ahani v. Canada 
(2004),144 discussed above in section 3.3.4. 
3.4.3 Equality of arms and adversariality 
The case of Sandra Fei v. Colombia (1995)145 concerned national proceedings over the 
custody of children after the divorce of their parents. The author alleged before the 
HRC that the national proceedings had been unfair, in violation of Article 14, first 
paragraph. The HRC agreed with the author. The national court proceedings were 
considered unfair for a number of reasons. One reason was that the national courts 
had not guaranteed equality of arms and had not offered adversarial proceedings: 
 
‘Finally, it is noteworthy that in the proceedings under article 86 of the Colombian Constitu-
tion instituted on behalf of the author’s daughters in December 1993, the hearing took place, 
and judgement was given, on 16 December 1993, that is, before the expiration of the deadline 
for the submission of the author’s defence statement. The State party has failed to address this 
                                                        
141 HRC, Anni Äärelä and Jouni Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, 7 November 2001, No. 779/1997, para. 7.3. 
142 See, for example, HRC, R.M. v. Finland, 27 March 1989, No. 301/1988 para. 6.4; HRC, Carlton Linton 
v. Jamaica, 22 October 1992, No. 255/1987, paras. 3.1, 3.2, 8.3; HRC, Errol Sims v. Jamaica, 3 April 
1995, No. 541/1993, para. 6.2.  
143 General Comment No. 32, para. 26. 
144 HRC, Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 15 June 2004, No. 1051/2002. 
145 HRC, Sandra Fei v. Colombia, 26 April 1995, No. 514/1992. 
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point, and the author’s version is thus uncontested. In the Committee’s opinion, the impossi-
bility for Mrs Fei to present her arguments before judgement was given was incompatible with 
the principle of adversary proceedings, and thus contrary to article 14, paragraph 1, of the Cov-
enant.’146 
 
The case of Jansen-Gielen v. the Netherlands (2001)147 provides another example in which 
the HRC concluded that there had been a violation of Article 14, first paragraph for 
reasons of non-compliance with the principles of equality of arms and adversarial 
proceedings. The author, a primary school teacher, was declared disabled for work by 
80% by the Director of the General Civil Pension Scheme. The decision rested on a 
psychiatrist’s report. She contested this decision in administrative and then judicial 
proceedings. In the proceedings before the Central Appeals Tribunal (Centrale Raad 
van Beroep), the highest court, the author changed counsels. Her new counsel sub-
mitted to the Tribunal a psychological report, refuting the conclusions of the first ex-
pert report. This new report was submitted by letter on 26 September 1994 and the 
hearing of the Central Appeals Tribunal took place, as scheduled, on 29 September 
1994. In its judgment of 20 October 1994, the Central Appeals Tribunal dismissed 
the author’s appeal. It considered that it could not take into account the expert report 
submitted by the author because of its late presentation. It appears from the judg-
ment that the Tribunal considered that the defending party would have been un-
reasonably hindered in its defence if the document had been allowed. In reaching its 
decision the Tribunal also referred to the provisions of Article 8:58 of the (new) 
General Administrative Law. The author argued before the HRC that the Tribunal’s 
failure to take the expert report into account violated her right to provide evidence, 
since it had prevented her from refuting the other party’s arguments as to her ability 
to work. She claimed that this constituted a violation of Article 14, since she had not 
received a fair hearing.148 The HRC agreed with the author and considered: 
 
‘The author has claimed that the failure of the Central Appeals Tribunal to append the psycho-
logical report, submitted by her counsel, to the case file two days before the hearing, consti-
tutes a violation of her right to a fair hearing. The Committee has noted the State party’s argu-
ment that the Court found that admission of the report two days before the hearing would 
have unreasonably obstructed the other party in the conduct of the case. However, the Com-
mittee notes that the procedural law applicable to the hearing of the case did not provide for a 
time limit for the submission of documents. Consequently, it was the duty of the Court of Ap-
peal, which was not constrained by any prescribed time limit to ensure that each party could 
challenge the documentary evidence which the other filed or wished to file and, if need be, to 
adjourn proceedings. In the absence of the guarantee of equality of arms between the parties in 
the production of evidence for the purposes of the hearing, the Committee finds a violation of 
article 14, paragraph 1 of the Covenant.’149 
 
                                                        
146 Ibidem, para. 8.6. 
147 HRC, Jansen-Gielen v. the Netherlands, 14 May 2001, No. 846/1999. 
148 Ibidem, paras. 2.1-3.1. 
149 Ibidem, para. 8.2. 
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In the case of Anni Äärelä and Jouni Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland (2001, see above 3.4.2)150 
the HRC agreed with the authors that Article 14, first paragraph, had been violated as 
the Appeal Court had violated the principle of equality of arms in taking into account 
material information without providing an opportunity to the other party to com-
ment.151 
The case of Fuenzalida v. Ecuador (1996)152 shows that in certain cases and under 
specific circumstances, national courts are required to apply investigative powers, for 
the sake of guaranteeing full equality of arms and fully adversarial proceedings. The 
author in this case complained before the HRC that his national trial, at which he had 
been convicted of rape, had been unfair. The victim in this case had submitted to the 
national court a laboratory report on samples (blood and semen) taken from her and 
samples of blood and hair taken from the author against his will, showing the exis-
tence of an enzyme which the author did not have in his blood. The author requested 
the national court to order an examination of his own blood and semen, but the court 
denied this request.153 The HRC agreed with the author and found that the national 
court’s refusal to order expert testimony of crucial importance to the case constituted 
a violation of Article 14.154 The HRC’s consideration is very brief, which can proba-
bly be explained by the fact that the respondent State party did not provide much in-
formation concerning this aspect of the national court proceedings. It is, however, 
interesting to point out that the HRC found the national court’s refusal to order an 
expert investigation incompatible with Article 14, third paragraph, sub e, which pro-
vision applies specifically to criminal proceedings and embodies the principles of 
equality of arms and adversarial proceedings, stating that ‘in the determination of any 
criminal charge against him, everyone shall be entitled to the following minimum 
guarantees, in full equality (…)(e) to examine, or have examined, the witnesses against 
him and to obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses on his behalf under 
the same conditions as witnesses against him’. Thus, the HRC found the national 
court’s refusal to order the requested expert investigation incompatible with the 
principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings. 
3.4.4 Article 14: interim conclusions 
Within the framework of Article 14, the procedural practice applied by national 
courts to determine the facts and to admit, exclude, weigh and evaluate evidence is a 
matter for those courts to determine. Unlike the ECtHR (see chapter 5, section 
5.4.1), the HRC has (so far) not developed a doctrine regarding the required intensity 
of national judicial scrutiny in administrative law cases. In a number of cases not con-
cerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, the HRC concluded that there had been a 
breach by national courts of the principles of equality of arms and adversarial pro-
ceedings. In those cases, the HRC relinquished its deference to national procedural 
                                                        
150 HRC, Anni Äärelä and Jouni Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, 7 November 2001, No. 779/1997. 
151 Ibidem, para. 7.4. 
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153 Ibidem, paras. 3.4, 3.5. 
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autonomy and overtly criticised the national court proceedings for being unfair. It is 
obvious from these cases that the HRC regards equality of arms and adversarial 
proceedings as the very essence of fair proceedings. The principles developed by the 
HRC within the framework of Article 14 strongly mirror those developed within the 
context of Articles 7 and 13, discussed in section 3.3 and summarised in 3.3.7. 
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ICCPR, Part 2: 
 
The assessment performed by the HRC in cases on the expulsion of 
asylum seekers 
3.5 The assessment performed by the HRC in cases on expulsion of 
asylum seekers 
The HRC has dealt with the merits in only a limited number of cases concerning the 
expulsion of asylum seekers.155 Furthermore, in a limited number of cases, it has de-
clared the communication inadmissible.156 Below, a step by step analysis is made of 
the examination performed by the HRC in these cases, with the aid of the eleven 
aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny introduced in Chapter 1. As the number of 
cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers is limited, which makes it difficult 
to discern clear jurisprudential lines, I also examined a number of internal torture 
cases: cases in which the author alleged before the HRC that he had been tortured in 
his own country, being the respondent State party. In addition to that category of 
cases, I examined a number of cases concerning extradition, in which Article 7 was 
invoked. 
3.5.1 Standard of proof 
General Comment No. 31 (2004) states: 
 
‘Moreover, the Article 2 obligation requiring that States Parties respect and ensure the Cove-
nant rights for all persons in their territory and all persons under their control entails an obli-
gation not to extradite, deport, expel or otherwise remove a person from their territory, where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of irreparable harm, such as 
that contemplated by Articles 6 and 7 of the Covenant, either in the country to which removal 
is to be effected or in any country to which the person may subsequently be removed. The rel-
evant judicial and administrative authorities should be made aware of the need to ensure com-
pliance with the Covenant obligations in such matters.’157 
 
It follows from this that the standard of proof applied by the HRC in expulsion cases 
is that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of a violation 
of Article 7. This standard has been further explained by the HRC in a number of 
cases. In the first two refoulement cases concerning extradition to the USA, Kindler v. 
Canada (1993)158 and Chitat Ng v. Canada (1994),159 the HRC defined the real risk as 
the necessary and foreseeable consequence of the extradition. It also considered in 
                                                        
155 See note 20 in section 3.1.1 above. 
156 See note 21 in section 3.1.1 above. 
157 General Comment No. 31 (2004), para. 12. 
158 HRC, Kindler v. Canada, 18 November 1993, No. 470/1991. 
159 HRC, Chitat Ng v. Canada, 7 January 1994, No. 469/1991. 
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both cases that treatment contrary to the ICCPR was ‘certain’. In both cases, the fol-
lowing consideration was used: 
 
‘However, if a State party takes a decision relating to a person within its jurisdiction, and the 
necessary and foreseeable consequence is that that person’s rights under the Covenant will be 
violated in another jurisdiction, the State party itself may be in violation of the Covenant. That 
follows from the fact that a State party’s duty under article 2 of the Covenant would be ne-
gated by the handing over of a person to another State (whether a State party to the Covenant 
or not) where treatment contrary to the Covenant is certain or is the very purpose of the hand-
ing over.’160 
 
In the next refoulement case concerning extradition, Cox v. Canada (1994),161 the HRC 
again defined the real risk as the necessary and foreseeable consequence, but did not 
repeat the ‘certainty’ requirement. Wouters (2009) points out that it may seem strange 
to define the risk criterion as a certain consequence of extradition, but that from a 
contextual point of view it may be understandable as extradition cases involve trans-
parent criminal proceedings so that it is by and large known what will happen to the 
authors after their extradition.162 Cases involving the expulsion of asylum seekers dif-
fer from extradition cases in that it is often much less certain what will happen to the 
author after expulsion. Nevertheless, in the first case about the expulsion of an asy-
lum seeker, A.R.J. v. Australia (1997, see section 3.1.1), the HRC once again explained 
that a real risk means that it is a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the expul-
sion that Article 7 will be violated.163 In following cases concerning expulsion, the 
HRC has been fairly consistent in reiterating the necessary and foreseeable conse-
quence criterion, although the criterion is not explicitly mentioned in all the cases.164 
The ‘necessary and foreseeable consequence’ criterion clearly indicates a high 
threshold which is not easily met. This threshold seems to be higher than under Ar-
ticle 3 ECHR, where the level of risk required is a real (not fictional), personal (relates 
to the individual), and foreseeable risk exceeding the mere possibility of being sub-
jected to proscribed ill-treatment, but where the risk does not need to be certain (nec-
essary) or highly probable.165 
                                                        
160 HRC, Kindler v. Canada, 18 November 1993, No. 470/1991, para. 6.2, HRC, Chitat Ng v. Canada, 7 
January 1994, No. 469/1991, para. 6.2. 
161 HRC, Cox v. Canada, 9 December 1994, No. 539/1993, para. 16.1. 
162 Wouters 2009, p. 393. 
163 HRC, A.R.J.v. Australia, 11 August 1997, No. 692/1996, para. 6.8. 
164 Examples of cases in which the HRC explicitly referred to the criterion of a necessary and fore-
seeable consequence are: HRC, G.T. v. Australia, 4 December 1997, No. 706/1996, para. 8.1; HRC, 
Byaruhanga v. Denmark, 9 December 2004, No. 1222/2003, para. 11.2; HRC, Daljit Singh v. Canada, 28 
April 2006, No. 1315/2004, para. 6.3; HRC, Dawood Khan v. Canada, 10 August 2006, No. 1302/ 
2004, para. 5.4; HRC, Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 18 March 2010, No. 1544/2007, para. 8.7. 
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tralia, 13 November 2002, No. 900/1999; HRC, Ahani v. Canada, 15 June 2004, No. 1051/2002; 
HRC, Alzery v. Sweden, 10 November 2006, No. 1416/2005; HRC, Moses SoloTarlue v. Canada, 27 
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3.5.2 Burden of proof 
It is constant case law of the HRC that in Article 7-cases, the burden of proof is 
shared between the author and the authorities of the State party. A consideration 
which is reiterated in many views in internal torture cases is that  
 
‘With regard to the burden of proof, this cannot rest alone on the author of the communica-
tion, especially considering that the author and the State party do not always have equal access 
to the evidence and that frequently the State party alone has access to relevant information. It 
is implicit in article 4 (2) of the Optional Protocol that the State party has the duty to inves-
tigate in good faith all allegations of violation of the Covenant made against it and its 
authorities, especially when such allegations are corroborated by evidence submitted by the 
author of the communication, and to furnish to the Committee the information available to it. 
In cases where the author has submitted to the Committee allegations supported by witness 
testimony, as in this case, and where further clarification of the case depends on information 
exclusively in the hands of the State party, the Committee may consider such allegations as 
substantiated in the absence of satisfactory evidence and explanations to the contrary submit-
ted by the State party.’166 
 
It follows from this consideration that the burden of proof is shared: there is an 
initial burden of assertion, and, preferably, also some corroboration, on the author. 
After that, an investigative burden on the authorities of the State party emerges. The 
authorities must investigate ‘in good faith’ the alleged violation. In some cases the 
HRC has stated that ‘a State party must investigate thoroughly, in good faith and 
within the imparted deadlines’ the alleged violation.167 
The term ‘especially’ (in the middle of the quote above) makes clear that, the 
more detailed and the more corroborated the author’s statements are, the more de-
tailed the investigation by the authorities of the respondent State party needs to be. 
For example, in the case of Joaquin Herrera Rubio v. Colombia (1987),168 the author of 
the communication to the HRC submitted detailed allegations of torture inflicted 
upon him in a military camp in an attempt to extract from him information about a 
guerrilla movement. The author mentioned specific names of military officers who 
allegedly tortured him. The HRC requested the respondent State party to provide in-
formation on the investigations undertaken with regard to the military officers named 
specifically by the author.169 In reply, Colombia forwarded copies of various docu-
ments relating to the investigation of the author’s case, but did not provide specific 
answers to the questions posed by the HRC. The HRC considered that  
 
                                                        
166 For examples of internal cases concerning torture, see HRC, Irene Bleier Lewenhoff and Rosa Valino de 
Bleier v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982, No. 30/1978, para. 13.3, HRC; Ilda Thomas on behalf of her brother, 
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‘It is implicit in article 4, paragraph 2, of the Optional Protocol that the State party has the duty 
to investigate in good faith all allegations of violation of the Covenant made against it and its 
authorities, and to furnish to the Committee the information available to it. In no circum-
stances should a State party fail to investigate fully allegations of ill-treatment when the person 
or persons allegedly responsible for the ill-treatment are identified by the author of a commu-
nication. The State party has in this matter provided no precise information and reports, inter 
alia, on the questioning of military officials accused of maltreatment of prisoners, or on the 
questioning of their superiors.’170 
 
The same principle – the more detailed and the more corroborated the author’s state-
ments are, the more detailed the investigation by the authorities of the respondent 
State party needs to be – is applied in other internal torture cases as well.171 So far the 
HRC has not used its standard consideration on the shared burden of proof in cases 
concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers. 
3.5.3  Relevant facts and circumstances 
In the case of Alzery v. Sweden (2006),172 the HRC made clear that  
 
‘In determining the risk (…) the Committee must consider all relevant elements, including the 
general situation of human rights in a State.’173 
 
The relevant facts and circumstances can be divided into two categories. First, 
personal circumstances, such as background, gender, ethnicity, age, sexual orienta-
tion, beliefs, activities, personal profile, experiences are relevant. Second, as is clear 
from the quote above, the general human rights situation in the country of origin is 
relevant. Some examples are provided below of relevant personal facts, and relevant 
facts and circumstances concerning the country of origin. The description is illustra-
tive, but is by no means exhaustive. 
3.5.3.1  Personal facts and circumstances 
The case law of the HRC demonstrates that it attaches great significance to recog-
nition as a refugee by a State party, in combination with (largely) unchanged circum-
stances in the country of origin. This is – explicitly or implicitly – considered to be an 
important indication of a real Article 7-risk. The case of C. v. Australia (2002)174 con-
cerned an Iranian Assyrian Christian who had been granted refugee status in Australia 
in 1995 on account of his experiences in Iran as an Assyrian Christian, along with the 
                                                        
170 Ibidem, para. 10.5. 
171 See, for example, HRC, Mukong v. Cameroon, 10 August 1994, No. 458/1991, paras. 9.1 and 9.2; 
HRC, Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, 21 July 1983, No. 107/1981, paras. 11, 12.1, 12.2; HRC, Nina 
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v. Zaire, 16 April 1996, No. 542/1993. 
172 HRC, Alzery v. Sweden, 10 November 2006, No. 1416/2005. 
173 Ibidem, para. 11.3. 
174 HRC, C. v. Australia, 13 November 2002, No. 900/1999. 
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deteriorating situation of that religious minority in Iran, and also because of his bad 
psychiatric status over a protracted period of detention and a diagnosis of delusional 
disorder, paranoid psychosis and depression requiring pharmaceutical and psycho-
therapeutic intervention. After a conviction and sentence for aggravated burglary and 
threats to kill, a deportation order was brought against him in 1997, which he appeal-
ed against in different national proceedings, without success. In the proceedings be-
fore the HRC, the author described the situation of Assyrian Christians as very bad. 
He relied on a report compiled by expert Dr. Rubinstein, Senior Lecturer in Middle 
East Politics of the Monash University, on the human rights situation in Iran.175 By 
contrast, the respondent State party, referring to various sources, contended that the 
human rights situation in Iran, and the position of Assyrian Christians there, had 
much improved in recent years.176 
The HRC found the recognition as a refugee highly important. It ruled: 
 
‘As to the author’s arguments that his deportation would amount to a violation of article 7, the 
Committee attaches weight to the fact that the author was originally granted refugee status on 
the basis of a well-founded fear of persecution as an Assyrian Christian, coupled with the likely 
consequences of a return of his illness. In the Committee’s view, the State party has not estab-
lished that the current circumstances in the receiving State are such that the grant of refugee 
status no longer holds validity.’177 
 
Byahuranga v. Denmark (2004)178 was a case concerning a Ugandan army officer who 
had served under Idi Amin, fled Uganda in 1981 and was granted asylum in Denmark 
on 4 September 1986. In 2002, he was convicted of drug-related offences, sentenced 
to two years and six months’ imprisonment and ordered to be expelled from Den-
mark. In the expulsion order, it was indicated that there was no risk that he would be 
ill-treated in Uganda. The HRC, nevertheless, assumed a real Article 7-risk. In this 
case, it did not state explicitly that recognition as a refugee in Denmark had played a 
role, but it is hard to imagine that this fact had not played a role. 
Other important personal facts and circumstances are engagement in opposi-
tional political or other activities and the level, type and scale of these activities, as 
well as past experiences of torture, ill-treatment, persecution or other serious human 
rights violations. In the case of Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada (2010),179 both op-
positional activities and past experiences of ill-treatment played an important role. 
The author, a police officer of the Political Security Directorate in Tunisia, claimed 
refugee status in Canada, alleging that he had a well-founded fear of persecution in 
Tunisia on account of his political opinions. As a guard of political detainees, he had 
fed hungry young prisoners, for which act he had been disarmed, interrogated, ac-
cused of sympathizing with political prisoners and placed under arrest for five 
months before being dismissed. After his release in August 1996, the author attempt-
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ed to leave Tunisia, but was stopped at the airport because he had no exit visa from 
the Director of the Security Services. He was then placed in detention for one month. 
On leaving prison he was subjected to very strict administrative surveillance, which 
required him to present himself twice a day to the security service to sign a surveil-
lance register. The author managed to leave Tunisia three years later by bribing an 
employee of the Ministry of the Interior to issue him with a new passport.180 At 
national level, the claim for protection was found incredible due to certain inconsis-
tencies concerning the question of whether or not the author had been able to work 
after detention. The HRC, however, assumed a real Article 7-risk in this case.181 
Oppositional political activities carried out in the country of refuge are also rele-
vant, as the case of Byahuranga v. Denmark (2004)182 demonstrates. In this case, the 
HRC attached great importance to the oppositional activities carried out in Denmark 
by the author, a former Ugandan army officer, and to the fact that it was very likely 
that the Ugandan authorities were aware of these activities.183 
3.5.3.2 Facts and circumstances concerning the situation in the country of origin 
Relevant circumstances concerning the country of origin are the general human rights 
situation, the plight of refugees, the level of violence in the country and control there-
of by the authorities, the practice of torture in prisons and other conditions in deten-
tion, changes in government or policies, the existence of a peace process or an agreed 
ceasefire, and the repatriation of refugees under the supervision of the UNHCR. 
Reference is made, again, to Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada (2010),184 where the 
HRC considered that, according to a variety of sources, torture was known to be 
practised in Tunisia.185 
Diplomatic assurances guaranteeing that the expelled (or extradited) applicant 
will not be subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 7 play an important role in a 
number of cases. An example is Alzery v. Sweden (2006).186 The HRC considered in 
that case that 
 
‘The existence of diplomatic assurances, their content and the existence and implementation of 
enforcement mechanisms are all factual elements relevant to the overall determination of 
whether, in fact, a real risk of proscribed ill-treatment exists.’187 
 
In the case of G.T. v. Australia (1997),188 the author had been convicted in Australia 
for drug-related offences. He faced deportation to Malaysia. He feared the death 
penalty and up to nine years’ detention on death row. He also feared being caned. 
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Malaysia had provided diplomatic assurances that the author would not be prose-
cuted for his offences committed overseas.189 In addition, the Australian authorities 
had investigated the possibility of the imposition of the death sentence on the author 
and had concluded that in similar cases no prosecution had occurred.190 Based on this 
and on the fact that Malaysia had not requested the author’s return, the HRC 
concluded that there was no real risk.191 
However, two HRC members, Klein and Kretzmer, pointed out in a separate 
dissenting opinion that the diplomatic assurances also stated that ‘a Malaysian na-
tional may be charged by the Malaysian authorities due to other offences that he 
might have committed in Malaysia’.192 Klein and Kretzmer stressed that the death 
sentence was mandatory in Malaysia for the drug-related offence committed by the 
author: importing 240 grams of heroin from Malaysia to Australia; obviously, these 
HRC members assumed that the Malaysian authorities would not see this offence as 
having been committed overseas, but as an offence committed in Malaysia. 
3.5.4 Required degree of individual risk 
In chapter 5 on the ECHR we will distinguish three categories of cases: 1) cases of 
extreme general violence, where an Article 3-risk is assumed for everyone returning 
to the particular country; 2) cases of group violence; and 3) individual risk cases. In 
the third category, it is required that an individual risk is established. So far the HRC 
has not developed its position on the question of the required degree of individual 
risk in the same way as the ECtHR has done. Nevertheless, case law of the HRC 
gives good reasons to assume that it has taken significant steps towards incorporating 
the lines of theory developed by the ECtHR on situations of group violence.193 In the 
case of Kaba v. Canada (2010),194 the HRC assumed that expulsion of the Guinean 
author and her daughter, Fatoumata, to Guinea would entail a real Article 7-risk, as it 
was foreseeable that Fatoumata would be subjected to female genital mutilation. The 
HRC considered as follows: 
 
‘(…) nor is there any question that women in Guinea traditionally have been subjected to geni-
tal mutilation and to a certain extent are still subjected to it. At issue is whether the author’s 
daughter runs a real and personal risk of being subjected to such treatment if she returns to 
Guinea. The Committee notes that in Guinea female genital mutilation is prohibited by law. 
However, this legal prohibition is not complied with. The following points should be noted: (a) 
genital mutilation is a common and widespread practice in the country, particularly among 
women of the Malinke ethnic group; (b) those who practise female genital mutilation do so 
with impunity; (c) in the case of Fatoumata Kaba, her mother appears to be the only person 
opposed to this practice being carried out, unlike the family of Fatoumata’s father, given the 
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context of a strictly patriarchal society; (d) the documentation presented by the author, which 
has not been disputed by the State party, reveals a high incidence of female genital mutilation 
in Guinea; (e) the girl is only 15 years old at the time the Committee is making its decision. Al-
though the risk of excision decreases with age, the Committee is of the view that the context 
and particular circumstances of the case at hand demonstrate a real risk of Fatoumata Kaba be-
ing subjected to genital mutilation if she was returned to Guinea.’195 
 
These considerations clearly demonstrate that the HRC, in fact, accepted that all 
Guinean girls of a certain age risked being subjected to the practice of FGM, thereby 
running a real Article 7-risk.  
The same approach is found in the case of Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada (2011, 
see section 3.3.3 above).196 Although the reasoning is extremely brief, it does become 
clear that the HRC assumed that individuals such as the authors, with the same ethnic 
background, from the same part of the country, ran a risk of being subjected to 
treatment prohibited by Article 7 (from both the police and the LTTE).  
The relaxation of the individualisation requirement in the HRC’s case law may be 
qualified as a significant step forward in the protection of individuals at risk, both in 
relation to the substantive scope of protection (the individual does not always need to 
be personally singled out) and the possibility to prove that a threat exists.197 In situ-
ations where serious group violence may be assumed to exist, less individual evidence 
of a personal risk is needed. 
3.5.5 Credibility assessment 
As has already been pointed out, the HRC frequently emphasises its subsidiary role in 
the determination of the facts, including the credibility assessment and the assess-
ment of evidence. The State party has a central role in assessing the facts and the 
HRC allows itself only a limited role in the determination of the relevant facts and the 
assessment of evidence.198 Limited investigative powers (see below section 3.5.9) and 
limited meeting time may explain this. The HRC’s case law on expulsion features 
eight cases in which, at national level, the claim for protection was found incredible, 
for example, because of contradictory statements.199 
In the majority (five) of these cases, the HRC did not, or at least not in an explicit 
and detailed manner, make a fresh and new credibility assessment of its own. In one 
                                                        
195 Ibidem, paras. 10.1 and 10.2. 
196 HRC, Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada, 25 March 2011, No. 1763/2008. 
197 Kjaerum 2010, pp. 28-29. 
198 For the same conclusion see Wouters 2009, pp. 397, 398; Kjaerum 2010, pp. 28-29. 
199 The number of cases mentioned here represent the cases I have been able to trace up to 1 January 
2012. The cases where, at national level, the claim for protection had been found incredible, are: 
HRC, Daljit Singh v. Canada, 28 April 2006, No. 1315/2004; Dawood Khan v. Canada, 10 August 2006, 
No. 1302/200; HRC, Hamid Reza Taghi Khadje v. the Netherlands, 15 November 2006, No. 1438/2005; 
HRC, A.C. v. the Netherlands, 22 July 2008, No. 1494/2006; 4; HRC, Mahmoud Walid Nakrash and Liu 
Qifen v. Sweden, 30 October 2008, No. 1540/2007; HRC, Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 18 March 
2010, No. 1544/2007; Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada, 25 March 2011, No. 1763/2008; HRC, Kaba v. 
Canada, 25 March 2010, No. 1465/2006. 
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of these five cases, it considered that deportation was not imminent and for that rea-
son the communication was declared inadmissible as insufficiently substantiated.200 In 
the other four of these five cases the HRC considered that the claim for protection 
had been thoroughly considered by the national authorities and had been found in-
credible at national level.201 In two of the five cases, the HRC added that, further-
more, the author had not adduced sufficient evidence to support an Article 7-
claim.202 And in two of the five cases, the HRC considered that ‘It is generally for the 
courts of States parties to evaluate facts and evidence in a particular case, unless it is 
found that the evaluation was clearly arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice’.203 
However, in the three remaining cases of the eight, the HRC made a fresh and 
independent credibility assessment of its own.204 It did so without giving specific rea-
sons for choosing this approach. The question remains on what grounds and under 
what circumstances the HRC chooses one of these two approaches: reliance on the 
respondent State’s credibility assessment or an independent assessment of credibility 
on its own account? It has, so far, not developed an elaborate doctrinal position on 
this issue. It is interesting to note that all three cases in which the HRC made a fresh 
and independent credibility assessment are views of 2010 and 2011. This, perhaps, in-
dicates that the HRC is intensifying its international supervisory scrutiny. In all three 
cases, in its conclusions on the merits (under the heading ‘issues before the Com-
mittee’) the HRC did not discuss at all the debate between the parties concerning the 
credibility of the account. Neither did it explain explicitly why it found certain state-
ments credible or not. The conclusions on the merits are mostly extremely brief and 
not very explicit. What can be inferred from these conclusions, however, is that in as-
sessing the credibility of the claim and the claimant, the HRC focuses on those state-
ments which are not in dispute, examines whether these statements are couched in 
terms of Article 7 (for example, statements on past torture), then examines whether 
these statements are consistent with country information, and, finally, verifies wheth-
er there is serious corroborative evidence. 
In the case of Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada (2010), the core of the flight nar-
rative – dissent in the Tunisian police, the six-month police detention, the strict ad-
ministrative surveillance to which the author had been subjected – had not been con-
tested at national level, or in the proceedings before the HRC. The core part of the 
                                                        
200 HRC, Hamid Reza Taghi Khadje v. the Netherlands, 15 November 2006, No. 1438/2005, para. 6.3. 
201 HRC, Daljit Singh v. Canada, 28 April 2006, No. 1315/2004, para. 6.3; Dawood Khan v. Canada, 10 
August 2006, No. 1302/200, para. 5.4; HRC, A.C. v. the Netherlands, 22 July 2008, No. 1494/2006, 
para. 8.2; HRC, Mahmoud Walid Nakrash and Liu Qifen v. Sweden, 30 October 2008, No. 1540/2007, 
para. 7.3 
202 HRC, Daljit Singh v. Canada, 28 April 2006, No. 1315/2004, para. 6.3; Dawood Khan v. Canada, 10 Au-
gust 2006, No. 1302/200, para. 5.4; HRC, Mahmoud Walid Nakrash and Liu Qifen v. Sweden, 30 Oc-
tober 2008, No. 1540/2007, para. 7.3 (only in relation to the female author, Liu Qifen, did the HRC 
state that she had not provided sufficientevidence to the effect that she would be subjected to treat-
ment contrary to Article 7.) 
203 HRC, A.C. v. the Netherlands, 22 July 2008, No. 1494/ 2006, para. 8.2; HRC, Mahmoud Walid Nakrash 
and Liu Qifen v. Sweden, 30 October 2008, No. 1540/ 2007, para. 7.3. 
204 These are the following cases: HRC, Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 18 March 2010, No. 1544/ 
2007; HRC, Kaba v. Canada, 25 March 2010, No. 1465/2006; HRC, Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada, 
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claim was supported by different types of serious evidence, including a wanted notice 
and summons to his mother, and was consistent with country information. For those 
reasons, the HRC found this core of the account credible. It did not explicitly state 
this, but it assumed an Article 7-risk on the basis of it.205 
The HRC applied the same approach in the case of Kaba v. Canada (2010). Just 
like in Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada (2010), the HRC did not discuss the 
contradictions and implausibility pointed out by the respondent State party. Neither 
did it discuss the problems raised by the State party concerning the reliability of the 
evidence presented by the author. Instead, it focused on the high incidence of FGM 
in Guinea appearing from the different country reports relied on by the parties, and 
on the fact that Guinean society was strictly patriarchal. Next, it considered that 
Fatoumata’s mother seemed to be the only person opposed to the practice of FGM. 
From these three circumstances the HRC inferred a real Article 7-risk.206 It is impor-
tant to note that, just as in the case of Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada (2010), in the 
Kaba case a significant amount of evidentiary materials were submitted in support of 
the protection claim, including different country reports and reports on the practice 
of FGM in Guinea from UNICEF and other sources, a medical certificate attesting 
to the fact that Fatoumata had not been excised, and different letters from family 
members.207 
The case of Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada (2011, see section 3.3.3 above) is a 
third example of this approach. Again, the HRC did not discuss at all the contradic-
tions and inconsistencies in the protection claim mentioned by the State party. It only 
noted that in the national proceedings the authors had not been questioned at all 
about the alleged earlier torture, whereas it appeared from the country reports in-
voked by both parties that torture was widespread in Sri Lanka.208 The HRC’s 
conclusion in this case was strikingly short. The linkage between the facts – defective 
national proceedings in which insufficient attention had been paid to allegations of 
past torture – and the conclusion that expulsion would lead to a violation of Article 7 
was not clearly spelt out by the HRC.209 The brief reasoning resulted in a lack of 
clarity and legal precision as to exactly how the HRC had arrived at its findings that 
the author’s statements were credible and that that there was a real Article 7-risk.  
The three cases discussed above make clear that the HRC is of the opinion that 
incredibility of peripheral aspects does not necessarily lead to incredibility of the en-
tire claim. This mirrors the ECtHR’s approach (see chapter 5, section 5.6.5). The core 
part or basic story as to why an Article 7-risk is feared must be credible, though. Al-
though the HRC does not make clear in an explicit way how the credibility of the 
core part of the claim is assessed, it may be inferred from the conclusions drawn in 
the three cases discussed above that credibility is assessed by examining whether the 
basic story (the core part) was and is in dispute between the parties, whether it is con-
                                                        
205 HRC, Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 18 March 2010, No. 1544/2007, para. 8.7. 
206 HRC, Diene Kaba, on her own behalf and on behalf of her daughter, Fatoumata Kaba, v. Canada, 25 March 
2010, No. 1465/2006, para. 10.2. 
207 Ibidem, paras. 2.2, 2.3, 2.5. 
208 HRC, Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada, 25 March 2010, No. 1763/2008, para. 11.4. 
209 McGoldrick 1996, p. 151, points to the same problem in relation to early views. 
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sistent with country information, and whether there is serious corroborative evidence 
in support of it. 
3.5.6 Admission of evidence, means and sources of evidence, minimum 
quantity and quality of evidence 
3.5.6.1  Means and sources of evidence 
In all the cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers in which the HRC de-
cided on the merits, it considered that 
 
‘The Committee has considered the present communication in the light of all the information 
received, in accordance with Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol.’210 
 
This means that it is open to the HRC to consider evidence from whatever source 
and then decide as to its relevance and probative value. The system of admission of 
evidence is open, flexible and liberal, and the HRC’s approach in this respect is the 
same as the one applied by the UNHCR (see chapter 2, section 2.4.6.1), the ComAT 
(see chapter 4, section 4.5.6.1) and the ECtHR (see chapter 5, section 5.6.6.1).211 Two 
examples are given to illustrate this. In the case of Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada 
(2010),212 the author submitted as evidence corroborating his statements that he 
would be at risk of ill-treatment in Tunisia a wanted notice from the Tunisian police, 
a summons addressed to his mother, a letter from his family, letters of support from 
Amnesty International, the Association for Human Rights in the Maghreb, the Que-
bec League of Rights and Liberties, a member of Parliament and Radhia Nasraoui, a 
Tunisian lawyer. All this evidence was considered admissible and was materially con-
sidered by the HRC.213 The same happened in the case of Kaba v. Canada (2010),214 a 
case in which the author alleged fear of the female genital mutilation (FGM) of her 
daughter Fatoumata in Guinea. The author presented many different types of docu-
ments from different sources, including country reports from different sources, in-
cluding UNICEF, a medical certificate attesting to the fact that Fatoumata had not 
been excised, letters from family members, a decision on the divorce of the author 
and her husband, and counsel’s explanation that, according to the Guinean Civil 
Code, custody of a child aged over seven years was automatically granted to the 
                                                        
210 See, for some examples, HRC, C. v. Australia, 13 November 2002, No. 900/1999, para. 8.1; HRC, 
Byahuranga v. Denmark, 9 December 2004, No. 1222/2003; HRC, Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 
18 March 2010, No. 1544/2007, para. 8.1; HRC, Kaba v. Canada, 25 March 2010, No. 1465/2006, 
para. 9.1; HRC, Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada, 25 March 2011, No. 1763/2008. 
211 McGoldrick 1996, p. 143. McGoldrick states that the HRC’s approach accords with the general 
practice of international tribunals in the admission of evidence of adopting the liberal system of pro-
cedure of civil law countries. 
212 HRC, Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 18 March 2010, No. 1544/2007. 
213 Ibidem, paras. 5.1, 8.3. 
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Chapter 3 
 
98 
 
father. All the evidence was admitted to the proceedings and was considered ma-
terially by the HRC.215 
3.5.6.2  Minimum quantity and quality of evidence 
It is clear from the case law of the HRC that allegations that expulsion will expose the 
individual to a real Article 7-risk must be substantiated, meaning that the individual 
has to put forward more than simple allegations. If the individual has submitted only 
simple allegations, and has not responded to contentions made by the State party, the 
HRC declares the communication inadmissible for failure to substantiate statements. 
This is what happened in the case of Ngoc Si Truong v. Canada (2003, see section 
3.3.5).216 
From the HRC’s case law, it seems that ‘substantiate’ can mean more than one 
thing. It can mean submitting more or further details to earlier statements, in re-
sponse to the reaction of the other party. It can also mean submitting evidentiary ma-
terials corroborating statements. And it can mean a combination of the two. An ex-
ample of the first category – the claim was found substantiated because the author’s 
statements were detailed and uncontested or insufficiently contested – is the internal 
torture case of Thomas v. Jamaica (1993).217 The author of the communication was a 
Jamaican citizen awaiting execution in prison. He claimed to have been maltreated by 
soldiers and prison warders while in detention. His statements were very detailed. 
Specifically, he mentioned the prison warders by name and stated that he had been 
severely beaten with rifle butts, that he had sustained injuries to his chest, his back, 
left hip and lower abdomen, that one of the soldiers had wounded him in the neck 
with a bayonet and had torn his clothes. In the proceedings before the HRC, the 
respondent State party confined itself to issues of admissibility and did not address 
the merits of the case. The HRC, therefore, first remarked that the author’s allega-
tions were uncontested. In addition, it stated that the author’s claims ‘have been sub-
stantiated’. As no mention whatsoever was made of corroborating evidence, it must 
be assumed that there was no such evidence in this case, and that the HRC found the 
claim substantiated and, therefore, admissible because the author’s statements were 
detailed and uncontested (or not seriously contested).218 
A case in which the HRC makes clear that the author corroborated his account 
with evidence and the account was found substantiated for that reason is Isidore 
Kanana Tshiongo a Minanga v. Zaire (1993), again an internal torture case. The respon-
                                                        
215 See also McGoldrick 1996, p. 143, who provides a list of particular sources of evidence the HRC has 
taken into consideration in different types of cases. He mentions testimonies from authors and al-
leged victims, testimonies of alleged witnesses of violations, medical reports, psychiatric reports, le-
gal judgments, legislative, executive and administrative acts, statements by a representative of the 
State party in proceedings before another United Nations body, the submissions from the respon-
dent State party. 
216 HRC, Ngoc Si Truong v. Canada, 5 May 2003, No. 743/1997. 
217 HRC, Maurice Thomas v. Jamaica, 19 October 1993, No. 321/1988. 
218 The same happened in HRC, Dwayne Hylton v. Jamaica, 21 July 1994, No. 407/1990. Here too, the 
HRC found statements substantiated because they were detailed, whereas the State party had pro-
vided very limited information. Substantiated here means detailed and not sufficiently contested. 
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dent State party did not provide any information concerning the merits of the case. 
The author of the communication provided to the HRC photographic evidence of 
the consequences of the torture inflicted upon him. On the basis of this material, the 
HRC concluded that the author had substantiated his claim.219 It is obvious that the 
HRC treated the photos provided by the author as serious evidence, and as sufficient 
corroboration of the statements of past torture. 
There have been a number of cases in which, in the national proceedings and in 
the proceedings before the HRC, the author has submitted various evidentiary mate-
rials in support of his protection claim, but the HRC has, nevertheless, declared the 
Article 7-claim inadmissible for failure of substantiation.220 At the other end of the 
spectrum there are cases in which, apart from detailed statements, no evidence at all 
seems to have been submitted (at least evidence was not mentioned by the HRC), but 
the HRC considered the Article 7-claim to be substantiated and concluded that there 
had been a violation of Article 7.221 Combined with the fact that the reasoning in the 
HRC’s conclusions on the merits is often extremely brief, it is very difficult to infer 
from the jurisprudence clear guidelines concerning the required minimum quantity 
and quality of the evidence. However, in the three cases concerning the expulsion of 
asylum seekers, discussed in the previous section on credibility assessment,222 a signi-
ficant amount of evidentiary materials from different sources was submitted to both 
the national authorities and to the HRC. In these cases, the HRC deemed the basic 
story of the claimant credible and assumed the existence of an Article 7-risk. These 
cases make clear that the HRC is more willing to consider the merits of the case and 
conclude that expulsion entails an Article 7-risk when a substantial amount of strong 
and persuasive evidentiary materials is submitted in support of the claim. 
It is not only important to submit evidence corroborating the individual account. 
Equally important is evidence about the human rights situation in the country of ori-
gin. No judgments or decisions have been found in which the HRC explicitly explain-
ed which of the parties – the applicant or the State party’s authorities – was respon-
sible for submitting recent information about the general human rights situation in 
the country of origin. It may be argued that, although the burden of proof remains a 
shared one, in the case of an arguable claim particular responsibility for shaping clari-
ty on the general human rights situation in the country of origin lies with the admi-
nistrative and judicial authorities of the State. This follows from the fact that, where 
the claimant has provided a basic level of substantiation of his or her claim, an inves-
tigative burden on the authorities of the State party emerges: the authorities must in-
vestigate thoroughly and in good faith the alleged violation.223 The national authori-
ties, thus, have an active role not only in verifying information put forward by the 
                                                        
219 HRC, Isidore Kanana Tshiongo a Minanga v. Zaire, 8 November 1993, No. 366/1989, para. 5.3. 
220 Examples are HRC, Daljit Singh v. Canada, 30 March 2006, No. 1315/2004, HRC, G.T. v. Australia, 4 
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complainant, but also in collecting and presenting evidence regarding the general 
human rights situation in the country of origin. With regard to the particular re-
sponsibility resting on the national authorities for shaping clarity on the situation in 
the country of origin, reference is also made to chapter 6 on EU asylum law, section 
6.4.4.  
3.5.7  Appreciation and weighing of evidence 
The HRC adheres to a free evaluation of all the evidence presented by the parties. 
There are no pre-determined rules for the weighing of evidence.224 In the paragraphs 
below, an attempt is made to discover factors determining the probative value and 
persuasiveness of evidence. After that, we will look in more detail at four particular 
categories of evidence, being reports containing the result of inquiries conducted by 
embassies or missions, witness statements by family members, medico-legal reports 
and reports about the human rights situation in the country of origin. 
3.5.7.1  Factors determining the probative value of evidence 
It is not an easy task to distinguish in the case law of the HRC the exact factors 
determining the probative value and persuasiveness of the evidence presented. The 
reasons are that the HRC’s conclusions on the merits are often very brief and it is 
often completely silent on the issue of evaluation of the evidence. In Daljit Singh v. 
Canada (2006),225 the author invoked a Human Rights Watch Report and an academic 
journal in support of his statements and fear. The HRC remained completely silent 
about this evidence and declared the communication inadmissible for failure of 
substantiation. Another striking example is G.T. v. Australia (1997),226 in which the 
author, who was to be deported to Malaysia, feared the death penalty and up to nine 
years’ detention on death row, as well as being caned, and submitted, in corrobora-
tion of these statements, a letter from the Australian Office of Amnesty International 
(AI). In this letter, AI opposed the forcible return of the author as it believed that, as 
a result of the conviction in Australia, the death penalty would be imposed on the 
author in Malaysia. The HRC did not say a word about this letter.227 As it did not say 
anything at all about the evidence presented by the authors of the mentioned cases, 
while at the same time declaring the communications inadmissible, it may be inferred 
                                                        
224 McGoldrick 1996, p. 143. McGoldrick states that the HRC’s approach accords with the general 
practice of international tribunals in the admission of evidence of adopting the liberal system of pro-
cedure of civil law countries. 
225 HRC, Daljit Singh v. Canada, 30 March 2006, No. 1315/2004. 
226 HRC, G.T. v. Australia, 4 December 1997, No. 706/1996.  
227 Another example in which the HRC remained completely silent about evidence presented by the 
author is HRC, Moses Solo Tarlue v. Canada, 28 April 2009, No. 1551/2007. In that case, the author 
submitted, in the national proceedings, three letters signed by one Senator Mobutu Vlah Nyenpan of 
the Liberian Senate Committee on Human Rights and Petition, stating that there was no record of 
his being involved in war crimes during the civil war in Liberia, and also stating that the author’s life 
would be in danger if he was deported to Liberia due to the war crime allegations made against him 
by Canada. The HRC declared the communication inadmissible as insufficiently substantiated, 
remaining completely silent about the mentioned three letters. 
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that it did not attach great weight to the evidence presented. The reasons for this low 
appreciation remain unclear, however. 
However, from other decisions of the HRC, we may deduce that the specificity, 
comprehensiveness and consistency of the information, and the independence, relia-
bility and objectiveness of the source, are relevant factors in determining the proba-
tive value and persuasiveness of the evidence presented.228 In Byahuranga v. Denmark 
(2004), a case concerning a Ugandan army officer who had served under Idi Amin, 
had fled Uganda in 1981 and was granted asylum in Denmark in 1986, the HRC 
attached significant weight to a letter from the former chairman of the Schiller Insti-
tute in Denmark (a human rights institute). This chairman confirmed that the author 
participated in conferences of the Institute in his capacity as chairman of the Ugan-
dan Union in Denmark. The letter also stated that the author’s participation in a Sep-
tember 1997 conference, during which Ugandan President Museveni’s alleged links 
with the Rwandan Patriotic Front were criticized, had been documented in an article 
published in the Executive Intelligence Review on 10 October 1997, as well as in a 
German-language newspaper. The letter expressed concern that the Ugandan Embas-
sy in Copenhagen may have registered Ugandan citizens who participated in the 
Schiller Institute’s conferences. Based on this letter – which contained detailed and 
specific information on the author’s activities and very specific reasons for assuming 
that the Ugandan authorities were aware of these activities – and based on different 
country reports, the HRC followed the author’s statements that the Ugandan authori-
ties were aware of his oppositional activities in Denmark, and assumed an Article 7-
risk.229 
3.5.7.2  Reports of inquiries conducted by embassies or missions 
In a number of cases, the HRC attached strong evidentiary value to reports submitted 
by States parties, containing the result of inquiries conducted by embassies or 
missions in the country to which the particular individual was planned to be expelled. 
The HRC generally regards such information as reliable and relies on it. Reference is 
made to the case of A.R.J. v. Australia (1997), discussed above in section 3.1.1).230 
By contrast, the HRC did not attach much value to information from the Aus-
tralian Mission in Iran in the case of C. v. Australia (2002), discussed above in section 
                                                        
228 These factors are also important in the opinion of the ECtHR; reference is made to chapter 5, 
section 5.6.7. See, for example,ECtHR, Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, 8 November 2005, Appl. No. 
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230 HRC, A.R.J.v. Australia, 11 August 1997, No. 692/1996. See also HRC, G.T. v. Australia, 4 Decem-
ber 1997, No. 706/1996. The State party relied on the result of inquiries made by its mission in 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, which stated that ‘The Royal Malaysian Police have orally confirmed to us 
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3.5.3.1.231 Unfortunately, the decision in this case did not contain explicit considera-
tions on the weighing and evaluation of the different evidentiary materials brought in 
by the parties to the case. The HRC did not explain why it attached decisive value to 
the evidence presented by the author and why it was not persuaded by the evidence 
relied on by the State party, including the information from the Australian Mission in 
Iran. 
3.5.7.3  Witness statements by family members 
The cases of Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada (2010)232 and Kaba v. Canada (2010)233 
make clear that the HRC may accord significant probative value to statements made 
by family members. In Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada (2010), the author sub-
mitted as evidence corroborating his statements that he would be at risk of ill-treat-
ment in Tunisia, a letter from his family (as well as other evidence, such as a wanted 
notice from the Tunisian police, a summons addressed to his mother, letters of 
support from various NGOs, including Amnesty International). Whereas the respon-
dent State party contended in the proceedings before the HRC that the letter from 
the author’s family did not constitute independent, objective evidence and was, there-
fore, of little probative value,234 the HRC, by contrast, considered that it gave due 
weight to the author’s allegations regarding the pressure put on his family in Tunisia, 
which indicated that it attached strong probative value to the letter from the author’s 
family.235 
In Kaba,236 the author submitted different letters from family members (her ex-
husband, brother, uncle) in corroboration of her fear of the excision of her daughter. 
The State party raised various problems in relation to this evidence, inter alia, that the 
author’s uncle was not an objective and independent source.237 Although the HRC 
did not explicitly discuss the debate between the parties concerning the reliability of 
the presented evidence, it did consider explicitly that the author seemed to be the 
only person opposed to the excision of Fatoumata.238 This meant that the HRC – al-
beit implicitly – accorded significant probative value to the letters from family mem-
bers who expressed that Fatoumata would be seriously at risk of excision upon return 
to Guinea. 
3.5.7.4  Medico-legal reports 
In the case of Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada (2011, see section 3.3.3)239 the authors 
submitted in the national proceedings before the Immigration and Refugee Board 
                                                        
231 HRC, C. v. Australia, 13 November 2002, No. 900/1999. 
232 HRC, Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 18 March 2010, No. 1544/2007. 
233 HRC, Kaba v. Canada, 25 March 2010, No. 1465/2006. 
234 HRC, Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 18 March 2010, No. 1544/2007, para. 6.2. 
235 Ibidem, paras. 5.1, 8.3. 
236 HRC, Kaba v. Canada, 25 March 2010, No. 1465/2006. 
237 Ibidem, para. 4.9. 
238 Ibidem, para. 10.2. 
239 HRC, Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada, 25 March 2010, No. 1763/2008. 
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(IRB) a Diagnostic Interview Report by a psychotherapist, containing a diagnosis of 
post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) for Mr Pillai. Also filed in evidence before the 
IRB was a letter from the authors’ doctor, which recommended that Mr Pillai’s wife 
represent both of them before the IRB, as she was considered stronger and less trau-
matized than her husband.240 The HRC expressed fierce criticism of the fact that in 
the national proceedings the authors had not been questioned at all about the alleged 
earlier torture, whereas it appeared from the country reports invoked by both parties 
that torture was widespread in Sri Lanka.241 The HRC considered the medical evi-
dence submitted by the authors to corroborate their allegations of past torture to be 
reliable and objective and attached serious probative value to it. It must be noted that 
the authors in this case also submitted country information making clear that torture 
was endemic in Sri Lanka. Thus, the statements on the past torture of the authors 
found confirmation in both the medical evidence and this country information.  
3.5.7.5 Reports on the human rights situation in the country of origin 
Many views of the HRC demonstrate that information on the situation in the coun-
tries of origin plays a very important role. This is a logical consequence of the fact 
that the assessment of whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the ap-
plicant faces a real Article 7-risk inevitably requires that the HRC assesses the condi-
tions in the receiving country.  
Three sources of country of origin information used by the HRC can be distin-
guished: 
- Information compiled by agencies of the United Nations;242 
- Information compiled by States (whether respondent in a particular case or any 
other Contracting or non-Contracting State, such as the US);243 
- Information from independent international human-rights protection organisa-
tions.244 
 
There seems to be no hierarchy of sources and it seems that the precise probative 
value accorded to country of origin information is determined primarily by its specific 
content. Again, it is difficult to draw firm conclusions here as the HRC’s conclusions 
on the merits are brief and do not contain explicit reasons for according certain pro-
bative value to reports on the situation in the country of origin. 
                                                        
240 Ibidem, para. 2.3. 
241 Ibidem, para. 11.4. 
242 See, for example, HRC, Kaba v. Canada, 25 March 2010, No. 1465/2006, in which case reports 
compiled by UNICEF on the practice of FGM in Guinea played an important role. 
243 See, for example, HRC, A.R.J.v. Australia, 11 August 1997, No. 692/1996; HRC, G.T. v. Australia, 4 
December 1997, No. 706/1996. In both cases, the result of inquiries conducted by the embassy or 
mission of the respondent State party in the country of origin of the author played a decisive role. 
See also HRC, Kaba v. Canada, 25 March 2010, No. 1465/2006, in which case a report on FGM in 
Guinea compiled by the United States Department of State played an important role. 
244 See, for example, HRC, Byahuranga v. Denmark, 9 December 2004, No. 1222/2003, in which case a 
letter from the former chairman of the Schiller Institute in Denmark (a human rights institute) play-
ed an important role. 
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3.5.8 Opportunities for presenting evidence and reacting to evidence 
In its proceedings, the HRC adheres to the principle of adversarial proceedings. In 
Rule 97 of its Rules of Procedure,245 it is stipulated that, as soon as possible after the 
communication has been received, it is transmitted to the State party. The State party 
is then requested to submit a written reply, relating both to the admissibility and the 
merits of the complaint, within six months. A complaint may not be declared admis-
sible unless the State party concerned has received its text and has been given an op-
portunity to furnish information or observations as provided in the first paragraph of 
this rule. The State party or the complainant may request to be afforded an oppor-
tunity to comment on any submission received from the other party. The Committee 
sets a time limit for submitting such additional comments.246 Rule 99 stipulates that, 
when the Committee has decided that a complaint is admissible, the Committee shall 
transmit to the State party the text of its decision together with any submission 
received from the author of the communication not already transmitted to the State 
party under rule 97, first paragraph. The Committee shall also inform the complain-
ant, through the Secretary-General, of its decision. Within the period established by 
the Committee, the State party concerned shall then submit to the Committee written 
explanations or statements clarifying the case under consideration and the measures, 
if any, that may have been taken by it. These explanations or statements submitted by 
a State party are then transmitted to the complainant who may submit any additional 
written information or observations within such time limit as the Committee shall 
decide.247 
In a number of views, the HRC has also explicitly pointed out that it adheres 
strictly to the principle of adversarial proceedings. The HRC uses the Latin term 
audiatur et altera pars. The views in which this principle is stressed concern mainly 
internal torture or disappearance cases in which the respondent State party did not 
reply to requests made by the HRC to furnish information, and the HRC, as a con-
sequence, fully relied on the author’s allegations. This, in turn, provoked criticism on 
the part of the respondent State party, which stated that the HRC had displayed legal 
ignorance. The HRC emphasised in these cases that it had offered the respondent 
State party every opportunity to furnish information to refute the evidence presented 
by the author.248 
In a number of cases, authors have raised new statements or submitted new 
evidence for the first time before the HRC, which statements and evidence have not 
been presented earlier to the national authorities in the national proceedings. The 
HRC normally does not tolerate this: it does not consider such statements and 
                                                        
245 Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee of 13 January 2011. They may be found at: 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc.  
246 Rule 97 of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, para. 1, 2, 4 and 6. 
247 Rule 99 of the Rules of Procedure of the Human Rights Committee, paras. 1, 2, 3. 
248 See, for example, HRC, Irene Bleier Lewenhoff and Rosa Valino de Bleier v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982, No. 
30/1978, para. 13.1; HRC, Almeida de Quinteros v. Uruguay, 21 July 1983, No. 107/1981, para. 11. See 
on the principle of equality of arms of the proceedings conducted by the HRC also Hanski & 
Scheinin 2003 and 2007, p. 13. 
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evidence on the merits, but instead refers authors back to the national proceedings. It 
considers, in such cases, that applicants are required to submit statements and evi-
dentiary materials in the national proceedings before the national authorities. This, 
then, leads it to the conclusion that national remedies have not been exhausted. In 
the case of A.C. v. the Netherlands (2008),249 the author submitted to the HRC medical 
evidence from a doctor and a psychologist.250 The HRC noted that in the national 
proceedings no medical evidence had been submitted and no statements had been 
made that expulsion would lead to a violation of Article 7 for medical reasons, such 
as the absence of treatment. For that reason, it found this part of the communication 
inadmissible for non-exhaustion of national remedies.251 The HRC took exactly the 
same approach in the case of Dawood Khan v. Canada (2006): it noted that it could not 
take medical reports into account, as they had not been presented in the national pro-
ceedings.252 
A different approach was taken in Kaba v. Canada (2010).253 This may be ex-
plained by the fact that, in the proceedings before the HRC, the respondent State 
party not only stated that part of the evidence had been presented too late (which 
would have led to inadmissibility of the claim due to non-exhaustion of domestic 
remedies) but, in fact, had also responded to the evidence in a material way, pleading 
that this new evidence was not credible. Given the fact that, in the proceedings 
before the HRC, the State party had also materially considered the new evidence, the 
HRC did not find it problematic to take this evidence into account and use it for its 
conclusions.254 
3.5.9 Application of investigative powers by the HRC 
Pursuant to Article 5, paragraph 1, of the Optional Protocol,255 and Rule 94 of the 
Rules of Procedure of the HRC,256 the HRC considers communications and formu-
lates its views on the basis of all written information made available to it by the in-
dividual and the State party concerned. The HRC holds no oral hearings.257 It follows 
from this system that the HRC has at its disposal and applies only a limited number 
of investigative powers. It can request a party to a pending case to submit certain 
specific information in writing which it deems necessary for taking a decision. Under 
Rule 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the HRC, the HRC may request the State party 
concerned or the author of the communication to submit additional written infor-
                                                        
249 HRC, A.C. v. the Netherlands, 22 July 2008, No. 1494/2006. 
250 Ibidem, paras. 2.1-2.4. 
251 Ibidem, para. 8.3. 
252 HRC, Daewood Khan v. Canada, 10 August 2006, No. 1302/2004, para. 5.5. 
253 HRC, Kaba v. Canada, 25 March 2010, No. 1465/2006. 
254 Ibidem, para.6.5. 
255 Article 5, para. 1, of the Optional Protocol states: ‘The Committee shall consider communications 
received under the present Protocol in the light of all written information made available to it by the 
individual and by the State Party concerned.’ 
256 Rule 94 of the Rules of Procedure of the HRC stipulates: ‘If the communication is admissible, the 
Committee shall consider it in the light of all written information made available to it by the indi-
viduals and by the State party concerned and shall formulate its views thereon.’ 
257 Hanski & Scheinin 2003 and 2007, p. 13. 
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mation or observations relevant to the question of the admissibility of the communi-
cation.258 From its case law, it follows that the HRC has the same power to request 
the State party or the author to submit additional written information relevant to the 
merits. This power has been used in numerous internal torture or disappearance 
cases.259 
It also follows from this system that, unlike the ECtHR, the HRC cannot – upon 
party request or proprio motu – hear witnesses. And, again unlike the ECtHR, the HRC 
cannot hold fact finding missions.260 The case of Oló Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea 
(1993) concerned allegations of discrimination, intimidation and persecution of indi-
viduals opposing the ruling political party. The respondent State party, Equatorial 
Guinea, invited the HRC to investigate the author’s allegations in Equatorial Guinea, 
in other words, to hold a fact finding mission in the respondent State. The HRC 
made clear that it lacked the power to organise such a mission: 
 
‘As to the State party’s suggestion that the Committee should investigate the author’s allega-
tions in Equatorial Guinea, the Committee recalls that pursuant to article 5, paragraph 1, of the 
Optional Protocol, it considers communications “on the basis of all written information made 
available to it by the individual and by the State party concerned”. The Committee has no 
choice but to confine itself to formulating its Views in the present case on the basis of the writ-
ten information received.’261 
 
The limited possession and application of investigative powers of the HRC explains 
to a certain extent its restricted role in the assessment of facts and evidence which has 
been stressed in literature.262 
3.5.10 Time limits for the presentation of statements and evidence 
It was pointed out above in 3.5.8 that the HRC normally does not tolerate authors 
raising new statements or submitting new evidence for the first time before it.  
There is some HRC case law on the problem of presenting evidence at a late 
moment in the national proceedings. In the case of Byahuranga v. Denmark (2004, see 
section 3.5.7.1 above),263 the applicant submitted crucial evidence in support of the 
alleged Article 7-risk at a late moment in the national proceedings, namely after sever-
                                                        
258 Rule 91 of the Rules of Procedure of the HRC stipulates: ‘The Committee or a working group estab-
lished under rule 89, paragraph 1, or a special rapporteur designated under rule 89, paragraph 3, may 
request the State party concerned or the author of the communication to submit additional written 
information or observations relevant to the question of the admissibility of the communication. To 
avoid undue delays, a time-limit for the submission of such information or observations shall be in-
dicated.’ 
259 See, for example, HRC, Violeta Setelich on behalf of her husband Raul Sendic Antonaccio v. Uruguay, 28 
October 1981, No. 63/1979, para. 19; HRC, Irene Bleier Lewenhoff and Rosa Valino de Bleier v. Uruguay, 
29 March 1982, No. 30/1978, para. 7. 
260 See for the investigative powers of the ECtHR Chapter 5, Part 2. 
261 HRC, Oló Bahamonde v. Equatorial Guinea, 10 November 1993, No. 468/1991, para. 8.2. 
262 McGoldrick 1996, p. 144. He points to the closed hearings of the HRC which make it impossible to 
hear, in the setting of a public hearing, witnesses or experts. See also Wouters 2009, p. 397. 
263 HRC, Byahuranga v. Denmark, 9 December 2004, No. 1222/2003. 
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al risk assessments had been made, during proceedings before the Danish Refugee 
Board (an appeal authority) after the last risk assessment made by the Immigration 
Service. The HRC clearly attached great weight to the author’s statement that the 
Ugandan authorities were aware of his oppositional activities in Denmark and to the 
letter from the Schiller Institute which he had submitted to corroborate this state-
ment. The HRC criticised the dismissal of this letter by the Refugee Board because of 
late submission. It ruled as follows:  
 
‘In particular, the Board merely dismissed, because of late submission, the author’s claim that 
his political activities in Denmark were known to the Ugandan authorities, thereby placing him 
at a particular risk of being subjected to ill-treatment upon return to Uganda. (…) the Commit-
tee finds that due weight must be given to his detailed account of the existence of a risk of 
treatment contrary to Article 7. Consequently, the Committee is of the view that the expulsion 
order against the author would, if implemented by returning him to Uganda, constitute a viola-
tion of article 7 of the Covenant.264 
 
We see a similar approach in the case of Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada (2010). In 
this case, crucial evidence corroborating the author’s allegations of a real Article 7-
risk upon expulsion to Tunisia was presented at a very late moment in the national 
proceedings in Canada. The crucial piece of evidence was a wanted notice issued 
against him by the Ministry of the Interior which mentioned his escape from admi-
nistrative surveillance.265 It was presented four years after its issuance, because, ac-
cording to the author, it had taken him that long to obtain the document.266 The State 
party explained in the proceedings before the HRC that the author had presented his 
evidence, including the warrant, at a very late moment, namely only with the most 
recent PRRA request submitted in December 2006 (this was the second PRRA re-
quest). The HRC considered that a violation of Article 7 would be the necessary and 
foreseeable consequence of the author’s expulsion. In arriving at this conclusion, it 
specifically mentioned the wanted notice as important evidence.267 It is obvious from 
these cases that the HRC does not see the late presentation of crucial evidence in the 
national proceedings as problematic. The same approach was followed by the HRC 
under Article 14 in the case of Jansen-Gielen v. the Netherlands (2001, see section 3.4.3). 
Taking into account the case law discussed above, it may be concluded that the 
HRC requires that evidence regarding the substance of the claim must be taken into 
account, even if such evidence was not presented earlier in the national proceedings, 
for example, during previous administrative proceedings. If evidence is presented at a 
moment close to the actual court hearing, the national court may adjourn proceedings 
in order to allow the other party more time to examine the newly presented evidence. 
                                                        
264 Ibidem, paras. 11.2, 11.3, 11.4. 
265 HRC, Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 18 March 2010, No. 1544/2007, paras. 5.1, 8.7. 
266 Ibidem, para. 5.1. 
267 Ibidem, para. 8.7. 
Chapter 3 
 
108 
 
3.5.11 Point in time for the risk assessment 
In the case of Bakhtiyari and Bakhtiyari v. Australia (2003), the HRC considered 
 
‘that as the authors have not been removed from Australia, the issue before the Committee is 
whether such removal if implemented at the present time would entail a real risk of treatment 
contrary to article 7 as a consequence.’268 
 
It follows from this that the HRC assesses the existence of the alleged Article 7-risk 
on an ex nunc basis. In other words, the material point in time is the moment at which 
it examines the case. The assessment needs to focus on the necessary and foreseeable 
consequences of the removal. The HRC has, so far, adopted no guidelines for situa-
tions where the removal has already taken place.269 
3.6 Final concluding remarks 
The ICCPR is an important universal general human rights treaty which has been 
ratified by all the EU Member States. It is also an important instrument in interna-
tional and EU asylum law. The ICCPR does not contain a right to asylum, but the 
HRC has interpreted Article 7 in such a way that States parties must not expose in-
dividuals to the danger of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment upon return to another country by way of their extradition, expulsion or 
refoulement. As a result, the (intended) expulsion of a failed asylum seeker is in breach 
of Article 7 and, therefore, unlawful where substantial grounds have been shown for 
believing that upon expulsion there is a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 7.  
In Part 1 it was shown that the ICCPR’s provisions on national proceedings im-
pose a number of obligations on national courts examining asylum cases. Under Arti-
cles 2, third paragraph, and 7, ICCPR the national authorities are required to consider 
the claim thoroughly and fairly. The HRC is generally reluctant to put national asylum 
court proceedings to a rigorous test of compliance with this criterion. It does not 
often respond in a meaningful way to specific procedural problems raised by authors 
of individual communications. The HRC’s reluctance to put national (court) proceed-
ings to a rigorous test is linked to the fact that it regards the determination and evalu-
ation of facts and evidence as matters for the national courts. The HRC itself will 
normally not engage in that. As a consequence, it will not easily find national reme-
dies ineffective for reasons having to do with determination of the facts. The HRC’s 
hands-off approach may be explained by its limited investigative possibilities and by 
the fact that its meeting time is very limited, which is difficult to reconcile with the 
time required to assess evidence and to write down an assessment of the presented 
evidence. The case of Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada (2011) – in which the HRC 
deemed the national proceedings defective because the national authorities did not 
seriously investigate allegations and evidence of past torture – may mark a turning 
                                                        
268 HRC, Bakhtiyari and Bakhtiyari v. Australia, 6 November 2003, No. 1069/2002, para. 8.4. 
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point towards firmer monitoring of procedural ICCPR-compliance, but more juris-
prudence is required to firmly draw such a conclusion. The case of Mansour Ahani v. 
Canada (2004) has shown that the HRC is prepared to give up its hands-off approach 
if the national authorities breach the key principles of equality of arms and adversarial 
proceedings. The HRC found the national expulsion proceedings in Ahani to be 
defective under Article 13 as the Minister had not provided the author with all the 
materials – including secret information that Ahani was a danger to Canada’s national 
security – on which the expulsion decision had been based and the national courts 
had not corrected this unfairness in the procedure. National procedural rules will nor-
mally not render national proceedings non-compliant with the requirement of a thor-
ough and fair examination of the claim, provided that such rules are reasonable and 
provided that they are not applied in an automatic and mechanical way. National 
courts must also be careful of automatically relying on steady jurisprudential lines. 
 
In Part 2, the assessment performed by the HRC in cases concerning the expulsion of 
asylum seekers was analysed with the help of the eleven aspects of evidence and judi-
cial scrutiny. The investigation demonstrated that the HRC has developed concrete 
standards and principles with regard to seven of the eleven aspects of evidence and 
judicial scrutiny. With regard to four aspects – the required degree of individual risk, 
the credibility assessment, the admission of evidence and the appreciation and weigh-
ing of evidence – the HRC has, so far, not explicitly developed standards and princi-
ples, but certain approaches by the HRC follow implicitly from the conclusions ar-
rived at. The standards, principles and approaches developed by the HRC are sum-
marised below.  
The standard of proof applied by the HRC in expulsion cases is that there are 
substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of a violation of Article 7. A 
real risk means that it is a necessary and foreseeable consequence of the expulsion 
that Article 7 will be violated. The ‘necessary and foreseeable consequence’ criterion 
indicates a high threshold which is not easily met. The threshold seems to be higher 
than under Article 3 ECHR. 
The burden of proof is shared: there is an initial burden of assertion, and, pref-
erably, also some corroboration, on the author. After that, the authorities must inves-
tigate ‘in good faith’ the alleged violation. The more detailed and the more corro-
borated the author’s statements are, the more detailed the investigation by the author-
ities of the respondent State party needs to be. 
Relevant facts and circumstances are all possible personal circumstances, and, 
also, the general human rights situation in the country of origin. Many concrete ex-
amples of such circumstances were given above. The personal facts must be assessed 
in the light of the general situation in the country of origin, and it is normally a 
combination of facts and circumstances, and not a single fact, which establish that 
there are substantial grounds for assuming a real Article 7-risk. 
So far the HRC has not elaborated its position on the question of the required 
degree of individual risk in the same way as the ECtHR. Nevertheless, the cases of 
Kaba v. Canada (2010) and Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada (2011) have demonstrated 
that there are good reasons for assuming that the HRC has made significant steps to-
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wards incorporating the lines of theory developed by the ECtHR on situations of 
extreme general violence and on group violence (see chapter 5, section 5.6.4). 
The HRC often stresses its subsidiary role with regard to the credibility assess-
ment. This is a logical consequence of the fact that it considers the determination of 
the facts as primarily a matter for the authorities of the States parties. It made a fresh 
and independent credibility assessment in three cases and concluded that expulsion 
would lead to a real Article 7-risk. The HRC is of the opinion that incredibility of pe-
ripheral aspects does not necessarily lead to incredibility of the entire claim. The core 
part or basic story as to why an Article 7-risk is feared must be credible, though. Al-
though the HRC does not make clear in an explicit way how the credibility of the 
core part of the claim is assessed, it may be inferred from its conclusions that the 
credibility of this core part is assessed by examining whether this core part was and is 
in dispute between the parties, whether it is consistent with country information, and 
whether there is serious corroborative evidence to support it. 
The system of admission of evidence is open, flexible and liberal. It is clear from 
the HRC’s case law that allegations that expulsion will expose the individual to a real 
Article 7-risk must be substantiated, but it is not very clear from the case law what 
exactly is meant by the term ‘substantiated’, which makes it difficult to infer from the 
HRC’s jurisprudence clear guidelines concerning the required minimum quantity and 
quality of evidence. In the cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers in which 
an Article 7-risk was assumed, a significant amount of evidentiary materials from dif-
ferent sources was submitted to both the national authorities and to the HRC. These 
cases make clear that the HRC is more willing to consider the merits of the case and 
conclude that expulsion entails an Article 7-risk when a substantial amount of serious 
evidentiary materials is submitted in support of the claim. It is not easy to distinguish 
the exact factors determining the probative value and persuasiveness of the evidence 
presented, as the HRC is often completely silent on the issue of evaluation of the evi-
dence. Four categories of evidence were looked at in more detail. From this exami-
nation, it became clear that strong evidentiary value is often attached to reports con-
taining the result of inquiries conducted by embassies or missions in the country to 
which the particular individual is planned to be expelled. Witness statements by fami-
ly members and medical reports are also accorded significant probative value. The 
HRC uses country reports from different sources, and it seems that the particular 
source and the specific content of the country report determine their probative value. 
The HRC adheres to the principle of adversarial proceedings. The relevant Rules 
of Procedure stipulate that, at both the admissibility stage and the merits stage, both 
parties to the case are allowed to submit their observations and evidence and to react 
to the observations and evidence lodged by the other party. In a number of views, the 
HRC has also strongly emphasised that it adheres to the principles of adversariality 
and equality of arms. It normally does not allow the complainant or the respondent 
State to submit new statements and evidence which were not presented in the nation-
al proceedings. An exception to this rule is made when the other party materially re-
sponds to the newly presented statements and evidence. 
The HRC possesses and applies only a limited number of investigative powers. It 
bases its views on written information made available to it by the individual and by 
the State party concerned. It holds no oral hearings. The HRC can request a party to 
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a pending case to submit certain specific information in writing which it deems neces-
sary for taking a decision. It may also request the State party concerned or the author 
of the communication to submit additional written information or observations 
relevant to the question of the admissibility of the communication or to the merits. 
The HRC cannot – upon party request or proprio motu – hear witnesses or experts, nor 
can it hold fact finding missions.  
As far as time limits for the presentation of statements and evidence are con-
cerned, the investigation has made clear that the HRC does not see the late presenta-
tion of crucial evidence in the national proceedings as problematic. Examples of this 
flexible approach are the cases of Byahuranga v. Denmark (2004) and Mehrez Ben Abde 
Hamida v. Canada (2010).  
The HRC requires that evidence regarding the substance of the claim, which is 
submitted to national courts, must be taken into account by these national courts, 
even when such evidence was not presented earlier, for example, during previous ad-
ministrative proceedings. If evidence is presented at a date close to the actual court 
hearing, the national court may adjourn the proceedings in order to allow the other 
party more time to examine the newly presented evidence. With regard to the 
eleventh aspect, the point in time for the risk assessment, it was concluded that the 
HRC assesses the existence of the alleged Article 7-risk on an ex nunc basis: the ma-
terial point in time is the moment at which it examines the case. 
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Chapter 4: The 1984 Convention against Torture and other 
Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment 
(CAT)1 
4.1  Introduction 
The CAT was adopted by the General Assembly of the United Nations on 10 De-
cember 1984 and it entered into force on 26 June 1987.2 The CAT has been ratified 
in 149 States,3 including all 27 Member States of the European Union.4 It is a spe-
cialised human rights treaty, created as a response to the widespread and systematic 
practice of torture in different regions of the world, in an attempt to make more 
effective the struggle against torture and other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
or punishment throughout the world.5 According to the Committee against Torture 
(the Committee or ComAT), the main aim of the CAT is the prevention of torture, 
and not to redress torture once it has occurred.6 The CAT establishes three different 
types of measures to achieve this aim: 1) repression against individual perpetrators of 
torture by means of national criminal law and the principle of universal jurisdiction; 
2) recognition of the right of victims of torture to a remedy and adequate reparation; 
and 3) comprehensive obligations on States parties to prevent torture and cruel, in-
human or degrading treatment or punishment.  
4.1.1  The CAT and asylum 
Just like the ICCPR and, as we will see in Chapter 5, the ECHR, the CAT does not 
contain a right to asylum.7 It does contain an explicit prohibition on refoulement, how-
ever. Article 3, first paragraph, stipulates: 
                                                        
1 See the following literature for more comprehensive descriptions and analyses of the history and 
working of the CAT: Burgers & Danelius 1988, Boulesbaa 1999, Joseph, Mitchell, Gyorki & Ben-
ninger-Budel 2006, Nowak & McArthur 2008, Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Human Rights: Human Rights Fact Sheet No 4 (rev 1): Combating Torture, Human Rights Fact 
Sheet No 17: The Committee against Torture. For the role of CAT in international asylum law see in 
particular Nowak 1996, Gorlick 1999 and Wouters 2009, Chapter 5. 
2 United Nations General Assembly Resolution 39/46, Doc. A/Res/39/46. See http://treaties.un.org 
under ‘Status of Treaties’. 
3 The number of States parties mentioned here reflects the situation on 31 December 2012, see: 
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_nl.htm under ‘Status of Treaties’. 
See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/United_Nations_Convention_Against_Torture#Signatories_ 
of_CAT. Both sites were visited last on 31 December 2012. 
4 The number of Member States mentioned here reflects the situation on 31 December 2012; see 
http://europa.eu/abc/european_countries/eu_members/index_nl.htm. 
5 Nowak & McArthur 2008, p. 8, Preamble to the CAT, para. 5. 
6 ComAT, Alan v. Switzerland, 8 May 1996, No. 021/1995, para. 11.5. 
7 See, for example, ComAT, Omer v. Greece, 28 April 1997, No. 040/1996, para. 11.2: ‘the Committee 
cannot determine whether or not the claimant is entitled to asylum under the national laws of a 
country, or can invoke the protection of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees’; 
ComAT, Aemei v. Switzerland, 29 May 1997, No. 34/1995, para.11: ‘finding a violation of Article 3 in 
no way affects the decision(s) of the competent national authorities concerning the granting or 
→ 
Chapter 4 
 
 
 
114 
‘No State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where there 
are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’ 
 
The adoption of this explicit prohibition on refoulement was inspired by the case law 
under Article 3 ECHR.8 
The large majority (80%) of individual complaints under the CAT have concern-
ed alleged violations of Article 3. Interestingly, of these complaints the large majority 
were lodged by asylum seekers who had unsuccessfully claimed asylum in one of the 
States parties.9 The first decision in an Article 3-claim lodged by an asylum seeker was 
issued in 1993 in the case of Mutombo v. Switzerland (1993).10 This case concerned a 
member of the Zairian Armed Forces who had become a member of the political 
movement Union pour la démocratie et le progrès social (UDPS) and had participated in 
several demonstrations and attended illegal meetings. The author had been arrested, 
detained and severely tortured by members of the Division Spéciale Présidentielle. After 
his provisional release from detention, a friend helped him to obtain a visa for Italy 
and from that country he entered Switzerland, where he applied for recognition as a 
refugee.11 The Swiss authorities rejected his application and ordered his removal from 
Switzerland. It considered that there were several contradictions in his testimony, that 
the principal document, the provisional release order, had no legal value, that the 
medical certificates were not persuasive and that, in general, the author’s allegations 
were not reliable. The authorities were, furthermore, of the opinion that the situation 
in Zaire was not one of systematic violence.12 By contrast, the Committee assumed 
substantial grounds for believing that the author would be in danger of being subject-
ed to torture upon expulsion. The Committee took into account the author’s ethnic 
background, his alleged political affiliation, his detention history, the fact that he had 
deserted from the army and had left Zaire in a clandestine manner, the fact that, 
when formulating an application for asylum, he had adduced defamatory arguments 
against Zaire, and the existence in Zaire of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or 
mass violations of human rights. The Committee finally took into consideration that 
Zaire was not a party to the CAT, so that the author would be in danger, in the event 
of expulsion to Zaire, not only of being subjected to torture but of no longer having 
the legal possibility of applying to the Committee for protection.13 
Many other cases followed Mutombo. The Committee has now developed a vast 
body of case law concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers. Not everyone has wel-
comed this as a positive development. There has been fierce criticism from a number 
of States that, since Mutombo, the Committee has been acting as a kind of fourth in-
                                                        
refusal of asylum (…) Consequently, the State party is not required to modify its decision(s) con-
cerning the granting of asylum.’ 
8 Burgers & Danelius 1988, p. 35, Wouters 2009, p. 425. 
9 Joseph, Mitchell, Gyorki & Benninger-Budel 2006, p. 217; Nowak & McArthur 2008, pp. 158-159. 
10 ComAT, Mutombo v. Switzerland, 27 April 1994, No. 13/1993. This View has been extensively com-
mented on by eminent scholars, see, for example, Nowak 1996, Ingelse 1999, pp. 246-267, Gorlick 
1999. 
11 ComAT, Mutombo v. Switzerland, 27 April 1994, No. 13/1993, paras. 2.1, 2.2, 2.3. 
12 Ibidem, paras. 2.4, 2.5, 6.1. 
13 Ibidem, paras. 9.4-9.6. 
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stance in asylum proceedings in the North, instead of concentrating its efforts on 
denouncing torture in those States in which it is actually practised.14 Be that as it may, 
the huge body of case law makes the CAT an important treaty in international asylum 
law and distinguishes it from the ICCPR, as the HRC has, so far, dealt with only a 
limited number of asylum cases under Article 7 ICCPR.15 
Just like Articles 3 ECHR and 7 ICCPR, Article 3 CAT is absolute and non-de-
rogable.16 Absolute means that it is not open to the respondent State to claim that its 
own public interest reasons for deporting the individual outweigh the risk of ill-treat-
ment on his or her return; non-derogable means that even in times of war or other 
public emergencies, it is not allowed for States parties to take measures derogating from 
it. Because of its absolute and non-derogable character, and because Article 3 CAT is 
not conditioned by the five grounds of persecution contained in Article 1 A (2) RC, 
Article 3 CAT (like Articles 3 ECHR and 7 ICCPR) offers broader protection than 
Article 33 RC. Its protection is narrower than the protection under Article 3 ECHR 
and Article 7 ICCPR, however, as these latter provisions include protection against 
subjection to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.17 
As this book focuses on issues of evidence and judicial scrutiny in asylum court 
proceedings, but is not a comprehensive analysis of the prohibitions on refoulement 
contained in international asylum law, the concept of torture is not analysed further 
here. Other authors have done this before.18 
4.1.2  Supervisory mechanisms 
Article 17 CAT establishes an autonomous treaty body which monitors the applica-
tion and implementation of the CAT: the UN Committee against Torture (Commit-
tee or ComAT).19 It consists of ten members who have to be of high moral standing 
                                                        
14 See Nowak & McArthur 2008, p. 128, Burns 2001. 
15 See Ingelse 1999, p. 260 and Joseph, Mitchell, Gyorki & Benninger-Budel 2006, p. 221. They write 
that there are numerous asylum cases before the Committee against Torture and only few before the 
Human Rights Committee. See also Nowak & McArthur 2008, pp. 127 and 194, para. 170. 
16 See, for example, ComAT, Paez v. Sweden, 28 April 1997, No. 039/1996, para. 14.5; ComAT, V.X.N. 
and H.N. v. Sweden, 2 September 2000, Nos. 130 and 131/1999, para. 13.4; ComAT, Tebourski v. 
France, 1 May 2007, No. 300/2006, para. 8.3. See on the non-derogable nature of Article 3, Article 2, 
second paragraph, CAT, which states that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever, whether a state 
of war or a threat of war, internal political instability or any other public emergency, may be invoked 
as a justification for torture, and General Comment No. 2, 23 September 2007, CAT/C/GC/2, 
para. 5: ‘Article 2, paragraph 2, provides that the prohibition against torture is absolute and non-de-
rogable. It emphasizes that no exceptional circumstances whatsoever may be invoked by a State Party to jus-
tify acts of torture in any territory under its jurisdiction. (…)’.  
17 See Wouters 2009 for a much more detailed comparison of the prohibitions on refoulement on 
pp. 525-578. 
18 See, for example, Wouters 2009, pp. 439-458. 
19 Article 17, para. 1, CAT. See the following literature for a more extensive description and more pro-
found analysis of the Committee against Torture’s functioning and work: Burgers & Danelius 1988, 
pp. 150-168; Byrnes 1992; Gorlick 1999; Boulesbaa 1999, pp. 237-294; Ingelse 1999, pp. 79-173; 
Ingelse 2000; Burns 2001; Joseph, Mitchell, Gyorki & Benninger-Budel 2006, pp. 46-48; Nowak & 
McArthur 2008, pp. 577-815; Wouters 2009, pp. 429-433; Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Human Rights: Human Rights Fact Sheet No 17: The Committee against Torture. 
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with a recognised competence in the field of human rights. The members serve in 
their personal capacity and not as representatives of their States.20 The Committee 
has six monitoring mechanisms at its disposal to supervise compliance with the CAT. 
These are the examination of State reports,21 the consideration of individual com-
plaints,22 the consideration of interstate complaints,23 the issuance of general com-
ments,24 special ex officio inquiries in cases of systematic practices of torture in a State 
party25 and, finally, under the Optional Protocol (OPCAT), carrying out missions to 
States parties and preventive visits to places of detention.26 
The competence of the Committee to examine inter-State and individual com-
plaints, as well as the competence to start ex officio enquiries, is optional. This means 
that at the time of ratifying or acceding to the CAT, a State party can choose either to 
recognise or not to recognise this competence of the Committee. While 147 States 
                                                        
20 Article 17, para. 1, CAT. 
21 Article 19, para. 1, CAT stipulates: ‘The States Parties shall submit to the Committee, through the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, reports on the measures they have taken to give effect to 
their undertakings under this Convention, within one year after the entry into force of this Con-
vention for the State Party concerned. Thereafter the States Parties shall submit supplementary re-
ports every four years on any new measures taken, and such other reports as the Committee may re-
quest.’ 
22 See Article 22, para. 1, CAT, which stipulates: ‘A State Party to this Convention may at any time de-
clare under this article that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
communications from or on behalf of individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims 
of a violation by a State Party of the provisions of the Convention. No communication shall be re-
ceived by the Committee if it concerns a State Party to the Convention which has not made such a 
declaration.’ 
23 See Article 21, para. 1, CAT, which stipulates: ‘A State Party to this Convention may at any time de-
clare under this article 3 that it recognizes the competence of the Committee to receive and consider 
communications to the effect that a State Party claims that another State Party is not fulfilling its 
obligations under this Convention. Such communications may be received and considered according 
to the procedures laid down in this article only if submitted by a State Party which has made a 
declaration recognizing in regard to itself the competence of the Committee. No communication 
shall be dealt with by the Committee under this article if it concerns a State Party which has not 
made such a declaration.’ 
24 Rule 74, para. 1, of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee stipulates. ‘The Committee may pre-
pare and adopt general comments on the provisions of the Convention with a view to promoting its 
further implementation or to assisting States parties in fulfilling their obligations.’ 
25 Article 20 CAT, paras. 1-3 stipulate: ‘If the Committee receives reliable information which appears 
to it to contain well-founded indications that torture is being systematically practised in the territory 
of a State Party, the Committee shall invite that State Party to co-operate in the examination of the 
information and to this end to submit observations with regard to the information concerned.Taking 
into account any observations which may have been submitted by the State Party concerned as well 
as any other relevant information available to it, the Committee may, if it decides that this is war-
ranted, designate one or more of its members to make a confidential inquiry and to report to the 
Committee urgently. If an inquiry is made in accordance with paragraph 2, the Committee shall seek 
the co-operation of the State Party concerned. In agreement with that State Party, such an inquiry 
may include a visit to its territory.’ 
26 The OPCAT was adopted on 18 December 2002 and entered into force on 22 June 2006. The 
OPCAT establishes a Subcommittee on Prevention with the task of carrying out missions to States 
parties and preventive visits to places of detention. OPCAT also envisages that parties will establish 
independent national preventive mechanisms with the task of regularly visiting and inspecting all 
places of detention. Many States in all regions of the world are presently in the process of ratifying 
OPCAT. See Nowak & McArthur 2008, vii. 
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are formally parties to the CAT, only 65 States parties have recognised the compe-
tence of the Committee to hear individual complaints under Article 22 CAT. All the 
EU Member States have recognised the competence of the Committee to receive 
individual communications under Article 22, with the exception of Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania, Romania and the UK.27 As these countries are parties to the CAT itself, 
they are bound by it and by the interpretations of treaty provisions given by the Com-
mittee. However, as a result of the fact that they have not made declarations in which 
they recognise the competence of the Committee to receive individual communica-
tions, individuals in these countries, including asylum seekers, cannot bring com-
plaints to the Committee.  
The Committee is not a court or tribunal, but an independent body of experts sui 
generis, with elements of judicial, quasi-judicial, administrative, investigative, inquisi-
torial, supervisory and conciliatory functions.28 According to the Committee itself, it 
is not an appellate, quasi-judicial or administrative body, but rather a monitoring body 
created by the States parties themselves with declaratory powers only.29 The opinions 
of the Committee set out in its various documents are not legally binding, as the CAT 
does not contain a provision like Article 46, first paragraph, ECHR, which provision 
stipulates, in short, that the respondent State is obliged to abide by the final judgment 
of the ECtHR.30 Unlike the ECHR, the CAT also lacks a separate body with a prac-
tice to keep cases on its agenda until the States concerned have taken satisfactory 
measures.31 The enforcement procedure under the CAT is weaker and consists of the 
following measures. Under Rule 118, fifth paragraph of the Rules of Procedure of the 
Committee,32 the Committee will normally invite the State party concerned to inform 
the Committee within a specific time period of the action it has taken in conformity 
with the Committee’s decisions. According to Rule 120, the Committee may desig-
nate one or more Rapporteur(s) for follow-up on decisions adopted under Article 22 
of the Convention, for the purpose of ascertaining the measures taken by States 
parties to give effect to the Committee’s findings. Although they are not legally bind-
ing, the opinions of the CAT are of a high authority. The reasons for this are the 
                                                        
27 This reflects the situation on 21 September 2012. See Nowak & McArthur 2008, p. 159, note 129, 
http://treaties.un.org, under ‘Status of Treaties’, and the List of States Parties Accepting Article 22 
CAT in the Bayefsky.com database, http://www.bayefsky.com/complain/cat_statesparties.php. 
Bayefsky.com is a database designed for the purpose of enhancing the implementation of the human 
rights legal standards of the United Nations. It contains a range of data concerning the application 
of the UN human rights treaty system by its monitoring treaty bodies. 
28 The term independent body of experts sui generis is used in relation to the HRC by McGoldrick 1996, 
p. 54, but it also fits the Committee against Torture as this Committee resembles the HRC in many 
ways. Both Committees are autonomous treaty bodies, consisting of independent experts (not only 
from the legal profession), with many similar monitoring mechanisms at their disposal, including re-
ceiving individual communications and issuing non-binding views on these communications. See 
Wouters 2009, pp. 429-434. 
29 Committee, General Comment No. 1, para. 9. 
30 Boulesbaa 1999, p. 63, Wouters 2009, p. 431. 
31 Under the ECHR, the Committee of Ministers performs this function, see Chapter 5.  
32 The Rules of Procedure of the Committee of 21 February 2011 may be found at: http://www2. 
ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat/ under ‘Rules of Procedure’. 
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same as those mentioned in relation to the views of the HRC. Reference is made to 
chapter 3, section 3.1.2. 
4.1.3  Provisions on proceedings 
This chapter examines: the procedural limb of Article 3, containing the prohibition 
on refoulement; Articles 12 and 13, containing the obligation of States parties to investi-
gate in a prompt and impartial manner every potential case of torture and ill-treat-
ment that has occurred in its territory, either ex officio (Article 12) or on the basis of an 
allegation (Article 13); Article 15, which prohibits the use of statements made as a re-
sult of torture as evidence in any proceedings, except in criminal proceedings against 
a person accused of torture as evidence of the very fact that this statement was made; 
and Article 22, fifth paragraph, second part, which requires that applicants should 
first exhaust effective national remedies before applying to the Committee. The rea-
son for including the latter provision is that the case law under it may help to explain 
when a national remedy is considered by the Committee to be (in)effective. 
It may seem odd to investigate Articles 12 and 13 as these provisions pertain to 
acts of torture committed in the territory of the State party and, therefore, to internal 
situations. Articles 12 and 13 do not relate to situations of the expulsion of asylum 
seekers to their countries of origin, where the (past act(s) of persecution and) fear of 
persecution is connected not to the State party itself, but to another country (often 
not a State party to the CAT). Nevertheless, it is interesting to examine these provi-
sions. First, the CAT constitutes a system; as the different provisions contained in it 
form part of this system, it is difficult to see them as completely separate stipulations. 
In that way, it is logical to see the procedural limb of Article 3 as a phenomenon 
which is related to the procedural provisions of Articles 12 and 13. Second, as we will 
see in more detail in sections 4.2 and 4.3 below, Article 3 requires an opportunity for 
effective, independent and impartial review of the decision on expulsion and Articles 
12 and 13 require an impartial investigation. The requirement of impartiality thus 
follows from both Article 3 and Articles 12 and 13. As there is so far not much juris-
prudence on this requirement of impartiality in Article 3-cases,33 it is worthwhile 
examining the case law under Articles 12 and 13. Third, asylum seekers or recognised 
refugees sometimes start an Article 12 or Article 13 procedure, after having fled to a 
State party to the CAT, against their countries of origin, in order to get the country of 
origin condemned for not having investigated acts of torture impartially and prompt-
ly.34 These cases create a link with the asylum context. For all these reasons it is 
relevant and worthwhile to examine Articles 12 and 13. 
4.1.4  Chapter outline 
Part 1 deals with the CAT’s provisions on national proceedings and what these provi-
sions say concerning the required intensity of national judicial scrutiny and eviden-
                                                        
33 So far the only case found in which the requirement of impartiality explicitly plays a role is ComAT, 
Sogi v. Canada, 16 November 2007, No. 297/2006, discussed below in 4.2.2.6. 
34 For example, ComAT, M’Barek v. Tunisia, 10 November 1999, No. 060/1996. 
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tiary issues in national asylum proceedings. In section 4.2, the provisions on national 
proceedings are first briefly introduced. After that, we will see how these provisions 
work in the asylum context, and what kinds of obligations they impose on national 
courts. The case law of the Committee is extensively discussed here, with a particular 
focus on how, according to the Committee, national courts should perform their re-
view. The requirement of impartiality flowing from Articles 12 and 13 is discussed in 
section 4.3. It will be shown that this requirement of impartiality calls for intense 
judicial scrutiny at national level. Section 4.4 pays attention to the prohibition on 
using evidence obtained under torture, laid down in Article 15. 
Part 2 focuses on the assessment performed by the Committee in cases con-
cerning the expulsion of asylum seekers. The assessment is analysed with the aid of 
the eleven aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny introduced in Chapter 1. Each as-
pect is dealt with in a separate sub-section. In section 4.6 final concluding remarks are 
made. 
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CAT, Part 1: 
 
Provisions on national proceedings; issues of intensity of judicial scrutiny 
and evidentiary issues in national judicial proceedings 
4.2  The CAT’s provisions on national proceedings: introduction and 
asylum context 
4.2.1  Texts of the provisions on national proceedings 
Article 3 stipulates: 
 
‘1. No State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a person to another State where 
there are substantial grounds for believing that he would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture. 
2. For the purpose of determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities 
shall take into account all relevant considerations including, where applicable, the existence in 
the State concerned of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human 
rights.’ 
 
Article 12 of the CAT stipulates: 
 
‘Each State Party shall ensure that its competent authorities proceed to a prompt and impartial 
investigation, wherever there is reasonable ground to believe that an act of torture has been 
committed in any territory under its jurisdiction.’ 
 
Article 13 of the CAT stipulates: 
 
‘Each State Party shall ensure that any individual who alleges he has been subjected to torture 
in any territory under its jurisdiction has the right to complain to, and to have his case prompt-
ly and impartially examined by, its competent authorities. Steps shall be taken to ensure that 
the complainant and witnesses are protected against all ill-treatment or intimidation as a conse-
quence of his complaint or any evidence given.’ 
 
Article 15 stipulates: 
 
‘Each State Party shall ensure that any statement which is established to have been made as a 
result of torture shall not be invoked as evidence in any proceedings, except against a person 
accused of torture as evidence that the statement was made.’ 
 
Article 22, fifth paragraph, second part, stipulates:  
 
‘The Committee shall not consider any communication from an individual under this article 
unless it has ascertained that: 
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The individual has exhausted all available domestic remedies; this shall not be the rule where 
the application of the remedies is unreasonably prolonged or is unlikely to bring effective relief 
to the person who is the victim of the violation of this Convention.’ 
4.2.2  The right to an effective remedy at national level 
4.2.2.1  Derivation from Article 3 itself 
The Committee derived the right to an effective remedy at national level in cases con-
cerning refoulement from Article 3 itself in the case of Agiza v. Sweden (2003).35 In this 
decision the Committee stated: 
 
‘The Committee observes that the right to an effective remedy for a breach of the Convention 
underpins the entire Convention, for otherwise the protections afforded by the Convention 
would be rendered largely illusory. (…) The prohibition on refoulement contained in Article 3 
should be interpreted (…) to encompass a remedy for its breach (…). The Committee ob-
serves that in the case of an allegation of torture or cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment 
having occurred, the right to remedy requires, after the event, an effective, independent and 
impartial investigation of such allegations. The nature of refoulement is such, however, that an 
allegation of breach of that article relates to a future expulsion or removal; accordingly, the 
right to an effective remedy contained in Article 3 requires, in this context, an opportunity for 
effective, independent and impartial review of the decision to expel or remove, once that deci-
sion is made, when there is a plausible allegation that article 3 issues arise.’36 
 
Sweden considered Agiza a serious threat to the national security and decided to 
expel him to Egypt, his country of origin, for this reason. Agiza did not have an op-
portunity to lodge an appeal against this decision prior to his expulsion. According to 
the Committee, that practice constituted a violation of Article 3.37 It follows from the 
decision in the case of Agiza that Article 3 requires an opportunity for effective, in-
dependent and impartial review of the decision on expulsion, prior to the expulsion 
itself. The Committee reiterated this position in subsequent decisions.38 
As follows from the last sentence of the above quotation from Agiza, the re-
quirement of an effective, independent and impartial review of the decision on ex-
pulsion arises only where there is a plausible allegation that an issue under Article 3 
arises. The Committee has not explained any further when a claim is plausible; it may 
be argued that a plausible claim is the same as an arguable claim under Article 13 
ECHR, meaning that the claim is supported by demonstrable facts and not manifestly 
                                                        
35 ComAT, Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, No. 233/2003. See on this decision also Boeles 2008. 
36 ComAT, Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, No. 233/2003, paras. 13.6 and 13.7. 
37 Ibidem, para. 13.8. 
38 See, for example, ComAT, Brada v. France, 24 May 2005, No. 195/2002, paras. 13.3, 13.4; ComAT, 
Nirmal Singh v. Canada, 30 May 2011, No. 319/2007, para. 7.3. 
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lacking in any ground in law.39 The threshold for plausibility should not be set too 
high.40 
4.2.2.2  Reluctance to critically review national court decisions 
In order to find out when the Committee finds national remedies compliant or non-
compliant with the requirement of effective, independent and impartial review, it is 
useful to look at those decisions in which the claim was declared inadmissible under 
Article 22, fifth paragraph, second part, for failure to exhaust national remedies.41 
Analysis of this case law demonstrates that the Committee, just like the HRC (see 
Chapter 3, section 3.3.1), is generally reluctant to submit national proceedings to a 
rigorous test of compliance with the requirement of an effective, independent and 
impartial review.42 Just like the HRC, the Committee normally assumes that national 
proceedings are CAT-compliant. Some examples are discussed now to illustrate this. 
In the case of M.A. v. Canada (1995),43 the Committee considered: 
 
‘In the present case, the author has invoked this exception (exception of non-exhaustion of do-
mestic remedies), arguing that the chances of success are almost non-existent, in view of the 
prior jurisprudence by the Courts and the process governing the reasonableness hearing. How-
ever (…) in principle, it is not within the scope of the Committee’s competence to evaluate the 
prospects of success of domestic remedies, but only whether they are proper remedies for the 
determination of the author’s claims.’44 
 
It does not appear from the decision in M.A. v. Canada that the Committee made a 
true inquiry into the characteristics of the national jurisprudence and the national 
proceedings governing the reasonableness hearing.  
In a number of decisions on the merits, the Committee, reacting to party sub-
missions with regard to the (un)fairness of the national refugee claim determination 
proceedings, observed that it is not called upon to review the prevailing system in the 
State party in general, but only to examine whether in the present case the State party 
complied with its obligations under the Convention. An example of this line is Khan v. 
Canada (1994).45 In the proceedings before the Committee, counsel complained ex-
tensively about the Canadian asylum procedure. In particular, he complained that the 
Canadian system did not allow for a judicial appeal on the merits, but only for an ap-
peal with leave on matters of law. Furthermore, he complained about the incom-
                                                        
39 See, for example, ECtHR, Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 2000, Appl. No. 30210/96, para. 157. 
40 Wouters 2009, p. 517. 
41 In the case law of the Committee under Article 3, non-exhaustion of national remedies is the num-
ber one ground for inadmissibility; on 1 January 2009 in 23 cases out of a total of 45 inadmissible 
cases under Article 3, the Committee established that national remedies had not been exhausted. 
42 The same conclusion is drawn by Joseph, Mitchell, Gyorki & Benninger-Budel 2006, p. 221; see also 
Nowak & McArthur 2008, p.193. 
43 ComAT, M.A. v. Canada, 3 May 1995, No. 22/1995. 
44 ComAT, 3 May 1995, M.A. v. Canada, No. 22/1995, para. 4. 
45 ComAT, Khan v. Canada, 15 November 1994, No. 15/1994. See on this decision also Nowak 1996 
and Tiemersma 2006. 
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petence of members of the Appeal Board, about constant interruptions during the 
presentation of the case at the hearing of the Appeal Board, a focus on contradictions 
instead of a search for the truth and some other aspects of the asylum procedure. The 
Committee responded as follows:  
 
‘The Committee notes that both parties have made considerable submissions with regard to 
the fairness of the refugee claim determination system and the post-claim risk-assessment pro-
cedures. The Committee observes that it is not called upon to review the prevailing system in 
Canada in general, but only to examine whether in the present case Canada complied with its 
obligations under the Convention. (…).’46 
 
In Chapter 3 on the ICCPR, it was noted that the HRC regards the determination 
and evaluation of facts and evidence as matters for the national courts and that the 
HRC itself will normally not engage in that (see section 3.3.1.). Exactly the same ap-
proach is found in a significant number of decisions of the ComAT. The Committee 
leaves the authorities of States, including national courts, much leeway in the deter-
mination of the facts and the proceedings applied for this aim. General Comment 
No. 147 stipulates in paragraph 9a that ‘considerable weight will be given, in exercising 
the Committee’s jurisdiction pursuant to Article 3, to findings of fact that are made 
by organs of the State party concerned’. The principle of primacy for the national 
authorities in the determination of the facts, and the corresponding national proce-
dural autonomy, has been reiterated in many decisions of the Committee.48 
The general reluctance of the Committee to engage in the determination of the 
facts and the evaluation of evidence when this has already been done at national level 
has also been emphasised in literature.49 Various explanations are given for this, 
which are, in fact, the same as those mentioned in relation to the HRC (see Chapter 
3, section 3.1.1). First, the Committee does not operate as an appellate court to which 
appeals may be taken from a State’s highest national court, but is a treaty monitoring 
body with declaratory powers only. Second, the meeting time of the Committee is 
very limited, which is difficult to reconcile with the time required to assess evidence 
and to write down an assessment of the presented evidence. The Committee meets in 
                                                        
46 Ibidem, para. 12.1. 
47 General Comment No. 1: Implementation of Article 3 of the Convention in the context of Article 
22, adopted on 21 November 1997: A/53/44 Annex IX, CAT. This document was adopted follow-
ing the high number of individual complaints relating to Article 3, in order to confirm and sum-
marize the case law of the Committee. See Nowak&McArthur 2008, p. 156. 
48 To mention a few examples: ComAT, A.R. v. Netherlands, 14 November 2003, No. 203/2002. The 
Committee considered: ‘The Committee recalls its jurisprudence to the effect that it is not an appel-
late, quasi-judicial or administrative body. Consistent with its General Comment, whilst the Com-
mittee has the power of free assessment of the facts arising in the circumstances of each case, it 
must give considerable weight to findings of fact made by the organs of the State party.’; ComAT, 
Rios v. Canada, 23 November 2004, No. 133/1999. The Committee stated: ‘The Committee has had 
due regard for its established practice according to which it is not the Committee’s place to question 
the evaluation of evidence by the domestic courts unless the evaluation amounts to a denial of jus-
tice.’ 
49 See, for example, Wouters 2009, p. 490, Kjaerum 2010, pp. 28-29. 
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Geneva and normally holds two sessions per year consisting of a four-week session in 
April/May and another four-week session in November.50 
4.2.2.3  Arbitrary evaluation of evidence or denial of justice at national level 
National judicial proceedings cannot be qualified as CAT-compliant – that is, effec-
tive, independent and impartial – if the evidence was evaluated in a clearly arbitrary 
way, if a denial of justice occurred, or if the national officers clearly violated their 
obligations of impartiality.51 This very much resembles the approach developed by 
the HRC (see sections 3.3.2 and 3.4.2). Within the framework of this research, no 
decisions have been found in which the Committee concluded explicitly that national 
courts had acted in a clearly arbitrary way or denied justice.  
4.2.2.4  Insufficiently thorough investigations at national level 
There are a number of decisions in which the Committee – without using the men-
tioned terminology – did reproach the national authorities for conducting insuffi-
ciently thorough investigations. An example is the case of A.S. v. Sweden (2000).52 The 
female Iranian applicant alleged in the national proceedings and, subsequently, in the 
proceedings before the Committee, that she was the widow of a high-ranking officer 
in the Iranian Air Force who had been declared a martyr, that she had been forced 
into a so-called sighe marriage53 with a high-ranking Ayatollah, that she had a Christian 
lover, that this had been discovered at a certain point in time, that she had been ar-
rested for this reason and that she and her lover had been sentenced to death by 
stoning by a Revolutionary Court.54 In the national proceedings the authorities noted 
that the author had failed to submit verifiable information, such as the telephone 
number on which she contacted her Christian lover, addresses (her own address and 
the address of her Christian lover) and names of her Christian friend’s family mem-
bers.55 The Committee noted that the claimant had indeed provided a number of 
details that could have been verified by the national authorities, and that the claim 
fitted well with information about the stoning of women in Iran for adultery. It ex-
plicitly reproached the national authorities for failure to conduct more thorough in-
vestigations into the details that had been provided by the claimant:  
 
‘The Committee notes the State party’s position that the author has not fulfilled her obligation 
to submit the verifiable information that would enable her to enjoy the benefit of the doubt. 
                                                        
50 See for information on the sessions of the Committee the site of this treaty body: http://www2. 
ohchr.org/english/bodies/cat, last visited 30 December 2011. 
51 See, for example, ComAT, S.P.A. v. Canada, 7 November 2006, No. 282/2005, para. 7.6. 
52 ComAT, A.S. v. Sweden, 24 November 2000, No. 149/1999. 
53 A short-term marriage recognised legally only by Shia Muslims in order to create a situation wherein 
the spouses are not obliged to live together but the wife is obliged to be at the husband’s disposal 
for sexual services whenever required, see ComAT, A.S. v. Sweden, 24 November 2000, No. 149/ 
1999, para. 2.3. 
54 ComAT, A.S. v. Sweden, 24 November 2000, No. 149/1999, paras. 2.1-2.8. 
55 Ibidem, paras. 4.6, 4.8, 4.13. 
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However, the Committee is of the view that the author has submitted sufficient details regard-
ing her sighe or mutah marriage and alleged arrest, such as names of persons, their positions, 
dates, addresses, name of police station, etc., that could have, and to a certain extent have 
been, verified by the Swedish immigration authorities, to shift the burden of proof. In this con-
text the Committee is of the view that the State party has not made sufficient efforts to deter-
mine whether there are substantial grounds for believing that the author would be in danger of 
being subjected to torture.’56 
4.2.2.5  States parties must provide for judicial review of the merits 
In a number of decisions, the Committee has made clear that, in order to qualify as 
effective, judicial remedies must be more than a mere formality or reasonableness-test 
and must make it possible to look at the substance, the merits, of the case. The first 
decision in which the Committee gave expression to this new line was Aung v. 
Canada57 (2006). It considered that 
 
‘In the view of the Committee, the decisions of the Federal Court support the contention that 
applications for leave and judicial review are not mere formalities, but that the Federal Court 
may, in appropriate cases, look at the substance of a case.’58 
 
In the decision of Nirmal Singh v. Canada (2011),59 the Committee concluded that the 
judicial review offered by the Federal Court of Canada did not constitute an effective 
national remedy. Two years earlier, in Yassin v. Canada (2009),60 the Committee had 
reached the opposite conclusion at the admissibility stage. The different outcome 
may well be explained by the fact that Yassin had not challenged the effectiveness of 
the judicial review by the Federal Court of Canada.61 In Nirmal Singh v. Canada (2011), 
the complainant stated explicitly in the proceedings before the Committee that he 
had not had an effective remedy to challenge the decision on expulsion. Nirmal Singh 
specifically pointed to the narrow character of the judicial review and to the fact that, 
when the Immigration Board decided that a refugee claimant was not credible, the 
Federal Court did not subject this decision to rigorous scrutiny.62 
The Committee ruled in Nirmal Singh that the judicial review offered by the 
Federal Court did not constitute an effective remedy. It articulated in a very clear way 
                                                        
56 Ibidem, paras. 8.6, 8.7. 
57 ComAT, Aung v. Canada, 15 May 2006, No. 273/2005. 
58 Ibidem, para. 6.3. 
59 ComAT, Nirmal Singh v. Canada, 30 May 2011, No. 319/2007. 
60 ComAT, Yassin v. Canada, 4 November 2009, No. 307/2006. 
61 In Yassin v. Canada, the complainant did not request leave to apply to the Federal Court for judicial 
review of the negative Pre-Removal Risk Assessment (PRRA) decision. As a result of this, in the 
proceedings before the Committee the respondent State party challenged the admissibility of the 
complaint for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. It is important to note that, in the proceedings 
before the Committee, the complainant did not challenge the effectiveness of the remedy of judicial 
review by the Federal Court. Logically, the Committee followed the State party in its position and 
declared the communication inadmissible for non-exhaustion of domestic remedies. See paras. 2.11, 
4.1, 6.1, 9.3. 
62 ComAT, Nirmal Singh v. Canada, 30 May 2011, No. 319/2007, paras. 3.4 and 5.2. 
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that States parties to the CAT are obliged to provide for judicial review of the merits, 
rather than merely of the reasonableness, of decisions on expulsion: 
 
‘The complainant states that he did not have an effective remedy to challenge the decision on 
deportation and that the judicial review of the Immigration Board decision, denying him Con-
vention refugee status, was not an appeal on the merits, but rather a very narrow review for 
gross errors of law. The State party in response submits that the Board’s decision was subject 
to judicial review by the Federal Court. The Committee notes that according to Section 18.1(4) 
of the Canadian Federal Courts Act, the Federal Court may quash a decision of the Immigra-
tion Refugee Board if satisfied that: the tribunal acted without jurisdiction; failed to observe a 
principle of natural justice or procedural fairness; erred in law in making a decision; based its 
decision on an erroneous finding of fact; acted, or failed to act, by reason of fraud or perjured 
evidence; or acted in any other way that was contrary to law. The Committee observes that none of the 
grounds above include a review on the merits of the complainant’s claim that he would be tortured if returned to 
India (emphasis added). With regard to the PRPA procedure of risk analysis, to which the com-
plainant also subjected his claim, the Committee notes that according to the State party’s sub-
mission, PRRA submissions may only include new evidence that arose after the rejection of the 
refugee protection claim; further, the PRRA decisions are subject to a discretionary leave to 
appeal, which was denied in the case of the complainant. The Committee refers to its Con-
cluding observations (CAT/C/CR/34/CAN of 7 July 2005, para 5 (c)), that the State party should 
provide for judicial review of the merits, rather than merely of the reasonableness, of decisions to expel an indi-
vidual where there are substantial grounds for believing that the person faces a risk of torture (emphasis add-
ed). The Committee accordingly concludes that in the instant case the complainant did not 
have access to an effective remedy against his deportation to India, in violation of article 22 of 
the Convention against Torture.’63 
 
The Committee has, so far, not clarified any further what a ‘review on the merits’ 
exactly entails, and how intense the judicial scrutiny should exactly be. What is clear, 
though, is that a review on the merits is more than just a reasonableness test. It is 
regrettable that in Nirmal Singh the Committee did not explain why an ‘erroneous 
finding of fact’, which is one of the statutory grounds on which the Federal Court can 
quash the decision of the Immigration Refugee Board, cannot be qualified as a review 
on the merits of the claim. In my opinion, the ground ‘erroneous finding of fact’ 
would make a review on the merits possible. It seems that, in fact, the Committee did 
not find this statutory ground problematic, but that it was convinced by the com-
plainant’s argument, supported by case law, that, in practice, the Federal Court tested 
only the reasonableness of decisions, although it had the statutory possibilities to 
review cases in a more independent and rigorous way. 
                                                        
63 Ibidem, paras. 8.8., 8.9, 9. 
CAT 
 
127 
 
 
4.2.2.6  Equality of arms, adversariality 
The most explicit case on this issue in the Committee’s case law is Sogi v. Canada 
(2007).64 The complainant in this case had applied for asylum in Canada. He stated 
that he and his family had been falsely accused of being Sikh militants and on the 
basis of that allegation had been arrested and tortured several times in India. In 
August 2002, the Canadian Security and Intelligence Service (CSIS) issued a report 
stating that there were reasonable grounds to believe that the complainant was a 
member of the Babbar Khalsa International (BKI) terrorist group, an alleged Sikh 
terrorist organization whose objective was to establish an independent Sikh state 
called Khalistan, taking in the Indian province of Punjab. Based on this report, a war-
rant was issued for his arrest as he was deemed a threat to Canada’s national security. 
While it was recognised that there was a risk of torture in the event of deportation, 
the complainant was refused asylum and a removal decision was taken as he was seen 
as a threat to Canada’s national security. The information underpinning the national 
security rating was ‘secret’ and not disclosed to the complainant. The complainant 
applied for judicial review of the removal decision. The Federal Court concluded that 
the hearing officer had not erred in determining that certain information was relevant, 
but could not be disclosed to the complainant for reasons of national security. The 
Federal Court considered it relevant that this secret information could, nevertheless, 
be taken into account by the Court, so that a counterbalance was created. This ruling 
was upheld on appeal in a Federal Court of Appeal judgment.65 
The Committee ruled that the non-disclosure of this relevant evidence to the 
complainant resulted in a violation of the requirement of a fair hearing. It considered 
as follows: 
 
‘As for the Canadian authorities’ use of evidence that for security reasons was not divulged to 
the complainant, the Committee notes the State party’s argument that this practice is author-
ized by the Immigration and Refugee Protection Act, and that in any event such evidence did 
not serve as a basis for the decision by the Minister’s delegate, as she did not consider the 
threat the complainant posed to Canadian security in her assessment of the risks. However, the 
Committee notes that, in both her decisions, the delegate considered the threat to national 
security. On the basis of the above, the Committee considers that the complainant did not en-
joy the necessary guarantees in the pre-removal procedure. The State party is obliged, in deter-
mining whether there is a risk of torture under Article 3, to give a fair hearing to persons sub-
ject to expulsion orders.’66 
 
This case and the conclusion drawn by the Committee strongly resemble the case of 
Mansour Ahani v. Canada (2004)67 of the HRC (see Chapter 3, section 3.3.4.) 
The decision in Sogi v. Canada strongly conveys the message that in expulsion 
cases both parties to the case must have equal access to the documents in the case 
                                                        
64 ComAT, Sogi v. Canada, 16 November 2007, No. 297/2006. 
65 Ibidem, paras. 2.1-2.11. 
66 Ibidem, paras. 10.4, 10.5. 
67 HRC, Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 15 June 2004, No. 1051/2002. 
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file. The Committee seems to be stricter in guarding adversariality and equality of 
arms than the ECtHR as it required in the Sogi decision that all the documents in the 
file be disclosed to the claimant, including those underpinning the allegation that Sogi 
constituted a threat to Canada’s national security. In other words, in Sogi the Com-
mittee treated adversariality and equality of arms as an absolute right and did not tol-
erate that national security interests justified non-disclosure of part of the evidentiary 
materials. The ECtHR, however, treats these rights as relative rights and has ruled 
that non-disclosure of evidentiary materials may be justified if this is strictly necessary 
to preserve the fundamental rights of another individual or to safeguard an important 
public interest, such as the protection of national security.68 For a more detailed 
analysis of the ECtHR’s position, reference is made to chapter 5, section 5.5.4. 
4.2.2.7  Effective national remedy: interim conclusions 
Article 3 and Article 22, fifth paragraph, second part require an opportunity for effec-
tive, independent and impartial review of the decision on expulsion, prior to expul-
sion. Just like the HRC, the Committee has for a long time been generally reluctant to 
submit national proceedings to a rigorous CAT compliance test. However, in a num-
ber of decisions the Committee has made clear that – in order to qualify as an effec-
tive, independent and impartial national remedy as required by Article 3 – national 
judicial remedies must make it possible to look at the substance, the merits, of the 
case, and must guarantee equality of arms and adversarial proceedings. 
4.3  Impartial investigation under Articles 12 and 13 CAT69 
4.3.1  Impartiality: active search for the truth by applying investigative 
powers 
In the case of M’Barek v. Tunisia (1999) the complainant was a Tunisian national 
residing in France where he enjoyed refugee status. He submitted the case on behalf 
of a friend, the late Faisal Baraket. Mr Baraket had been arrested on 8 October 1991 
by members of the Criminal Investigation Brigade of the Nabeul National Guard. Mr 
Baraket was an activist in the Tunisian General Students’ Union and a member of Al 
Nahdha, an unofficial political party. He knew that the police were looking for him 
and had, therefore, gone into hiding. After his arrest, during which he was beaten, he 
was brought to the headquarters of the Brigade where he was taken to the office of 
Ladib, the officer in charge. In the presence of the captain and police officers, 
Baraket was tortured. Some of the officers later threw him out into the corridor after 
bringing another detainee into the office. It was noted that Baraket was seriously 
                                                        
68 See, for example, ECtHR, Edwards and Lewis v. the UK, 27 October 2004, Appl. Nos. 39647/98 and 
40461/98, para. 46. 
69 Literature on these provisions of the CAT is scarce, and there is not very much jurisprudence either 
so far. See Burgers & Danelius 1988, pp. 144-146, Ingelse 1999, pp. 297-299, Joseph, Mitchell, 
Gyorki & Benninger-Budel 2006, pp. 231-233, Nowak & McArthur 2008, pp. 413-451. 
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injured and seemed to be dying. The officers prevented the other detainees present, 
including his own brother, from giving him assistance. After a further half hour it was 
discovered that he was dead.70 
In October 1991, the father, Hedi Baraket, was informed that his son had died in 
a car accident. He was asked to identify the body and he noted that the face was 
disfigured and difficult to recognise. He was also not permitted to see the rest of the 
body. He was made to sign a statement acknowledging that his son had been killed in 
an accident. An autopsy report was drawn up by doctors at the Nabeul hospital. It 
mentioned, among other things, that death appeared to have resulted from acute 
respiratory insufficiency related to extensive pulmonary congestion.71 
The author M’Barek (friend of deceased Baraket) visited the two principal wit-
nesses to Baraket’s death some months after the incident. They said that Baraket had 
died in their arms at the Brigade’s headquarters. The author was then arrested on 15 
May 1992 by the same Brigade and was detained at the same location as the victim. 
He was sentenced to five months’ imprisonment. His detention gave him the oppor-
tunity to meet witnesses to Baraket’s death.  
These witnesses corroborated what the first witnesses had said, namely that 
Baraket had died under torture. After his release, while he was still under house ar-
rest, the author left Tunisia and was granted asylum in France.72 Through Amnesty 
International a report was drawn up in 1992 by Mr Pounder, Professor of Forensic 
Medicine at the University of Dundee (United Kingdom). That report, which was 
prepared on the basis of the autopsy report, indicated, inter alia, that the pattern of 
injuries described in the autopsy report was inconsistent with the deceased having 
died in a road traffic accident as a pedestrian, pedal cyclist, motor cyclist or vehicle 
occupant. The report also stated that the entire pattern of injury was that of a sys-
tematic physical assault, which corroborated the allegation of ill-treatment and torture 
that had been made.73 
On 11 December 1991, the author sent an anonymous letter to the Prosecutor of 
the Republic in the town of Grombalia in which he reported the crime, identified the 
victim and the police officers responsible and specified the circumstances in which 
the victim had died. He also wrote to the Minister of Justice, his deputies and the na-
tional and international media. However, the death of Faisal Baraket was never inves-
tigated. From October 1991 onwards, Amnesty International, the World Organiza-
tion against Torture, Action of Christians for the Abolition of Torture (France) and 
the Association for the Prevention of Torture (Switzerland) also requested the Tuni-
sian Government to investigate the death of Faisal Baraket. The Tunisian Govern-
ment, however, kept maintaining to the Committee that his death had resulted from a 
road accident.74 On 13 July 1992, a report prepared by the Higher Committee for 
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, an official Tunisian body, considered 
Faisal Baraket’s death to be suspicious and suggested that an inquiry should be started 
                                                        
70 ComAT, M’Barek v. Tunisia, 10 November 1999, No. 060/1996, paras. 2.1-2.3. 
71 Ibidem, paras. 2.4, 2.5. 
72 Ibidem, para. 2.7. 
73 Ibidem, para. 2.6. 
74 Ibidem, paras. 2.9, 2.10. 
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under Article 36 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. On 22 September 1992, an in-
quiry was ordered into these allegations of torture. The examining magistrate ordered 
a new medical evaluation which found it impossible to determine the origins or 
mechanism of the injuries on the victim and dismissed the case. Assigned the case for 
a second time, the magistrate examined the same persons who had denied any knowl-
edge of the alleged events, and so again dismissed the case.75 
The Committee concluded in this case that the magistrate, in failing to investigate 
the case more thoroughly, had committed a breach of the duty of impartiality im-
posed on him by his obligation to give equal weight to both accusation and defence 
during the investigation. Thus, Tunisia had breached its obligations under Articles 12 
and 13 CAT. The Committee was very explicit in its findings as to what other inves-
tigative activities the magistrate could and should have used: checking prison records, 
hearing witnesses, and even exhumation of the body: 
 
‘The Committee considers that, among other things, the examining magistrate had at his dis-
posal the results of other important investigations which are customarily conducted in such 
matters, but made no use of them:  
First, notwithstanding the statements made by the witnesses mentioned, and in particular bear-
ing in mind the possibility of incomplete recall, the magistrate could have checked in the rec-
ords of the detention centres referred to whether there was any trace of the presence of Faisal 
Baraket during the period in question, as well as that, in the same detention centre and at the 
same time, of the two persons mentioned by the author of the communication as having been 
present when Faisal Baraket died. It is not without relevance to note in this regard that in pur-
suance of principle 12 of the Body of Principles for the Protection of All Persons under Any 
Form of Detention or Imprisonment, adopted on 9 December 1988, as well as article 13 bis of 
the Tunisian Code of Penal Procedure, a record must be left of every person detained.  
Next, the magistrate might have sought to identify the accused officials, examine them and ar-
range a confrontation between them and the witnesses mentioned as well as the complainant. 
Lastly, in view of the major disparities in the findings of the forensic officials as to the causes 
of some of the lesions observed on the victim, the Committee considers that it would have 
been wise to order the exhumation of the body in order at least to confirm whether the victim 
had suffered fractures to the pelvis (confirming the accident hypothesis) or whether he had not 
(confirming the hypothesis that a foreign object had been introduced into his anus); this 
should have been done, as far as possible, in the presence of non-Tunisian experts, and more 
particularly those who have had occasion to express a view on this matter.’76 
 
This case of M’Barek is important. It makes clear that, in cases of allegations or sus-
picions of torture, the requirement of impartiality enshrined in Articles 12 and 13 
obliges the national judge to reconstruct as meticulously as possible what actually 
happened and to use his or her investigative powers to that end. Impartiality of courts 
and tribunals generally refers to the relationship between a judge and the matter at 
issue in a specific case; it implies that judges must not harbour preconceptions about 
                                                        
75 Ibidem, paras. 8.8, 11.8. 
76 Ibidem, paras. 11.9, 11.10, 12. 
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the matter put before them and must not act in ways that promote the interests of 
one of the parties.77 In M’Barek, the Committee gave this requirement of impartiality 
a new dimension. It explained that, if parties strongly disagreed about what had ac-
tually happened, the judge must make his or her own independent, thorough search 
for the truth. In the case of M’Barek, the author had stuck to allegations of torture 
inflicted upon his friend and the respondent government had kept on denying these 
allegations. Both parties referred to extensive materials to support their positions. In 
such situations, according to the Committee, the judge must make his or her own, 
thorough, independent attempt to come as close to the truth as possible by using all 
investigative powers at his or her disposal. 
A very similar case in which the Committee concluded that there had been a vio-
lation of Articles 12 and 13, due to insufficiently effective and thorough – and there-
fore not impartial – investigations by the national authorities, including the national 
judiciary, is Ristic v. Yugoslavia (2001).78 The author of the communication, Radivoje 
Ristic, a citizen of the former Yugoslavia, claimed that an act of torture resulting in 
the death of his son, Milan Ristic, had been committed by the police and that the 
authorities had failed to carry out a prompt and impartial investigation.79 In this case, 
the Committee explicitly reproached the investigating judge for not ordering an 
exhumation of the body, in spite of the differences and inconsistencies between the 
various medical reports, the differences between statements made by the three police 
officers, the fact that the doctor who carried out the autopsy had admitted in a state-
ment that he was not a specialist in forensic medicine and the fact that the police had 
not informed the investigating judge on duty of the incident in order for him to 
oversee the on-site investigation in accordance with national law. Noting these ele-
ments, the Committee considered that the investigation conducted by the State 
party’s authorities had been neither effective nor thorough. A proper investigation 
would have entailed an exhumation and a new autopsy, which would in turn have al-
lowed the cause of death to be medically established with a satisfactory degree of cer-
tainty.80 
4.3.2  Articles 12 and 13: interim conclusions 
Articles 12 and 13 CAT contain the obligation of States parties to investigate in a 
prompt and impartial manner every potential case of torture and, by virtue of Article 
16 CAT, every potential case of ill-treatment.81 Both provisions pertain to situations 
                                                        
77 See, for example, HRC, General Comment No. 32 on Article 14 ICCPR, para. 21. 
78 ComAT, Ristic v. Yugoslavia, 11 May 2001, No. 113/1998. 
79 Ibidem, para. 1. 
80 Ibidem, paras. 9.4-9.8. 
81 Article 16 CAT stipulates: ‘Each State Party shall undertake to prevent in any territory under its juris-
diction other acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment which do not amount to 
torture as defined in article 1, when such acts are committed by or at the instigation of or with the 
consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. In parti-
cular, the obligations contained in articles 10, 11, 12 and 13 shall apply with the substitution for 
references to torture or references to other forms of cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or pun-
ishment.’  
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occurring within the territory of a State party – internal situations – in which indi-
viduals become victims of torture and ill-treatment, for example in prisons and deten-
tion centres, the army, or at police stations during interrogations. They do not relate 
directly to national asylum proceedings where (the past act(s) of torture or ill-treat-
ment and) the fear of torture or ill-treatment is connected not to the State party itself, 
but to another country. Articles 12 and 13 are, nevertheless, relevant for this research 
as they impose – just like the procedural limb of Article 3 – a requirement of 
impartiality. 
In cases of allegations or suspicion of internal torture, the requirement of im-
partiality enshrined in Articles 12 and 13 obliges the national judge to reconstruct as 
meticulously as possible what actually happened and to use his or her investigative 
powers to that end. Impartiality under Article 3 may be interpreted as meaning the 
same thing as impartiality under Articles 12 and 13. That would mean that national 
asylum courts must act impartially and must, therefore, make their own independent, 
thorough search for the truth and apply investigative powers to that end. So far, we 
cannot be entirely sure that this interpretation of impartiality under Article 3 is cor-
rect, as the Committee has, so far, not clarified any further what a ‘judicial review on 
the merits’ exactly entails, and exactly how intense the judicial scrutiny should be (see 
section 4.2.2.5). 
4.4  Article 15: the prohibition on using evidence obtained under torture 
Article 15 prohibits the use of statements made as a result of torture as evidence in 
any proceedings, except in criminal proceedings against a person accused of torture 
as evidence of the very fact that this statement was made. The prohibition is based on 
two different considerations. First of all, it is clear that a statement made under tor-
ture is often unreliable, and it could, therefore, be contrary to the principle of ‘fair 
trial’ to invoke such a statement as evidence before a court. Even in countries whose 
court proceedings are based on free evaluation of all evidence, it is hardly acceptable 
that a statement made under torture should be allowed to play any part in court pro-
ceedings. In the second place, torture is often aimed at ensuring evidence in court 
proceedings. Consequently, if a statement made under torture cannot be invoked as 
evidence, an important reason for using torture is removed. The prohibition on the 
use of such statements can, therefore, have the indirect effect of preventing torture.82 
Article 15 only speaks of statements made as a result of torture, but due to the case 
law of the Committee, the provision also extends to ill-treatment.83 The Committee 
has, so far, not dealt with Article 15 in the context of asylum. In P.E. v. France (2001) 
and G.K. v. Switzerland (2002), concerning extradition and involving allegations of tor-
ture by the Spanish authorities against female ETA suspects, the Committee consid-
                                                        
82 Literature on Article 15 is rather scarce and there is not much case law so far either. See Burgers & 
Danelius 1988, pp.147-148, Ingelse 1999, pp. 317-320, Boeles 1997, p. 174, Joseph, Mitchell, Gyorki 
& Benninger-Budel 2006, pp. 235-236, Nowak & McArthur 2008, pp. 503-537. Wouters 2009 has 
not written on Article 15. 
83 ComAT, Halimi-Nedyibi v. Austria, 30 November 1993, No. 9/1991. 
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ered Article 15 applicable to extradition proceedings.84 Interestingly, Boeles (1997) 
notes that Article 15 may play a role in asylum proceedings where the facts of the 
claim to refugee status by someone who has been tortured in his or her own country 
are disputed. To the extent that statements made under pressure of torture are used 
against a victim of torture, in order to discredit his or her story, these statements may 
not be used as evidence.85 One may think here of a case in which persuasive medical 
reports confirming past torture are presented and in which statements made under 
pressure of this torture contain discrepancies and contradictions. In such a case, such 
statements may not be held against the individual as evidence discrediting the claim 
for protection.  
 
 
                                                        
84 ComAT, P.E. v. France, 19 December 2002, No. 193/2001; ComAT, G.K. v. Switzerland, 12 May 
2003, No. 219/2002. In both cases no violation of Article 15 was assumed. 
85 Boeles 1997, p. 174. 
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CAT, Part 2: 
 
The assessment performed by the Committee against Torture in cases on 
expulsion of asylum seekers 
4.5 The assessment performed by the Committee against Torture 
A step by step analysis of the examination performed by the Committee in its deci-
sions concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers is made below. The eleven aspects 
of evidence and judicial scrutiny introduced in Chapter 1 are used as a tool for this 
analysis. 
4.5.1 Standard of proof86 
The standard of proof follows directly from Article 3, first paragraph CAT. This 
provision stipulates that there must be ‘substantial grounds for believing that the 
claimant would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’ This standard is explicitly 
referred to in all the decisions of the Committee concerning the expulsion of asylum 
seekers, from the very first case, Mutombo v. Switzerland (1994),87 to the last decision 
included in this research, Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden (2011).88 The text of Article 3 CAT and 
the Committee do not speak of a ‘real risk’, which term is used by the HRC and the 
ECtHR, but of a ‘danger’.  
In case law and in General Comment No.1,89 the Committee has further ex-
plained what is meant by ‘danger’ and what level of risk is required. In Mutombo v. 
Switzerland (1994), the Committee considered that 
 
‘In the present circumstances, his return to Zaire would have the foreseeable and necessary 
consequence of exposing him to a real risk of being detained and tortured.’90 
 
This ‘necessary and foreseeable consequence’ criterion copies the risk criterion 
developed by the HRC (see Chapter 3, section 3.5.1). It clearly indicates a high 
threshold which is not easily met. However, this criterion was never repeated by the 
Committee in subsequent case law: since Mutombo, the Committee has never again 
used the term ‘necessary’.91 Instead, it explains that ‘danger’ means that there must be 
more than a mere possibility of torture, more than mere theory or suspicion, but that 
torture does not need to be highly likely or highly probable to occur. For example, in 
E.A. v. Switzerland (1997), the Committee considered: 
                                                        
86 See for an analysis of the standard of proof, the burden of proof and the required level of 
individualisation also Bruin 1998 and Wouters 2009, pp. 458-487. 
87 ComAT, Mutombo v. Switzerland, 27 April 1994, No. 13/1993, para. 9.3. 
88 ComAT, Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden, 3 June 2011, No. 379/2009, paras. 10.2, 10.3. 
89 ComAT, General Comment No. 1, 21 November 1997, A/53/44, annex IX. 
90 ComAT, Mutombo v. Switzerland, 27 April 1994, No. 13/1993, para. 9.4 
91 See also Wouters 2009, p. 460. 
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‘The Committee has noted the State party’s argument that the danger to an individual must be 
serious (“substantial”) in the sense of being highly likely to occur. The Committee does not ac-
cept this interpretation and is of the view that ‘substantial grounds’ in article 3 require more 
than a mere possibility of torture but do not need to be highly likely to occur to satisfy that 
provision’s conditions.’92 
 
And General Comment No. 1 stipulates in paragraph 6: 
 
‘Bearing in mind that the State party and the Committee are obliged to assess whether there are 
substantial grounds for believing that the author would be in danger of being subjected to tor-
ture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited, the risk of torture must be assessed on 
grounds that go beyond mere theory or suspicion. However, the risk does not have to meet the 
test of being highly probable.’93 
 
The principle that the risk does not have to meet the test of being highly probable 
has been reiterated in many early and more recent decisions of the Committee.94 
Furthermore, it has made clear that the risk must be foreseeable, real, personal and 
present.95 
Wouters (2009) points out that the Committee has not always been consistent 
regarding the applicable level of risk.96 In Dadar v. Canada (2005) and El Rgeig v. 
Switzerland (2007),97 phrases are used at the end of the Committee’s considerations 
which imply the adoption of a lower level of risk. In Dadar, the Committee concluded 
that the complainant ‘might indeed be tortured upon his return’. And in El Rgeig the 
Committee considered that ‘the State party has not presented to it sufficiently con-
vincing arguments to demonstrate a complete absence of risk’.98 However, I sub-
scribe to Wouters’ opinion that it must be assumed that it was not the Committee’s 
intention to change the standard of proof, as in both decisions it explicitly mentioned 
its commonly used standard that the risk must go beyond mere theory and suspicion, 
but does not have to meet the test of being highly probable.99 
To conclude, the standard of proof developed by the Committee is that there 
must be a real, personal, present and foreseeable risk of torture in the country to 
                                                        
92 ComAT, E.A. v. Switzerland, 10 November 1997, No. 028/1995, para. 11.3. 
93 ComAT, General Comment No. 1, 21 November 1997, A/53/44, annex IX, para. 6. 
94 See, for example,ComAT, Haydin v. Sweden, 20 November 1998, No. 101/1997; para. 6.5; ComAT, 
S.M.R. and M.M.R. v. Sweden, 5 May 1999, No. 103/1998, para. 9.4; ComAT, S.G. v. the Netherlands, 
12 May 2004, No. 135/1999, para. 6.3; ComAT, Falcon Rios v. Canada, 23 November 2004, No. 
133/1999, para. 8.2; ComAT, Jahani v. Switzerland, 23 May 2011, No. 357/2008, 9.3. 
95 See, for example, ComAT, Haydin v. Sweden, 20 November 1998, No. 101/1997, para. 6.5 (‘the indi-
vidual concerned must face aforeseeable, real and personal risk’); see also ComAT, General Com-
ment No. 1, 21 November 1997, A/53/44, annex IX, para. 7 (‘the author must establish (…) that 
such danger is personal and present’). 
96 Wouters 2009, p. 460. 
97 ComAT, El Rgeig v. Switzerland, 22 January 2007, No. 280/2005. 
98 ComAT, El Rgeig v. Switzerland, 22 January 2007, No. 280/2005, para. 7.4. 
99 ComAT, Dadar v. Canada, 5 December 2005, No. 258/2004, para. 8.4; ComAT, El Rgeig v. Switzer-
land, 22 January 2007, No. 280/2005, para. 7.3. 
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which the claimant is returned. Torture must not be certain or highly probable or 
likely, but there must be more than mere theory or suspicion. 
4.5.2  Burden of proof 
General Comment No. 1100 contains a number of stipulations on the burden of 
proof. Paragraph 5 states: 
 
‘The burden is upon the author to present an arguable case. This means that there must be a 
factual basis for the author’s position sufficient to require a response from the State party.’ 
 
Paragraph 7 stipulates: 
 
‘The author must establish that he/she would be in danger of being tortured and that the 
grounds for so believing are substantial in the way described, and that such danger is personal 
and present. (…)’ 
 
And paragraph 6 states: 
 
‘(…) the State party and the Committee are obliged to assess whether there are substantial 
grounds for believing that the author would be in danger of being subjected to torture were 
he/she to be expelled (…).’ 
 
It follows from this that the burden of proof in Article 3 claims is initially on the 
claimant. He or she must present an arguable case, a sufficient factual basis. The 
Committee has confirmed this principle in several decisions.101 It has not explained 
any further when a claim is arguable. The term arguable may be interpreted with the 
aid of the admissibility requirement under Rule 107 (b) of the Committee’s Rules of 
Procedure that the claim must rise to a basic level of substantiation.102 It must con-
tain a certain number of verifiable details and must be supported by some (documen-
tary) evidence to reach this level. The consideration of this in K.A., on her own behalf 
and on behalf of her husband, R.A., and their children, v. Sweden (2007) is illustrative and, 
therefore, quoted here:  
‘The Committee recalls that for a claim to be admissible under article 22 of the Convention 
and Rule 107 (b) of its rules of procedure, it must rise to the basic level of substantiation re-
                                                        
100 ComAT, General Comment No. 1, 21 November 1997, A/53/44, annex IX.  
101 See, for example, ComAT, E.V.I. v. Sweden, 1 May 2007, No. 296/2006; ComAT, M.J.A.M.O., on his 
own behalf and on behalf of his wife, R.S.N., and his daughter, T.X.M.S., v. Canada, 9 May 2008, No. 
293/2006,para. 10.4: ‘As to the burden of proof, the Committee recalls its general comment and its 
jurisprudence, which establishes that the burden is generally upon the complainant to present an ar-
guable case (…)’; ComAT, C.A.R.M. v. Canada, 18 May 2007, No. 298/2006, para. 8.10; ComAT, 
A.M. v. France, 5 May 2010, No. 302/2006, para. 13.4. 
102 Rule 107 (b) of the Committee’s Rules of Procedure stipulate that: ‘With a view to reaching a deci-
sion on the admissibility of a complaint, the Committee, its Working Group or a rapporteur desig-
nated under rules 98 or 106, paragraph 3, shall ascertain that the complaint is not (…) manifestly 
unfounded.’ 
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quired for purposes of admissibility. It notes that the complainant has provided no documen-
tary evidence in support of her account of events in Azerbaijan prior to her and R. A.’s 
departure for Sweden. Specifically, she claimed that in July 2001 her husband was beaten and 
tortured during military service in the Azerbaijani military due to his mother being Armenian. 
However, beyond the mere claim, she and R. A. have failed to provide any detailed account of 
these incidents or any medical evidence which would corroborate this claim, including a proof 
of possible after-effects of such ill-treatment.’103 
 
It was stated above that Article 3, first paragraph, CAT was modelled on the prohibi-
tion on refoulement developed by the ECtHR under Article 3 ECHR. This being so, 
there is no reason to assume that the term ‘arguable’ under Article 3 CAT denotes 
another kind of threshold than the arguable claim under Article 13 ECHR, meaning 
that the claim is supported by demonstrable facts and not manifestly lacking in any 
ground in law.104 
When an arguable claim is provided by the claimant, a response by the State party 
is required. This means that a shift of the burden takes place and an obligation arises 
for the State party to make sufficient efforts to determine whether there are substan-
tial grounds for believing that the claimant would be in danger of being subjected to 
torture. It follows from the text of Article 3, first and second paragraphs, that the 
authorities have an active role in verifying information put forward by the complain-
ant and collecting and presenting evidence. According to the first paragraph, substan-
tial grounds must exist (emphasis added). It does not say that substantial grounds 
must be shown by the applicant. The second paragraph states that for the purpose of 
determining whether there are such grounds, the competent authorities shall take into 
account all relevant considerations.105 The burden of proof is, thus, a shared one. The 
idea of a shared burden also clearly follows from the preparatory works on Article 3, 
first paragraph: there was consensus among the drafters that ‘the burden of proof 
should not fall solely upon the person concerned’.106 
Reference is made to section 4.2.2.4 in which the case of A.S. v. Sweden (2000)107 
was discussed. This case perfectly illustrates when a claim may be considered arguable 
and, as a consequence, a shift of the burden towards the authorities takes place. It fol-
lows from this case that, to be arguable, the claim must reach a basic level of substan-
tiation, meaning that the claim must contain a certain number – not necessarily a very 
high number – of verifiable details and must be supported by some – not necessarily 
a very large amount of – evidence. Where the author has provided a basic level of 
                                                        
103 ComAT, K.A., on her own behalf and on behalf of her husband, R.A., and their children, v. Sweden, 16 No-
vember 2007, No. 308/2006, para. 7.2. In a substantial number of other decisions the Committee 
considered that the basic level of substantiation had not been reached and declared the complaint in-
admissible for that reason. See, for example, ComAT, S.A. v. Sweden, 7 May 2004, No. 243/2004; 
ComAT, R.T. v. Switzerland, 30 November 2005, No. 242/2004; ComAT, A.T.A. v. Switzerland, 14 
November 2003, No. 236/2003; ComAT, H.S.V. v. Sweden, 17 May 2004, No. 229/2003; ComAT, 
H.I.A. v. Sweden, 8 May 2003, No. 216/2002. 
104 See, for example, ECtHR, Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 2000, Appl. No. 30210/96, para. 157. 
105 See in the same vein Wouters 2009, p. 485. 
106 E/CN.4/WG.1/WP.1. 
107 ComAT, A.S. v. Sweden, 15 February 2001, No 149/1999. 
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substantiation the burden of proof shifts to the national authorities. It also follows 
from the decision in A.S. v. Sweden (2000) that the author must be able to explain why 
certain details and certain corroborative evidence have not been submitted, if this is 
seen as problematic by the national authorities. Where sound reasons are provided, 
the absence of certain details and certain evidence is not necessarily problematic. 
In a number of subsequent decisions, the Committee placed a stricter burden 
upon the claimant than in A.S. v. Sweden (2000). Bruin and Reneman (2006) explain 
this by referring to the fact that for a number of years, States have been pushing the 
Committee to abstain from evaluating facts and evidence in full and to take a more 
reserved stand.108 A striking example of the Committee’s stricter approach is S.L. v. 
Sweden (2001),109 in which it considered that the author had not provided it with suf-
ficient evidence, although very detailed information had been provided, including 
names, an authentic verdict concerning a conviction and sentence and several medical 
certificates pointing to a post-traumatic stress disorder and strongly supporting the 
author’s statements of past torture.110 It is hard to imagine what other evidence the 
author should have submitted to make his claim arguable and it is difficult to recon-
cile this approach with the Committee’s approach in A.S. v. Sweden (2000). Another 
example of this stricter approach is F.F.Z. v. Denmark (2002),111 in which a report by 
Amnesty International’s medical group was submitted stating that the physical symp-
toms found on the applicant were consistent with the alleged torture. The Committee 
concluded in this case that the complainant ‘has not proved his claim’, which indi-
cated that the burden of proof rested entirely on the applicant.112 Similarly, in A.A.C. 
v. Sweden (2006), the Committee used terminology indicating that the burden of proof 
rested entirely with the applicant, considering not only that it was for the complainant 
‘to present an arguable case’, but also that it was for the complainant ‘to establish that 
he would be in danger of being tortured and that the grounds for so believing are 
substantial in the way described and that such danger is personal and present’.113 
To conclude, it may be said that the burden of proof is shared between the indi-
vidual and the national authorities. In a number of cases, though, the ComAT placed 
the burden of proof entirely on the applicant. It is rather difficult to determine in 
general the exact division of responsibilities and the exact moment at which the shift 
of the burden takes place, as this is decided by the Committee on a case by case basis. 
It may be helpful to apply the guideline of the gradual scale mentioned in literature, 
based on the early case law of the Committee, such as A.S. v. Sweden (2000), that there 
is an inversely proportional relationship between the onus on the claimant and the 
general human rights situation in the country of origin. The poorer this situation, the 
sooner it is assumed that the claimant runs a risk, the less the claimant has to ‘prove’ 
and the sooner the onus shifts to the State party. If the human rights situation is not 
                                                        
108 Bruin & Reneman 2006, p. 90. 
109 ComAT, S.L. v. Sweden, 11 May 2001, No. 150/1999. 
110 Ibidem, para. 6.4. 
111 ComAT, F.F.Z. v. Denmark, 24 May 2002, No. 180/2001. 
112 Ibidem, para. 12. Both examples mentioned here are also noted by Wouters 2009, p. 487. 
113 ComAT, A.A.C. v. Sweden, 16 November 2006, No. 227/2003, para. 8.5. 
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obviously poor, the onus shifts more towards the claimant, which means that more 
evidence is expected.114 
4.5.3  Relevant facts and circumstances 
Article 3, second paragraph, stipulates that the national authorities shall take into 
account ‘all relevant considerations, including the existence in the State concerned of 
a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human rights’. It is clear 
from this text that the human rights situation in the countries of origin is a ‘relevant 
consideration’. Apart from this, however, the term ‘relevant consideration’ is not 
explained any further in the CAT. The preparatory work on the second paragraph 
shows that the original draft of Article 3 did not contain a provision of this kind. In 
1979, the Soviet Union proposed an additional paragraph according to which, in con-
sidering whether a danger of torture existed in a given case, special regard should be 
had to the existence of a situation ‘characterized by flagrant and massive violations of 
human rights brought about when apartheid, racial discrimination or genocide, the 
suppression of national liberation movements, aggression or the occupation of for-
eign territory are made State policy’.115 A number of delegations were firmly opposed 
to an enumeration of this kind, whereas others considered that the enumeration 
should be further extended by also referring to State policies of colonialism or neo-
colonialism. Eventually a compromise was reached which consisted of deleting the 
enumeration of specific situations while maintaining a reference to situations charac-
terized by a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human 
rights.116 
The term ‘all relevant considerations’ is not confined to considerations relating to 
the situation in the country of origin, but also includes information relating to the 
individual applicant and his or her personal risk.117 In General Comment No. 1,118 the 
term ‘all relevant considerations’ is explained somewhat further, although slightly dif-
ferent terminology is used. Paragraph 7 stipulates that ‘all pertinent information may 
be introduced by either party to bear on this matter.’ Paragraph 8 gives examples of 
such ‘pertinent information’. It stipulates: 
                                                        
114 This principle is reflected in a number of decisions of the Committee. See, for example, ComAT, 
Hayden v. Sweden, 16 December 1998, No. 97/1997, in which the Committee considered: ‘The Com-
mittee is aware of the serious human rights situation in Turkey. Reports from reliable sources sug-
gest that persons suspected of having links with the PKK are frequently tortured in the course of in-
terrogations by law enforcement officers and that this practice is not limited to particular areas of 
the country. In this context, the Committee further notes that the Government has stated that it 
shares the view of UNHCR, i.e. that no place of refuge is available within the country for persons 
who risk being suspected of being active in or sympathizers of the PKK.’ See also Ingelse 1999, 
p. 252, Nowak & McArthur 2008, pp. 190-193, particularly para. 164, and p. 224. See also Wouters 
2009, p. 473, who states that the graver the general human rights situation in the country of return as 
regards a particular group, for example, a specific clan in Somalia or Kurds in Turkey, the more sig-
nificant the general human rights situation will be in assessing the individual risk. 
115 E/CN.4/WG.1/WP.2. 
116 Burgers & Danelius 1988, pp. 51, 93-94 and 128 and Nowak & McArthur 2008, pp. 131-146. 
117 Nowak & McArthur 2008, p. 228. 
118 Committee, General Comment No. 1, 21 November 1997, A/53/44, Annex XI. 
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‘The following information, while not exhaustive, would be pertinent:  
(a) Is the State concerned one in which there is evidence of a consistent pattern of gross, fla-
grant or mass violations of human rights (see art. 3, para. 2)? 
(b) Has the author been tortured or maltreated by or at the instigation of or with the consent 
or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity in the past?  
If so, was this the recent past? 
(c) Is there medical or other independent evidence to support a claim by the author that he/ 
she has been tortured or maltreated in the past? Has the torture had after-effects? 
(d) Has the situation referred to in (a) above changed? Has the internal situation in respect of 
human rights altered? 
(e) Has the author engaged in political or other activity within or outside the State concerned 
which would appear to make him/her particularly vulnerable to the risk of being placed in dan-
ger of torture were he/she to be expelled, returned or extradited to the State in question?  
(f) Is there any evidence as to the credibility of the author? 
(g) Are there factual inconsistencies in the claim of the author? If so, are they relevant?’ 
4.5.3.1  Personal facts 
Based on this enumeration, and on the case law of the Committee, a number of rele-
vant personal circumstances of substance may be identified. The focus here is on the 
facts and circumstances of substance; in separate sections below, attention will be 
paid to particular issues of credibility and evidence. The list provided below is only il-
lustrative and by no means exhaustive.119 
A history of detention is a relevant personal fact. So is ethnic background. Both 
circumstances played an important role in the first decision of the Committee con-
cerning the expulsion of an asylum seeker, Mutombo v. Switzerland (1994). Ethnic 
background also played a major role in a number of cases concerning Turkish Kurds, 
for example, Alan v. Switzerland (1996).120 Next, a history of torture is of relevance, as 
appears from numerous decisions.121 However, in accordance with paragraph 8 of 
General Comment No. 1, the Committee also critically examines whether the torture 
took place in the recent past, or in the more remote past. Where a number of years 
have passed since the torture, it is easily assumed by the Committee that there is no 
present real, personal and foreseeable risk of torture,122 sometimes even without 
                                                        
119 See for relevant facts and circumstances also Nowak & McArthur 2008, pp. 171-177, and Wouters 
2009, pp. 462-475. 
120 ComAT, Mutombo v. Switzerland, 27 April 1994, No. 013/1993, para. 9.4; ComAT, Alan v. Switzerland, 
8 May 1996, No. 021/1995, para. 11.3. 
121 See, for example, the following early decisions: ComAT, Khan v. Canada, 15 November 1994, No. 
015/1994, para. 12.3; Alan v. Switzerland, 8 May 1996, No. 021/1995, para. 11.3; Kisoki v. Sweden, 8 
May 1996, No. 041/1996, para. 9.3. 
122 See, for example, ComAT, T.M. v. Sweden, 18 November 2003, No. 228/2003, para. 7.3. In this case, 
the Committee also took into account that a change in the situation in the country of origin, Bang-
ladesh, had taken place, being that the complainant’s political party now participated in the govern-
ment. See also ComAT, S.G. v. the Netherlands, 12 May 2004, No. 135/1999, para. 6.4. The Commit-
tee found it relevant that since the past torture of the Turkish applicant, nine years had passed. 
→ 
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providing a reason (for example, by referring to an improved human rights situation 
in the country of origin) why the past torture can no longer indicate a risk of future 
subjection to torture. For example, in H.A.D. v. Switzerland (2000), the Committee 
only noted that, in view of the fact that fifteen years had passed since the author’s 
detention and ill-treatment, there was no current risk to the author, without explicitly 
discussing the present situation in Turkey and the question of whether, and why, the 
past torture could or could no longer indicate a risk of future subjection to torture.123 
Political or other activity making the claimant vulnerable is an important personal 
fact. In particular, the level, type and scale of these activities are taken into account. 
For example, in Khan v. Canada (1994), the Committee found it important that the 
claimant was the local leader of the Baltistan Student Federation.124 Such activities 
may include sur place activities (activities against the regime in the country of origin, 
performed in the country of refuge). In Kisoki v. Sweden (1996), a combination of po-
litical activities in the country of origin and sur place activities played an important 
role: the claimant had been an active member of the opposition party UDPS in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC, then Zaire) and continued her activities 
for the UDPS in Sweden. Another example of a case in which sur place activities play-
ed an important role is Aemei v. Switzerland (1997); in this case, too, a combination of 
political oppositional activities in Iran and Switzerland played an important role.125 
Also relevant is whether or not it is plausible that the authorities in the country of ori-
gin have knowledge of sur place activities. In S.G. v. the Netherlands (2004), the Com-
mittee noted that it had not been established that the Turkish authorities were aware 
of the author’s participation in the occupation of the Greek ambassador’s residence 
in The Hague in 1999. Based on this, and on the fact that the author’s problems in 
Turkey had occurred a long time previously (nine years), the Committee concluded 
that there was no Article 3-danger.126 To the contrary, in Jahani v. Switzerland (2011), 
the Committee noted that the Iranian complainant had participated in demonstra-
tions organised by the Democratic Association for Refugees and in radio broadcasts 
where he had expressed his political opinions against the Iranian regime, and that he 
had written several articles published in Kanoun magazine, in which his name and 
telephone number had been published. Under these circumstances, the Committee 
considered that the complainant’s name could have been identified by the Iranian 
authorities.127 
Desertion from the army is another relevant personal circumstance.128 The fact 
that the author is, or is not, being sought by the authorities in the country of origin is 
also an important personal factor. For example, in X. v. the Netherlands (1996), the 
                                                        
Another example is ComAT, Ruben David v. Sweden, 2 May 2005, No. 220/2002, in which the Com-
mittee noted that seven years had passed since the torture took place. 
123 ComAT, H.A.D. v. Switzerland, 10 May 2000, No. 126/1999, paras. 8.5, 8.6. 
124 ComAT, Khan v. Canada, 15 November 1994, No. 015/1994, para. 12.3.  
125 ComAT, Kisoki v. Sweden, 8 May 1996, No. 041/1996, para. 9.4; ComAT, Aemei v. Switzerland, 9 May 
1997, No. 034/1995, paras. 9.6 and 9.7. See for another example in which sur place activities played 
an important role also ComAT, A.F. v. Sweden, 8 May 1998, No. 089/1997, paras. 2.7, 6.5.  
126 ComAT, S.G. v. the Netherlands, 12 May 2004, No. 135/1999, para. 6.4.  
127 ComAT, Jahani v. Switzerland, 23 May 2011, No. 357/2008, para. 9.9. 
128 See, for example, ComAT, Mutombo v. Switzerland, 27 April 1994, No. 013/1993, para. 9.4. 
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Committee noted that the author had been detained twice and that he had been 
maltreated during his first detention; however, as the periods of detention had been 
short, the author had not claimed to be an active political opponent and there were 
no indications that he was currently being sought by the authorities, the Committee 
concluded that there was no Article 3-risk.129 To the contrary, in Iya v. Switzerland 
(2007), the case of a journalist who had published articles on human rights violations 
in the DRC, the Committee based its conclusion that an Article 3-risk existed on the 
fact that the complainant was being sought, in combination with his political activities 
and his recent detention in the DRC.130 
Recognition as a refugee by a State party is another example of a relevant per-
sonal fact. In Pelit v. Azerbaijan (2007), the Committee attached importance to the fact 
that the Turkish Kurdish complainant had been granted refugee status in Germany in 
1998 and that this status was still valid when Azerbaijan extradited her to Turkey.131 
In some cases the author’s family background plays an important role. In the case 
of A.F. v. Sweden (1998), the Iranian claimant belonged to a politically active family. 
His father had become a local leader for the Tudeh party in 1963 and had been im-
prisoned and persecuted for his political activities. Based on this and on the personal 
oppositional political activities of the author himself, his history of detention and tor-
ture, the Committee concluded that expulsion would expose him to a danger of tor-
ture.132 
From the Committee’s case law, it is clear that it is generally a combination of 
personal circumstances which, in the light of the general human rights situation in the 
country of origin, leads the Committee to the conclusion that expulsion would 
amount to a violation of Article 3. For example, in Uttam Mondal v. Sweden (2011), it 
was the combination of the complainant’s political activities in the past, the findings 
in submitted medical reports confirming past torture, his religion and his homosexu-
ality, seen in the light of the general deterioration of the human rights situation in 
Bangladesh that made the Committee assume an Article 3-danger.133 
4.5.3.2  Facts and circumstances concerning the situation in country of origin 
The second paragraph of Article 3 stipulates that for the purpose of determining 
whether there are grounds for believing that there is an Article 3-danger, the com-
petent authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations, including, where 
applicable, the existence in the country of origin of a consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights. In line with this, General Comment No. 
1 lists as relevant considerations in paragraph 8:  
 
‘(a) Is the State concerned one in which there is evidence of a consistent pattern of gross, fla-
grant or mass violations of human rights (see art. 3, para. 2)?  
                                                        
129 ComAT, X. v. the Netherlands, 8 May 1996, No. 036/1995, para. 8. 
130 ComAT, Iya v. Switzerland, 16 November 2007, No. 299/2006, paras. 2.5, 6.5, 6.8. 
131 ComAT, Pelit v. Azerbaijan, 1 May 2007, No. 281/2005, para. 11. 
132 ComAT, A.F. v. Sweden, 8 May 1998, No. 089/1997, paras. 2.1-2.5, para. 6.5. 
133 ComAT, Uttam Mondal v. Sweden, 23 May 2011, No. 338/2008, paras. 7.2, 7.3, 7.7. 
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(d) Has the situation referred to in (a) above changed? Has the internal situation in respect of 
human rights altered? 
 
The general human rights situation is supplementary to the personal facts and 
circumstances.134 Even the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass 
violations of human rights in a country cannot as such constitute a sufficient ground 
for determining that a person would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon 
return.135 
Logically, developments and changes in the human rights situation in the country 
of origin are relevant. In a number of cases, concerning mainly Sri Lankan and Bang-
ladeshi complainants, the Committee has attached much weight to information about 
the on-going peace process (and, in the Sri Lankan cases, to the return of large num-
bers of Tamils).136 
Another relevant factor concerning the situation in the country of origin is the 
risk of expulsion to a third country: indirect refoulement. In Korban v. Sweden (1998), the 
Swedish authorities ordered the author’s expulsion to Jordan. Based on information 
from the UNHCR and other sources, submitted by the parties, the Committee de-
termined that it could not be excluded that the author would be deported to Iraq 
from Jordan. It found that substantial grounds existed for believing that the author 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture if returned to Iraq.137 
A final example of a relevant fact is whether the country of origin is or is not a 
State party to the CAT. Where the country of origin is not a State party, there is no 
legal possibility of applying to the Committee for protection.138 However, the fact 
that a State is party to the CAT does not always work to the detriment of the claim-
ant: in Alan v. Switzerland (1996) the Committee concluded that there had been an Ar-
ticle 3-risk, in spite of Turkey being a party to the CAT; it noted that the practice of 
torture was still systematic in Turkey.139 Again, the list of circumstances concerning 
the country of origin provided here is only illustrative and by no means exhaustive.140 
                                                        
134 Wouters 2009. 
135 This is a standard consideration in the case law of the Committee, featuring in the very first case, 
Mutombo v. Switzerland, 27 April 1994, No. 013/1993, para. 9.3, and in almost all the subsequent deci-
sions under Article 3 concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers. The Committee has a number of 
times concluded that there is a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human 
rights in countries of origin. See ComAT, Mutombo v. Switzerland, 27 April 1994, No. 13/1993, para. 
9.5 (Zaire, nowadays the Democratic Republic of the Congo); ComAT, Elmi v. Australia, 25 May 
1999, No. 120/1998, para. 6.6 (Somalia); ComAT, A.S. v. Sweden,15 February 2001, No. 149/1999, 
para. 8.7 (Iran). 
136 See, for example, ComAT, U.S. v. Finland, 1 May 2003, No. 197/2002, para. 7.7 (a Sri Lankan case); 
ComAT, T.M. v. Sweden, 18 November 2003, No. 228/2003, para. 7.3; ComAT, M.N. v. Switzerland, 
17 November 2006, No. 259/2004 (a Bangladeshi case).  
137 ComAT, Korban v. Sweden, 16 November 1998, No. 088/1997, paras. 6.4, 6.5. 
138 This consideration is used in many decisions. To mention just afew examples: ComAT, Mutombo v. 
Switzerland, 27 April 1994, No. 13/1993, para. 9.6; ComAT, Khan v. Canada, 15 November 1994, No. 
015/199, para. 12.5. 
139 ComAT, Alan v. Switzerland, 8 May 1996, No. 021/1995, para. 11.5. 
140 See, again, Nowak & McArthur 2008, pp. 171-177, Wouters 2009, pp. 469-472.  
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The personal facts are generally assessed in the light of the general human rights 
situation in the country of origin. The general human rights situation is of supple-
mentary importance, strengthening or weakening the individual claim for protection: 
the graver the general human rights situation in the country of origin, the more sig-
nificant this situation will be in assessing the risk.141 
4.5.4  Required degree of individual risk 
It is a constant consideration in the case law of the Committee that  
 
‘The aim of the determination (…) is to establish whether the individual concerned would be 
personally at risk of being subjected to torture in the country to which he would return. It 
follows that the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, flagrant or mass violations of human 
rights in a country does not as such constitute a sufficient ground for determining that a per-
son would be in danger of being subjected to torture upon his return to that country; addi-
tional grounds must exist that indicate that the individual concerned would be personally at 
risk. Similarly, the absence of a consistent pattern of gross violations of human rights does not 
mean that a person cannot be considered to be in danger of being subjected to torture in his 
specific circumstances.’142 
 
This general consideration stresses twice that a personal risk needs to be established, 
indicating that the Committee strictly requires that an applicant is singled out. 
In Chapter 5 on the ECHR we will see that the ECtHR distinguishes between 
three categories of cases: 1) cases of extreme general violence, where an Article 3-risk 
is assumed for everyone returning to the particular country; 2) cases of group vio-
lence; and 3) individual risk cases. In the third category it is required that an indi-
vidual risk is established, in other words, that the individual concerned has been 
singled out. So far the Committee has not developed its position on the question of 
the required degree of individual risk in the same way as the ECtHR has done. Nev-
ertheless, there are good reasons for assuming that the Committee, just like the HRC 
(see chapter 3, section 3.5.4), has taken significant steps towards incorporating the 
                                                        
141 This principle is reflected in a number of decisions of the Committee. See, for example, ComAT, 
Hayden v. Sweden, 16 December 1998, No. 97/1997, in which the Committee considered: ‘The Com-
mittee is aware of the serious human rights situation in Turkey. Reports from reliable sources sug-
gest that persons suspected of having links with the PKK are frequently tortured in the course of in-
terrogations by law enforcement officers and that this practice is not limited to particular areas of 
the country. In this context, the Committee further notes that the Government has stated that it 
shares the view of UNHCR, i.e. that no place of refuge is available within the country for persons 
who risk being suspected of being active in or sympathizers of the PKK.’ See also Ingelse 1999, 
p. 252, Nowak & McArthur 2008, pp. 190-193, particularly para. 164, and p. 224, Wouters 2009, 
p. 473. 
142 This consideration is included in almost all the Committee’s decisions under Article 3 concerning the 
expulsion of asylum seekers, from the very first case of Mutombo v. Switzerland, 27 April 1994, No. 
13/1993, para. 9.3, up to and including the most recent decisions of the Committee included in this 
research, Uttam Mondal v. Sweden, 23 May 2011, No. 338/2008, para. 7.3, and Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden, 3 
June 2011, No. 379/2009, para. 10.3. 
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lines of theory developed by the ECtHR on situations of group violence.143 This re-
laxation of the individualisation requirement started perhaps with the case of Elmi v. 
Australia (1999), in which the Committee based the risk assessment primarily on the 
human rights situation in Somalia and the fact that the claimant belonged to the small 
unprotected clan of the Shikal, so that the assessment came close to acceptance of 
the claim based on membership of a ‘high risk’ group. However, two personal facts 
also played a role in this case, being that the complainant’s family had been targeted 
and the wide publicity surrounding the case.144 In the case of S.S. and S.A. v. the Neth-
erlands (2001), the Committee considered that 
 
‘The likelihood of torture of Tamils in Colombo who belong to a high risk group is not so 
great that the group as a whole runs a substantial risk of being so exposed.’145 
 
It emerges from this decision that the Committee deemed it possible, in theory, that a 
claim could be based solely on the fact of belonging to a ‘high risk group’. In Njamba 
v. Sweden (2010),146 the Committee prohibited Sweden from returning a woman to the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) due to the general high threat of (sexual) 
violence against women in that country. It noted that a number of factual issues of 
the case were in dispute between the parties, but it left this dispute aside, focusing 
instead on the future risk and pointing to the extremely high rate of violence against 
women across the country. In other words, the Committee left the complainant’s 
individual account of past events for what is was, and focused instead on the general 
risk to women. It considered as follows: 
 
‘The Committee notes that the State party itself acknowledges that sexual violence occurs in 
Equateur Province, to a larger extent in rural villages (para. 9.2). It notes that since the State 
party’s last response of 19 March 2010, relating to the general human rights situation in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, a second joint report from seven United Nations experts 
on the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo was published, which refers to 
alarming levels of violence against women across the country and concludes that, “Violence 
against women, in particular rape and gang rape committed by men with guns and civilians, re-
mains a serious concern, including in areas not affected by armed conflict.” In addition, a sec-
ond report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on the situation of 
human rights and the activities of her Office in the Democratic Republic of the Congo as well 
as other UN reports, also refers to the alarming number of cases of sexual violence throughout 
the country, confirming that these cases are not limited to areas of armed conflict but are hap-
pening throughout the country. (…) In reviewing this information, the Committee is reminded 
of its General Comment no. 2 on article 2, in which it recalled that the failure, “to exercise due 
diligence to intervene to stop, sanction and provide remedies to victims of torture facilitates 
and enables non-State actors to commit acts impermissible under the Convention with im-
punity...”. Thus, in light of all of the abovementioned information, the Committee considers 
                                                        
143 Kjaerum 2010, pp. 28-29. 
144 ComAT, Elmi v. Australia, 25 May 1999, No. 120/1998, paras. 6.6 and 6.7. 
145 ComAT, S.S. and S.A. v. the Netherlands, 11 May 2001, No. 142/1999, para. 6.6. 
146 ComAT, Njamba v. Sweden, 14 May 2010, No. 322/2007. 
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that the conflict situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, as attested to in all recent 
United Nation reports, makes it impossible for the Committee to identify particular areas of 
the country which could be considered safe for the complainants in their current and evolving 
situation. Accordingly, the Committee finds that, on a balance of all of the factors in this parti-
cular case and assessing the legal consequences aligned to these factors, substantial grounds 
exist for believing that the complainants are in danger of being subjected to torture if returned 
to the Democratic Republic of the Congo.’147 
 
The Committee adopted the same approach in the case of Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden 
(2011).148 Both cases concerned complainants from the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo (DRC). Just as in Njamba v. Sweden (2010), in Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden (2011), there 
was a dispute between the parties about the past facts stated by the complainant. 
Again, the Committee left this dispute for what it was, and focused instead on the 
extremely high rate of violence against women across the country.149 Kjaerum (2010) 
calls this relaxation of the individualisation requirement in the Committee’s case law a 
big step forward in the protection of individuals at risk, both in relation to the 
substantive scope of protection and the possibility to prove that a threat exists.150 At 
the end of this section, it is useful to refer once again to the principle of the gradual 
scale (see above section 4.5.2). According to this principle, the graver the general hu-
man rights situation in the country of origin, the more significant this situation will be 
in assessing the risk and the sooner it is assumed that the claimant runs a risk. In such 
situations, the less the claimant has to ‘prove’, the sooner the onus shifts to the State 
party. If the human rights situation is not obviously poor, the onus shifts more to-
wards the claimant, which means that more individual circumstances and more in-
dividual evidence are expected.151 In line with this principle, it may be argued that the 
more a certain group or category of persons is targeted, the less individual facts and 
circumstances, including evidence thereof, are required. 
4.5.5  Credibility assessment 
General Comment No. 1 stipulates in paragraph 9:  
 
‘Bearing in mind that the Committee against Torture is not an appellate, a quasi-judicial or an 
administrative body, but rather a monitoring body created by the States parties themselves with 
declaratory powers only, it follows that:  
(a) Considerable weight will be given, in exercising the Committee’s jurisdiction pursuant to 
article 3 of the Convention, to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party con-
cerned; but  
                                                        
147 Ibidem, paras. 9.5 and 9.6. 
148 ComAT, Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden, 3 June 2011, No. 379/2009. 
149 Ibidem, paras. 10.6 – 10.8. 
150 Kjaerum 2010, pp. 27-29 
151 Ingelse 1999, p. 252, Nowak & McArthur 2008, pp. 190-193, particularly para. 164, and p. 224. See 
also Wouters 2009, p. 473, who states that the graver the general human rights situation in the coun-
try of return as regards a particular group, for example, a specific clan in Somalia or Kurds in Tur-
key, the more significant the general human rights situation will be in assessing the individual risk. 
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(b) The Committee is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by arti-
cle 22, paragraph 4, of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set 
of circumstances in every case.’ 
 
It follows from this paragraph that, depending on the particular case before it, the 
Committee has the possibility and freedom to choose either of two approaches: reli-
ance on the respondent State party’s determination of the facts, including the credi-
bility assessment, or an independent determination of the facts and evaluation of the 
evidence on its own account. The Committee’s case law demonstrates, however, that, 
more than the ECtHR does, the Committee stresses its subsidiary role and considers 
that the determination of the facts and the assessment of evidence, including the 
assessment of credibility, is primarily a matter for the authorities of the States parties. 
In this respect the Committee strongly resembles the HRC (see Chapter 3, section 
3.3.1). In a number of decisions, the Committee clearly expressed this preference for 
reliance on the respondent State party’s determination of the facts. For example, in 
A.R. v. Netherlands (2003) it considered as follows: 
 
‘The Committee recalls its jurisprudence to the effect that it is not an appellate, quasi-judicial 
or administrative body. Consistent with its General Comment, whilst the Committee has the 
power of free assessment of the facts arising in the circumstances of each case, it must give 
considerable weight to findings of fact made by the organs of the State party.’152 
 
The reasons for the Committee’s reluctance to engage in determination of the facts 
and evaluation of the presented evidence were mentioned above in section 4.2.2.2.  
In several other – early and later – cases, the Committee made a fully independ-
ent assessment of the facts, including the claimant’s credibility, on its own account. 
An early example is Khan v. Canada (1994), in which the Committee accepted as credi-
ble the facts and evidence adduced by the claimant, and considered that even if there 
were some doubts about the facts, it should ensure that the complainant’s security 
was not endangered.153 A more recent example is Heidar v. Sweden (2002), in which 
case the Committee found the author’s statements incredible on the basis of numer-
ous inconsistencies, late and vague statements about past torture, and, finally, the fact 
that the presented medical evidence did not state the presence of a post-traumatic 
stress disorder.154 Another example is Dadar v. Canada (2005), in which the Commit-
tee made the following relevant consideration:  
 
The Committee notes that the complainant’s arguments and his evidence to support them have 
been considered by the State party’s authorities. It also notes the State party’s observation that 
the Committee is not a fourth instance. While the Committee gives considerable weight to 
findings of fact made by the organs of the State party, it has the power of free assessment of 
the facts arising in the circumstances of each case. In the present case, it notes that the 
                                                        
152 ComAT, A.R. v. Netherlands, 21 November 2003, No. 203/2002, para. 7.6. For a similar considera-
tion, see ComAT, N.Z.S. v. Sweden, 29 November 2006, No. 277/2005, para. 8.6. 
153 ComAT, Khan v. Canada, 15 November 1994, No. 015/1994, paras. 12.3-12.6. 
154 ComAT, Heidar v. Sweden, 19 November 2002, No. 204/2002, para.6.3.  
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Canadian authorities made an assessment of the risks that the complainant might face if he was 
returned and concluded that he would be of limited interest to the Iranian authorities. How-
ever, the same authorities did not exclude that their assessment proved to be incorrect and that 
the complainant might indeed be tortured. In that case, they concluded that their finding re-
garding the fact that the complainant presented a danger to the Canadian citizens should pre-
vail over the risk of torture and that the complainant should be expelled from Canada. The 
Committee recalls that the prohibition enshrined in article 3 of the Convention is an absolute 
one. Accordingly, the argument submitted by the State party that the Committee is not a 
fourth instance cannot prevail, and the Committee cannot conclude that the State party’s re-
view of the case was fully satisfactory from the perspective of the Convention.155 
 
The remaining question is when the Committee chooses one of the two approaches: 
reliance on the respondent State’s credibility assessment or independent assessment 
of the facts, including the claimant’s credibility, on its own account? In J.A.M.O. et al 
v. Canada (2008), the Committee explained to a certain extent when it considered it 
necessary to make an independent determination of the facts and evaluation of the 
evidence on its own account: 
 
‘The Committee (…) recalls its general comment, which states that considerable weight will be 
given to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party; however, the Committee is 
not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22, paragraph 4, of 
the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circumstances in 
every case. In particular, the Committee must assess the facts and evidence in a given case, 
once it has been ascertained that the manner in which the evidence was evaluated was clearly 
arbitrary or amounted to a denial of justice, and that domestic courts clearly violated their obli-
gations of impartiality. In the case under consideration, the evidence before the Committee 
does not show the examination by the State party of the allegations of the complainant to have 
been marred by any such irregularities.’156 
 
No case law has been found in which the Committee, under Article 3, further ex-
plains what is meant by a ‘clearly arbitrary evaluation of evidence’, a ‘denial of justice’, 
or a ‘clear violation of obligations of impartiality’. Nor has any case law under Article 
3 been found in which the Committee explicitly concluded that one of these three 
things, or a combination thereof, had occurred (see also section 4.2.2.3). Finally, no 
decisions have been found in which the Committee explains in a more detailed way 
why it has opted, in a particular case, for a marginal or, instead, intense scrutiny. 
What is worse, the Committee’s assessment is in some decisions truly confusing as far 
as the intensity of scrutiny is concerned. In its decision in S.S. and S.A. v. the Nether-
lands (2001), the Committee marginally assessed the claim for protection based on the 
complainants’ Tamil ethnicity, whereas it conducted a full examination of the indi-
vidual facts and circumstances.157 To conclude, just like the HRC, the Committee has, 
                                                        
155 ComAT, Dadar v. Canada, 5 December 2005, No. 258/2004, para. 8.8. 
156 ComAT, J.A.M.O. et al v. Canada, 15 May 2008, No. 293/2006, para. 10.5 
157 ComAT, S.S. and S.A. v. the Netherlands, 11 May 2001, No. 1421999, paras. 6.6 and 6.7. 
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so far, not developed an elaborate doctrinal position on the issue of the intensity of 
the scrutiny it applies as an international treaty supervisor. 
From the cases in which the Committee did make a fully independent assessment 
of the facts, including the claimant’s credibility, we may infer that two circumstances 
in particular trigger the Committee to proceed to an independent determination of 
the facts, including the credibility of the claimant’s statements. A first trigger is that in 
the national proceedings the absolute nature of Article 3 CAT was not respected, and, 
instead, a weighing of national security considerations against the Article 3-danger 
occurred.158 This happened in Dadar v. Canada (2005): the primary stance of the State 
party’s authorities was that the account was incredible; their secondary position was 
that, if the stated facts were assumed to be true, national security considerations out-
weighed the alleged Article 3-risk.159 
A second trigger is that the State party’s authorities have not taken into 
consideration important facts or evidence. This happened in C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden 
(2007). In this case, the Committee considered that the State party’s authorities had in 
fact not taken into account statements on past torture and corroborating medical 
evidence. It then proceeded to its own independent determination of the facts.160 
When it is decided that the Committee proceeds to an independent fresh assess-
ment of the credibility, how does it go about this and which principles does it follow?  
In a significant number of (mainly early) decisions, the Committee laid down the 
important principle that some doubts as to the stated facts do not necessarily prevent 
it from establishing that an Article 3-danger exists. In this respect, it has repeatedly 
considered as follows (sometimes with a slight change in terminology, see note): 
 
‘Even if there could be some doubts about the facts as adduced by the author, it must ensure 
that his security is not endangered.’161 
 
Furthermore, the Committee has made clear that ‘general veracity’ is required.162 To 
assume ‘general veracity’, a number of requirements must be met. 
First, the claim must be sufficiently detailed.163 Second, the claim must be accu-
rate. General veracity does not require complete accuracy and consistency of every 
                                                        
158 See for the same conclusion about the reasons for the Committee to proceed to an independent de-
termination of the facts: Wouters 2009, p. 492. 
159 ComAT, Dadar v. Canada, 5 December 2005, No. 258/2004; see para. 8.8. 
160 ComAT, C.T. and K.M.v. Sweden, 22 January 2007, No. 279/2005. 
161 ComAT, Mutombo v. Switzerland, 15 November 1994, No. 015/1994, para. 9.2; ComAT, Khan v. 
Canada, 15 November 1994, No. 015/1994, para. 12.3; Aemei v. Switzerland, 9 May 1997, No. 034/ 
1995, para. 9.6; ComAT, H.D. v. Switzerland, 30 April 1999, No. 112/1998, para. 6.4, where the Com-
mittee used different words and stated that ‘even in the presence of lingering doubts as to the truth-
fulness of the facts presented by the author of a communication, it must satisfy itself that the appli-
cant’s security will not be jeopardized’; ComAT, M.S.P. v. Australia,30 April 2002, No. 138/1999, 
para. 7.3. 
162 The term ‘general veracity’ features in a number of decisions. See, for example, ComAT, Alan v. 
Switzerland, 8 May 1996, No. 021/1995, para. 11.3; ComAT, Kisoki v. Sweden, 8 May 1996, No. 041/ 
1996, para. 9.3; ComAT, Tala v. Sweden, 15 November 1996, No. 043/1996, para. 10.3; ComAT, 
Haydin v. Sweden, 20 November 1998, No. 101/1997, para. 6.7. 
163 See, for example, ComAT, A.S. v. Sweden, 15 February 2001, No. 149/1999, para. 8.6. 
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single aspect and detail of the claim, but requires the core of the story, the basic story, 
to be plausible. The Committee decides on a case by case basis when contradictions 
and inconsistencies undermine the ‘general veracity’. Much depends on whether good 
explanations for the inconsistencies are given. An important explanation for inconsis-
tencies is sound and conclusive medical evidence confirming past torture and stating 
that the author suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder as a result. In a significant 
number of (mostly early) decisions, the Committee explained and excused inconsis-
tencies by referring to this past torture. For example, in I.A.O. v. Sweden (1998), it 
stated that  
 
‘It has noted the medical evidence provided by the author and, on that basis, is of the opinion 
that there is a firm reason to believe that the author has been tortured in the past. In this con-
text, the Committee observes that the author suffers from a post-traumatic stress disorder, and 
that this has to be taken into account when assessing the author’s presentation of the facts. 
The Committee is therefore of the opinion that the inconsistencies as exist in the author’s 
story do not raise doubts as to the general veracity of his claim that he was detained and tor-
tured.’164 
 
In similar vein, the Committee has made clear that, where past torture of the claimant 
may be assumed on the basis of medical evidence, gaps or vague points do not nec-
essarily affect the veracity of the claim.165 The Committee has, however, not always 
been consistent in applying this principle. In a number of cases – for unknown rea-
sons and contrary to its earlier developed line – it did not accept presented medical 
evidence to explain away inconsistencies. More will be said about this in the separate 
section on the appreciation and weighing of evidence (section 4.5.7 below). 
Other explanations for inconsistencies can be difficulties in translation, certain 
procedural circumstances, and the fact that much time has passed by between the ap-
plication for protection and the time of the assessment.166 
Third, the Committee has made clear that, to assume general veracity of the 
claim, the claim, particularly its core aspects, must be corroborated by evidence other 
than the complainant’s statements. The absence of corroborative evidence supporting 
the core aspects of the claim may negatively affect the veracity of the claim. This is 
particularly true where there are also inconsistencies in the claim.167 At the same time, 
though, the Committee has made clear that not all the stated facts have to be corrob-
orated by supporting evidence: 
 
                                                        
164 ComAT, I.A.O. v. Sweden, 6 May 1998, No. 065/1997, para. 14.3. 
165 ComAT, Falcon Rios v. Canada, 23 November 2004, No. 133/1999, para. 8.5. 
166 See, for example, ComAT, V.X.N. and H.N. v. Sweden, 2 September 2000, Nos. 130 and 131/1999, 
paras. 9.4-9.6. 
167 See, for example, ComAT, G.T. v. Switzerland, 2 May 2000, No. 137/1999, paras. 6.5-6.8; ComAT, 
N.M. v. Switzerland, 9 May 2000, No. 116/1998, paras. 6.5, 6.6, 6.7. 
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‘It is not necessary that all the facts invoked by the author should be proved; it is sufficient that 
the Committee should consider them to be sufficiently substantiated and reliable.’168 
 
Fourth, the claim must be consistent with country information.169 
Fifth, the claim must be consistent throughout the proceedings; serious changes 
in statements in the course of the proceedings may make these statements incredi-
ble.170 However, in a number of early cases the Committee accepted significant 
changes in the complainant’s statements, referring to the complainant’s ‘logical expla-
nations of reasons’ for having made such changes. For example, in the case of Ayas v. 
Sweden (1998),171 the author stated in the first national asylum proceedings that his 
family and friends had been involved in the activities of the PKK. He did not 
mention that he himself had been an active PKK member. After the dismissal of his 
first application, he lodged a fresh application and disclosed for the first time that he 
himself had actively supported the PKK. He explained that his relatives had strongly 
advised him not to reveal any personal connection with it because of the risk of being 
considered a ‘terrorist’ by the Swedish authorities. In these second asylum proceed-
ings, the author also submitted the verdict of a military court which showed that in 
1993 he had been sentenced in absentia to five years’ imprisonment for his activities 
and affiliation with the PKK.172 In third asylum proceedings, he submitted medical 
evidence in support of statements of past torture.173 Accepting the change, the Com-
mittee considered as follows: 
 
‘It is not in dispute that the author comes from a politically active family. Moreover, the Com-
mittee considers the explanations regarding his own political activities as credible and consis-
tent with the findings of the medical reports according to which he suffers from post-traumatic 
stress syndrome and his scars are in conformity with the alleged causes. Although the author 
changed his first version of the facts he gave a logical explanation of his reasons for having 
done so. Hence, the Committee has not found inconsistencies that would challenge the general 
veracity of his claim.’174 
 
In the case of A. v. the Netherlands (1998), the Committee accepted even more striking 
changes in the author’s statements, including lies about identity and nationality in the 
first asylum procedure. Persuasive medical evidence, the failure to have a physician 
                                                        
168 ComAT, Aemei v. Switzerland, 9 May 1997, No. 34/1995, para. 9.6; ComAT, H.D. v. Switzerland, 30 
April 1999, No. 112/1998, para. 6.4; ComAT, M.S.P. v. Australia, 30 April 2002, No. 138/1999, para. 
7.3. This case is also discussed by Ingelse in his work of 1999, Chapter 10, pp. 246-267. 
169 See, for example, ComAT, Kisoki v. Sweden, 8 May 1996, No. 041/1996, para. 9.5; ComAT, Tala v. 
Sweden, 15 November 1996, No. 043/1996, para. 10.4; ComAT, A.S. v. Sweden, 15 February 2001, 
No. 149/1999, para. 8.7; ComAT, Falcon Rios v. Canada, 23 November 2004, No. 133/1999, para. 
8.3; ComAT, Njamba v. Sweden, 14 May 2010, No. 322/2007, para. 9.5; ComAT, Chahin v. Sweden, 30 
May 2011, No. 310/2007, para. 9.4. 
170 ComAT, General Comment No. 1, para. 8, sub f and sub g. 
171 ComAT, Ayas v. Sweden, 12 November 1998, No. 097/1997. 
172 Ibidem, paras. 2.1 and 2.6. 
173 Ibidem, para. 2.8. 
174 Ibidem, Ayas v. Sweden, 12 November 1998, No. 097/1997, para. 6.5. 
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examine the author during the national proceedings, and the very poor human rights 
situation in Tunisia, in particular the difficult position of persons associated with the 
Al-Nahdha movement, all seem to have played an important role in the Committee’s 
conclusions in this case.175 
Sixth, all facts and evidence must be brought forward as early as possible. Late 
submission of statements and late presentation of evidence – for example, after an 
asylum application has been rejected, or in the course of repeat proceedings –may 
negatively affect the general veracity of the claim, particularly when no sound reasons 
for this are given.176 It seems that in the earlier case law the Committee followed a 
more lenient line in this respect and did not perceive the late presentation of certain 
facts and supportive evidence as fatal to the veracity of the claim.177 More about this 
will be said below in section 4.5.10 on time limits for the presentation of statements 
and evidence. The list of factors mentioned here as determining credibility is by no 
means as exhaustive. It does, however, provide an impression of the factors taken in-
to account by the Committee when assessing the credibility of the claimant’s story.178 
4.5.6 Admission of evidence, possible types and sources of evidence, 
minimum quantity and quality of evidence 
4.5.6.1  Admission of evidence 
General Comment No. 1 states in paragraph 7 that the parties to the case may intro-
duce all pertinent information to bear on the question of whether there are substan-
tial grounds for believing that there is a personal and present danger of torture.179 It is 
a standard consideration in the Committee’s decisions under Article 3 that  
 
‘The Committee must decide, pursuant to paragraph 1 of Article 3, whether there are substan-
tial grounds for believing that the complainant would be in danger of being subject to torture. 
In reaching this conclusion, the Committee must take into account all relevant considerations, 
pursuant to paragraph 2 of Article 3, including the existence of a consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights.’180 
                                                        
175 See, for example, ComAT, A. v. Netherlands, 13 November 1998, No. 91/1997; this case is also dis-
cussed by Tiemersma in her article ‘Medical information in the asylum procedure’, NAV 2006, 
No. 1. 
176 See, for example, ComAT, X.Y. v. Switzerland, 15 May 2001, No. 128/1999, para. 8.5. 
177 Examples of early cases in which the Committee did not find late presentation of statements or evi-
dence problematic are ComAT, Khan v. Canada, 15 November 1994, No. 015/1994 (presentation of 
statements and evidence after refusal of asylum claim and commencement of deportation proceed-
ings, the Committee notes that this behaviour is not uncommon for torture victims); ComAT, Kisoki 
v. Sweden, 8 May 1996, No. 041/1996 (evidence submitted during second national asylum applica-
tion); ComAT, Tala v. Sweden, 15 November 1996, No. 043/1996 (statements on past torture during 
national appeal stage, the Committee does not say anything about this and obviously does not see 
this as problematic).  
178  See on the Committee’s credibility assessment also Wouters 2009, pp. 475-480. 
179  ComAT, General Comment No. 1, 21 November 1997, A/53/44, Annex XI, para. 7. 
180 This standard consideration features in all the Committee’s decisions on the merits, from the first 
case of ComAT, Mutombo v. Switzerland, 27 April 1994, No. 13/1993, up to and including the last 
→ 
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Article 118, paragraph 1, of the Rules of Procedure, states that  
 
‘The Committee shall consider the complaint in the light of all information made available to it 
by or on behalf of the complainant and by the State party concerned and shall formulate its 
findings thereon.’181 
 
The Committee has reiterated this principle in a number of decisions:  
 
‘The Committee has considered the communication in the light of all the information made 
available to it by the parties concerned, in accordance with Article 22, paragraph 4, of the Con-
vention.’182 
 
The terminology used indicates that it is open to the Committee to consider evidence 
from whatever source and then decide as to its relevance and probative value. The 
system of admission of evidence is open, flexible and liberal. The Committee’s ap-
proach in this respect is the same as the one applied by the UNHCR (see chapter 2, 
section 2.4.6.1), the HRC (see chapter 3, section 3.5.6) and the ECtHR (see chapter 5, 
section 5.6.6.1).183 
4.5.6.2  Means and sources of evidence 
To give an impression of what kind of materials can be submitted by the parties as 
evidence, some examples of evidentiary materials admitted by the Committee are 
briefly mentioned here. A very prominent feature of the Committee’s case law, 
particularly the earlier decisions, is the significance attached to medical reports cor-
roborating statements on past torture and the effects of past torture.184 Medical evi-
dence is also explicitly mentioned in General Comment No. 1, paragraph 8, which 
qualifies as ‘pertinent information’ medical evidence to support a claim by the author 
that he or she has been tortured or maltreated in the past.185 Other examples of evi-
dentiary materials are statements made by family members186 or other persons or 
                                                        
decision included in this research, ComAT, Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden, 3 June 2011, No. 379/2009, para. 
10.3. 
181 Article 18, para. 1, of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture, 21 February 2011. 
The Rules of Procedure may be found at: un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/G11/411/40/PDF/ 
G1141140/pdf, last visited 15 January 2012. 
182 See, for example, ComAT, Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden, 3 June 2011, No. 379/2009, para. 10.1. 
183 See on the open and flexible system of admission of evidence also McGoldrick 1996, p. 143, who 
points to the liberal practice of international treaty monitoring bodies and tribunals in the admission 
of evidence. 
184 Examples are ComAT, Alan v. Switzerland, 8 May 1996, No. 021/1995, para. 11.3; ComAT, I.A.O. v. 
Sweden, 6 May 1998, No. 065/1997, para. 14.3; ComAT, Kisoki v. Sweden, 8 May 1996, No. 041/1996, 
para. 9.3; ComAT, Tala v. Sweden, 15 November 1996, No. 043/1996, para. 10.3; ComAT, Haydin v. 
Sweden, 20 November 1998, No. 101/1997, para. 6.7; ComAT, E.T.B. v. Denmark, 30 April 2002, No. 
146/1999, para. 10; ComAT, Karoui v.Sweden, 8 May 2002, No. 185/2001, para. 10. 
185 ComAT, General Comment No. 1, para. 8, 21 November 1997, A/53/44, Annex XI. 
186 See, for example, ComAT, T.A. v. Sweden, 6 May 2005, No. 226/2003, paras. 5.5 and 7.3, and 
ComAT, A.S. v. Sweden, 15 February 2001, No. 149/1999, para. 84. These cases are discussed in 
more detail in the next section on appreciation of evidence. 
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organisations187 that the claimant is still being sought or is wanted by the authorities 
of the country of origin. Another important category of evidence is reports drawn up 
in individual cases by the respondent State’s mission or embassy in the particular 
country of origin.188 Of course, of special significance are also reports from various 
sources containing country of origin information, as the individual claim needs to be 
assessed in the light of the situation in the country of origin. In section 4.5.7 below, 
more detailed attention will be paid to a number of specific categories of evidentiary 
materials, being medico-legal reports, embassy reports submitted by the respondent 
State, statements from family members, and country of origin information. 
4.5.6.3  Minimum quantity and quality of evidence 
How much evidence can reasonably be expected from a claimant is decided on a case 
by case basis and very much depends on the particularities of the personal account 
and the other individual features of the case, as well as on the situation in the country 
of origin. The Committee has not developed hard and fast rules for assessing the 
sufficiency of the presented evidence. Its case law features a number of decisions in 
which, apart from the statements of the claimant, no supporting evidence, or only 
very limited evidentiary materials, were submitted. This led the Committee either to 
the conclusion that the claim failed to rise to the basic level of substantiation for the 
purposes of admissibility,189 or to the conclusion on the merits that an Article 3-risk 
had not been established.190 It follows from these cases that it is generally fatal to the 
case when no corroborative evidence at all is submitted in support of the claim. 
The Committee has also made clear that not all the stated facts have to be cor-
roborated by supporting evidence: 
 
‘It is not necessary that all the facts invoked by the author should be proved; it is sufficient that 
the Committee should consider them to be sufficiently substantiated and reliable.’191 
 
It appears from the case law that ‘sufficiently substantiated’ still means that all the 
core aspects or central aspects of the claim are supported by evidence other than the 
                                                        
187 See, for example, ComAT, Karoui v. Sweden, 25 May 2002, No. 185/2001, in which case the com-
plainant relied on, inter alia, a support letter from Amnesty International, Sweden, and an attestation 
from the chairman of the Al-Nahdha organisation. See also ComAT, Dadar v. Canada, 23 November 
2005, No. 258/2004, paras. 2.7 and 8.6, in which the Iranian complainant relied on letters from the 
Military Office of the Shah and the Secretariat of Reza Pahlavi referring to his activities as a member 
of the monarchist opposition group. The Committee attached much weight to these letters. 
188 See, for example, ComAT, H.D. v. Switzerland, 30 April 1999, No. 112/1998, paras. 4.3, 6.5; ComAT, 
Y.S. v. Switzerland, 14 November 2000, No. 147/1999, para. 6.6; S.S.H. v. Switzerland, 15 November 
2005, No. 254/2004, para. 6.5. 
189 See, for example, ComAT, R.T v. Germany, 24 November 2005, No. 242/2003. 
190 See, for example, ComAT, K.T. v. Switzerland, 19 November 1999, No. 118/1998, paras. 6.4 and 6.5; 
ComAT, G.T. v. Switzerland, 2 May 2000, No. 137/1999, para. 6.7. 
191 See, for example, ComAT, Aemei v. Switzerland, 9 May 1997, No. 34/1995, para. 9.6; ComAT, H.D. v. 
Switzerland, 30 April 1999, No. 112/1998, para. 6.4; ComAT, M.S.P. v. Australia, 30 April 2002, No. 
138/1999, para. 7.3; this case is also discussed by Ingelse in his work of 1999, Chapter 10, pp. 246-
267. 
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complainant’s statements. Just like the HRC, the Committee is strict on this, requiring 
substantial evidence of the basic story: it truly needs a strongly corroborated case to 
obtain a decision from the Committee in which a violation of Article 3 is estab-
lished.192 To illustrate its strict approach, three cases are discussed below in more 
detail.  
In G.T. v. Switzerland (2000), the author stated that he had been a very active sup-
porter of the Youth Union of Kurdistan, the youth branch of the PKK, and that as 
such he had taken part in demonstrations, meetings, the distribution of pamphlets, 
and that he had also collected money for the cause and helped to recruit new sup-
porters. The Committee found it problematic that the author had not provided any 
evidence of his membership of, or his activities in, the PKK or the youth branch of 
the PKK. The absence of such evidence, together with inconsistencies in his claim 
and the fact that much time had elapsed since his departure from Turkey, led the 
Committee to the conclusion that no Article 3-risk had been established.193 In N.M. 
v. Switzerland (2000), the Congolese complainant stated that he had worked in Kin-
shasa for five years as an employee of the Hyochade Company, which had belonged 
to Mr Kongolo Mobutu, the son of former president Mobutu. This company had 
been a cover for plundering the wealth of the country in various ways. Acting on be-
half of the regime, the company had also carried out propaganda activities and kept 
track of members of the political opposition in order to keep them under control. 
The author’s responsibilities had included collecting information on members of the 
opposition within a particular geographical area and denouncing any subversive ac-
tivities. He had reported to his supervisors at least every two months and had been 
generously paid. In addition to his salary, he had received a bonus when he de-
nounced someone and he had enjoyed a range of other privileges. After the rebellion 
led by Mr Kabila reached Kinshasa in May 1997, soldiers had first arrested the 
author’s father and then the author himself. In the Kokolo military camp he had been 
accused of treason, extortion and complicity in murder. He had received beatings for 
denying the charges.194 In the proceedings before the Committee, the respondent 
State party expressed serious doubts about the author’s professional activities and 
about the very existence of the Hyochade company, since the author had never been 
able to produce any documents relating to his work for that company, even though 
he had been able to obtain a number of other documents and his family on the spot 
could have helped him find the papers he wanted.195 Although the Committee did 
not spend many words on it, it did state that the author had not provided enough evi-
dence to conclude that he would run a real Article 3-risk. Obviously, the Committee 
agreed with the State party that the author should have presented evidence in support 
of his work for the Hyochade Company, a central aspect of his account.196 
                                                        
192 See also Wouters 2009, pp. 480-484, and p. 492, where he states that it requires a strong case to get a 
decision of the State overruled by the Committee. 
193 ComAT, G.T. v. Switzerland, 2 May 2000, No. 137/1999, paras. 6.5-6.8. 
194 ComAT, N.M. v. Switzerland, 9 May 2000, No. 116/1998, paras. 2.1-2.7. 
195 Ibidem, para. 4.8. 
196 Ibidem, para. 6.7. 
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In M.A.K. v. Germany (2004), a central aspect of the Turkish Kurdish complain-
ant’s account was that he had been an active member of the PKK and that he had 
participated in a Dutch PKK military training camp. The Committee found it prob-
lematic that the author had not submitted evidence corroborating these statements 
and regarded as insufficient the presented affidavit, as it corroborated only that the 
complainant had been introduced as a guerrilla candidate, but not his membership of 
the PKK or his participation in the Dutch PKK training camp.197 From this, a basic 
principle as to the quality of evidence emerges; being that evidence must be specific 
and precise and must cover the central aspects of the account. 
A central aspect of the claim in many cases is that the complainant was tortured 
in the past in his or her home country. The Committee generally requires that such 
statements on past torture are supported by evidence, preferably medical reports. 
Such medical reports must be drawn up by medical specialists and must conclusively 
identify a causal link between the individual’s bodily or mental injuries and the alleged 
past torture.198 If statements on past torture are not supported by such evidence, this 
works to the detriment of the complainant and the Committee then generally finds 
the claim insufficiently substantiated (or incredible due to inconsistencies and inaccu-
racies in combination with the absence of medical evidence corroborating statements 
on past torture).199 
It is not only important to submit evidence corroborating the individual account. 
Equally important is evidence about the human rights situation in the country of 
origin. No decisions have been found in which the Committee explicitly explained 
which of the parties – the complainant or the State party’s authorities – is responsible 
for submitting recent information about the general human rights situation in the 
country of origin. It may be argued that, although the burden of proof remains a 
shared one, in the case of an arguable claim particular responsibility for shaping 
clarity on the general human rights situation in the country of origin lies with the ad-
ministrative and judicial authorities of the State. This follows from the fact that 
paragraph 2 of Article 3 states that for the purpose of determining whether there are 
substantial grounds for assuming an Article 3-risk, the competent authorities shall take into 
account all relevant considerations (emphasis added). It follows from this text of Article 3, 
paragraph 2, that the authorities have an active role not only in verifying information 
put forward by the complainant, but also in collecting and presenting evidence, in-
cluding evidence regarding the general human rights situation in the country of ori-
gin. With regard to the particular responsibility resting on the national authorities for 
shaping clarity on the situation in the country of origin, reference is also made to 
chapter 6 on EU asylum law, section 6.4.4. 
                                                        
197 ComAT, M.A.K. v. Germany, 17 May 2004, No. 214/2002, para. 13.5. 
198 This terminology is used by the Committee in several cases. See, for example, ComAT, El Rgeig v. 
Switzerland, 15 November 2006, No. 280/2005, para. 7.4. See also Wouters 2009, p. 481. 
199 See, for example, ComAT, A.L.N. v. Switzerland, 19 May 1998, No. 90/1997; this case is commented 
on by Tiemersma in her article ‘Medical information in the asylum procedure’, NAV 2006, No. 1; 
ComAT, M.S. v. Switzerland, 13 November 2001, No. 156/2000; ComAT, S.N.A.W. v. Switzerland, 29 
November 2005, No. 231/2003; ComAT, E.V.I. v. Sweden, 2 May 2007, No. 296/2003; ComAT, 
E.R.K. and Y.K. v. Sweden, 2 May 2007, Nos. 270 & 271/2005; ComAT, M.S. v. Switzerland, 13 No-
vember 2001, No. 156/2000, para. 6.7. See, for the same conclusion, Bruin & Reneman 2006, p. 96. 
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The case law of the Committee discussed above gives some indication as to the mini-
mum quantity and quality of evidence, but it remains very difficult to distinguish fur-
ther criteria or guidelines. The reasons are that the Committee’s reasoning on the 
merits is often extremely brief, consisting to a large extent of standard considerations 
on the standard of proof and some brief remarks on the individual case.200 What is 
worse, in a number of cases the Committee is completely silent about the evidence 
presented by the complainant and does not make clear why this evidence does not 
support the case and is considered insufficient. More will be said about this in the 
next section on the appreciation of evidence. For now, as far as the minimum quan-
tity and quality of evidence are concerned, the conclusion can be drawn that it re-
quires a significant amount of precise, comprehensive, persuasive and conclusive evi-
dentiary materials to win a case before the Committee. 
4.5.7 Appreciation and weighing of evidence 
Just like the HRC, the Committee adheres to a free evaluation of all the evidence 
presented by the parties. It is open to the Committee to consider evidence from 
whatever source and then to decide on its relevance and probative value. There are 
no pre-determined rules for the weighing of evidence. In the paragraphs below, an 
attempt is made to discover factors determining the probative value and persuasive-
ness of evidence. After that, I will look in more detail at four particular categories of 
evidence, being reports containing the result of inquiries conducted by embassies or 
missions of respondent States parties, witness statements by family members, medi-
co-legal reports and reports about the human rights situation in the country of origin. 
4.5.7.1  Factors determining the probative value and persuasiveness of evidence 
It is not an easy task to distinguish in the case law of the Committee the exact factors 
determining the probative value and persuasiveness of the evidence. The reasons are 
that the conclusions on the merits are often very brief, consisting of a number of 
standard considerations on the standard and the burden of proof, followed by just 
one or two considerations on the merits of the individual case. In these brief conclu-
sions, the Committee does not explicitly mention factors determining the probative 
value of the presented evidence.  
Just like the HRC (see Chapter 3, section 3.5.7), the Committee is, in a significant 
number of cases, even completely silent about the evidence presented by the com-
plainant and does not make clear how it weighed or evaluated that evidence. A truly 
striking example is the case of S.L. v. Sweden (2001).201 In this case the Iranian com-
plainant presented to the Swedish authorities the verdict by which he had been con-
victed and sentenced for cheque fraud. The Swedish embassy in Tehran concluded 
                                                        
200 See also Wouters 2009, p. 433, who states that the Committee’s considerations are often brief and 
poorly reasoned. 
201 ComAT, S.L. v. Sweden, 11 May 2001, No. 150/1999. 
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that this verdict was authentic.202 In the proceedings before the Committee, several 
medical certificates were submitted, including one from the Centre for Torture and 
Trauma Survivors in Stockholm, stating that the author suffered from a post-trau-
matic stress disorder and that both medical and psychological evidence indicated that 
he had been subjected to torture with typical psychological effects as a result. In addi-
tion, a certificate from a psychiatrist was submitted to the Committee, stating that the 
circumstances, together with the author’s whole attitude and general appearance, in-
dicated very strongly that he had been subjected to severe abuse and torture for a 
long time and that he was considered to be completely trustworthy.203 In its ultra-brief 
considerations on the merits and conclusions, the Committee did not mention at all 
or discuss the evidence presented by the author. It did not make clear why this evi-
dence did not (sufficiently) support the complainant’s claim. It only stated the follow-
ing:  
 
‘The Committee has taken note of the arguments presented by the author and the State party 
and is of the opinion that it has not been given enough evidence by the author to conclude that 
the latter would run a personal, real and foreseeable risk of being tortured if returned to his 
country of origin.’204 
 
As the Committee did not say anything at all about the evidence presented by the 
complainant and concluded that an Article 3-risk was absent, it may be inferred that it 
did not attach great weight to the evidence presented. The reasons for this low 
evaluation remain unclear, however.205 
4.5.7.1.a Authenticity of documents 
In a significant number of cases, the Committee did not attach probative value to 
documents submitted by the complainant because it had been established, as a result 
of investigations by the State party, that these documents were fakes or forged or 
contained false information. For example, in Mehdi Zare v. Sweden (2006)206 the Com-
mittee considered as follows: 
 
                                                        
202 Ibidem, paras. 2.3, 2.5, 2.7, 4.6.  
203 Ibidem, para. 3.2.  
204 ComAT, S.L. v. Sweden, 11 May 2001, No. 150/1999, para. 6.4. 
205 Examples of other cases in which the Committee remained completely silent about presented 
evidence are: ComAT, K.S.Y. v. the Netherlands, 15 May 2003, No. 190/2001, in which the Committee 
did not say anything about the presented strong medical evidence stating severe post-traumatic stress 
disorder and a serious restriction in the right shoulder of the complainant because he had been hang-
ed by one arm for prolonged periods; ComAT, A.A. v. Switzerland, 17 November 2006, No. 251/ 
2004; in this decision the Committee did not say anything in its considerations on the merits about 
the medical evidence presented which stated that the author suffered from a dissociative, trance-like 
condition, as a result of being subjected to sexual abuse during childhood, exacerbated by the fact 
that he had been ill-treated and had spent two years in prison.This report also mentioned that the 
author was severely traumatised; ComAT, C.A.R.M. v. Canada, 18 May 2007, No. 298/2006 (the 
complainant presented medico-legal reports mentioning post-traumatic stress disorder; the Commit-
tee did not say anything about this evidence in its considerations on the merits. 
206 ComAT, Mehdi Zare v. Sweden, 17 May 2006, No. 256/2004. 
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‘In assessing the risk of torture in the present case, the Committee has noted the complainant’s 
contention that there is a foreseeable risk that he would be tortured if returned to Iran, on the 
basis of his alleged previous political involvement, and that the alleged sentence against him of 
140 whiplashes would be carried out. (…) The Committee notes that the complainant has ad-
duced three documents, which he purports to validate the existence of the sentence against 
him. He has adduced what he alleges are two summonses to attend the Public Court of Shiraz, 
on 31 July 2004 and 25 August 2004. He had originally alleged that these documents were ori-
ginals but, in his comments on the State party’s submission, confirmed that they were copies. 
The Committee notes that the State party has provided extensive reasons, based on expert evi-
dence obtained by its consular services in Tehran, why it questioned the authenticity of each of 
the documents. In reply the complainant argues that, apparently, the criminal procedure was 
not applied in this case. The Committee considers that the complainant has failed to disprove 
the State party’s findings in this regard, and to validate the authenticity of any of the docu-
ments in question. It recalls its jurisprudence that it is for the complainant to collect and pres-
ent evidence in support of his or her account of events.’207 
 
Another illustrative case is E.R.K. and Y.K. v. Sweden (2007).208 In this case, the com-
plainants claimed a danger of torture upon return to Azerbaijan, due to their broth-
er’s alleged previous political activities on the basis of which they claimed to have 
been previously mistreated by the Azerbaijani authorities. In support of their claim, 
they presented to the Swedish authorities a number of documents which they alleged 
to be judgments. The Swedish authorities conducted investigations through the em-
bassy in Ankara209 to find out whether the documents were authentic. As a result it 
was established that the authenticity was questionable. The Committee stated that the 
Swedish authorities had the right to investigate the authenticity of the documents and 
that the complainants had failed to disprove the State party’s findings and to validate 
the authenticity of the documents presented.210 There are numerous other cases in 
which the Committee found that forged documents seriously discredited the claim 
for protection.211 
4.5.7.1.b Specificity and comprehensiveness of information contained in evidentiary materials 
As well as authenticity, the Committee requires that evidence is specific, that is, 
relates specifically to the complainant and supports the claim that it is the complain-
ant who runs a risk. In addition, the evidence must also be comprehensive, that is, 
prove the core aspects of the claim. When the information contained in evidentiary 
                                                        
207 Ibidem, paras. 9.4, 9.5. 
208 ComAT, E.R.K. and Y.K. v. Sweden, 2 May 2007, Nos. 270 & 271/2005. 
209 The ComAT’s decision in E.R.K. and Y.K. v. Sweden mentions the embassy in Ankara, Turkey, al-
though the applicants came from Azerbaijan and they presented documents from that country; a 
possible explanation is that there is no Swedish embassy (only a consulate) in Azerbaijan. 
210 Ibidem, paras. 7.4, 7.5.  
211 See, for example, ComAT, N.Z.S. v. Sweden, 29 November 2006, No. 277/2005; ComAT, E.V.I. v. 
Sweden, 1 May 2007, No. 296/2006; ComAT, T.A. v. Sweden, 22 November 2007, No. 303/2006; 
ComAT, A.M. v. France, 5 May 2010, No. 302/2006. See also Wouters 2009, p. 482, who states that 
it goes without saying that faked or forged documents seriously undermine the credibility of the 
claim. 
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materials does not specifically relate to the complainant, little or no evidentiary value 
is accorded to it. The Committee’s approach is strict. In the case of A.A. v. Switzerland 
(2007), the complainant had never been tortured in the past, but claimed to fear 
torture during pre-trial detention in Pakistan. He submitted various documents in 
support of his claim, including an annual report by the Human Rights Commission of 
Pakistan on conditions in Pakistani prisons, and a note from a certain Mr Asif, a 
member of the National Assembly of Pakistan, stating that, if the complainant return-
ed to Pakistan he would be arrested and imprisoned for political reasons because of 
an offence that he had not committed, and that the conditions of detention in Paki-
stani prisons were such that imprisonment constituted torture or at least inhuman 
treatment.212 
The Committee considered that the report on detention conditions in Pakistan 
was of a general nature and did not, therefore, sufficiently relate to the individual 
complainant; as to the note from Mr Asif, the Committee found that it related mainly 
to Mr Asif’s detention and did not, therefore, sufficiently support a future danger for 
the complainant.213 In M.A.K. v. Germany (2004),214 the presented evidence was deem-
ed insufficiently comprehensive as it did not sufficiently prove the core aspects of the 
claim. One of the core aspects of the complainant’s account was his alleged parti-
cipation in a PKK training camp in the Netherlands in 1994. He did not submit evi-
dence which supported this participation. The evidence he did submit was an affi-
davit from a certain F.S., which stated that the complainant had been introduced as a 
‘guerrilla candidate’ at the Halim-Dener-Festival, and a letter from the International 
Association for Human Rights of the Kurds, which stated that it was not implausible 
that the complainant had been temporarily exempted from military PKK training in 
Turkey. The Committee stated that this evidence fell short of proving the complain-
ant’s alleged participation in the PKK training camp in the Netherlands in 1994.215 
4.5.7.2  Reports containing the result of inquiries conducted by embassies or missions of respondent 
States parties 
Just like the HRC, the Committee generally attaches strong evidentiary value to re-
ports submitted by States parties containing the result of inquiries conducted by em-
bassies or missions in the complainant’s country of origin. In a significant number of 
cases from, mainly, Switzerland and Sweden, the national authorities have requested 
the embassy or mission in the country of origin to investigate whether the com-
plainant was being sought by the authorities in his or her country of origin. Such an 
investigation was also carried out by the Swiss Embassy in Ankara in the case of H.D. 
v. Switzerland (1999).216 The Turkish Kurdish complainant in this case stated that he 
had provided food and clothing to friends involved with the PKK. In 1991, one of 
his cousins, an active PKK member, came to live with the complainant after deten-
                                                        
212 ComAT, A.A. v. Switzerland, 1 May 2007, No. 268/2005, paras. 7.1, 7.2. 
213 Ibidem, para. 8.5. 
214 ComAT, M.A.K. v. Germany, 12 May 2004, No. 214/2002. 
215 Ibidem, para. 13.5. 
216 ComAT, H.D. v. Switzerland, 30 April 1999, No. 112/1998. 
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tion. The security forces came to search for this cousin, but not having found this 
cousin, arrested the complainant. The complainant was then detained and tortured. 
Upon release, he learned that his cousin had been killed by the security forces. He 
saw his cousin’s disfigured and mutilated body. He was told that the security forces 
were aware of his support for the PKK. He was threatened with death if he refused 
to co-operate with the information service. The complainant then decided to leave 
the country and travelled to Istanbul. Persons in civilian clothes came to his home, 
insulted and slapped his wife and asked her where he was. His wife then joined the 
complainant in Istanbul and together they travelled to Switzerland where they applied 
for asylum.217 
In the proceedings before the Committee, the State party held that the author’s 
statements contained inconsistencies and contradictions. Furthermore, the State party 
relied on information obtained by the Swiss embassy in Ankara that the author was 
not wanted by the police and was not forbidden to hold a passport.218 
The Committee noted that the complainant’s problems in Turkey dated back to 
1991, a long time previously, that the question of a prosecution against him on speci-
fic charges had never arisen and that there was nothing to suggest that he or his fami-
ly members had been sought or intimidated by the Turkish authorities.219 It is ob-
vious that the Committee attached significant weight to the embassy report, although 
it did not re-mention it in its own considerations on the merits under the heading 
‘views’. Similar decisions were taken in K.M. v. Switzerland (1999),220 H.A.D. v. Switzer-
land (2000)221 and Y.S. v. Switzerland (2000).222 Just as in H.D. v. Switzerland (1999), in 
these three cases concerning Turkish Kurdish complainants the State party relied on 
information obtained from the Swiss embassy in Ankara. The Committee based its 
conclusion on the absence of an Article 3-danger on, mainly, lapse of time since the 
problems had occurred and information from the Swiss embassy in Turkey that the 
complainant was not being sought.223 
In other cases, the national authorities requested the embassy or mission in the 
country of origin to investigate the truthfulness of aspects of the complainant’s per-
sonal account. This was done, for example, in M.M. et al. v. Sweden (2008).224 In this 
case, the complainant from Azerbaijan stated that he feared he would be tortured 
upon return to Azerbaijan on account of his past political activities for the Musavat 
party. He also stated that he had been tortured in the past for these activities.225 
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However, according to the results of an investigation carried out by the Swedish con-
sulate in Baku, the complainant had never been a member of the Musavat party and 
had never worked for it.226 The Committee relied on this information, on contradic-
tions in the complainant’s flight narrative and, finally, on the fact that the medical re-
ports were not definitive and did not coincide in their diagnosis, and concluded that 
there was no Article 3-danger.227 
In another group of cases, investigations into the authenticity of documents sub-
mitted by complainants were carried out via embassies or missions in the countries of 
origin. This happened, for example, in N.Z.S. v. Sweden (2006),228 Y.K. and E.R.K. v. 
Sweden (2007)229 and T.A. v. Sweden (2007).230 In all these cases, the State party ques-
tioned the authenticity of presented documents on the basis of inquiries made by or 
via the Swedish embassy or consulate in, respectively, Iran and Azerbaijan. In all 
three cases the Committee attached great value to the results of these investigations 
and based its negative decision to a large extent on these results.231 
In a number of cases, the complainants objected to the use of the information 
provided by the embassy or mission in the country of origin. For example, in H.A.D. 
v. Switzerland (2000), the complainant pointed out that the information collected by 
the Swiss embassy in Ankara was suspect as the Turkish Government was under no 
obligation to provide such information to the State party.232 In M.M. et al. v. Sweden 
(2008), the complainant pointed out that the report requested by the Swedish 
consulate in Baku contained several inaccuracies, did not describe how the work had 
been carried out and was extremely short.233 In Y.K and E.R.K. v. Sweden (2007), the 
complainants stated that the Swedish embassy’s report was based on anonymous 
sources and precluded the possibility of challenging the information it contained. The 
Committee generally does not respond to such complaints, or only responds in a very 
brief way. For example, in Y.K and E.R.K. v. Sweden (2007) it responded that 
 
‘The complainants challenge the decision to request information of the Embassy in Ankara, 
which they claim risked revealing their identities to the Azerbaijani authorities. The Committee 
notes that the State party denies that the complainants were identified, but in any event con-
siders the means by which the State party conducted its investigations irrelevant for the pur-
poses of establishing whether the complainants would be subjected to torture upon return to 
Azerbaijan. Having presented the State party with documents which were alleged to corrobo-
rate the complainants’ claims, it was up to the State party to attempt to establish the authen-
ticity of those documents. The Committee also notes that the only other arguments made by 
the complainants with respect to the information in the Embassy’s report, were that the dis-
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crepancies in the documents were merely “alleged formal errors” and that they lack the means 
and necessary legal expertise to make any further comments. The Committee considers that 
the complainants have failed to disprove the State party’s findings in this regard, and to vali-
date the authenticity of any of the documents in question. It recalls its jurisprudence that it is 
for the complainants to collect and present evidence in support of his or her account of 
events.’234 
 
We may infer from this that the Committee generally regards information obtained 
via embassies and missions in the countries of origin as highly reliable, and that very 
persuasive counter-evidence is necessary to refute such information.  
4.5.7.3  Witness statements by family members 
It follows from the Committee’s case law that statements made by the complainant’s 
family members are treated with caution, but may be accorded probative value if they 
corroborate, in a specific and comprehensive way, the complainant’s account. Illus-
trative is the case of A.S. v. Sweden (2001). For the facts of this case reference is made 
to section 4.2.2.4 above. Having taken note of the submissions made by both the 
author and the State party regarding the merits of the case, the Committee requested 
further information from both parties.235 It requested the author to submit informa-
tion about the author’s older son, who had tried to seek asylum in Sweden from Den-
mark in March 2000, including records of the asylum interview.236 The Committee 
accorded significant weight to information from the asylum interview records of the 
author’s son: 
 
‘From the information submitted by the author, the Committee notes that she is the widow of 
a martyr and as such supported and supervised by the Bonyad-e Shahid Committee of Martyrs. 
It is also noted that the author claims that she was forced into a sighe or mutah marriage and 
to have committed and been sentenced to stoning for adultery. Although treating the recent 
testimony of the author’s son, seeking asylum in Denmark, with utmost caution, the Commit-
tee is nevertheless of the view that the information given further corroborates the account 
given by the author.’237 
 
Unlike the national authorities, the Committee concluded in this case that there was a 
danger of torture in case of expulsion. The Committee based its decision on the com-
plainant’s account, the identity papers and the documentation showing that the com-
plainant was the widow of a martyr, the statements made by the author’s son, and 
information on the human rights situation in Iran.238 
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Another case in which the Committee accorded significant weight to information 
provided by the complainant’s family members is T.A. v. Sweden (2005).239 In this 
case, the complainant stated that she feared torture upon expulsion to Bangladesh 
due to her and her husband’s political activities for the Jatiya Party. She stated that 
she was being sought by the authorities; the complainant’s sister visited Bangladesh 
from December 2002 to February 2003, where she learned that the police was still 
looking for the complainant.240 The Committee, relying on this information, assumed 
that the complainant was indeed still being sought by the Bangladeshi authorities, and 
concluded that an Article 3-risk was imminent.241 
4.5.7.4 Medico-legal reports242 
General Comment No. 1 states in paragraph 8: 
 
‘The following information, while not exhaustive, would be pertinent: 
(c) Is there medical or other independent evidence to support a claim by the author that he/ 
she has been tortured or maltreated in the past? Has the torture had after-effects?’ 
 
Medico-legal reports play a prominent role in the case law of the Committee, more so 
than in the case law of the HRC and the ECtHR. In many individual communications 
the complainants submitted medico-legal reports to support their claims. Medico-
legal reports are often brought in with different functions, namely as corroboration of 
statements on experiences of torture in the past, but also as an explanation for 
inconsistencies and for belated statements or tardy presentation of evidence. Each of 
these reasons receives separate attention below. 
4.5.7.4.a Medico-legal reports to explain inconsistencies in the personal account 
As pointed out above in section 4.5.5 on the credibility assessment, in a significant 
number of – mostly early – decisions, the Committee explained and excused inconsis-
tencies or gaps and vague points in the complainant’s account by referring to past 
torture as evidenced by medico-legal reports. A commonly used consideration in 
these decisions is that  
 
‘The State party has pointed to contradictions and inconsistencies in the author’s story, but the 
Committee considers that complete accuracy is seldom to be expected by victims of torture 
and that such inconsistencies as may exist in the author’s presentation of the facts are not ma-
terial and do not raise doubts about the general veracity of the author’s claims.’243 
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In a number of these cases, for example, Alan v. Switzerland (1996)244 and Kisoki v. 
Sweden (1996),245 the medical evidence presented by the complainant during the na-
tional proceedings and to the Committee was only mentioned under the heading 
‘facts as submitted by the complainant’. The Committee did not explicitly mention 
this medical evidence in its own conclusion under the heading ‘issues and proceed-
ings before the Committee’. It is, however, obvious that it attached significant weight 
to this evidence when determining the facts of the case as it concluded on the basis 
of this evidence that the complainant had been tortured in the past. In other cases, 
the Committee explicitly mentioned the medical evidence in its own considerations 
and conclusions as a reason to lower the threshold of accuracy and explain away in-
accuracies in the flight narrative. An example of this more elaborate approach is 
I.A.O. v. Sweden (1998), where it considered:  
 
‘It has noted the medical evidence provided by the author and, on that basis, is of the opinion 
that there is a firm reason to believe that the author has been tortured in the past. In this con-
text, the Committee observes that the author suffers from a post-traumatic stress disorder, and 
that this has to be taken into account when assessing the author’s presentation of the facts. 
The Committee is therefore of the opinion that the inconsistencies as exist in the author’s 
story do not raise doubts as to the general veracity of his claim that he was detained and tor-
tured.’246 
4.5.7.4.b Medico-legal reports to explain tardy presentation of statements and evidence  
In a number of early cases, the Committee did not perceive belated presentation of 
facts and evidence in the national proceedings as problematic. In many of these cases, 
medico-legal reports confirming past torture and stating post-traumatic stress dis-
order or other mental disturbances or disorders were submitted. Although the Com-
mittee does not always explicitly mention such medical evidence in its considerations 
on the merits, it does seem to have played a role in its decision to accept the tardy 
presentation of statements and evidence. For example, in Khan v. Canada (1994),247 
the author was first interviewed by immigration officials on 9 August 1990. It was 
only during a so-called post-claim procedure, in 1994, that the author alleged past 
torture and that he submitted medico-legal reports in support of these statements. In 
the proceedings before the Committee, the State party contended that it doubted the 
veracity of the author’s statements. One of the reasons for this was that he had not 
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mentioned past torture and had not presented medical evidence earlier in the national 
proceedings.248 Importantly, the author had not explained why he had alleged past 
torture so late in the national proceedings. As an explanation for the late presentation 
of medical evidence, he referred only to the fact that he had been detained and that 
he had been medically examined after detention.249 The Committee did not find the 
tardy mention of torture and the late presentation of evidence in support of this 
problematic:  
 
‘The Committee notes that some of the author’s claims and corroborating evidence have been 
submitted only after his refugee claim had been refused by the Refugee Board and deportation 
procedures had been initiated; the Committee, however, also notes that this behaviour is not 
uncommon for victims of torture. The Committee, however, considers that, even if there 
could be some doubts about the facts as adduced by the author, it must ensure that his security 
is not endangered. The Committee notes that evidence exists that torture is widely practised in 
Pakistan against political dissenters as well as against common detainees.’250 
 
In Kisoki v. Sweden (1996),251 crucial evidence was submitted in support of a third asy-
lum application. The Committee did not say anything in its considerations about the 
fact that important evidence had been submitted only in support of a third appli-
cation and not earlier on. It is obvious from its considerations that it saw the author 
as a torture victim, obviously on the basis of the medico-legal reports presented in 
support of the author’s third asylum application. The case of A.F. v. Sweden (1998) is 
another example.252 This case is striking, as it was only in support of a fourth asylum 
application that the author had corroborated his allegations about past torture in the 
Iranian Evin prison with medical evidence from the Centre for Torture and Trauma 
Survivors in Stockholm.253 It is obvious from the Committee’s considerations that it 
did not see the late presentation of this crucial evidence as problematic. It took the 
evidence into account and concluded that the author had a history of detention and 
torture.254 
4.5.7.4.c Medico-legal reports as corroboration of experiences of torture and ill-treatment 
In order to be considered as evidence with strong probative force in support of state-
ments about past torture, medico-legal reports must be drawn up by medical spe-
cialists and must conclusively identify a causal link between the individual’s bodily or 
mental injuries and the alleged past torture. For example, in El Rgeig v. Switzerland 
(2006), the Committee considered as follows: 
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‘Lastly, he has submitted a copy of a medical certificate dated 24 April 2006 in which a specialist 
in post-traumatic disorders from a Geneva hospital identified a causal link between the complainant’s bodily 
injuries, his psychological state and the ill-treatment he described at the time of his medical examination. (Em-
phasis added.) According to this doctor, in his present psychological state, the complainant 
does not appear capable of coping with a forcible return to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, and 
such coercive action would entail a definite risk to his health. The State party has made no 
comments in this regard. In the specific circumstance of this case, and in particular in the light 
of the findings in the above-mentioned medical report on the presence of serious after-effects 
of the acts of torture inflicted on the complainant, his political activities subsequent to his de-
parture from the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya (as described in paragraphs 2.4 and 5.3 above), and 
the persistent reports concerning the treatment generally meted out to such activists when they 
are forcibly returned to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, the Committee considers that the State 
party has not presented to it sufficiently convincing arguments to demonstrate a complete ab-
sence of risk that the complainant would be exposed to torture if he were to be forcibly return-
ed to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya.’255 
 
In a number of cases, the Committee explicitly stated that it found the presented 
medical evidence insufficiently conclusive in identifying the required causal link be-
tween the bodily or mental injuries and the alleged past torture. The case of X. v. 
Switzerland(1997)256 provides an example of this. In this case, counsel submitted to the 
Committee a medical report showing that, for a number of years, the author had been 
receiving treatment for psychiatric and physical problems and that the treatment had 
to be continued for some weeks. This report did not say anything about the cause of 
these problems, however. The Committee, therefore, did not attach much weight to it 
and did not regard it as evidence of past torture: 
 
‘The Committee notes that the author does not claim that he has been tortured by the police 
or security forces in Sudan, and that no medical evidence exists that he suffers from the conse-
quences of torture, either physically or mentally. The Committee therefore concludes that the 
inconsistencies in the author’s story cannot be explained by the effects of a post-traumatic 
stress disorder, as in the case of many torture victims.’ 
 
In M.O. v. Denmark (2003),257 the complainant claimed that he had been tortured in 
the past by the Algerian authorities and presented medical evidence which was, ac-
cording to the Committee, consistent with the claim, but did not discount other pos-
sible causes for his injuries. Obviously, for the Committee the medical evidence was 
not sufficiently conclusive in establishing the required causal link between the state-
ments of past torture and the found harm on the complainant. Similarly, in the cases 
of M.N. v. Switzerland (2004)258 and R.K. and others v. Sweden(2006),259 the medical 
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evidence was considered insufficiently specific about the cause of scars/signs on the 
complainant’s body.  
It is important to mention here that no matter how strong and conclusive the 
medical evidence is in identifying a causal link between the individual’s bodily or 
mental injuries and the alleged past torture, this does not automatically mean a vio-
lation of Article 3. Past torture does not automatically mean that a risk of torture 
exists upon return to the country of origin. It needs more factors to draw this con-
clusion.260 It seems that over the years, the Committee has become stricter in 
requiring other factors, as well as past torture, to assume an Article 3-danger. In A. v. 
the Netherlands (1999), it considered that ‘past torture is a major element to be taken 
into account when examining a case such as this’.261 Six years later, in M.S.H. v. Swe-
den (2005), it considered that ‘previous experience of torture is but one consideration 
in determining whether a person faces a personal risk of torture upon return to his 
country of origin’.262 
4.5.7.4.d Medico-legal reports: less probative value in more recent decisions? 
The Committee has not always been consistent in applying the approach outlined 
above in which decisive probative value is attached to conclusive medical evidence of 
past torture. In a number of cases the Committee – for unknown reasons and con-
trary to its line – was not prepared to accept past torture on the basis of persuasive 
and conclusive medical evidence. For example, in the case of F.F.Z. v. Denmark 
(2002),263 a case concerning a Libyan complainant who alleged to have been detained 
and tortured due to activities for the Al Jama’a movement, a report prepared by Am-
nesty International’s medical team was submitted. It stated that the symptoms identi-
fied in the author were often seen in people who had been subjected to extreme 
stress, such as acts of war, detention or torture, and that these symptoms were consis-
tent with the consequences of alleged torture. The report did not identify physical 
symptoms of torture.264 In its considerations on the merits, the Committee only re-
peated how the respondent State party had evaluated the medical report, remarking 
that ‘the Amnesty International medical report provides no objective indication that 
he was subjected to gross outrages’.265 In a number of subsequent cases, the Commit-
tee did not say anything about the presented medical evidence in its considerations on 
the merits, so we cannot know what the Committee made of it. For example, in the 
case of K.S.Y. v. the Netherlands (2003), medical reports were submitted stating that the 
complainant suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and that his right shoulder 
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was restricted because he had been hanged by one arm for prolonged periods.266 The 
Committee did not say anything about this medical evidence, but only considered that  
 
‘Concerning the alleged difficulties faced by the complainant because of his sexual orientation, 
the Committee notes a number of contradictions and inconsistencies in his account of past 
abuses at the hands of the Iranian authorities, as well as the fact that that part of his account 
has not been adequately substantiated or lacks credibility.’267 
 
Another striking case in which the Committee did not say anything about the con-
clusive medical evidence presented by the complainant is S.P.A. v. Canada (2006).268 
The complainant in this case, a hospital nurse and university lecturer from Iran, 
claimed to have been detained and tortured by the Iranian authorities after she had 
discovered that human bones and cadavers she received at the university for teaching 
purposes had been taken from ‘anti-revolutionary groups’ and by raiding Armenian 
and Baha’i cemeteries. In the national Canadian proceedings and before the Commit-
tee, counsel submitted a medical certificate based on the complainant’s Personal In-
formation Form and a clinical interview and examination. This medical certificate 
concluded that there was evidence of multiple scars on the applicant’s body. Signifi-
cant wounds were on her face and scalp, and were consistent with blunt trauma, as 
described by her. The irregular depressed scar on the top of her head was said to be 
consistent with her description of a lesion that had been left open and sutured at a 
later date. The scars on her arms and legs were more non-specific but were consistent 
with blunt trauma. The bilateral toenail onycholysis was found typical for post-trau-
matic nail injury and could certainly have resulted from being stepped on repeatedly 
as the applicant had described. The medical report concluded that her psychological 
history was consistent with chronic post-traumatic stress disorder. In the national 
proceedings and before the Committee, the Canadian authorities maintained that they 
doubted the veracity of the claim for a number of reasons, among them material 
inaccuracies. The complainant contended before the Committee that the medical evi-
dence corroborated her claim and that, as she was a victim of torture, complete 
accuracy could not have been expected. In her opinion, the national authorities had 
not given enough weight to the medical evidence. The Committee upheld the stance 
taken by the national authorities. Nothing was said in its considerations about the 
medical evidence. It is clear from the Committee’s reasoning that it found the flight 
narrative so doubtful that it was highly questionable whether the scars had been 
caused by torture inflicted by the authorities. Significant weight was attached to the 
fact that the applicant had travelled through seven countries before applying for 
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asylum in Canada.269 However, in the light of the jurisprudential line developed in 
earlier cases, according to which past torture is assumed when conclusive medical evi-
dence is presented and complete accuracy is then not needed, it remains remarkable 
that the Committee did not make explicit its thoughts about the medical evidence 
presented. 
From the analysis of the Committee’s case law, it is obvious that in its early ju-
risprudence (up to 2000), the Committee rather easily assumed past torture on the 
basis of conclusive medical reports and also rather easily explained away inaccuracies 
and late presentation of statements and evidence by making reference to the present-
ed medical evidence. It seems that the Committee started to draw stricter lines after 
2000. Cases were discussed above in which the Committee did not even mention the 
presented medical evidence in its own considerations and concluded that there was 
no Article 3-risk. It seems that the Committee has become more critical in testing the 
conclusiveness of medical evidence. It also seems to have become stricter in requiring 
other factors in addition to past torture to assume an Article 3-danger.270 My impres-
sion is, therefore, that the Committee has generally become stricter in determining 
the value of medical evidence and is generally inclined to attach less value to it than in 
its early jurisprudence. It may probably be argued that, although still prominent, med-
ical evidence has been downgraded from decisive evidence to supportive evidence. 
Bruin and Reneman (2006) explain this by referring to the fact that, for a number of 
years, States have been pushing the Committee to abstain from evaluating facts and 
evidence in full and to take a more reserved stand.271 Still, medical evidence remains 
important as supportive evidence. The Committee has shown dissatisfaction over the 
fact that in national proceedings in the Netherlands, medico-legal reports are not nor-
mally taken into account as evidence. In its Conclusions and Recommendations re-
garding the Netherlands of 3 August 2007 it stated:  
 
‘The Committee notes with concern that medical reports are not taken into account on a regu-
lar basis in the Dutch asylum procedures and that the application of the Istanbul protocol is 
not encouraged. The State party should reconsider its position on the role of medical investiga-
tions and integrate medical reports as part of its asylum procedures. The Committee also en-
courages the application of the Istanbul Protocol in the asylum procedures and the provision 
of training.’272 
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4.5.7.5  Reports on the situation in the country of origin 
The second paragraph of Article 3 stipulates that for the purpose of determining 
whether there are grounds for believing that there is an Article 3-risk, the competent 
authorities shall take into account all relevant considerations, including, where ap-
plicable, the existence in the country of origin of a consistent pattern of gross, fla-
grant or mass violations of human rights.273 In line with this, General Comment No. 
1 lists as relevant considerations in paragraph 8:  
 
‘(a) Is the State concerned one in which there is evidence of a consistent pattern of gross, fla-
grant or mass violations of human rights (see art. 3, para. 2)?  
(d) Has the situation referred to in (a) above changed? Has the internal situation in respect of 
human rights altered?’ 
 
It follows from these rules that information on the situation in the country of origin 
is of vital importance. Logically, reports containing such information are a very im-
portant category of evidentiary materials. The Committee makes use of reports 
stemming from a variety of sources. In a significant number of decisions, however, it 
only mentions that it is aware of the human rights situation in the country of origin, 
without specifying the sources it has used and the reasons why it has considered the 
information reliable.274 
The Committee makes use of reports it has drawn up as a result of ex officio in-
quiries under the Article 20 inquiry procedure.275 An example of a case in which it 
explicitly made use of such a report, as well as reports from other sources, is Falcon 
Ríos v. Canada (2004).276 The Committee also uses reports resulting from the Article 
                                                        
273 The Committee has in a number of views concluded that there is a consistent pattern of gross, 
flagrant or mass violations of human rights in the countries of origin. See ComAT, Mutombo v. Swit-
zerland, 27 April 1994, No. 13/1993 (Zaire, nowadays the Democratic Republic of the Congo), 
ComAT, Elmi v. Australia, 25 May 1999, No. 120/1998 (Somalia); ComAT, A.S. v. Sweden, 15 Feb-
ruary 2001, No. 149/1999 (Iran); ComAT, H.M.H.I. v. Australia, 1 May 2002, No. 177/2001 
(Somalia). 
274 See, for example, ComAT, A. v. the Netherlands, 13 November 1998, No. 091/1997, para. 6.4: ‘Re-
ports from reliable sources have over the years documented cases suggesting that a pattern of deten-
tion, imprisonment, torture and ill-treatment of persons accused of political opposition activities, 
including links with the Al-Nahda movement, exist in Tunisia.’ See also ComAT, El Rgeig v. Switzer-
land, 15 November 2006, No. 280/2005, para. 7.4, in which the Committee mentioned ‘persistent 
reports concerning the treatment generally meted out to such activists when they are forcibly re-
turned to the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya’. See also Wouters 2009, p. 483. 
275 Article 20 CAT, paras. 1-3 stipulate: ‘If the Committee receives reliable information which appears 
to it to contain well-founded indications that torture is being systematically practised in the territory 
of a State Party, the Committee shall invite that State Party to co-operate in the examination of the 
information and to this end to submit observations with regard to the information concerned. 
Taking into account any observations which may have been submitted by the State Party concerned 
as well as any other relevant information available to it, the Committee may, if it decides that this is 
warranted, designate one or more of its members to make a confidential inquiry and to report to the 
Committee urgently. If an inquiry is made in accordance with paragraph 2, the Committee shall seek 
the co-operation of the State Party concerned. In agreement with that State Party, such an inquiry 
may include a visit to its territory.’ 
276 ComAT, Falcon Ríos v. Canada, 17 December 2004, No. 133/1999, para. 8.3. 
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19 reporting mechanism;277 examples are the cases of Karoui v. Sweden (2002)278 and 
G.K. v. Switzerland (2003).279 Reports drawn up by other United Nations organisations 
and agencies are also frequently used by the Committee. A particularly important 
source within this category is reports drawn up by the UNHCR. An example is the 
case of U.S. v. Finland (2003)280 concerning a Sri Lankan complainant, in which the 
Committee attached significant weight to information from the UNHCR according 
to which a large number of Tamil refugees had returned to Sri Lanka in 2001 and 
2002.281 
In a number of cases the Committee made use of information from non-govern-
mental organisations, including Amnesty International.282 In other cases, it referred to 
information from non-governmental organisations without further mentioning these 
organisations.283 
As has been made clear above in section 4.5.7.2, the Committee generally at-
taches strong evidentiary value to reports submitted by States parties containing the 
result of inquiries conducted by embassies or missions in the complainant’s country 
of origin.284 
With regard to the country of origin information, it is, finally, important to note 
that, on the basis of Rules 63, and 118, paragraph 2, of the Committee’s Rules of Pro-
cedure, the Committee can proprio motu obtain information from a variety of sources, 
including the entire United Nations system, intergovernmental organisations, national 
human rights institutions, non-governmental organisations, and other relevant civil 
society organisations.
285
 
                                                        
277 Article 19, para. 1, CAT stipulates: ‘The States Parties shall submit to the Committee, through the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations, reports on the measures they have taken to give effect to 
their undertakings under this Convention, within one year after the entry into force of this Con-
vention for the State Party concerned. Thereafter the States Parties shall submit supplementary 
reports every four years on any new measures taken, and such other reports as the Committee may 
request.’ 
278 ComAT, Karoui v. Sweden, 25 May 2002, No. 185/2001, para. 9. 
279 ComAT, G.K. v. Switzerland, 12 May 2003, No. 219/2002, para. 6.3. 
280 ComAT, U.S. v. Finland, 1 May 2003, No. 197/2002. 
281 ComAT, U.S. v. Finland, 1 May 2003, No. 197/2002, para. 7.7. Another example is Kisoki v. Sweden, 8 
May 1996, No. 41/1996, para. 9.5: ‘the Committee has noted the position of the United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, according to whom deportees who are discovered to have sought 
asylum abroad undergo interrogation upon arrival at Kinshasa airport, following which those who 
are believed to have a political profile are at risk of detention and consequently ill-treatment’. 
UNHCR information also played a significant role in ComAT, X.Y. and Z. v. Sweden, 6 May 1998, 
No. 61/1996, para. 11.5; ComAT, Korban v. Sweden,16 November 1998, No. 88/1997, para. 6.5; 
ComAT, Haydin v. Sweden, 16 December 1998, No. 101/1997, para. 6.4. 
282 Examples of cases in which the Committee used information from Amnesty International are 
ComAT, H.B.H. et al v. Switzerland, 16 May 2003, No. 192/2001, para. 6.9 and ComAT, S.S. v. the 
Netherlands,19 May 2003, No. 191/2001, para. 6.3, footnote 8. 
283 An example is ComAT, G.K. v. Switzerland, 12 May 2003, No. 219/2002, para. 6.3. 
284 Examples are ComAT, H.D. v. Switzerland, 30 April 1999, No. 112/1998; ComAT, K.M. v. 
Switzerland, 16 November 1999, No. 107/1998; ComAT, H.A.D. v. Switzerland, 10 May 2000, No. 
126/1999; ComAT, Y.S. v. Switzerland, 14 November 2000, No. 147/1999. 
285 Rule 63, para. 1, of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture of 11 February 2011 
stipulates that ‘The Committee may invite the Secretariat, specialized agencies, United Nations 
bodies concerned, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, intergovernmental organiza-
→ 
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4.5.8 Opportunities for presenting evidence and reacting to evidence 
In its proceedings, the Committee adheres to the principle of adversarial proceedings. 
In Rule 115 of its Rules of Procedure, it is stipulated that, as soon as possible after 
the complaint has been registered, it is transmitted to the State party. The State party 
is then requested to submit a written reply, relating both to the admissibility and the 
merits of the complaint, within six months. A complaint may not be declared admis-
sible unless the State party concerned has received its text and has been given an op-
portunity to furnish information or observations, as provided in paragraph 1 of this 
rule. The State party or the complainant may request to be afforded an opportunity to 
comment on any submission received from the other party. The Committee sets a 
time limit for submitting such additional comments.286 
Rule 117 stipulates that, when the Committee has decided that a complaint is ad-
missible, it shall transmit to the State party the text of its decision together with any 
submission received from the author of the communication not already transmitted 
to the State party under Rule 115, paragraph 1. The Committee shall also inform the 
complainant, through the Secretary-General, of its decision. Within the period 
established by the Committee, the State party concerned shall then submit to the 
Committee written explanations or statements clarifying the case under consideration 
and the measures, if any, that may have been taken by it. These explanations or state-
ments submitted by a State party are then transmitted to the complainant who may 
submit any additional written information or observations within such time limit as 
the Committee shall decide. The Committee may invite the complainant or his or her 
representative and representatives of the State party to be present at specified closed 
meetings of the Committee in order to provide further clarifications or to answer 
questions on the merits of the complaint. Whenever one party is so invited, the other 
party shall be informed and invited to attend and make appropriate submissions. The 
non-appearance of a party will not prejudice the consideration of the case. The Com-
mittee may revoke its decision that a complaint is admissible in the light of any ex-
planations or statements thereafter submitted by the State party pursuant to this rule. 
However, before the Committee considers revoking that decision, the explanations or 
statements concerned must be transmitted to the complainant so that he or she may 
submit additional information or observations within a time limit set by the Commit-
tee.287 
The structure of the decisions of the Committee generally reflects the principle of 
adversariality and the resulting debating rounds between the parties. Most decisions 
                                                        
tions, National Human Rights Institutions, non-governmental organizations, and other relevant civil 
society organizations, to submit to it information, documentation and written statements, as appro-
priate, relevant to the Committee’s activities under the Convention.’ Rule 118, para. 2, stipulates: 
‘The Committee, the Working Group, or the Rapporteur may at any time in the course of the exami-
nation obtain any document from United Nations bodies, specialized agencies, or other sources that 
may assist in the consideration of the complaint.’ 
286 Rule 115 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture, paras. 1, 2, 8 and 10. 
287 Rule 117 of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture, paras. 1-5. 
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contain a section entitled ‘author’s submissions, followed by a number of sections 
under the headings ‘State party’s observations’, and ‘author’s submissions’.  
In the proceedings before the Committee, a party is not allowed, in principle, to 
submit new statements and evidence which were not presented in the national pro-
ceedings. In a number of cases, the complainant submitted new statements or evi-
dence for the first time before the Committee, which statements and evidence had 
not been presented earlier to the national authorities in the national proceedings.288 
Similarly, in certain cases, in the proceedings before the Committee, States parties 
have relied on new evidence resulting from investigations conducted after the termi-
nation of the national proceedings.289 Just like the HRC, the Committee generally 
does not tolerate this and does not take into account statements and evidence pro-
duced for the first time in the proceedings before it. In such a situation, the Com-
mittee will normally examine whether there is a national remedy in which such new 
statements and new evidence can be brought forward and considered. It does not 
materially consider such statements and evidence itself, but instead refers complain-
ants back to the national remedy, and concludes that national remedies have not been 
exhausted.290 In E.J. et al v. Sweden (2008) the State party submitted to the Committee 
new evidence which had not been presented in the national proceedings. The Com-
mittee did not accept this.291 
The case of E.J. et al v. Sweden (2008) is interesting for yet another reason. In the 
proceedings before the Committee, the State party relied on a report drawn up by its 
embassy in Ankara. This report was based on an investigation conducted by an anon-
ymous source. The Committee noted that the author had had no opportunity to 
challenge the investigator whose name had not been revealed before the national au-
thorities. It clearly found this problematic as it stated that this was one of the reasons 
why the State party should not have relied on the report in the proceedings before it.  
4.5.9 Application of investigative powers by the Committee 
In the section on the credibility assessment (section 4.5.5 above), it was made clear 
that by virtue of General Comment No. 1, paragraph 9,292 the Committee has the 
                                                        
288 See, for example, ComAT, M.X. v. Switzerland, 7 May 2008, No. 311/2007, para. 9.4 (detention and 
sexual assault were not mentioned before the national Swiss asylum authorities, but were submitted 
only within theframework of the communication to the Committee against Torture); ComAT, F.M-
M. v. Switzerland, 26 May 2011, No. 399/2009, para. 6.5 (new evidence submitted for the first time in 
the proceedings before the Committee). 
289 ComAT, E.J. et al v. Sweden, 14 November 2008, No. 306/3006, para. 8.4. 
290 See, for example, ComAT, K.K.H. v. Canada, 22 November 1995, No. 35/1995, para. 5. 
291 ComAT, E.J. et al v. Sweden, 14 November 2008, No. 306/2006, para. 8.4. 
292 General Comment No. 1, para. 9, states: ‘Bearing in mind that the Committee against Torture is not 
an appellate, a quasi-judicial or an administrative body, but rather a monitoring body created by the 
States parties themselves with declaratory powers only, it follows that: 
(a) Considerable weight will be given, in exercising the Committee’s jurisdiction pursuant to article 3 
of the Convention, to findings of fact that are made by organs of the State party concerned; but  
(b) The Committee is not bound by such findings and instead has the power, provided by article 22, 
paragraph 4, of the Convention, of free assessment of the facts based upon the full set of circum-
stances in every case.’ 
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possibility and freedom to choose, in each case before it, one of two approaches: re-
liance on the respondent State party’s determination of the facts, or an independent 
determination of the facts on its own account. It was also made clear that the Com-
mittee’s case law demonstrates that the Committee stresses its subsidiary role and 
considers that the determination of the facts is primarily a matter for the authorities 
of the States parties. In this respect the Committee strongly resembles the HRC. 
However, in a number of cases it has made its own fully independent assessment of 
the facts.293 Two circumstances in particular seem to trigger it to proceed to an inde-
pendent determination of the facts. A first trigger is that in the national proceedings, 
the absolute nature of Article 3 CAT was not respected and a weighing of national 
security considerations against the Article 3-danger took place.294 This happened in 
Dadar v. Canada (2005): the primary stance of the State party’s authorities was that the 
account was incredible; their subsidiary position was that, if the stated facts were as-
sumed to be true, national security considerations outweighed the alleged Article 3-
risk.295 
A second trigger is that the State party’s authorities did not take into considera-
tion important facts or evidence. This happened in C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden (2007). In 
this case, the Committee considered that the State party’s authorities had, in fact, not 
taken into account statements on past torture and corroborating medical evidence. It 
then proceeded to its own independent determination of the facts.296 
The Committee has at its disposal a number of investigative powers which may 
help to obtain clarity on the facts of the case. On the basis of Rules 63, and 118, para-
graph 2, of the Committee’s Rules of Procedure, the Committee can proprio motu ob-
tain information from a variety of sources, including the entire United Nations sys-
tem, intergovernmental organisations, national human rights institutions, non-govern-
mental organisations, and other relevant civil society organisations.297 By applying this 
power, the Committee can obtain reports from various sources on the situation in the 
countries of origin. Applying this investigative power, the Committee has obtained 
and used reports drawn up by itself as a result of ex officio inquiries under the Article 
20-inquiry procedure;298 reports resulting from the Article 19-State reporting mecha-
                                                        
293 See, for example, ComAT, Khan v. Canada, 15 November 1994, No. 015/1994, paras. 12.3-12.6; 
ComAT, Heidar v. Sweden, 19 November 2002, No. 204/2002, para.6.3; ComAT, Dadar v. Canada, 5 
December 2005, No. 258/2004, para. 8.8. 
294 See for the same conclusion about the reasons for the Committee to proceed to an independent de-
termination of the facts: Wouters 2009, p. 492. 
295 ComAT, Dadar v. Canada, 5 December 2005, No. 258/2004; see para. 8.8. 
296 ComAT, C.T. and K.M.v. Sweden, 22 January 2007, No. 279/2005. 
297 Rule 63, para. 1, of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture of 11 February 2011 
stipulates that ‘The Committee may invite the Secretariat, specialized agencies, United Nations 
bodies concerned, Special Procedures of the Human Rights Council, intergovernmental organiza-
tions, National Human Rights Institutions, non-governmental organizations, and other relevant civil 
society organizations, to submit to it information, documentation and written statements, as appro-
priate, relevant to the Committee’s activities under the Convention.’ Rule 118, para. 2, stipulates: 
‘The Committee, the Working Group, or the Rapporteur may at any time in the course of the exami-
nation obtain any document from United Nations bodies, specialized agencies, or other sources that 
may assist in the consideration of the complaint.’ 
298 See, for example, ComAT, Falcon Ríos v. Canada, 17 December 2004, No. 133/1999, para. 8.3. 
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nism;299 reports drawn up by other United Nations organisations and agencies, such 
as the UNHCR,300 and reports from non-governmental organisations, including Am-
nesty International.301 
On the basis of Rule 115 of the Committee’s Rules of Procedure, the Committee 
may request the State party concerned or the complainant to submit additional writ-
ten information, clarification or observations relevant to the question of admissibility 
or merits.302 Rule 117 further specifies that when the Committee requests the re-
spondent State party to submit written explanations or statements clarifying the case, 
it may indicate the specific type of information it wishes to receive.303 An example of 
a case in which the Committee used this investigative power is A.S. v. Sweden 
(2001).304 After taking note of the submissions made by both the author and the State 
party regarding the merits of the case, the Committee requested further information 
from both parties.305 It specifically requested the author to submit information about 
the author’s older son, who had tried to seek asylum in Sweden from Denmark in 
March 2000, including records of his asylum interview.306 In addition to the inves-
tigative powers mentioned above, the Committee also has the possibility to invite the 
complainant, or his or her representative and representatives of the State party con-
cerned, to be present at specified closed meetings of the Committee in order to 
provide further clarification or to answer questions on the merits of the complaint.307 
This investigative power of questioning the parties on the merits at oral hearings dis-
tinguishes the Committee from the HRC, which does not have this power and does 
not hold oral hearings.308 
Unfortunately, the Committee does not often make clear in its decisions how it 
obtained the information used to take a decision and whether it used the mentioned 
investigative powers. 
                                                        
299 See, for example, ComAT, G.K. v. Switzerland, 12 May 2003, No. 219/2002, para. 6.3. 
300 See, for example, ComAT, U.S. v. Finland, 1 May 2003, No. 197/2002, para. 7.7. 
301 Examples of cases in which the Committee used information from Amnesty International are 
ComAT, H.B.H. et al v. Switzerland, 16 May 2003, No. 192/2001, para. 6.9 and ComAT, S.S. v. the 
Netherlands,19 May 2003, No. 191/2001, para. 6.3, footnote 8. 
302 Rule 115, para. 5, of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture stipulates: ‘The Com-
mittee or the Working Group established under rule 112 or Rapporteur(s) designated under rule 112, 
paragraph 3, may request, through the Secretary-General, the State party concerned or the complain-
ant to submit additional written information, clarifications or observations relevant to the question 
of admissibility or merits.’ 
303 Rule 117, para. 2, of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture stipulates: ‘Within the 
period established by the Committee, the State party concerned shall submit to the Committee writ-
ten explanations or statements clarifying the case under consideration and the measures, if any, that 
may have been taken by it. The Committee may indicate, if it deems it necessary, the type of infor-
mation it wishes to receive from the State party concerned.’ 
304 ComAT, A.S. v. Sweden, 15 February 2001, No. 149/1999. 
305 Ibidem, para. 7.2. 
306 Ibidem, paras. 7.6, 7.7. 
307 Rule 117, para. 4, of the Rules of Procedure of the Committee against Torture stipulates: ‘The Com-
mittee may invite the complainant or his/her representative and representatives of the State party 
concerned to be present at specified closed meetings of the Committee in order to provide further 
clarifications or to answer questions on the merits of the complaint. Whenever one party is so in-
vited, the other party shall be informed and invited to attend and make appropriate submissions.’ 
308 See Chapter 3, section 3.5.9. 
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4.5.10 Time limits for presentation of statements and evidence 
It has been pointed out above in section 4.5.8 that in the proceedings before the 
Committee, a party is not allowed, in principle, to submit new statements and evi-
dence which were not presented in the national proceedings. 
As was made clear above in section 4.5.5 on the credibility assessment, all the 
relevant facts and evidence must, in principle, be brought forward as early as possible. 
On the issue of presentation of statements and evidence at a late stage in the national 
proceedings– later than the initial interview(s) in the national asylum proceedings – 
the Committee’s case law is not entirely consistent and seems to have become stricter 
in the course of time. In a number of early cases, the Committee did not perceive late 
presentation of facts and evidence in the national proceedings as problematic. In the 
case of Khan v. Canada (1994),309 the author was first interviewed by immigration offi-
cials on 9 August 1990. In its decision, dated 14 January 1992, the Refugee Division 
had determined that the author was not a refugee and that his oral testimony had 
been fabricated. The author’s leave to appeal had been dismissed by the Federal 
Court of Appeal on 22 April 1992. After having been informed that the author had 
submitted a communication to the Committee, the State party arranged for a review 
of the author’s case by a post-claim determination officer. It was only during this 
post-claim procedure, in 1994, that the author had alleged past torture and that he 
had submitted medical evidence in support of these statements. In the proceedings 
before the Committee, the State party contended that it doubted the veracity of the 
author’s statements. One of the reasons for this was that he had not mentioned past 
torture and had not presented medical evidence earlier in the national proceedings.310 
Importantly, the author had not explained why he had alleged past torture so late in 
the national proceedings. As an explanation for the late presentation of medical evi-
dence he had referred only to the fact that he had been detained and that he had been 
medically examined after detention.311 The Committee did not find the tardy mention 
of torture and the late presentation of evidence in support of this problematic:  
 
‘The Committee notes that some of the author’s claims and corroborating evidence have been 
submitted only after his refugee claim had been refused by the Refugee Board and deportation 
procedures had been initiated; the Committee, however, also notes that this behaviour is not 
uncommon for victims of torture. The Committee, however, considers that, even if there 
could be some doubts about the facts as adduced by the author, it must ensure that his security 
is not endangered. The Committee notes that evidence exists that torture is widely practised in 
Pakistan against political dissenters as well as against common detainees.’312 
 
In Kisoki v. Sweden (1996),313 crucial evidence was submitted in support of a third asy-
lum application. After refusal of a first and second application, the author had sub-
                                                        
309 ComAT, Khan v. Canada, 15 November 1994, No. 15/1994. 
310 Ibidem, para. 8.5. 
311 Ibidem, para. 9.6. 
312 Ibidem, para. 12.3. 
313 ComAT, Kisoki v. Sweden, 8 May 1996, No. 041/1996. 
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mitted a new application to the Swedish Aliens Appeal Board, on the basis of new 
forensic medical evidence, prepared by the Centre for Torture and Trauma Survivors 
in Stockholm. The Aliens Appeal Board had rejected the author’s application, judging 
that the information now submitted could easily have been submitted earlier, thereby 
decreasing the trustworthiness of the claim. The Committee did not say anything in 
its considerations about the fact that important evidence had been submitted only in 
support of a third application and not earlier. It is obvious from its considerations 
that it saw the author as a torture victim, obviously on the basis of the medical evi-
dence presented in support of the author’s third asylum application. We may infer 
from this that the Committee did not find the late presentation of crucial evidence 
problematic. Another example of this flexible approach is Tala v. Sweden (1996), in 
which case statements on past torture were presented after an asylum application had 
been rejected at the appeal stage. As the Committee did not say anything about this 
and accepted as true the stated facts on past torture, it obviously did not see the late 
presentation of the statements on past torture as problematic.314 A final example of 
the Committee’s early flexible approach is the case of A.F. v. Sweden (1998).315 This 
case is striking, as it was only in support of a fourth asylum application that the au-
thor had corroborated his allegations about past torture in the Iranian Evin prison 
with medical evidence from the Centre for Torture and Trauma Survivors in Stock-
holm.316 It is obvious from the Committee’s considerations that it did not see the late 
presentation of this crucial evidence as problematic. It took the evidence into account 
and concluded that the author had a history of detention and torture.317 
The above cases show that, in its early case law, the Committee approached the 
problem of late presentation of statements and evidence in a flexible way and did not 
specifically require good explanations from the author as to why statements and 
evidence had not been submitted earlier. Over the years, however, the Committee’s 
approach towards late presentation of statements and evidence seems to have 
become stricter in the sense that the author must provide very good explanations for 
tardy presentations of statements and evidence. In a number of decisions taken after 
2000, late submission of statements and late presentation of evidence were seen as 
negatively affecting the general veracity of the claim. In X.Y. v. Switzerland (2001), the 
claimant had mentioned past torture and presented evidence in corroboration of 
these statements only after his initial request for asylum had been rejected (in second 
asylum proceedings). The State party had clearly found this problematic.318 Impor-
tantly, the author had not given a personal explanation as to why he had omitted to 
mention past torture earlier; instead, he referred to the Committee’s flexible approach 
described above: 
 
                                                        
314 ComAT, Tala v. Sweden, 15 November 1996, No. 043/1996. 
315 ComAT, A.F. v. Sweden, 8 May 1998, No. 089/1997. 
316 Ibidem, para. 2.6. 
317 Ibidem, para. 6.5. 
318 ComAT, X.Y. v. Switzerland, 15 May 2001, No. 128/1999, paras. 6.7 and 6.8. 
CAT 
 
179 
 
 
‘With regard to the delay in making the allegation of torture, the author claims that the Com-
mittee itself has repeatedly emphasized that it is quite understandable for a torture victim ini-
tially to remain silent about his sufferings.’319 
 
Without explicitly explaining the change, the Committee saw fit not to follow its 
flexible approach in this case, but, instead, applied a stricter approach: 
 
‘The Committee expresses doubts about the credibility of the author’s presentation of the 
facts, since he did not invoke his allegations of torture or the medical certificate attesting to the 
possibility of his having been tortured until after his initial application for political asylum had 
been rejected.’320 
 
Two years later, in H.B. and others v. Switzerland (2003), the Committee made clear that, 
in cases of late presentation of statements and tardy presentation of evidence, the 
author had to have good reasons for the delay. In relation to new evidence corrobo-
rating statements on membership of the Yekiti political party, an arrest warrant and a 
copy of a judgment sentencing the author to three years’ imprisonment, presented 
after rejection of the initial asylum applications, the Committee considered as follows: 
 
‘The Committee considers that the above-mentioned documents were produced by the com-
plainants only in response to decisions by the Swiss authorities to reject their application for 
asylum, and that the complainants have failed to offer any coherent explanation of the delay in 
making submissions.’321 
 
The case of V.L. v. Switzerland (2006)322 demonstrates, however, that tardy presenta-
tion of important facts and evidence is not always fatal to the case at hand. If sound 
explanations are provided by the author as to why he or she did not mention im-
portant matters and submit evidence earlier on, tardy statements and evidence are not 
problematic. The case of V.L. is an interesting example of how the Committee dealt 
with a situation in which a female asylum seeker came forward with a flight narrative 
based on sexual abuse at a very late stage in the national asylum proceedings. The 
complainant, together with her husband, applied for asylum in Switzerland on 19 
December 2002. Both based their claims on the alleged political persecution of the 
                                                        
319 Ibidem, para. 7.3. 
320 Ibidem, para.8.5. 
321 ComAT, H.B. and others. v. Switzerland, 16 May 2003, No. 192/2001, para. 6.8. See, for the same ap-
proach – statements and evidence presented belatedly in the national proceedings are not taken into 
consideration by the Committee as no consistent and convincing explanation has been offered for 
their tardy production – ComAT, Zubair Elahi v. Switzerland, 20 May 2005, No. 222/2002, para.6.7, in 
this decision the Committee also attached importance to the fact that the author had had legal 
assistance throughout the national proceedings; and ComAT, Z.K. v. Sweden, 16 May 2008, No. 301/ 
2006, para. 8.4. 
322 ComAT, V.L. v. Switzerland, 20 November 2006, 262/2005. See on this case also Boeles in his article 
‘Case reports of the European Court of Human Rights, the Human Rights Committee, and the 
Committee against Torture’ in: European Journal of Migration and Law 10 (2008). See also Wouters 
2009, p. 477. 
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husband by the Belorussian authorities. These claims were not considered credible by 
the Swiss Federal Office for Refugees (BFF), which considered that the documents 
submitted by the claimants were not genuine. Consequently, the applications had 
been rejected on 14 August 2003 and the complainant and her husband had been 
ordered to leave the country by 9 October 2003.On 11 September 2003, the com-
plainant and her husband appealed to the Swiss Asylum Review Board (ARK). The 
ARK rejected the appeal on 15 September 2004. The complainant requested a re-
vision of this judicial decision on 11 October 2004, in which she mentioned for the 
first time that she had been sexually abused by police officers. She urged the Swiss 
authorities to reconsider her asylum application in its own right, rather than as part of 
her husband’s claims, explaining that they now lived separately. The complainant 
claimed that her failure to mention the rape in her initial interview with the BFF had 
been due to the fact that she had considered it humiliating and an affront to her 
personal dignity. Furthermore, the psychological pressure from her husband had 
prevented her from mentioning the sexual abuse. She explained that her husband had 
disappeared in October 2004 and that his whereabouts were unknown to her. Now 
that he had left the country, she was, however, willing to provide details about the 
events described above and a medical certificate. In its decision of 1 December 2004, 
the Asylum Review Board acknowledged that, in principle, rape was a relevant factor 
to be considered in the asylum procedure, even when reported belatedly, and that 
there might be psychological reasons for victims not mentioning it in the first inter-
view. However, the complainant’s claims did not seem plausible, since she had nei-
ther substantiated nor proven psychological obstacles to at least mentioning the rape 
in the initial interview. The Committee considered as follows: 
 
‘The State party has argued that the complainant is not credible because the allegations of sexu-
al abuse and the medical report supporting these allegations were submitted late in the domes-
tic proceedings. The Committee finds, to the contrary, that the complainant’s allegations are 
credible. The complainant’s explanation of the delay in mentioning the rapes to the national 
authorities is totally reasonable. It is well-known that the loss of privacy and prospect of humil-
iation based on revelation alone of the acts concerned may cause both women and men to 
withhold the fact that they have been subject to rape and/or other forms of sexual abuse until 
it appears absolutely necessary. Particularly for women, there is the additional fear of shaming 
and rejection by their partner or family members. Here the complainant’s allegation that her 
husband reacted to the complainant’s admission of rape by humiliating her and forbidding her 
to mention it in their asylum proceedings adds credibility to her claim. The Committee notes 
that as soon as her husband left her, the complainant who was then freed from his influence 
immediately mentioned the rapes to the national authorities in her request for revision of 11 
October 2004. Further evidence of her psychological state or psychological “obstacles,” as 
called for by the State party, is unnecessary. The State party’s assertion that the complainant 
should have raised and substantiated the issue of sexual abuse earlier in the revision pro-
ceedings is insufficient basis upon which to find that her allegations of sexual abuse lack credi-
bility, particularly in view of the fact that she was not represented in the proceedings.’323 
                                                        
323 Ibidem, para. 8.8. 
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The Committee found the explanation for the delay in mentioning the rapes ‘totally 
reasonable’, so that there was no obstacle to taking the rapes into account. Also im-
portant in this case was that the applicant had not been represented by legal counsel 
in the national proceedings.324 
To conclude, the case law discussed above shows that it is expected from the 
claimant that he or she presents all the relevant statements and corroborating evi-
dence as soon as possible. When statements and evidence are presented later on in 
the national proceedings, convincing explanations have to be given for this. In gen-
eral, it seems that the Committee has become somewhat stricter in testing whether 
convincing explanations for tardy production of statements and evidence exist. Nev-
ertheless, in a significant number of early and also later cases, the Committee did not 
see the tardy presentation of relevant statements and evidence as problematic and 
rather easily accepted that good reasons had been brought forward for the belated 
presentation of statements and evidence. 
4.5.11  Point in time for the risk assessment 
In cases where the complainant has not yet been expelled from the respondent State 
at the moment of examination by the Committee, the Committee assesses the exis-
tence of the alleged Article 3-danger on an ex nunc basis, which means that the mate-
rial point in time is the moment at which it examines the case. The assessment of the 
danger is made on the basis of all the information available at the moment of con-
sideration of the case by the Committee.325 
The Committee’s case law is not entirely consistent in cases where deportation 
from the respondent State has already been effectuated. In a number of cases, it has 
stated that the point in time for its risk assessment remains the moment of the 
removal: the question remains as to what is real and foreseeable at the moment of re-
moval. Facts and circumstances which become known after the removal are relevant 
only in that they may confirm or refute what the State party knew or ought to have 
                                                        
324 Two more examples which make clear that tardy presentation of evidence is not always fatal to the 
case at hand are ComAT, Iya v. Switzerland, 16 November 2007, No. 299/2006, in which the author 
submitted identity documents during the appeal stage in the national proceedings, and ComAT, 
Chahin v. Sweden, 30 May 2011, No. 310/2007, in which the author brought forward statements on 
past torture and evidence thereof only in the proceedings following a second request for revocation 
of an expulsion order. 
325 See, for example, ComAT, A.D. v. the Netherlands, 24 January 2000, No. 96/1997, para. 7.4 : ‘The 
Committee is aware of the human rights situation in Sri Lanka but considers that, given the shift in 
political authority and the present circumstances, the author has not substantiated his claim that he will 
personally be at risk of being subjected to torture if returned to Sri Lanka at present.’ (Emphasis 
added.) See also ComAT, Attiav. Sweden, 24 November 2003, No. 199/2002, para. 12.1: ‘The issue 
before the Committee is whether removal of the complainant to Egypt would violate the State par-
ty’s obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel or to return a person to another State 
where there are substantial grounds for believing that he or she would be in danger of being sub-
jected by the Egyptian authorities to torture. In so doing, the Committee refers to its consistent 
practice of deciding this question as presented at the time of its consideration of the complaint, 
rather than as presented at the time of submission of the complaint. It follows that intervening 
events transpiring between submission of a complainant and its consideration by the Committee 
may be of material relevance for the Committee’s determination of any issue arising under Article 3.’ 
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known at the time of removal. In Agiza v. Sweden (2005), the Committee considered 
that  
 
‘Subsequent events are relevant to the assessment of the State party’s knowledge, actual or 
constructive, at the time of the removal.’326 
 
And in Tebourski v. France (2007), it considered: 
 
‘The Committee must determine whether, in deporting the complainant to Tunisia, the State 
party violated its obligation under article 3 of the Convention not to expel, return (“refouler”) 
or extradite a person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The Committee stresses that it must take a 
decision on the question in the light of the information which the authorities of the State party 
had or should have had in their possession at the time of the expulsion. Subsequent events are 
useful only for assessing the information which the State party actually had or could have de-
duced at the time of expulsion.’327 
 
However, in neither of these decisions did the Committee explicitly take into con-
sideration subsequent events. In Agiza v. Sweden (2005), it stated (emphasis added) 
that ‘the natural conclusion from the facts and circumstances known at the time of the ex-
pulsion was that a real risk existed’.328 However, Wouters (2009) convincingly points 
out that it is very likely that the Committee did take into account the large number of 
subsequent events put forward by both parties, albeit indirectly or explicitly.329 The 
subsequent events related mainly to safety guarantees, and the Committee considered 
that the safety guarantees did not suffice to protect against this manifest risk; by using 
the past tense the Committee indicated that it took subsequent events into account. 
Another indication that subsequent events were taken into account is that the Com-
mittee addressed the differences between its considerations in the Agiza case and the 
case of his wife, Attia v. Sweden (2003).330 One of the differences between these cases 
was the breach by Egypt of the element of assurances relating to guaranteeing a fair 
trial. This breach came to light after the removal of Agiza.331 
In T.P.S. v. Canada (2000), however, the Committee explicitly took subsequent 
facts and circumstances into consideration, making in fact an ex nunc risk assessment. 
In this case, the complainant had been removed to India more than two and a half 
years before the Committee decided the complaint. It took into account the fact that 
after the expulsion the complainant had had no serious problems in India and con-
cluded that 
 
                                                        
326 ComAT, Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, No. 233/2003, para. 13.2. 
327 ComAT, Tebourski v. France, 11 May 2007, No. 300/2006, para. 8.1. See on the point in time for the 
risk assessment also Wouters 2009, pp. 487-490. 
328 See ComAT, Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, No. 233/2003, para. 13.3. 
329 Wouters 2009, p. 489. 
330 ComAT, Attia v. Sweden, 24 November 2003, No. 199/2002. 
331 ComAT, Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, No. 233/2003, para. 13.5. 
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‘It is unlikely that the author is still at risk of being subjected to acts of torture’.332 
4.6 Final concluding remarks 
The CAT is a specialised human rights treaty with a strong focus on combating the 
widespread and systematic practice of torture in different regions of the world. It has 
been ratified by all the EU Member States. The CAT does not contain a right to asy-
lum, but it does contain an explicit prohibition on refoulement in Article 3, first para-
graph, which stipulates that no State Party shall expel, return (refouler) or extradite a 
person to another State where there are substantial grounds for believing that he 
would be in danger of being subjected to torture. The Committee against Torture has 
developed a vast body of case law under Article 3 and the majority of the cases con-
cern the expulsion of asylum seekers, which makes the CAT an important instrument 
in international asylum law. 
In the first part of this chapter, the CAT’s provisions on national provisions were 
explored. Article 3 and Article 22, fifth paragraph, second part CAT require an 
opportunity for effective, independent and impartial review of the decision on expul-
sion, prior to the expulsion itself. Just like the HRC, the Committee against Torture 
has for a long time been generally reluctant to submit national remedies and proceed-
ings to a rigorous CAT compliance test. However, in more recent jurisprudence, the 
Committee has made clear that in order to qualify as an effective, independent and 
impartial national remedy as required by Article 3, national judicial remedies must 
make it possible to look at the substance, the merits of the case, and must guarantee 
equality of arms and adversarial proceedings. In the case of Sogi v. Canada (2007), the 
Committee required that all the documents in the file be disclosed to the claimant, 
including those underpinning the allegation that Sogi constituted a threat to Canada’s 
national security. In other words, in Sogi the Committee treated adversariality and 
equality of arms as an absolute right and did not tolerate that national security in-
terests justified the non-disclosure of part of the evidentiary materials. 
In cases of allegations or suspicions of internal torture, the requirement of 
impartiality enshrined in Articles 12 and 13 obliges the national judge to reconstruct 
as meticulously as possible what actually happened and to use his or her investigative 
powers to that end. Impartiality under Article 3 may be interpreted as meaning the 
same thing as impartiality under Articles 12 and 13. That would mean that the nation-
al asylum judge must act impartially and must, therefore, make his or her own inde-
pendent, thorough search for the truth and apply investigative powers to that end. 
Article 15 CAT prohibits the use of statements made as a result of torture as evi-
dence in any proceedings, except in criminal proceedings against a person accused of 
torture as evidence of the very fact that this statement was made. The Committee 
has, to date, not dealt with Article 15 in the context of asylum. 
In the second part of this chapter, it was analysed, with the aid of the eleven as-
pects of evidence and judicial scrutiny, how the Committee against Torture assesses 
                                                        
332 ComAT, T.P.S. v. Canada, 4 September 2000, No. 99/1997, paras. 15.4 and 15.5. 
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claims under Article 3. The standard of proof follows directly from Article 3, first 
paragraph CAT. This provision stipulates that there must be ‘substantial grounds for 
believing that the claimant would be in danger of being subjected to torture.’ This 
means that there must be a real, personal, present and foreseeable risk of torture in 
the country to which the claimant is returned. Torture need not be certain or highly 
probable or likely, but there must be more than mere theory or suspicion. 
The burden of proof in Article 3-claims is initially on the claimant; the claimant 
must generally present an arguable case. Where an arguable claim is provided by the 
claimant, a shift of the burden takes place and an obligation arises for the State party 
to make sufficient efforts to determine whether there are substantial grounds for be-
lieving that he or she would be in danger of being subjected to torture. There is an 
inversely proportional relationship between the onus on the claimant and the general 
human rights situation in the country of origin. The poorer this situation, the sooner 
it is assumed that the claimant runs a risk, the less he or she has to ‘prove’ and the 
sooner the onus shifts to the State party. If the human rights situation is not obvious-
ly poor, the onus shifts more towards the claimant, which means that more evidence 
is expected. It seems that with time, the Committee has become stricter and has 
placed a heavier burden on the applicant, requiring more detailed information and 
more evidence to shift the burden towards the national authorities. 
Relevant facts and circumstances are all possible personal circumstances, and, as 
well as these, the general human rights situation in the country of origin are relevant. 
Many concrete examples of such circumstances were given above. The personal facts 
must be assessed in the light of the general situation in the country of origin. From 
the Committee’s case law it becomes clear that it is normally a combination of facts 
and circumstances, and not a single fact, which indicate that there are substantial 
grounds for assuming a real Article 3-danger. 
As to the required level of individual risk, the general consideration used in 
almost all the Committee’s decisions stresses that a personal risk needs to be estab-
lished, suggesting that it strictly requires an applicant to be singled out. However, re-
cent case law – in particular the decisions in the cases of Njamba v. Sweden (2010) and 
Bakatu-Bia v. Sweden (2011) – has made clear that, just like the HRC, the Committee 
has relaxed this requirement of individualisation. In both cases, the Committee 
prohibited Sweden from returning women to the Democratic Republic of the Congo 
(DRC) due to the general high threat of (sexual) violence against women in that 
country. 
As to the assessment of credibility, it follows from General Comment No. 1 that, 
depending on the particular case before it, the Committee has the possibility and 
freedom to choose one of two approaches: reliance on the respondent State party’s 
determination of the facts, including the credibility assessment, or an independent 
determination of the facts and evaluation of the evidence on its own account. The 
Committee generally does not explain why it chooses one of the two avenues. It gen-
erally stresses its subsidiary role and considers that the determination of the facts and 
the assessment of evidence, including the assessment of credibility, is primarily a mat-
ter for the authorities of the States parties. In this respect the Committee strongly re-
sembles the HRC. Just like the HRC, it has, so far, not developed an elaborate doc-
trinal position on the issue of the intensity of its scrutiny as an international treaty 
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supervisor. It seems that two triggers in particular make the Committee proceed to-
wards an independent determination of the facts. A first trigger is that in the national 
proceedings the absolute nature of Article 3 CAT was not respected. A second trigger 
is that the State party’s authorities have not taken into consideration important facts 
or evidence (C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden, 2007). In assessing the credibility of the claim-
ant’s statements the Committee examines the ‘general veracity’. This means that the 
statements made by the asylum seeker may contain some incredible or not entirely 
credible aspects, but that the core aspects – the basic story – must be credible, that is, 
sufficiently detailed, consistent with country information, consistent throughout the 
(national and international) proceedings, brought forward in a timely manner and cor-
roborated by (some) evidence. 
The Committee generally admits to the proceedings every possible form of evi-
dence corroborating an alleged Article 3-danger.It generally requires the core aspects 
or central aspects of the claim to be supported by evidence other than the complain-
ant’s statements. The Committee is strict on this, requiring substantial evidence of the 
basic story; it needs a strongly corroborated case to obtain a positive decision from 
the Committee. It is not only important to submit evidence corroborating the indi-
vidual account. Equally important is evidence about the human rights situation in the 
country of origin. 
It is not easy to distinguish in the Committee’s case law the exact factors de-
termining the probative value and persuasiveness of evidence. The conclusions on 
the merits are often very brief, and it does not explicitly mention factors determining 
the probative value of the presented evidence. In a number of cases it is even 
completely silent about the evidence presented by the complainant and does not 
make clear how it has weighed or evaluated that evidence. However, from other cases 
it may be inferred that the authenticity of documents and the specificity and compre-
hensiveness of the information contained in evidentiary materials are important fac-
tors. Four categories of evidence were looked at in more detail. Strong probative 
value is often attached to reports submitted by States parties, containing the result of 
inquiries conducted by embassies or missions in the country to which the particular 
individual is planned to be expelled. Witness statements by family members may also 
be accorded significant probative value. A very prominent position in the case law of 
the Committee is taken by medico-legal reports, submitted as corroboration of al-
leged past torture and to explain inconsistencies or belated statements and evidence. 
In order to be considered as evidence with strong probative force in support of state-
ments about past torture, medico-legal reports must be drawn up by medical special-
ists and must conclusively identify a causal link between the individual’s bodily or 
mental injuries and the alleged past torture. In the Committee’s early case law, such 
medico-legal reports often played a decisive role. With time, the Committee has come 
to approach medico-legal reports in a stricter way, and it seems that conclusive 
medico-legal reports have been downgraded from decisive to supportive. Just like the 
ECtHR and the HRC, the Committee uses country reports from different sources, 
often without specifically mentioning these sources and without explaining the rea-
sons for giving them probative value. 
The Committee regards the principles of equality of arms and adversarial pro-
ceedings as important and crucial for fairness of its own proceedings. The relevant 
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Rules of Procedure stipulate that, at both the admissibility stage and the merits stage, 
both parties to the case are allowed to submit their observations and evidence and to 
react to the observations and evidence lodged by the other party. The Committee 
does not normally allow the complainant or the respondent State to submit new 
statements and evidence which were not presented in the national proceedings.  
The Committee has at its disposal a number of investigative powers which may 
help to obtain clarity on the facts of the case. It can proprio motu obtain information 
from the entire United Nations system, intergovernmental organisations, national hu-
man rights institutions, non-governmental organisations, and other relevant civil so-
ciety organisations. It may also request the State party concerned or the complainant 
to submit additional written information, clarification or observations relevant to the 
question of admissibility or merits. In addition, it also has the possibility to invite the 
complainant, or his or her representative and representatives of the State party con-
cerned, to be present at specified closed meetings in order to provide further clari-
fication or to answer questions on the merits of the complaint. Unfortunately, the 
Committee does not often mention in its decisions how it obtained the information 
used to take a decision and whether it used the mentioned investigative powers. 
As far as time limits for the presentation of statements and evidence are concern-
ed, the Committee, as has been said, does not normally permit complainants to raise 
new statements or submit new evidence for the first time before it. As far as the 
national proceedings are concerned, it has been a basic, unchanged, principle that the 
claimant is expected to present all the relevant statements and corroborating evidence 
as soon as possible. When statements and evidence are presented later on in the na-
tional proceedings, convincing explanations have to be given for this. In general it 
seems that the Committee has become stricter in testing whether convincing explana-
tions for tardy production of statements and evidence exist. 
With regard to the eleventh aspect, the point in time for the risk assessment, it 
was concluded that the main rule, applying inin cases where the applicant has not yet 
been expelled at the moment of examination by the Committee, is that the Commit-
tee assesses the existence of the alleged Article 3-risk on an ex nunc basis. In cases 
where deportation from the respondent State has already been effectuated, the point 
in time for the consideration by the Committee is still the moment of expulsion. 
Facts and circumstances which become known after the removal are relevant only in 
that they may confirm or refute what the State party knew or ought to have known at 
the time of removal. 
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Chapter 5: The 1950 European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(ECHR)1 
5.1  Introduction 
The ECHR was drafted within the Council of Europe, an international organisation 
formed after the Second World War in an attempt to unify Europe, as a reaction to 
the serious human rights violations that Europe had witnessed during the war.2 The 
ECHR was adopted in 1950 and it entered into force in 1953. All 47 Member States 
of the Council of Europe, including the 27 EU Member States, are party to the 
ECHR.3 The rights in the Convention have been supplemented by further rights in a 
number of Protocols to the Convention that are binding upon those States that have 
ratified them (the First,4 Fourth,5 Sixth,6 Seventh,7 Twelfth8 and Thirteenth9 Proto-
cols). In addition to these material Protocols, there are Protocols which have streng-
thened the judicial character and efficiency of the enforcement machinery. These 
procedural Protocols are the Eleventh Protocol,10 which introduced fundamental 
reforms to the enforcement machinery of the Convention as of 1998. The Commis-
sion of Human Rights was abolished and a new European Court of Human Rights 
(ECtHR), composed of full-time judges, was introduced. The Fourteenth Protocol,11 
which entered into force on 1 June 2010,12 is aimed at further improving the efficien-
                                                        
1 See the following literature for more comprehensive general descriptions and analyses of the history 
and working of the ECHR: (see bibliography for full titles): Barkhuijsen 1998, Blake 2004, Dembour 
2006, Harris, O’Boyle, Bates & Buckley 2009, Kempees 1996-2000, Lawson 1999, Lawson 2006, 
Myjer & Lawson 2000, Ovey & White 2006, Robertson 1975-1985, Van Dijk et al. 2006. For the im-
plications of the ECHR for asylum see Battjes 2006, Mole 2007, Spijkerboer & Vermeulen 2005, 
Wouters 2009, Van Bennekom & Van der Winden 2011. 
2 Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 2-4. 
3 All the European states, except for Belarus and the Vatican City, which are not Council of Europe 
members. See for this general information on the history, the adoption and the entry into force of 
the ECHR, as well as the States parties to it, the first chapter of Harris and others 2009, as well as 
the website of the Council of Europe: http://www.coe.int.  
4 213 UNTS 262; ETS 9. Adopted 1952, in force 1954, 45 parties: all Convention parties except Mo-
naco and Switzerland. 
5 1469 UNTS 263; ETS 46. Adopted 1963, in force 1968, 40 parties: all Convention parties except 
Andorra, Greece, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. 
6 ETS 114. Adopted 1983, in force 1985, 46 parties: all Convention parties except Russia. 
7 ETS 117. Adopted 1984, in force 1988. 41 parties, all Convention parties except Belgium, Germany, 
the Netherlands, Spain, Turkey, and the UK.  
8 ETS 177; 8 IHRR 300 (2000). Adopted 2000, in force 2005, 17 parties: Albania, Andorra, Armenia, 
Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Finland, Georgia, Luxembourg, Montenegro, the Nether-
lands, Romania, San Marino, Serbia, Spain, FYRM, and Ukraine. 
9 ETS 187; 9 IHRR 884 (2002). Adopted 2002, in force 2003, 40 parties: all Convention parties except 
Armenia, Azerbaijan, Italy, Latvia, Poland, Russia and Spain. 
10 ETS 155;1-3 IHRR 206 (1994). Adopted 1994. In force 1998. Ratified by all Convention parties.  
11 ETS 194; 9 IHRR 884 (2002). Adopted 2004. In force 2010.  
12 Ratification by all the States parties to the Convention is necessary. Russia ratified on 4 February 
2010, after lengthy and problematic discussions in parliament.  
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cy of the enforcement machinery. The large number of States parties to the ECHR, 
the long history and the impressive body of binding case law of the ECtHR) make 
the ECHR a very important human rights treaty in Europe. 
5.1.1  The ECHR and asylum 
The ECHR does not contain a right to political asylum.13 However, Article 3, which 
provides that no one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment, contains an implicit prohibition on refoulement. The first case in 
which the ECtHR derived this prohibition on refoulement from Article 3 was Soering v. 
the UK (1989).14 This was not an asylum case but a case concerning the extradition of 
a German national from the United Kingdom to the United States, where he faced 
capital murder charges in connection with the accusation of killing the parents of his 
girlfriend. In Soering, the ECtHR developed the rule that it would be a breach of 
Article 3 for a State party to the ECHR to send an individual to another State where 
substantial grounds had been shown for believing that the individual concerned, if 
extradited, faced a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading 
treatment or punishment in the requesting country. The Court unanimously decided 
that the extradition of Soering would indeed be in breach of Article 3 as there was a 
real risk that he would be exposed to the death row phenomenon. Given the very 
long period of time spent on death row in extreme conditions, with the ever present 
and mounting anguish of awaiting execution of the death penalty, and given the age 
and the mental state of the applicant at the time of the offence, the Court concluded 
that extradition would indeed subject Soering to treatment contrary to Article 3.15 
The refoulement prohibition developed in Soering was expanded to the situation of 
the expulsion of asylum seekers in Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden (1991).16 In this 
case, the first applicant, Hector Cruz Varas, who had applied for asylum in Sweden 
together with his wife and son, stated that he had taken part in various clandestine 
and subversive political activities in Chile in collaboration with the Frente Patriótico 
Manuel Rodriguez (FPMR), a radical organisation that had tried to kill General 
Pinochet. As a result, he had been arrested on various occasions and tortured by the 
Chilean police. He claimed that because of his previous activities, his expulsion ex-
posed him to the risk that he would be arrested and tortured once more on his return 
to Chile, where torture was still prevalent.17 In the national proceedings, the Swedish 
                                                        
13 See, for example, ECtHR, Vilvarajah and others v. the UK, 30 October 1991, Appl. Nos. 13163/87, 
13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87 and 13448/87, para, 102, ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic v. 
Turkey, 6 February 2003, Appl. Nos. 46827/99, 46951/99, para. 65, ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia 
v. Turkey, 22 September 2009, Appl. No. 30471/08, para. 72, ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 June 
2011, Appl. Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, para. 212. See also Van Bennekom and Van der Winden 
2011, p. 211. 
14 ECtHR, Soering v. the UK,7 July 1989, Appl. No. 14038/88. 
15 Ibidem, paras. 91 and 111. 
16 ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, para. 70: ‘Although the 
present case concerns expulsion as opposed to a decision to extradite, the Court considers that the 
above principle also applies to expulsion decisions and a fortiori to cases of actual expulsion.’ 
17 Ibidem, para. 72. 
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authorities rejected the claim on the ground that the applicant had made contradic-
tory statements and had radically changed his story. The applicant and the claim were 
found incredible for these reasons.18 
The ECtHR followed the reasoning of the Swedish Government. The Court 
found that the available medical evidence did support the claim that the applicant had 
been subjected to ill-treatment in the past, but not that the Chilean police had been 
behind this. Like the Swedish authorities, the Court seriously doubted the credibility 
of the applicant’s story, due to his complete silence as to his alleged clandestine ac-
tivities and torture by the Chilean police until more than eighteen months after his 
first interrogation, the numerous changes in his story and the fact that no evidence 
corroborating his clandestine activities had been presented.19 The Court also noted 
that a democratic evolution was in the process of taking place in Chile, which had led 
to improvements in the political situation and to the voluntary return of refugees 
from Sweden and elsewhere.20 The Court, finally, attached importance to the fact that 
the Swedish authorities had particular knowledge and experience in evaluating asylum 
claims lodged by Chilean asylum seekers, and that the final decision to expel the ap-
plicant had been taken after thorough examinations of his case. The Court concluded 
that no substantial grounds had been shown for believing that the first applicant’s 
expulsion would expose him to a real risk of being subjected to torture or inhuman or 
degrading treatment on his return to Chile in October 1989 and that, accordingly, 
there had been no breach of Article 3.21 
A significant number of other judgments and admissibility decisions concerning 
the expulsion of (failed) asylum seekers followed the case of Cruz Varas and others v. 
Sweden (1991) so that a vast body of case law concerning the expulsion of asylum 
seekers is now available. As a result, Article 3 has become a very important prohibi-
tion on refoulement, which is frequently invoked in national asylum proceedings. Article 
3 offers absolute protection, which means that it is not open to the respondent State 
party to claim that its own public interest reasons for expelling the individual out-
weigh the risk of ill-treatment on his or her return.22 Article 3 also contains a non-de-
rogable right,23 meaning that even in times of war or other public emergencies threat-
ening the life of the nation, it is not allowed for States parties to take measures dero-
                                                        
18 Ibidem, para. 25. 
19 Ibidem, paras. 77 – 79. 
20 Ibidem, para. 80. 
21 Ibidem, paras. 81, 82. 
22 Some examples of judgments concerning expulsion in which the absolute nature of Article 3 was 
stressed are ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy 28 February 2008, Appl. No. 37201/06, paras. 137-141; ECtHR, 
Dbouba v. Turkey, 13 July 2010, Appl. No. 15916/09, para. 40; ECtHR, A. v. the Netherlands, 20 July 
2010, Appl. No. 4900/06, paras. 142-143; ECtHR, Charahili v. Turkey, 13 April 2010, Appl. No. 
46605/07, para. 58; ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 June 2011, Appl. Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/ 
07, para. 212. See also Van Bennekom & Van der Winden 2011, p. 211. 
23 Article 15 (derogation in time of emergency) stipulates in para. 1 that: ‘in time of war or other public 
emergency threatening the life of the nation any High Contracting Party may take measures derogating 
from its obligations under this Convention to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situa-
tion, provided that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under international 
law’. Para. 2 stipulates that: ‘no derogation from Article 2, except in respect of deaths resulting from 
lawful acts of war, or from Articles 3, 4 (paragraph 1) and 7 shall be made under this provision’. 
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gating from their obligations under Article 3. Because of its absolute and non-dero-
gable character, and because Article 3 is not conditioned by the five grounds of per-
secution contained in Article 1 A (2) RC, Article 3 in this respect offers broader pro-
tection than Article 33 RC.24 
As this book focuses on issues of evidence and judicial scrutiny in asylum court 
proceedings, but is not a comprehensive analysis of the prohibitions on refoulement 
contained in international asylum law, the concepts of torture and inhuman or de-
grading treatment or punishment are not analysed further here. Other authors have 
done this before.25 
5.1.2  Supervisory mechanisms 
Compared to most other international human rights treaties, the ECHR has very 
strong enforcement mechanisms. Three international monitoring institutions can be 
distinguished, being the ECtHR, the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary Gen-
eral of the Council of Europe.  
States26 and individuals27 are entitled to lodge complaints to the ECtHR, which is 
a permanent judicial body composed of full-time judges, established under the ECHR 
to ensure the observance of the obligations undertaken by the States parties.28 
Unlike the ICCPR and the CAT, where the right of individual complaint is op-
tional – that is, only applicable as against those parties that have made a declaration 
accepting it – under the ECHR, the right of individual complaint has been compul-
sory since the Eleventh Protocol entered into force in 1998.29 The ECtHR consists of 
a number of judges equal to the number of States parties30 who have to be of high 
moral character and who either possess the qualifications required for appointment to 
high judicial office or are jurisconsults of recognised competence. The judges serve in 
their own personal capacity and do not represent their respective governments.31 
It follows from Article 46, first paragraph, which stipulates that the Contracting 
Parties ‘undertake to abide by the final judgment of the Court in any case to which 
                                                        
24 See Wouters 2009 for a much more detailed material comparison of the prohibitions on refoulement 
on pp. 525-578. See also Westerveen 2011 for an asylum-focused comparison of the RC and the 
ECHR. 
25 See, for example, Wouters 2009, pp. 221-244 and Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 406-418. 
26 Article 33 ECHR stipulates: ‘Any High Contracting Party may refer to the Court any alleged breach 
of the provisions of the Convention and the Protocols thereto by another High Contracting Party.’ 
27 Article 34 ECHR stipulates: ‘The Court may receive applications from any person, non-government-
al organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the victim of a violation by one of the High 
Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or the Protocols thereto. The High 
Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective exercise of this right.’ 
28 See Article 19 ECHR. 
29 Protocol No. 11 (ETS 155;1-3 IHRR 206 (1994), adopted 1994, in force 1998, ratified by all Con-
vention parties) introduced in its Article 1 a new Article 34, which stipulates: ‘The Court may receive 
applications from any person, non-governmental organisation or group of individuals claiming to be the 
victim of a violation by one of the High Contracting Parties of the rights set forth in the Convention or 
the protocols thereto. The High Contracting Parties undertake not to hinder in any way the effective 
exercise of this right.’ 
30 See Article 20 ECHR. 
31 See Article 21 ECHR. 
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they are parties’, that the judgments of the ECtHR have binding force.32 This feature 
clearly distinguishes the ECHR from the ICCPR and the CAT, which have weaker 
monitoring bodies in the shape of Committees issuing non-binding views. Even 
though it follows from the text of Article 46, first paragraph, that in a particular case 
only the respondent State is obliged to abide by the final judgment of the ECtHR, the 
judgment is of significant importance to States parties not involved in that particular 
case. The ECtHR has also ruled in this respect that 
 
‘The Court’s judgments in fact serve not only to decide those cases brought before the Court, 
but, more generally, to elucidate, safeguard and develop the rules instituted by the Convention, 
thereby contributing to the observance by the States of the engagements undertaken by them 
as Contracting Parties (…)’.33 
 
According to Article 46, second paragraph, once the Court’s final judgment has been 
transmitted to the Committee of Ministers, the latter invites the respondent State to 
inform it of the steps taken to pay the amounts awarded by the Court in respect of 
just satisfaction, and, where appropriate, of the individual and general measures taken 
to abide by the judgment.34 It is the Committee of Ministers’ practice to keep cases 
on its agenda until the States concerned have taken satisfactory measures.35 The 
ICCPR and the CAT also lack this strong supervision mechanism of Article 46, 
second paragraph. The Secretary General of the Council of Europe may, under 
Article 52 ECHR, request any State party to furnish an explanation of the manner in 
which its internal law ensures the effective implementation of the ECHR.36 
5.1.3  Provisions on national proceedings 
The ECHR and a number of its Protocols contain provisions regulating national 
proceedings. In this chapter, the focus is on provisions with immediate relevance for 
national judicial proceedings in asylum cases. These are Article 6, first paragraph, on 
the right to a fair trial, Article 13 on the right to an effective national remedy, Article 
3, which contains a procedural limb imposing certain requirements on national judi-
cial proceedings, and Article 35, first paragraph, which requires that applicants should 
first exhaust effective national remedies before applying to the ECtHR. The case law 
                                                        
32 See also Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 291-321. 
33 ECtHR, Ireland v. the United Kingdom, 18 January 1978, Appl. No. 5310/71, para. 154. This notion of 
binding force towards all States parties to the ECHR was reaffirmed in Opuz v. Turkey, 9 June 2009, 
Appl. No. 33401/02. 
34 See the Rules of the Committee of Ministers for the application of Article 46, second paragraph, of 
the Convention; http://www.coe.int/T/E/Human_rights/execution. 
35 Rule 4(a) of the Rules of the Committee of Ministers provides that, until the State concerned has 
provided information on the payment of the just satisfaction awarded by the Court or concerning 
possible individual measures, the case will be placed on the agenda of each human rights meeting of 
the Committee of Ministers, unless the Committee decides otherwise. See for more detailed infor-
mation on the supervision of the execution of the Court’s judgments by the Committee of Ministers: 
Sitaropoulos 2008, Wouters 2009, pp. 196-198. 
36 See for more information on this power of the Secretary General of the Council of Europe, 
Schokkenbroek 2006. 
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under Article 35, first paragraph, may help to explain when a national remedy is 
considered (in)effective, in addition to the jurisprudence on Article 13. 
The choice to investigate Article 6, first paragraph may seem odd, as it is standard 
case law of the ECtHR that Article 6 is not applicable in asylum cases.37 For the 
purpose of this research it is, nevertheless, useful to examine this provision. Since its 
judgment in Kudla v. Poland (2000),38 the ECtHR has held that the requirements of 
Article 13 should be considered as ‘reinforcing’ those of Article 6, first paragraph.39 It 
may be inferred from this that the requirements developed under Article 6, first para-
graph, also form part of the more general and broader Article 13. For a good under-
standing of Article 13 it is, therefore, necessary to have knowledge of the require-
ments of Article 6, first paragraph. Second, the case law of the ECtHR under Article 
6, first paragraph, defines to a large extent the content of Article 47, second para-
graph, of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union,40 containing 
the right to a fair hearing, which provision will normally be applicable to asylum court 
proceedings. Reference is made to Chapter 6 on EU asylum law, section 6.3, for a 
more detailed analysis of this incorporation of Article 6 ECHR into EU law via 
Article 47 of the EU Charter. 
Article 5, fourth paragraph, ECHR, containing the right to a speedy trial in cases 
of detention, and Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 to the ECHR on the expulsion of aliens 
and the procedure to be followed in cases of expulsion, are not extensively explored 
in this chapter. The reasons are that the detention of asylum seekers is not covered by 
this research and that Article 1 of Protocol 7 has, so far, not yielded jurisprudence of 
interest to the questions of this research.41 
                                                        
37 The first judgment in which the ECtHR ruled that Article 6 is not applicable to cases concerning the 
expulsion of a non-citizen is ECtHR, Maaouia v. France, 5 October 2000, Appl. No. 39652/98, paras. 
33-41; it was repeated in a number of later judgments, for example ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Abdura-
sulovic v. Turkey, 4 February 2005, Appl. Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, paras. 80, 81. The idea was 
that cases concerning expulsion did not involve either a civil right or a criminal charge. In literature, 
criticism has been voiced about this approach; see, for example, Wouters 2009, pp. 344-345. 
38 ECtHR,Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 2000, Appl. No. 30210/96. 
39 Ibidem, para. 152. Van Dijk 2006 describes a change in the caselaw of the ECtHR as the Court in 
pre-Kudla case law tended to rule that the requirements of Article 13 were less strict than, and sus-
ceptible to absorption by, those of Article 6, first paragraph.In Kudla, the ECtHR made a crucial de-
parture from this case law by ruling that the requirements of Article 13 reinforced those of Article 
6(1) rather than being absorbed by the requirements of Article 6, paragraph 1. See Van Dijk et al., 
pp. 1017-1021. The Kudlaapproach was followed in later cases, see, for example, Romashov v. 
Ukraine27 July 2004, Appl. No. 67534/01, paras. 42-47. 
40 OJ of the EU 2000, C-364/1. Certain parts of this version of the Charter were amended subsequently. 
The version now in force can be found in OJ of the EU 2010, C-83/02. See Chapter 6 for a more de-
tailed analysis of the (history of the) Charter. 
41 Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 stipulates: 
‘1. An alien lawfully resident in the territory of a State shall not be expelled therefrom except in 
pursuance of a decision reached in accordance with law and shall be allowed: 
a. to submit reasons against his expulsion, 
b. to have his case reviewed, and 
c. to be represented for these purposes before the competent authority or a person or persons desig-
nated by that authority. 
→ 
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5.1.4  Chapter outline 
The content of this chapter is divided into two parts. Part 1 covers the ECHR’s 
provisions on national proceedings. The central question in Part 1 is what these 
provisions say about the required intensity of national judicial scrutiny and what they 
say about evidentiary issues in national asylum court proceedings. The provisions on 
national proceedings are first briefly introduced in section 5.2. Many readers will be 
familiar with these basics, but some knowledge of them is indispensable before we 
focus on the asylum context. Section 5.3 discusses how the provisions on national 
proceedings work in the asylum context and, more in particular, what the provisions 
require from national asylum courts with regard to the intensity of judicial scrutiny 
and with regard to issues of evidence. 
In section 5.4 we will look at the question of the required intensity of judicial 
scrutiny under Article 6, first paragraph. The Zumtobel doctrine, and its implications 
for national asylum courts, is discussed here. Section 5.5 examines the implications of 
Article 6, first paragraph, for issues of evidence in national proceedings. Special at-
tention will be paid to the acceptability of the use of secret evidence in national pro-
ceedings.  
In Part 2, the assessment performed by the ECtHR itself in cases concerning the 
expulsion of asylum seekers is analysed with the aid of the eleven aspects of evidence 
and judicial scrutiny introduced in Chapter 1. In section 5.7, final concluding remarks 
are made. 
 
                                                        
2. An alien may be expelled before the exercise of his rights under paragraph 1.a, b and c of this Ar-
ticle, when such expulsion is necessary in the interests of public order or is grounded on reasons of 
national security.’ 
Article 1 of Protocol 7 very much resembles Article 32 RC (discussed in Chapter 2) and Article 13 
ICCPR (discussed in Chapter 3). It contains exactly the same procedural rights in cases of expulsion, 
being the right to submit reasons against the expulsion, the right to review and the right to be repre-
sented before the competent review authority. Compared to Article 32 RC and Article 13 ICCPR, 
Article 1 of Protocol 7 to the ECHR is broader in the sense that it allows expulsion before the exer-
cise of these rights on both grounds of public order and national security whereas Articles 32 RC 
and 13 ICCPR only allow such expulsions when national securityso requires. From the Explanatory 
Report on Protocol 7 (to be found at: ) it follows, however, that persons who are waiting for a 
decision on a request for a residence permit are explicitly excluded from the scope of Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 7 and that the right of review contained in paragraph 1 of Article 1 of Protocol No. 7 
does not pertain to judicial appeal proceedings. This is also stressed in literature. See Boeles 1997, 
pp. 286-288, Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 953-957 and 965-969, Wouters 2009, pp. 342-344. This 
restricted personal scope is also stressed in the limited jurisprudence of the Court under this 
provision.See ECtHR, Sejdovic and Sulejmanovic, admissibility decision,14 March 2002,Appl. No. 
57575/00, ECtHR, Sulejmanovic and Sultanovic v. Italy, admissibility decision, 14 March 2002, Appl. 
No. 57574/00, Bolat v. Russia, 5 October 2006, Appl. No. 14139/03 and Shchukin and others v. Cyprus, 
29 July 2010, Appl. No. 14030/03. It is in this respect – the personal scope – that Article 1 of 
Protocol No. 7 differs clearly from Articles 32 RC and 13 ICCPR. Because of the limited personal 
scope and because the provision does not pertain to judicial review or appeal proceedings, the 
relevance for this research is minimal. See also Boeles 1997, p. 288, who qualifies Article 1 of 
Protocol 7 as taking a subordinate position within the total web of the other provisions on pro-
ceedings within the ECHR. 
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ECHR, Part 1: 
 
Provisions on national proceedings; 
Issues of intensity of judicial scrutiny and evidentiary issues in national 
judicial proceedings 
5.2  Basics: introduction to the provisions on national proceedings 
5.2.1  Texts of the provisions on national proceedings 
Article 3 stipulates: 
 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punish-
ment.’ 
 
Article 6, first paragraph, stipulates: 
 
‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations or of any criminal charge against him, 
everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and 
impartial tribunal established by law. Judgment shall be pronounced publicly but the press and 
public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest of morals, public order or 
national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles or the protection of 
the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the opinion of the 
court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of justice.’ 
 
Article 13 stipulates: 
 
‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention are violated shall have an 
effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation has been com-
mitted by persons acting in an official capacity.’ 
 
Article 35, first paragraph, stipulates: 
 
‘The Court may only deal with the matter after all national remedies have been exhausted, ac-
cording to the generally recognised rules of international law, and within a period of six 
months from the date on which the final decision was taken.’ 
5.2.2  The procedural limb of Article 3 
According to the ECtHR’s case law, Article 3 contains an important procedural obli-
gation: where an individual raises an arguable claim that Article 3 has been violated 
(or threatens to be violated), Article 3 requires an independent, effective and thor-
ough official investigation, aimed at securing all the available evidence concerning the 
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incident, which should be a prompt response and reasonable expedition and which 
guarantees a sufficient element of public scrutiny.42 
5.2.3  Article 6, first paragraph: the right to a fair hearing 
Article 6, first paragraph, grants the right of access to court43 and requires that na-
tional judicial proceedings are fair,44 take place before an independent and impartial 
tribunal established by law,45 hearings and judgments should be public46 and judg-
ment is to be rendered within a reasonable time.47 Independence of courts and tribu-
nals refers to the structural relationship between the judiciary and other government 
structures. The functions and competences of the judiciary and, for example, the 
executive, should be clearly distinguishable and the latter should not be able to con-
trol or direct the former.48 Impartiality of courts and tribunals refers to the relation-
ship between a judge and the matter at issue in a specific case; it implies that judges 
must not harbour preconceptions about the matter put before them and must not act 
in ways that promote the interests of one of the parties.49 
‘Fair’ in Article 6, first paragraph, means that the parties to the case have equal 
arms, meaning that each party is afforded a reasonable opportunity to present his or 
her case, including his or her evidence, under conditions that do not place him or her 
at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the other side.50 ‘Fair’ also means that proceed-
ings are adversarial: parties must have knowledge of and must be able to comment on 
the observations filed or evidence adduced by the other party.51 Other components 
of ‘fairness’ are that the decision or judgment is reasoned52 and that individuals have 
the right to attend proceedings and participate effectively in them.53 
                                                        
42 See, for example, ECtHR, Slimani v. France, 27 July 2004, Appl. No. 57671/00, paras. 30-32. See also 
Van Dijk et al. 2006, p. 410, Harris, O’Boyle, Bates & Buckley 2009, pp. 108, 110. 
43 See for an extensive explanation of the right of access to court Harris et al. 2009, pp. 235-246, Van 
Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 557-559, Ovey & White 2006, pp. 170-174. 
44 See for a detailed description of the right to a fair hearing and its different aspects: Harris, O’Boyle, 
Bates & Buckley 2009, pp. 246-271, Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 578-596, Ovey & White 2006, pp. 175-
181. 
45 For an extensive description of the requirements of independence and impartiality, I refer to Harris, 
O’Boyle, Bates & Buckley 2009, pp. 284-298, Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 612-623, Ovey & White 2006, 
pp. 181-185. 
46 See for a detailed discussion of the requirement of publicity Harris et al. 2009, pp. 271-278, Ovey & 
White 2006, pp. 185-189. 
47 For an extensive discussion of the reasonable time requirement, see Harris, O’Boyle, Bates & 
Buckley 2009, pp. 278-284, Ovey & White 2006, pp. 187-188, Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 602-612. 
48 For example, ECtHR, Ringeisen v. Austria, 16 July 1971, Appl. No. 2614/65, para. 95. 
49 For example, ECtHR, Tierce and Others v. San Marino, 25 July 2000, Appl. Nos 24954/94, 24971/94, 
24972/94, paras. 78-81. 
50 See, for example, ECtHR, Dombo Beheer B.V. v. the Netherlands, 27 October 1993, Appl. No. 14448/ 
88, para. 33.  
51 See, for example, ECtHR, Kress v. France, 7 June 2001, Appl. No.39594/98, para. 65. 
52 See, for example, ECtHR, Van de Hurk v. the Netherlands, 19 April 1994, Appl. No. 16034/90, para. 
61.  
53 An example of a criminal case is ECtHR, Kremzow v. Austria, 21 September 1993, Appl. No. 12350/ 
86, para. 67; an example of a civil case is ECtHR, Salomonsson v. Sweden, 12 November 2002, Appl. 
→ 
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5.2.4  Article 13: the right to an effective remedy 
Article 13 accords to individuals a means whereby they can obtain relief at national 
level for violations of their ECHR rights, before having recourse to the Strasbourg 
system.54 The machinery of complaint to the ECtHR is, thus, subsidiary to national 
systems safeguarding human rights. To make Article 13 applicable, there must be an 
arguable claim that an ECHR right has been violated. This means that the claim is 
supported by demonstrable facts and is not manifestly lacking in any ground in law.55 
The scope of obligations flowing from Article 13 depends on the nature of the 
complaint.56 The Court has accepted that the context in which an alleged violation 
occurs (for example, national security considerations) may entail inherent limitations 
on the conceivable remedy.57 In the case of alleged violations of fundamental rights 
of a non-derogable nature, such as the right contained in Article 3, the obligations 
flowing from Article 13 are more stringent.58 To be effective, the remedy must be 
truly usable and personally accessible59 and the national authority must take a decision 
within a reasonable time.60 Furthermore, the national remedy must make it possible 
to enforce the substance of the Convention rights and freedoms and the decision 
taken by the national authority must be binding.61 Although no single national reme-
dy may itself entirely satisfy the requirements of Article 13, the aggregate of remedies 
provided for under national law can do so.62 
                                                        
No. 38978/97, paras. 36-40. See also Harris et al. 2009, pp. 250-251, Ovey & White 2006, pp. 180-
181. 
54 Collected edition of the Travaux Préparatoires of the ECHR, Vol. II, p. 485-490, and Vol. III, p. 651. 
See also ECtHR, Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 2000, Appl. No. 30210/96, para. 152. See for a recent 
judgment concerning asylum in which the subsidiary nature of the ECtHR was stressed once again: 
ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09, para. 287. 
55 See, for example, ECtHR, Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 2000, Appl. No. 30210/96, para. 157 and 
ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09, para. 197. For a more 
detailed discussion of the arguability test, see Van Dijk et al. 2006, pp. 1000-1006, Wouters 2009, 
pp. 333-336. 
56 See, for example, ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09, para. 
197. 
57 See, for example, ECtHR, Leander v. Sweden, 26 March 1987, Application No. 9248/81, para. 84; 
ECtHR, Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 2000, Appl. No. 30210/96, para. 151. Harris, O’Boyle, Bates & 
Buckley 2009 give an interesting overview and analysis of Article 13 decisions with national security 
connotations, see pp. 568-570.  
58 ECtHR, Klass and others v. Germany, 6 September 1978, Appl. No. 5029/71, para. 69; ECtHR, Chahal 
v. the UK, 15 November 1996, Appl. No. 22414/93, paras. 150, 151; Barkhuysen 1998, p. 123, Van 
Dijk et al. 2006, p. 999, Harris, O’Boyle, Bates & Buckley 2009, p. 559. 
59 See ECtHR, Akdivar v. Turkey 16 September 1996, Appl. No. 21893/93, paras. 93-97, where the 
ECtHR concluded that there was a remedy on paper, but too many practical obstacles to using it, so 
that the remedy could not be regarded as effective. 
60 See, for example, ECtHR, Plaksin v. Russia, 29 April 2004, Appl. No. 14949/02, para. 35. 
61 See, for example, ECtHR, Chahal v. the UK, 15 November 1996, Appl. No. 22414/93, para. 154. This 
case concerned the deportation of an alleged terrorist on national security grounds. The Court was 
critical of the fact that the advisory panel, which reviewed the deportation order, reached decisions 
which were not binding. 
62 In the case of Klass and others v. Germany, 6 September 1987, Appl. No. 5029/71, para. 68, the Court 
applied the ‘aggregation approach’ for the first time. In that case, the Court ruled that the aggregate 
of remedies fulfilled the conditions of Article 13. In Chahal v. the UK,15 November 1996, Appl. No. 
→ 
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The ‘authority’ referred to in Article 13 does not per se require a judicial authori-
ty.63 When, however, national judicial review proceedings are available at national 
level, they, in principle, constitute an effective remedy within the meaning of Article 
13, provided that the national court or courts can effectively review the legality of 
executive discretion on substantive and procedural grounds and quash decisions as 
appropriate.64 No effective remedy exists where this national judicial review is so 
weak that it is unable to properly address the key elements of whether there has been 
a violation of the ECHR.65 
5.2.5  Article 35, first paragraph: the obligation to exhaust national 
remedies 
Article 35, first paragraph, requires that applicants should first exhaust national reme-
dies before applying to the ECtHR. The machinery of complaint to the ECtHR is, 
thus, subsidiary to national systems safeguarding human rights: the purpose of Article 
35, first paragraph, is to afford the States parties to the ECHR the opportunity of 
preventing or putting right the violations alleged against them before those allega-
tions are submitted to the ECtHR.66 The rule in Article 35, first paragraph, is based 
on the assumption, reflected in Article 13, that there is an effective national remedy 
available in respect of the alleged breach of an individual’s Convention rights; the rule 
of exhaustion of effective remedies does not apply when, in short, there is no effec-
tive national remedy.67 
                                                        
22414/93, para. 145, the aggregate of national remedies was found insufficient and, therefore, in-
compliant with Article 13. In M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09, the 
Court reiterated the ‘aggregation doctrine’ in para. 289. In para. 321, the Court concluded that there 
had been a violation of Article 13 by Greece because the aggregate of national remedies was not ef-
fective. In para. 396, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 13 by Belgium 
because the appeal stage had not been effective; with regard to Belgium the aggregation doctrine 
was, therefore, not applied in concreto. Barkhuysen and Harris, O’Boyle, Bates & Buckley criticise the 
‘aggregation doctrine’ as the ECtHR, when applying this approach, does not make clear how differ-
ent national remedies reinforce each other. See Barkhuysen 1998, pp.146-150 and Harris, O’Boyle, 
Bates & Buckley 2009, pp. 566-567. See also Boeles pp. 1997, p. 272, 273, 277 and Wouters 2009, 
p. 332. 
63 See, for example, ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09, para. 
197. 
64 See, for example, ECtHR, Slivenko v. Latvia, 9 October 2003, Appl. No. 48321/99, para. 99; ECtHR, 
Baysakov v. Ukraine, 1 June 2010, Appl. No. 29031/04, para. 75. See also Van Bennekom & Van der 
Winden 2011, p. 28. 
65 On this basis, the Court found violations of Article 13 in conjunction with Article 8 in Smith and 
Grady v. the UK, 27 September 1999, Appl. Nos. 33985/96 and 33986/96, paras. 135-139 and in 
Hatton v. the UK, 8 July 2003, Appl. No. 36022/97, paras. 137-142. 
66 See, for a non-expulsion case, ECtHR, Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 2000, Appl. No. 30210/96, para. 
152. See for examples of cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. 
the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04, para. 121 and ECtHR, Diallo v. the Czech Repub-
lic, 23 June 2011, Appl. No. 20493/07, para. 53. 
67 ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04, para. 121. 
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5.2.6  Mutual relationships 
There is close affinity between the provisions on national proceedings briefly intro-
duced above. The ECtHR has repeatedly emphasized that once an individual makes 
out an arguable claim under Article 3, the notion of effectiveness under Article 13 
entails the institutional, investigative and procedural elements parallel to those estab-
lished under Article 3. This means that the effective investigation requirements flow-
ing from Article 3 (see section 5.2.2 above) are also requirements which determine 
whether a national remedy is effective.68 
The same kind of close affinity exists between Articles 13 and 35, first paragraph: 
as the rule of exhaustion of national remedies does not apply where national remedies 
are not effective, the case law under Article 35, first paragraph, is relevant to the no-
tion of an effective remedy contained in Article 13. The ECtHR has emphasized a 
number of times that the concept of an effective remedy as required under Article 35, 
first paragraph, corresponds to the nature of obligations under Article 13.69 
As has been said above, the requirements of Article 13 should be considered as 
reinforcing those of Article 6, first paragraph.70 This implies that the principles and 
requirements developed under Article 6, first paragraph, in fact also form part of 
Article 13. Indeed, the Court has concluded in a number of judgments that there has 
been a violation of both provisions for exactly the same reasons, whereby it first 
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 6 and then established a breach 
of Article 13.71 
5.3  The provisions on national proceedings in the asylum context 
5.3.1  The requirement of an independent and rigorous scrutiny 
National judicial review proceedings constitute, in principle, an effective remedy 
within the meaning of Article 13, provided that the national court can effectively 
review the legality of executive discretion on substantive and procedural grounds and 
quash decisions as appropriate.72 This general principle has been reiterated in a num-
                                                        
68 See, for example,ECtHR, Yüksel v. Turkey 20 July 2004, Appl. No.40154/98,para. 36. 
69 See, for example, ECtHR, Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 2000, Appl. No. 30210/96, para. 152. The 
judgments in Doganv. Turkey, 29 June 2004, Appl. Nos. 8803/02, 8804/02, 8805/02 and Rachevi v. 
Bulgaria 23 September 2004, Appl. No. 47877/99, also clearly illustrate the closely intertwined rela-
tionship between issues of exhaustion of national remedies under Article 35(1) and the requirement 
to safeguard an effective remedy under Article 13. In both cases, the ECtHR concluded at the ad-
missibility stage that national remedies had not been exhausted but it did not hold this against the 
applicant because the remedies were considered ineffective. Logically, at the merits stage, the Court 
concluded that there had been a violation of Article 13. See also Harris, O’Boyle, Bates & Buckley 
2009, p. 561. 
70 ECtHR, Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 2000, Appl. No. 30210/96, para. 152. See also Van Dijk et al. 
2006, p. 1019. 
71 See, forexample, ECtHR, Romashov v. Ukraine, 27 July 2004, Appl. No. 67534/01, paras. 42-47. 
72 See, for example, ECtHR, Slivenko v. Latvia, 9 October 2003, Appl. No. 48321/99, para. 99. 
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ber of cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers.73 In a number of judgments 
concerning expulsion, the ECtHR has further clarified what kind of scrutiny is 
required from the national court (or review authority) by virtue of the procedural 
limb of Article 3, and Article 13. Chahal v. the UK (1996) was the first judgment in 
which the Court considered as follows: 
 
‘in such cases, given the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the risk of ill-treat-
ment materialised, and the importance the Court attaches to Article 3, the notion of an effec-
tive remedy under Article 13 requires independent scrutiny of the claim that there exist sub-
stantial grounds for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3’.74 
 
In Jabari v. Turkey (2000), the Court added the term ‘rigorous’ to this: it considered 
that the national appeal authority or court should perform an ‘independent and rigor-
ous scrutiny’ of a claim that there were substantial grounds for believing that there 
was a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3.75 The ECtHR has reiterated in nu-
merous subsequent judgments concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers that the 
notion of ‘effective remedy’ within the meaning of Article 13 taken together with Ar-
ticle 3 requires independent and rigorous scrutiny of the complaint.76 The Court has 
not formulated any further general rules but decides on a case-by-case basis whether 
or not an independent and rigorous scrutiny has occurred.77 Nevertheless, from the 
Court’s case law certain categories of non-compliant cases do emerge. This makes it 
possible to define in a more precise way what an independent and rigorous scrutiny 
entails. Four categories of non-compliant cases are discussed below, with a particular 
focus on how the national court operated in the asylum court proceedings.78 
5.3.2  No material investigation by national courts (mostly due to failure to 
comply with national procedural rules) 
The first category of non-compliant cases consists of cases in which the national 
authorities, and in particular the national court, did not conduct any material investi-
                                                        
73 See, for example, ECtHR, Baysakov v. Ukraine, 1 June 2010, Appl. No. 29031/04, para. 75; ECtHR, 
Abdulazhon Isakov v. Russia, 8 July 2010, Appl. No. 14049/08, para. 137; ECtHR, A. v. the Netherlands, 
20 July 2010, Appl. No. 4900/06, para. 158. 
74 ECtHR, Chahal v. the UK, 15 November 1996, Appl. No. 22414/93, para. 151. 
75 ECtHR, Jabari v. Turkey, 11 July 2000, Appl. No. 40035/98, para.50. 
76 See, for some more recent examples, ECtHR, Muminov v. Russia, 11 December 2008, Appl. No. 
42502/06, para. 101; ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 2009, Appl. No. 
30471/08, para. 108; ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09, 
para. 198. 
77 Boeles 1997, p. 278, Wouters 2009, p. 332. 
78 As this research focuses on court proceedings, I specifically searched for cases in which the ECtHR 
expressed itself about the quality of national court proceedings. For a broader test of the entire 
asylum procedure (not only the court proceedings) against the requirements of Articles 3 and 13, see 
the case of ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09, paras. 301-
315. In this case the Court pointed out many different deficiencies in the asylum procedure, such as 
defective access to the asylum procedure, due to absence of information and of communication 
between the asylum seeker and the decision maker, inavailability of interpreters and legal aid, and ill-
trained staff. 
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gation whatsoever into the alleged Article 3-risk, because national procedural rules 
barred this. This does not always lead the ECtHR to the conclusion that no inde-
pendent and rigorous scrutiny was applied. Two cases in which the Court reached op-
posite conclusions may illustrate this. 
In Bahaddar v. the Netherlands (1998), a case concerning a Bangladeshi asylum seek-
er, the ECtHR considered that  
 
‘even in cases of expulsion to a country where there is an alleged risk of ill-treatment contrary 
to Article 3, the formal requirements and time-limits laid down in national law should normally 
be complied with (…). Whether there are special circumstances which absolve an applicant 
from the obligation to comply with such rules will depend on the facts of each case. It should 
be borne in mind in this regard that in applications for recognition of refugee status it may be 
difficult, if not impossible, for the person concerned to supply evidence within a short time, es-
pecially if – as in the present case – such evidence must be obtained from the country from 
which he or she claims to have fled. Accordingly, time-limits should not be so short, or applied 
so inflexibly, as to deny an applicant for recognition of refugee status a realistic opportunity to 
prove his or her claim.’79 
 
In Bahaddar, the ECtHR held, under the old Article 26 ECHR, now Article 35, first 
paragraph, that it could not consider the merits of the case because national legal 
remedies had not been exhausted. This finding was based to a large extent on the fact 
that the applicant’s lawyer had not stated any grounds when lodging her client’s ap-
peal against the decision of the Deputy Minister of Justice to the Judicial Division of 
the Council of State, although she had been offered the opportunity and a significant 
period of time – nearly four months – to cure this failing and although it would have 
been possible for the lawyer to request an extension of this time-limit. The applicant’s 
lawyer submitted grounds of appeal nearly three months after the time-limit had 
expired, and without explaining the delay, which led the Council of State to declare 
the appeal inadmissible.80 
In Jabari v. Turkey (2000), a case concerning an Iranian woman who had fled to 
Turkey in fear of inhuman punishment for adultery in Iran, the Ankara administrative 
court only established that the asylum claim had not been lodged within the statutory 
time frame of five days after arrival in the country. It did not investigate the merits of 
the claim. The ECtHR concluded that there had been a violation of both the proce-
dural limb of Article 3 and Article 13. It ruled as follows: 
 
‘the Court concludes that the automatic and mechanical application of such a short time-limit 
for submitting an asylum application must be considered at variance with the protection of the 
fundamental value embodied in Article 3 of the Convention.’81 
 
                                                        
79 ECtHR, Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, 19 February 1998, Appl. No. 25894/94, para. 45. 
80 Ibidem, paras. 45-49. 
81 ECtHR, Jabari v. Turkey, 11 July 2000, Appl. No. 40035/98, para. 40. 
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‘The Ankara Administrative Court considered that the applicant’s deportation was fully in line 
with domestic law requirements. It would appear that, having reached that conclusion, the 
court felt it unnecessary to address the substance of the applicant’s complaint, even though it 
was arguable on the merits in view of the UNHCR’s decision to recognise her as a refugee 
within the meaning of the Geneva Convention. In the Court’s opinion, given the irreversible 
nature of the harm that might occur if the risk of torture or ill-treatment alleged materialised 
and the importance which it attaches to Article 3, the notion of an effective remedy under Arti-
cle 13 requires independent and rigorous scrutiny of a claim that there exist substantial grounds 
for fearing a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3 and the possibility of suspending the 
implementation of the measure impugned. Since the Ankara Administrative Court failed in the 
circumstances to provide any of these safeguards, the Court is led to conclude that the judicial 
review proceedings (…) did not satisfy the requirements of Article 13. Accordingly, there has 
been a violation of Article 13 of the Convention.’82 
 
From Bahaddar v. the Netherlands (1998) and Jabari v. Turkey (2000), we may conclude 
that applicants for asylum must normally comply with national procedural rules. At 
the same time, the automatic and mechanical application of procedural rules, barring 
an examination by the national court of the merits of the asylum claim, is at variance 
with the requirement to conduct an independent and rigorous scrutiny of the claim. 
This is particularly true for short time limits. Regard must be had to the reasons for 
non-compliance and other particular circumstances of the case. In addition, the 
question of whether the particular procedural rule is not too strict, given the difficult 
evidentiary position of asylum seekers, must be posed. If ample opportunities have 
been given to the applicant to bring forward the merits of the case, but the applicant 
or legal counsel has chosen not to use these opportunities, the bar to a material con-
sideration of the case by the national court is imputed to the asylum seeker and does 
not make the national remedy ineffective.  
Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey (2009), a case discussed in Chapter 2, is another 
example of a case in which no material investigation whatsoever was conducted by 
the national court.83 A final example of the first category worthwhile mentioning is 
the case of Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy (2012).84 The case concerned interception and 
push back operations on the high seas by Italian military personnel, conducted in ac-
cordance with bilateral Italian-Libyan agreements aimed at combating illegal immi-
gration. The applicants in this case were Somali and Eritrean nationals who formed 
                                                        
82 Ibidem, paras. 49 and 50. Another example of a case in which the national court did not conduct a 
material examination because national procedural rules (time limits for filing the application and 
rules on court fees) were not adhered to, is the case of Charahili v. Turkey, 13 April 2010, Appl. No. 
46605/07, para. 57. The ECtHR noted that no material examination had taken place, but did not ex-
plicitly conclude that there had been a violation of the procedural limb of Article 3. Nor did the 
ECtHR rule on the applicant’s complaint under Article 13. The Court stated that, by establishing a 
violation of Article 3 (and Article 5(1)), it had considered the main legal questions so that there was 
no need to give a separate ruling on the remaining complaints. 
83 See section 2.5.2. ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 2009, Appl. No. 30471/ 
08, paras. 107-117. See also the very similar cases of Tehrani and others v. Turkey, 13 April 2010, Appl. 
Nos. 32940/08, 41626/08, 43616/08 and Charahili v. Turkey, 13 April 2010, Appl. No. 46605/07. 
84 ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09. 
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part of a group of about two hundred individuals who left Libya aboard three vessels 
with the aim of reaching the Italian coast. When the vessels were near Lampedusa, 
they were intercepted by three ships from the Italian Revenue Police and the Coast-
guard. The occupants of the intercepted vessels were transferred onto Italian military 
ships and returned to Tripoli. On arrival in the Port of Tripoli, after a ten-hour voy-
age, the migrants were handed over to the Libyan authorities. They objected to this, 
but were forced to leave the Italian ships. According to the applicants, during the 
voyage the Italian authorities did not inform them of their real destination and took 
no steps to identify them.85 According to the applicants’ representatives, two of the 
applicants died in unknown circumstances after the events in question.86 Relying on 
Article 13, the applicants complained that they had not been afforded an effective 
remedy under Italian law by which to lodge their complaints under Article 3 and un-
der Article 4 of Protocol No. 4, which prohibits collective expulsions.87 
The ECtHR determined that the transfer of the applicants to Libya had been 
carried out without any form of examination of each applicant’s individual situation. 
The Italian authorities had restricted themselves to embarking the intercepted mi-
grants onto military ships and disembarking them on Libyan soil. The personnel 
aboard the military ships were not trained to conduct individual interviews and were 
not assisted by interpreters or legal advisers.88 
The Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 13 taken together 
with Article 3 (and Article 4 of Protocol No. 4 prohibiting collective expulsions), as 
the applicants had been deprived of any remedy which would have enabled them to 
lodge their complaints under Article 3 with a competent authority and to obtain a 
thorough and rigorous assessment of their requests before the removal measure was 
enforced.89 
Interestingly, the Court did not follow the Italian Government’s argument that 
the applicants should have availed themselves of the opportunity of applying to the 
Italian criminal courts upon their arrival in Libya to complain about violations of na-
tional and international law by the Italian military personnel involved in their re-
moval. The Court doubted whether such a remedy would have been accessible in 
practice, and pointed out that such a remedy was not compliant with Article 13 any-
way for lack of suspensive effect.90 The proposed remedy was, therefore, not effec-
tive in the sense of Article 13 and Article 35, first paragraph, so that non-exhaustion 
of it was not held against the applicants.91 
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5.3.3  Insufficiently thorough national court proceedings 
A second category comprises cases in which the national courts did investigate the 
Article 3-risk in a material way, but did not do this in a sufficiently serious or thor-
ough manner. In Klein v. Russia (2010)92 and Khodzhayev v. Russia (2010),93 the ECtHR 
concluded that there had been a breach of the procedural limb of Article 3 because of 
a very limited investigation into the alleged Article 3-risk by the national courts. The 
Court saw no reason to make a separate examination under Article 13. Klein v. Russia 
(2010) concerned an Israeli applicant who had been convicted in Colombia for train-
ing terrorists. In 2007, Klein was arrested at an airport in Moscow and detained with 
the aim of extraditing him to Colombia. In the proceedings before the ECtHR, Klein 
alleged that the Russian authorities had not conducted a serious investigation into 
possible ill-treatment in Colombia. The ECtHR agreed with the applicant and con-
sidered as follows:  
 
‘Lastly, the Court will examine the applicant’s argument that the Russian authorities did not 
conduct a serious investigation into possible ill-treatment in the receiving country. It notes in 
this respect that the applicant informed the Russian courts about the poor human rights 
situation in Colombia referring to the fact that there had been a lengthy internal armed conflict 
between State forces and paramilitaries and citing the UN General Assembly’s Resolution and 
the materials of the meeting of the Human Rights Committee (see paragraph 18 above). 
Furthermore, the applicant brought to the authorities’ attention the fact that the Colombian 
Vice-President had threatened “to have him rot in jail”. The Supreme Court of Russia limited 
its assessment of the alleged individualised risk of ill-treatment deriving from Vice-President 
Santos’s statement to a mere observation that the Colombian judiciary were independent from 
the executive branch of power and thus could not be affected by the statement in question 
(…). The Court is therefore unable to conclude that the Russian authorities duly addressed the 
applicant’s concerns with regard to Article 3 in the national extradition proceedings.’94 
 
It appears from the case that the Russian courts were provided with reports on the 
situation in Colombia in general and in Colombian prisons in particular. However, in 
their judgments the national courts did not say anything about the information in 
these reports and the question whether this information made it likely or not likely 
that the applicant would run an Article 3-risk upon extradition.  
Khodzhayev v. Russia (2010)95 concerned a Tajik applicant who had fled from Taji-
kistan to Russia in 2001 in fear of persecution on political and religious grounds. In 
2002, Tajikistan requested his extradition. In 2008 an asylum request was rejected by 
the Russian authorities. In the summer of 2008 the extradition request was granted. 
In the proceedings before the ECtHR, the applicant alleged that the Russian authori-
ties had not conducted a serious investigation into possible ill-treatment following his 
extradition to Tajikistan. The ECtHR ruled that the Moscow City Court and the 
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93 ECtHR, Khodzhayev v. Russia, 12 May 2010, Appl. No. 52466/08. 
94 ECtHR, Klein v. Russia, 1 April 2010, Appl. No. 24268/08, para. 56. 
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Supreme Court of Russia had not duly investigated the applicant’s concerns with re-
gard to Article 3 when examining the appeals against the extradition order. These 
national courts had merely stated that the applicant’s request for asylum had been 
rejected and that his allegations of persecution on religious grounds in Tajikistan had 
been unsubstantiated. The national courts had failed to conduct any independent in-
vestigation into the alleged risk, in breach of the procedural limb of Article 3. The 
Court also ruled that, given the findings under Article 3, it was not necessary for the 
Court to carry out a separate investigation under Article 13.96 
A similar judgment is Soldatenko v. Ukraine (2008).97 This case concerned the ex-
tradition of the applicant from Ukraine to Turkmenistan. In Soldatenko, the ECtHR 
concluded that under the Ukrainian Code of Administrative Justice the administrative 
courts could potentially review a decision to extradite in the light of a complaint of a 
risk of ill-treatment, but that the Ukrainian Government had failed to give any indi-
cation of the powers of the courts in such matters or to submit any examples of cases 
in which an extradition decision had been reviewed on the merits by a national ad-
ministrative court, while the applicant had submitted court decisions to the con-
trary.98 The ECtHR ruled, under Article 35, first paragraph, that the remedy offered 
by the national administrative courts was not effective and that, as a consequence, it 
could not be held against the applicant that he had not used this national remedy be-
fore applying to the ECtHR. It follows from Soldatenko that a national court must in-
dependently consider the alleged Article 3-risk on the merits and must possess the 
powers to truly do so. 
A particularly interesting example is the case of R.C. v. Sweden (2010).99 This case 
concerned an Iranian man who had applied for asylum in Sweden in October 2003. 
He stated that he had been threatened since 1997 for expressing criticism against the 
regime. After participating in a demonstration in July 2001, he was arrested and spent 
two years in prison, where he was tortured a number of times. Every three months, 
his detention was prolonged by a so-called revolutionary court. In June 2003, while 
attending such a court hearing on the prolongation of the detention, he managed to 
escape with the assistance of friends. In the national proceedings before the Swedish 
                                                        
96 Ibidem, paras. 104, 151. See also ECtHR, Khaydarov v. Russia, 20 May 2010, Appl. No. 21055/09 about 
a very similar case. As in Khodzhayev, in Khaydarov, the Court concluded that there had been a breach 
of the procedural limb of Article 3 as well as a material violation of Article 3 because the Moscow 
City Court and the Supreme Court had failed to study carefully the documents produced in the ap-
plicant’s extradition case. Both the City Court and the Supreme Court had limited their analysis of 
the alleged Article 3-risk to assurances given by the Tajik Prosecutor’s General Office, which they 
had interpreted as assurances that the applicant would not be ill-treated in Tajikistan, whereas it was 
clear, according to the ECtHR, from the text of the letters that no such assurances had been given. 
A similar case, also concerning extradition to Tajikistan, is Gaforov v. Russia, 21 October 2010, Appl. 
No. 25404/09, paras. 124-127. In this case, the ECtHR found it problematic that the City Court and 
the Supreme Court had not given any consideration to information on the situation in Tajikistan 
from various independent NGOs, and that, instead, the national courts had chosen to rely solely on 
scant information contained in a letter from the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
97 ECtHR, Soldatenko v. Ukraine, 23 October 2008, Appl. No. 2440/07. 
98 Ibidem, para. 49. 
99 ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07. See for a detailed analysis of this case 
and the Court’s reasoning Geertsema 2010. 
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authorities the applicant stated that he suffered from medical and psychiatric prob-
lems. He submitted to the Swedish Migration Board (the administrative decision 
maker in asylum cases) a medical certificate issued by a physician at a local health care 
centre. The certificate stated that the applicant had scars around both ankles, scars on 
the outside of both kneecaps and two lateral scars on his left thigh. He also had a 
reddish area stretching from his neck down to his chest and when he yawned there 
was a loud clicking sound from the left side of his jaw. In the physician’s opinion, 
these injuries could very well have originated from the torture to which the applicant 
claimed that he had been subjected in Iran.100 The Migration Board rejected the asy-
lum request as incredible. The Board considered that the applicant had never been a 
member of a political party and had not fulfilled a leading role in the demonstrations. 
It also found the escape to be incredible. It furthermore noted that corroborating evi-
dence was absent and that the medical certificate did not prove that the applicant had 
been tortured even if the injuries documented could very well have originated from 
the torture described.101 On appeal to the Aliens Appeals Board, and, after transfer of 
the case to the Migration Court, the applicant stated a number of new grounds for his 
flight and submitted four new medical certificates. The Migration Court rejected the 
appeal. It considered that the applicant appeared to have expanded his grounds for 
asylum, that he had not been a member of a party or an organisation which was criti-
cal of the regime so that it was unlikely that he would be of any interest to the author-
ities in his home country if he returned, that the account of how he had escaped was 
incredible, and that he had failed to show that he had been tortured in Iran.102 
The ECtHR expressed fierce criticism of the investigation conducted by the na-
tional Swedish administrative and judicial authorities. It found that either the adminis-
trative or the judicial authorities ought to have directed that an expert medical opin-
ion be obtained as to the probable cause of the applicant’s scars. The Court ruled as 
follows: 
 
‘Firstly, the Court notes that the applicant initially produced a medical certificate before the 
Migration Board as evidence of his having been tortured (…). Although the certificate was not 
written by an expert specialising in the assessment of torture injuries, the Court considers that 
it, nevertheless, gave a rather strong indication to the authorities that the applicant’s scars and 
injuries may have been caused by ill-treatment or torture. In such circumstances, it was for the 
Migration Board to dispel any doubts that might have persisted as to the cause of such scarring 
(…). In the Court’s view, the Migration Board ought to have directed that an expert opinion be 
obtained as to the probable cause of the applicant’s scars in circumstances where he had made 
out a prima facie case as to their origin. It did not do so and neither did the appellate courts (italics 
author). While the burden of proof, in principle, rests on the applicant, the Court disagrees 
with the Government’s view that it was incumbent upon him to produce such expert opinion. 
In cases such as the present one, the State has a duty to ascertain all relevant facts, particularly 
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in circumstances where there is a strong indication that an applicant’s injuries may have been 
caused by torture.’103 
 
To illustrate the second category of cases, it is also useful to mention the case of Said 
v. the Netherlands (2005), concerning an Eritrean deserter.104 Just like the case of R.C. v. 
Sweden, this case illustrates the need for national courts to seriously investigate pre-
sented evidence and, if necessary for further clarification of the facts, apply investi-
gative powers. Although the ECtHR concluded that there had been a material (and 
not procedural) violation of Article 3 and did not explicitly express concerns about 
the national judicial proceedings, Judge Thomassen did so in her concurring opinion 
to the judgment.105 Separate opinions do not form part of the judgments to which 
they are annexed, but as they represent the opinions of the highest judges of the 
European continent, they do constitute authoritative statements. On the investigation 
conducted at national court level, Thomassen stated: 
 
‘In my view, no serious investigation was carried out in the present case. In the first decision 
on the applicant’s request for asylum, it was held against him that he had failed to provide 
documentary evidence of his identity. Yet, when he subsequently submitted a number of iden-
tity documents in the appeal proceedings before the Regional Court, the relevance of these for 
the assessment of the credibility of his account remained unaddressed. (…) For me, the lack of 
rigorous scrutiny justifies the Court’s decision not to follow the national courts’ assessment.’ 
 
During the appeal proceedings before the District Court of Amsterdam, the applicant 
submitted a written statement by a certain Mr. Khalifa, to the effect that Mr. Khalifa’s 
son had been executed in Eritrea in October 2000 after he had been staying with his 
mother for three months without having obtained prior permission from his army 
commanders. The applicant requested the court of Amsterdam to hear Mr. Khalifa as 
a witness. The court refused this request and dismissed the appeal. The Council of 
State dismissed the higher appeal and ruled that, as the Amsterdam court had con-
cluded that the Deputy Minister had not been wrong in describing the applicant’s ac-
count as not credible, the Court had been entitled to decide not to hear evidence 
from Mr. Khalifa as a witness.106 The unwillingness of the national court to use its 
power to hear witnesses, along with the arguments stated explicitly in the concurrent 
opinion, may have contributed to the conclusion that no rigorous scrutiny at national 
level had taken place.107 
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The case of Auad v. Bulgaria (2011)108 forms another interesting illustration of 
cases in which the national authorities, including the courts, did not meaningfully in-
vestigate the applicant’s concern with regard to Article 3 ECHR. The Bulgarian State 
Agency for National Security proposed to expel the applicant, a stateless person of 
Palestinian origin, from Bulgaria on national security grounds, less than three weeks 
after the State Refugees Agency had granted him humanitarian protection. The Pales-
tinian refugee camp to which he would be returned, were under control of various 
Palestinian armed factions and the camp from which he fled, appeared to be one of 
the more chaotic and violent camps.109 The Bulgarian administrative authorities and 
courts did not try to make any assessment of the risk the applicant would run if 
returned. The ECtHR concluded to a procedural and a material breach of Article 3 
ECHR.110 
In the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (2011),111 the ECtHR established that 
the national Belgian court (the Aliens Appeals Board) did not always take into consid-
eration materials submitted by the asylum seeker after the initial interview, and found 
this practice to be at variance with Article 13.112 The case of M.S.S. is discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 8, section 8.2. 
A final – highly illustrative – example of a case in which the national authorities, 
including the national courts, did not conduct a sufficiently thorough examination is 
Singh and Others v. Belgium (2012).113 The case concerned a family of asylum seekers 
who claimed to belong to the Sikh minority in Afghanistan. They complained in par-
ticular that their removal from Belgium to Moscow entailed a risk of refoulement to 
their country of origin, Afghanistan, where they would face ill-treatment. They told 
the Belgian authorities that they were Afghan nationals, members of the Sikh mi-
nority, and that they had fled Afghanistan for India in 1992 because of the civil war 
and the attacks and kidnappings endured by the Sikh and Hindu communities there at 
that time. They had later taken refuge in Moscow. In 2009 the applicants had appar-
ently returned to Kabul. As they had not felt safe there they had fled to Belgium.114 
The Office of the Commissioner General for Refugees and Stateless Persons 
(‘CGRA’) rejected their applications on the grounds that they had not provided 
evidence of their Afghan nationality. They had been travelling with false passports 
and the wife of the principal applicant, Mrs Kaur, had an insufficient knowledge of 
Afghanistan and the Pashto language.115 
The applicants appealed against this decision to the Aliens Disputes Board 
(‘CCE’). On appeal, they produced new evidence corroborating their Afghan nation-
ality and their flight narrative. This new evidence included e-mail messages between 
                                                        
and the prohibition of torture, undue formalism and marginal review must yield under certain cir-
cumstances.’  
108 ECtHR, Auad v. Bulgaria, 11 October 2011, Appl. No. 46390/10. 
109 Ibidem, para. 103. 
110 Ibidem, paras. 104, 108. 
111 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09. 
112 Ibidem, para. 389. 
113 ECtHR, Singh and Others v. Belgium, 2 October 2012, Appl. No. 33210/11. 
114  Ibidem, para. 12. 
115 Ibidem, para. 13. 
Chapter 5 
 
 
 
208 
their lawyer and a representative of the Belgian Committee for Aid to Refugees, an 
operational partner of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees (UNHCR) in Belgium. It also included attestations that the applicants had 
been registered as refugees under the protection of the UNHCR; finally, the new evi-
dence contained a reference to an application for Indian naturalisation, lodged by Mrs 
Kaur in 2009, and to the fact that she had a valid Afghan passport delivered by the 
Afghan Embassy in New Delhi. 
The Aliens Disputes Board dismissed the applicants’ appeals. It was of the opin-
ion that the applicants had been unable to prove their Afghan nationality or the ve-
racity of the protection granted to them by the UNHCR. The CCE took the view 
that the UNHCR documents were easy to falsify and that without the originals those 
documents had no probative value. For the CCE, the only part of the applicants’ 
story that was not in dispute was the fact that they had lived in India and so their fear 
of persecution had to be examined vis-à-vis India, not Afghanistan. It took the view 
that their decision to leave India had been based merely on social and economic 
grounds.116 
The ECtHR found that the applicants’ fear that the Russian authorities might 
send them back to their State of origin was not manifestly ill-founded. It noted that 
the applicants had arrived at the Belgian border with identity documents and copies 
of pages of two Afghan passports and that copies of UNHCR attestations had sub-
sequently been submitted. Taking this into consideration, and in the light of a num-
ber of reports about discrimination and violence against the Sikh minority in Afghan-
istan, the ECtHR found that the applicants’ complaints under Article 3 were argu-
able.117 
The ECtHR ruled that in this case, no close and rigorous scrutiny as required by 
Article 13 ECHR, taken together with Article 3 ECHR, had been applied by the 
national authorities. The administrative decision maker, the CGRA, had not made 
any additional enquiries, for example to authenticate the identity documents present-
ed. The reviewing authority, the CCE, had not made up for that omission, whereas 
the documents presented to it by the applicants had been capable of dispelling the 
doubts expressed by the CGRA as to their identities and previous movements. The 
CCE had given no weight to those documents on the grounds that they were easy to 
falsify and the applicants were not able to supply the originals.The ECtHR consider-
ed that the documents presented to the CCE had not given rise to any investigation, 
whereas enquiries could readily have been made, for example, at the offices of the 
UNHCR in New Delhi. The fact that both the administrative decision making au-
thority, and the reviewing authority, had dismissed documents which were pertinent 
for the protection request, finding them to have no probative value because they 
were only copies and could easily have been falsified, and without verifying their 
authenticity as they could easily have done by contacting the UNHCR, was at odds 
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with the close and rigorous scrutiny required under Article 13 taken together with 
Article 3 ECHR.118 
5.3.4  National courts apply incorrect evidentiary standards 
A third category comprises cases in which the national court did investigate the 
Article 3-risk, but applied incorrect evidentiary criteria in doing so, for example, an 
incorrect standard of proof (see Part 2). An example is M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece 
(2011).119 The ECtHR concluded in this case that the Belgian national procedure for 
applying for a stay of execution with the Aliens Appeals Board did not constitute an 
effective remedy in the sense of Article 13 as, inter alia, the Aliens Appeals Board had 
limited its examination to verifying whether the persons concerned had ‘produced 
concrete proof of the irreparable nature of the damage that might result from the al-
leged potential violation of Article 3.’ This standard of proof was much higher than 
the standard developed by the ECtHR of substantial grounds for assuming a real 
Article 3-risk. According to the ECtHR, this incorrect standard of proof had hin-
dered examination on the merits of the alleged risk of a violation of Article 3. For this 
reason, the Court concluded that there had been a violation of Article 13.120 
Another example is the case of Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands (2007). In that case, 
the ECtHR did not hold non-exhaustion of national remedies against the applicant. It 
found that a higher appeal was bound to fail anyway, as the Council of State applied a 
constant jurisprudential line which incorporated a too strict requirement of individu-
alisation. Even in cases where it was obvious that applicants belonged to a group of 
persons systematically exposed to a practice of ill-treatment, the Council of State still 
required such applicants to establish, in addition to their belonging to such a group, 
special personal features (special distinguishing features).121 
5.3.5  The provisions on national proceedings in the asylum context: 
interim conclusions 
In cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, a national judicial remedy is 
compliant with Articles 3, 13 and 35, first paragraph, if it is able to comprise both 
substantive and procedural points and is able to quash the administrative decision 
upholding refusal of a protection claim. The procedural limb of Article 3, Article 13, 
and Article 35, first paragraph, ECHR require the national authorities, including the 
national courts, to conduct an adequate examination of the claim for protection.122 In 
assessing whether national proceedings are adequate, the ECtHR takes into consid-
eration whether an applicant was heard (several times), whether he or she was assist-
ed by appointed counsel, whether the national authorities had the benefit of seeing, 
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hearing and questioning the applicant in person, and of assessing directly the infor-
mation and documents submitted by him or her, before deciding the case. The 
ECtHR also takes into account whether the assessment of the national authorities 
was sufficiently supported by both national materials as well as materials originating 
from other reliable and objective sources.123 
The cases of R.C. v. Sweden (2010) and Singh and Others v. Belgium (2012) have 
clearly illustrated that the national authorities, including the reviewing courts, must 
carefully and seriously examine evidence submitted by applicants. When and if such 
evidence leaves questions unanswered, the national authorities, including the review-
ing courts, must try to find answers by applying investigative powers in order to fur-
ther clarify the facts. This is particularly necessary when it is rather easy to make fur-
ther inquiries, as was the case in Singh and Others v. Belgium, where the national au-
thorities could easily have made inquiries with the UNHCR. In sum, decisive is the 
thoroughness of the investigations undertaken at national level, including the investi-
gations of the involved national court(s).124 
Constant national jurisprudential lines may not normally bar an individual, case-
specific and factual examination on the merits. It follows from Bahaddar v. the Nether-
lands (1998)125 and Jabari v. Turkey (2000)126 that time limits and other procedural rules 
laid down in national law – although they must normally be adhered to – should not 
be so short, or applied so mechanically or inflexibly, as to deny an applicant for asy-
lum a realistic opportunity of proving his or her claim.  
Finally, independent and rigorous scrutiny also means that the correct evidentiary 
standards and principles are to be applied by the national court in assessing the 
Article 3-risk. As was shown above, it follows from M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (2011) 
that the national court is not allowed to apply, for example, a stricter standard of 
proof than the one applied by the ECtHR. For national courts to comply with the 
requirement of independent and rigorous scrutiny it is, therefore, essential to know 
exactly what these evidentiary standards are. Part 2 of this chapter explores the evi-
dentiary standards applied by the ECtHR. 
5.4 Issues of intensity of judicial scrutiny under Article 6, first paragraph 
5.4.1  The Zumtobel doctrine 
Under Article 6, first paragraph, as part of the requirement of ‘access to an independ-
ent and impartial tribunal’, the ECtHR has gradually developed the doctrine of suffi-
ciency of jurisdiction of national courts in administrative law cases.127 Albert and Le 
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Compte v. Belgium (1983)128 is the first case in which the Court explicitly dealt with the 
question of sufficiency of jurisdiction of national courts. The applicant doctors, ac-
cused by the professional medical association of having issued spurious certificates of 
unfitness for work, wished to challenge disciplinary decisions (suspension of the right 
to practice medicine and, for applicant Le Compte, finally a complete bar from prac-
ticing medicine) against them on their merits. The decisions were taken by a profes-
sional association, with a right of appeal to another such body, the Appeals Council, 
and finally to the Belgian Court of Cassation. The Appeals Council did not sit in pub-
lic, so one of the requirements of Article 6, first paragraph, was not met. In the opin-
ion of the ECtHR, the public character of the subsequent cassation proceedings be-
fore the Court of Cassation did not suffice to remedy this defect, because the Court 
of Cassation did not take cognisance of the merits of the case. This meant that many 
aspects in dispute, including review of the facts and assessment of the proportionality 
between fault and sanction, fell outside its jurisdiction. The ECtHR ruled as follows: 
 
‘To sum up, the cases were not heard publicly by a tribunal competent to determine all the as-
pects of the matter and pronouncing judgment publicly. In this respect, there was a breach of 
Article 6(1).’129 
 
It follows from this judgment that a national court should normally be competent to 
determine ‘all the aspects of the matter’, in other words, have full jurisdiction. This 
means that the national court must be able to take cognisance of and decide on the 
merits of the case. In a number of later judgments, the Court clarified what is meant 
by ‘all the aspects of the matter’. In Terra Woningen B.V. v. the Netherlands (1996, dis-
cussed below in more detail) and in the case of Druzstevni Zálozna Pria and others v. The 
Czech Republic (2008) the ECtHR ruled that  
 
‘For the determination of civil rights and obligations by a “tribunal” to satisfy Article 6(1), it is 
required that the “tribunal” in question have jurisdiction to examine all questions of fact and 
law relevant to the dispute before it’.130 
 
And in Veeber v. Estonia (2002) and Chevrol v. France (2003), the Court, while using the 
same terminology, strongly emphasised that full jurisdiction on points of fact and 
points of law is indeed the general rule: 
 
‘only an institution that has full jurisdiction, including the power to quash in all respects, on 
questions of fact and law, the challenged decision, merits the description “tribunal” within the 
meaning of Article 6(1)’.131 
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The precise meaning of this requirement of full jurisdiction on points of fact and 
points of law, and the boundaries of this requirement, were elaborated further in a 
number of other judgments.  
From W. v. the UK (1987)132 it becomes clear that the requirement of full judicial 
jurisdiction on points of fact and points of law is not an absolute right under Article 
6, first paragraph. The case concerned parental access to a child in public care. The 
parents wished to challenge on the facts a local authority parental rights decision on 
the placement of their youngest child with foster parents on a long-term basis with a 
view to adoption. They could challenge the impugned decision in two ways: judicial 
review or the institution of wardship proceedings. The ECtHR ruled that both these 
national judicial remedies were not compliant with Article 6, first paragraph, as they 
were not competent to examine the merits of the case.133 As the ECtHR spoke of a 
‘case of the present kind’, we can infer from this judgment that there are certain types 
of cases which do, and certain cases which do not, require full national judicial re-
view. However, the ECtHR did not clarify in this case which cases required full na-
tional judicial jurisdiction on the merits and which cases justified a less intense form 
of judicial scrutiny. 
In Zumtobel v. Austria (1993),134 the ECtHR gave further clarification. The case 
concerned expropriation proceedings instituted with a view to the construction of a 
provincial highway, affecting the land of the Zumtobel Company. The applicant re-
peatedly but unsuccessfully requested to be allowed to study various documents in 
the file resting with the provincial authorities. In February 1986, the Office of the 
Provincial Government dismissed two requests by the applicant, one for full details 
of the planning procedure for the projected road, and the other for the appointment 
of an independent road traffic expert to assess whether the planned road was neces-
sary. The Office considered the first request to be irrelevant to the case; as to the 
second, it stated that the official expert had not shown any bias in favour of the 
authorities and had submitted a convincing report. Zumtobel thereupon applied to 
the Constitutional Court, claiming that the expropriation proceedings had violated its 
right of access to a court with full jurisdiction, guaranteed by Article 6, first para-
graph. It was also alleged that there had been a breach of the principle of equality of 
arms, as the provincial Office had heard its own experts but had refused to consult 
independent ones. The Constitutional Court decided not to examine the application. 
One of the reasons for rejection was that, in view of its jurisprudence on Article 6 of 
the ECHR, and the authorities’ discretion in determining the routes of highways, the 
application did not have sufficient prospects of success. The applicant then chal-
lenged the expropriation order in the Administrative Court. Relying on substantially 
the same arguments as in the Constitutional Court, Zumtobel now complained of 
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breaches of procedural and substantive law; it also asked for an expert to be ap-
pointed.135 The Administrative Court dismissed the appeal, considering that  
 
‘In the context of the power of review conferred on it by Article 41 of the Administrative 
Court Law, the Administrative Court cannot hold to be unlawful the fact that the respondent 
authority had regard to road traffic requirements and based its decision principally on the con-
sideration that no other more appropriate solution was possible’.136 
 
The Administrative Court also held that Zumtobel had failed to cast doubt on the of-
ficial experts’ reports such as could disclose a procedural irregularity capable of af-
fecting the decision. In a more general consideration about its jurisdiction and powers 
in cases like this, the Administrative Court considered: 
 
‘The Administrative Court is not allowed, in a case which has been before the respondent ad-
ministrative authority, to put itself in the place of that authority and take evidence, which the 
latter may have omitted to take, or to supplement the investigation by itself taking investigative 
measures to establish the facts. It can, however, take evidence in order to determine whether 
an essential procedural requirement has been breached, and it is therefore entitled to take in-
vestigative measures in order to establish whether a procedural defect is essential or whether 
the respondent authority could have reached a different decision if that procedural defect had 
been avoided (…).’137 
 
Zumtobel complained before the ECtHR that none of the national authorities before 
which the case had come in the contested proceedings could be regarded as a ‘tri-
bunal’ within the meaning of Article 6, first paragraph. This was so, in the first place, 
with regard to the Office, an organ of the Provincial Government. It was also true of 
the Constitutional Court, as it was prohibited by law from reconsidering all the facts 
of a case. The Administrative Court was bound by the findings of the authorities, 
except in borderline cases – not the position here – in which such findings were ma-
terial to determining the effect of an alleged procedural defect; and even in those 
cases, the Administrative Court could not correct or supplement the facts, or rule in 
the relevant authority’s stead, but had always to remit the file to the latter. In short, its 
review only concerned the question of lawfulness and could not be considered 
equivalent to a full review, according to the applicant.138 
The ECtHR did not agree with the applicant. Referring to its earlier jurispru-
dence, it agreed in principle with the applicant that the Office of the Government did 
not constitute a tribunal for the purposes of Article 6, first paragraph, and that, as a 
consequence, there had to be a possibility of appealing to a judicial body having full 
jurisdiction. The Court also agreed with the applicant that the Constitutional Court 
did not satisfy the requirement of full jurisdiction, as it could only inquire into the 
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contested proceedings from the point of view of their conformity with the Consti-
tution. With regard to the review effected by the Austrian Administrative Court, the 
ECtHR, however, considered: 
 
‘Regard being had to the respect which must be accorded to decisions taken by the adminis-
trative authorities on grounds of expediency and to the nature of the complaints made by the 
Zumtobel partnership, the review by the Administrative Court accordingly, in this instance, 
fulfilled the requirements of Article 6(1).’139 
 
It is clear from the Zumtobel judgment that the national Administrative Court did not 
have full jurisdiction to re-examine all the relevant facts of the case. In the specific 
circumstances of the case, the ECtHR, however, did not find this problematic. It is 
important to note that the Court started its reasoning by referring to its standard 
jurisprudence that normally in cases like this, where the initial decision had been 
taken by an administrative body, full judicial review by a national tribunal was re-
quired.140 This was the general rule. The Court then explained why, in this specific 
case, an exception to this rule was justified:  
 
‘As regards the review effected by the Administrative Court, its scope must be assessed in the 
light of the fact that expropriation – the participants in the proceedings all recognise this – is 
not a matter exclusively within the discretion of the administrative authorities, because Article 
44 para. 1 of the Provincial Highways Law makes the lawfulness of such a measure subject to a 
condition: the impossibility “of constructing or retaining a section of highway which is more 
suitable from the point of view of traffic requirements, environmental protection and the 
financial implications” (see paragraph 16 above). It was for the Administrative Court to satisfy 
itself that this provision had been complied with. In this respect the present dispute may be 
distinguished from the Obermeier v. Austria case (judgment of 28 June 1990, Series A no. 179, 
p. 23, para. 70). 
In addition, it should be stressed that the submissions relied upon before the Administrative 
Court concerned solely the proceedings before the Government Office. The Administrative 
Court in fact considered these submissions on their merits, point by point, without ever having 
to decline jurisdiction in replying to them or in ascertaining various facts. (...) Regard being had 
to the respect which must be accorded to decisions taken by the administrative authorities on 
grounds of expediency and to the nature of the complaints made by the Zumtobel partnership, 
the review by the Administrative Court accordingly, in this instance, fulfilled the requirements 
of Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1).’141 
 
Three reasons justifying an exception can be discerned in this consideration. First, the 
specific nature of the case. The case concerned land planning and expropriation, an 
area in which the administration had taken decisions on grounds of expediency, in 
other words, an area which could have been qualified as a classical administrative 
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task. Second, before the national courts, the applicant had complained mainly about 
the proceedings before the administrative authority. He had not explicitly requested 
the national courts to make a fresh factual re-examination. Third, the review effected 
by the Administrative Court, although it had not included points of fact, had been, 
nevertheless, rigorous as it had dealt with all the applicant’s complaints concerning 
the proceedings, point by point, and had satisfied itself that a legal condition crucial 
for the lawfulness of the expropriation had indeed been met. 
In the case of Bryan v. the UK (1995),142 the ECtHR followed exactly the same 
reasoning as in Zumtobel. Like the Zumtobel case, the case of Bryan concerned town and 
country planning. The Court agreed, in principle, with the applicant that the national 
High Court did not have full jurisdiction, as its jurisdiction over the facts was limited. 
The ECtHR considered in Bryan, just as in Zumtobel, that the litigious decision had 
been taken by the administration on grounds of expediency. The ECtHR also stress-
ed that there was no dispute as to the primary facts before the national High Court. 
Next, the Court emphasised that the jurisdiction of the national High Court, as far as 
the facts were concerned, was indeed limited, but not totally absent, and the High 
Court had indeed rigorously examined the procedural complaints brought forward by 
the applicant. Compared to Zumtobel, the Bryan judgment contains one additional 
fourth argument supporting the conclusion that no violation of Article 6, first para-
graph, had occurred. The Court noted in Bryan that the procedure before the admin-
istrative inspector – the first instance administrative body – contained many safe-
guards and could, therefore, be qualified as a ‘quasi-judicial procedure governed by 
many of the safeguards required by Article 6, first paragraph’. The four arguments in 
conjunction led the ECtHR to the conclusion that no breach of Article 6, first para-
graph had occurred.143 
In addition to Zumtobel v. Austria (1993) and Bryan v. the UK (1995), the Court ac-
cepted in a number of other cases that the national court did not have full jurisdiction 
on points of fact and points of law. Examples are the cases of Chapman v. the UK 
(2001) and Jane Smith v. the UK (2001), which concerned the refusal by the local au-
thorities of an application lodged by Gypsies for permission to occupy land. The 
ECtHR repeated in those cases the conclusion reached in the Bryan judgment, and 
concluded, in short, that in the specialised area of town-planning, full judicial review 
of the facts was not required by Article 6, paragraph 1.144 The case of Kingsley v. the 
UK (2002) concerned a decision by the Gaming Board for Great Britain to declare 
the applicant, director of casino companies in London, unfit and improper to have 
this function. The ECtHR noted in this case that the litigious decision concerned the 
regulation of the gaming industry, which, due to the nature of the industry, called for 
particular monitoring, which was a decisive factor in accepting limited judicial scru-
tiny.145 
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In Sigma Radio Television Ltd v. Cyprus (2011),146 the ECtHR provided a helpful 
summary of its full jurisdiction doctrine. The case concerned decisions by the radio 
and television broadcasting authority of Cyprus, which had imposed fines on a broad-
casting company, Sigma Radio Television Ltd, for non-compliance with the National 
Radio and Television Broadcasting Act. The applicant company complained before 
the ECtHR that the national judicial scrutiny of the litigious decisions had been in-
sufficient in scope and intensity as the Supreme Court could not look into the merits, 
did not and was not able to examine the facts of the case, hear evidence or decide on 
matters afresh.147 
The ECtHR first made clear that it very much depended on the particular cir-
cumstances of the case whether the national judicial review was sufficient for the 
purposes of Article 6.148 The Court noted that it was not always necessary for the na-
tional court to fully substitute its own opinion for that of the administrative authori-
ties, particularly in cases concerning decisions on grounds of expediency, involving 
specialised areas. The ECtHR mentioned as concrete examples of such areas land 
planning, environmental protection and the regulation of gaming:  
 
‘it is often the case in relation to administrative law appeals in the Member States of the Coun-
cil of Europe that the scope of judicial review over the facts of a case is limited and that it is 
the nature of review proceedings that the reviewing authority reviews the previous proceedings 
rather than taking factual decisions. (…) It is not the role of Article 6 to give access to a level 
of jurisdiction which can substitute its opinion for that of the administrative authorities. In this 
regard, particular emphasis has been placed on the respect which must be accorded to deci-
sions taken by the administrative authorities on grounds of “expediency”, and which often in-
volve specialised areas of law (for example, planning, environmental protection, regulation of 
gaming).’149 
 
Next, the Court explained what factors determined sufficiency of national court juris-
diction. Here the Court in fact reiterated the factors it had also taken into considera-
tion in the cases of Zumtobel v. Austria (1993) and Bryan v. the UK (1995). The follow-
ing factors were mentioned as decisive: 
- the powers of the judicial body in question; 
- the subject matter of the decision appealed against, in particular whether or not it 
concerned a specialised issue requiring professional knowledge or experience and 
whether it involved the exercise of administrative discretion and to what extent; 
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- the manner in which the decision was arrived at, in particular, the procedural 
guarantees available in the proceedings before the administrative body; 
- the content of the dispute, including the desired and actual grounds of appeal.150 
 
The ECtHR further clarified that it was crucial that the national court was not pre-
cluded from determining ‘the central issue in dispute’.151 In the particular case of 
Sigma Radio Television Ltd v. Cyprus (2011) the ECtHR concluded that the intensity of 
scrutiny in the national judicial review proceedings had been sufficient to comply 
with Article 6, first paragraph, although the Supreme Court of Cyprus possessed lim-
ited jurisdiction over the facts and could not substitute its own decision for that of 
the radio and television broadcasting authority. The Court noted, first, that the Su-
preme Court could have annulled the decisions on a number of grounds, including if 
the decision had been reached on the basis of misconception of fact and of law. 
Second, as to the subject matter, the ECtHR noted that the litigious decisions had 
been taken by the radio and television broadcasting authority and concerned the 
classical exercise of administrative discretion in the specialised area of law concerning 
broadcasting taken in the context of ensuring standard setting and compliance with 
the relevant legislation and regulations pursuant to public interest aims (the subject 
matter of the decision appealed against). Third, the ECtHR noted that a number of 
procedural guarantees had been available to the applicant in the proceedings before 
the radio and television broadcasting authority, including an oral hearing before this 
authority (the procedural guarantees in the proceedings before the administrative 
body). Finally, the Court took into account the content of the dispute and noted that 
the applicant’s complaints in the national proceedings had centered on points of law 
and procedure; the applicant’s case had not centered on a fundamental question of 
fact, which the Supreme Court did not have jurisdiction to revisit.152 
We may draw a number of conclusions from the case law discussed above. The 
first conclusion is that Article 6, first paragraph, requires, in principle, that a national 
court has full jurisdiction on points of fact and points of law. In all the cases dis-
cussed above, the ECtHR starts out its considerations by reiterating this general rule. 
A second conclusion is that in the particular circumstances of a given case, a more 
limited jurisdiction of a national court may, nevertheless, be found to be compatible 
with Article 6, first paragraph, provided that a number of conditions are met. It 
seems that the ECtHR has, so far, accepted limited jurisdiction of national courts in a 
relatively limited number of cases only. In those cases, the ECtHR accepted more 
limited forms of judicial review because of: 
- the fact that the particular subject-matter of the litigious decision belonged to the 
classical tasks of the administration (the classical exercise of administrative dis-
cretion) and/or involved a specialised issue requiring professional knowledge or 
experience; and 
- the thorough safeguards attending the preceding administrative procedure; and 
                                                        
150 Ibidem, para. 154. 
151 Ibidem, para. 157. 
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- the fact that the national judicial review was, although limited, indeed meaningful 
as it entailed at least a very thorough examination of the disputed points of law 
and procedural points; and  
- the fact that there was no true dispute on points of fact before the national 
courts.  
 
The case of Tsfayo v. the United Kingdom (2006)153 illustrates that it may not be assumed 
too easily that a case concerns a decision in the area of classical tasks of the adminis-
tration.154 The dispute between Tsfayo and the local authorities revolved around so-
cial benefits, an area which, at first sight, might easily be qualified as a classical ad-
ministrative task. During the proceedings before the ECtHR, the UK Government 
tried to explain and justify the limited scope and intensity of the High Court’s juris-
diction by referring to the type of case (social benefits). The ECtHR did not follow 
this argument. It noted that the heart of the case was a simple dispute concerning the 
credibility of the applicant’s statements as to the reasons why she had submitted her 
benefits renewal form too late. The ECtHR considered: 
 
‘(…) the decision-making process in the present case was significantly different. In Bryan (…) 
the issues to be determined required a measure of professional knowledge or experience and 
the exercise of administrative discretion pursuant to wider policy aims. In contrast, in the in-
stant case, the Hammersmith and Fulham Council Housing Benefit and Council Tax Benefit 
Review Board (HBRB) was deciding a simple question of fact, namely whether there was 
“good cause” for the applicant’s delay in making a claim. On this question, the applicant had 
given evidence to the HBRB that the first moment that she knew that anything was amiss with 
her claim for housing benefit was the receipt of a notice from her landlord – the housing 
association – seeking to repossess her flat because her rent was in arrears. The HBRB found 
her explanation to be unconvincing and rejected her claim for back-payment of benefit 
essentially on the basis of their assessment of her credibility. No specialist expertise was 
required to determine this issue (…). Nor, unlike the cases referred to, can the factual findings 
in the present case be said to be merely incidental to the reaching of broader judgments of 
policy or expediency which it was for the democratically accountable authority to take.’155 
 
The remaining question now is what full jurisdiction on points of fact and points of 
law precisely entails. The ECtHR has clarified this in a number of judgments. Full 
jurisdiction means that, when a decision of the administration is based on certain 
facts that, according to the administration, happened in the past, and the other party 
                                                        
153 ECtHR, Tsfayo v. the UK, 14 November 2006, Appl. No. 60860/00. 
154 See also Van Dijk et al. (2006), p. 561, who present the requirement of full judicial jurisdiction on 
points of fact and points of law as the main rule, and limited judicial jurisdiction as an exception to 
the rule, permissible only in specific circumstances. 
155 ECtHR, Tsfayo v. the UK, 14 November 2006, Appl. No. 60860/00, para. 46. See also ECtHR, Capital 
Bank AD v. Bulgaria, 24 November 2005, Appl. No. 49429/99, for a case in which the Bulgarian 
Government tried to persuade the ECtHR that the case concerned an area which belonged to the 
realm of the classical exercise of administrative discretion: supervision over the banking business. 
The ECtHR was not convinced and concluded that the Bulgarian courts should have exercised full 
jurisdiction. 
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denies or challenges these facts, the national court independently determines whether 
or not the facts indeed took place. The case of Koskinas v. Greece (2002)156 may illus-
trate this. The case concerned dismissal from employment as a steward by ‘Olympic 
Airways’, a company in which the Greek State was the only shareholder. The appli-
cant was dismissed on the basis of a decision taken by the so-called Board of Dis-
missals, stating that he had sexually intimidated a number of passengers. The appli-
cant lodged an appeal before the First Instance Tribunal of Athens. The Tribunal 
quashed the decision taken by the Board, basically because no reasons had been given 
and because it had not been ascertained whether or not the applicant had indeed 
committed the alleged sexual intimidation. Olympic Airways brought an appeal to the 
Court of Appeals of Athens, which quashed the First Instance Court’s judgment, and 
after this the applicant applied to the Court of Cassation. Both the Court of Appeals 
of Athens and the Court of Cassation ruled that the First Instance Court lacked the 
competence to examine whether the facts mentioned by the Board of Dismissals had 
or had not taken place. The ECtHR found this to be incompatible with Article 6, first 
paragraph.157 
Full jurisdiction also means that the national court has jurisdiction to independ-
ently examine the credibility of statements made by a claimant. This appears from 
Tsfayo v. the UK (2006), mentioned above. The central question in this case was the 
credibility of the applicant’s statements that she had never received any correspon-
dence from the local authorities about the need to submit benefit renewal forms for 
housing benefit and property tax, and that, due to her poor English and her unfamil-
iarity with the system, she had not herself known about this need. The High Court 
did not have the power, however, to form its own views as to the credibility of these 
statements. Instead, it was bound to follow the views of the HBRB, an administrative 
body. This led the ECtHR to the conclusion that the central issue, the applicant’s 
credibility, had never been determined by a tribunal independent of the administra-
tive body, which constituted a violation of Article 6 first paragraph.158 
Full jurisdiction also means that a national court does not rely automatically on, 
and draw automatic inferences from, an advice or opinion given by an organ of the 
executive. The cases of Terra Woningen B.V. v. the Netherlands (1996),159 Chevrol v. France 
(2003),160 Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria (2005)161 and Druzstevni Zálozna Pria and others v. 
The Czech Republic (2008)162 are illustrative. Terra Woningen v. the Netherlands (1996) con-
                                                        
156 ECtHR, Koskinas v. Greece, 20 June 2002, Appl. No. 47760/99. 
157 Ibidem, para. 30. 
158 ECtHR, Tsfayo v. the UK, 14 November 2006, Appl. No. 60860/00, paras. 48 and 49. In the Nether-
lands, a very similar situation exists with regard to the credibility of asylum seekers’ statements as far 
as past facts are concerned. It is constant jurisprudence that the courts are not allowed to substitute 
their own views as to an applicant’s credibility. Instead, they are bound by the opinion of the admin-
istrative body. Based on the mentioned case law of the ECtHR, it may be held, under Article 47, 
paragraph 2, of the EU Charter of fundamental rights, that the national courts for this reason do not 
act as independent tribunals, as is required by Article 6(1). 
159 ECtHR, Terra Woningen B.V. v. the Netherlands, 28 November 1996, Appl. No. 49/1995/555/64. 
160 ECtHR, Chevrol v. France, 13 February 2003, Appl. No. 49636/99. 
161 ECtHR, Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, 24 November 2005, Appl. No. 49429/99. 
162 ECtHR, Druzstevni Zálozna Pria and others v. The Czech Republic, 31 July 2008, Appl. No. 72034/01. 
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cerned judicial proceedings before the national District Court on a dispute concern-
ing the rent for an apartment between an individual Mr. W. and Terra Woningen 
B.V., a property development company (hereinafter: the applicant company). In the 
proceedings before the District Court, Mr. W. argued that there was an undesirable 
situation that justified reducing the rent to the legal minimum. He submitted to the 
District Court letters from the Provincial Executive concerning soil cleaning as well 
as the Provincial Executive’s implementation programme for soil cleaning from 1992 
onwards. The applicant company argued that the soil pollution should not be taken 
into account. The company stated that it did not appear that there was pollution of 
the soil under or in the immediate vicinity of the accommodation such as to cause se-
rious danger to public health or the environment. In addition, in the opinion of the 
company, the pollution found could not affect the standard of a third-floor flat with-
out a garden. In its decision, the District Court set the rent at the legal minimum. 
Having regard to the fact that the Provincial Executive had designated the area as one 
where soil cleaning was required, and had set it down in its annual soil-cleaning pro-
gramme for 1992 as a site to be dealt with in accordance with that Act, the District 
Court found it established that there was an ‘objectionable situation’ that justified 
reducing the points rating by 20 points and setting the rent at the legal minimum. The 
District Court explicitly stated that the question of whether the soil-cleaning decision 
of the Provincial Executive was well-founded fell outside its jurisdiction. 
Before the ECtHR, the applicant company complained that it had not had access 
to a tribunal possessing jurisdiction to make an independent assessment of the rele-
vance of the soil pollution. The applicant company relied on the fact that the District 
Court had held that the decision of the Provincial Executive to include the Noord-
Nieuwlandsepolder-Zuid in its implementation programme for soil cleaning in itself 
amounted to proof that the legal provision triggering the application of the minimum 
rent provision had been satisfied. The District Court had not itself examined the re-
port of the further inspection, although, in the applicant company’s contention, it did 
not appear from that report that the pollution found had in any way affected the 
standard of the flat let to Mr W. The ECtHR ruled as follows: 
 
‘The Court recalls that for the determination of civil rights and obligations by a “tribunal” to 
satisfy Article 6 para. 1 (art. 6-1), it is required that the “tribunal” in question have jurisdiction 
to examine all questions of fact and law relevant to the dispute before it. (…)  
(…) there was uncertainty at the relevant time as to whether district courts should themselves 
decide whether the “further inspection under the Soil Cleaning (Temporary Provisions) Act” 
justified the conclusion that “pollution of the soil” was “such as to cause serious danger to 
public health or the environment”, or in the alternative accept without question or examination 
of their own the determination by the competent authorities that soil-cleaning measures were 
required. However, the Schiedam District Court, in its judgment in the present case, held that 
such risk was “necessarily implied” by the Provincial Executive’s decision. 
In so doing the Schiedam District Court, a “tribunal” satisfying the requirements of Article 6 
para. 1 (art. 6-1) (as was not contested), deprived itself of jurisdiction to examine facts which 
were crucial for the determination of the dispute. In these circumstances the applicant com-
pany cannot be considered to have had access to a tribunal invested with sufficient jurisdiction 
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to decide the case before it. There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 para.1 (art. 6-
1).’163 
 
Chevrol v. France (2003) concerned permission for an Algerian medical graduate to 
practise as a doctor in France. From 17 February 1987 onwards, the applicant sought 
permission to practise as a doctor in France, firstly from the council of the Ordre des 
Médecins and subsequently, on eleven occasions, from the Minister for Health. In 
these proceedings, she relied on Article 5 of Part 1 of the 1962 ‘Government Decla-
ration on Cultural Cooperation between France and Algeria’, which stipulated that 
academic diplomas and qualifications obtained in Algeria and France under the same 
conditions as regards curriculum, attendance and examinations should be automatic-
ally valid in both countries. The outcome of these proceedings was unfavourable to 
the applicant. She then applied to the Conseil d’Etat, which gave judgment on 9 April 
1999, dismissing her application. In the course of the proceedings before the Conseil 
d’Etat, the Conseil requested the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to submit an opinion on 
the applicability of the mentioned Article 5 invoked by the applicant. The Ministry 
thereupon stated that Article 5 could not be applied to the present case, as the reci-
procity requirement in Article 55 of the French Constitution could not be regarded as 
having been satisfied, since Algeria did not recognise French academic diplomas and 
qualifications as being automatically valid in Algeria. After being apprised of the ob-
servations of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the applicant produced to the Conseil 
d’Etat declarations from various Algerian authorities certifying that qualifications 
obtained in France by French practitioners were recognised as being automatically 
valid in Algeria. In its judgment, the Conseil d’Etat did not take these declarations from 
the Algerian authorities into account. It automatically followed the observations made 
by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, ruling that Article 5 of the Declaration on Cultural 
Cooperation between France and Algeria could not be regarded as having been in 
force on the date of the decision complained of, as on that date the reciprocity re-
quirement laid down in Article 55 of the Constitution had not been satisfied. The ap-
plicant was, accordingly, not entitled to rely on this provision. The applicant com-
plained before the ECtHR that the proceedings before the Conseil d’Etat had been un-
fair. In her opinion, the fact that the Minister for Foreign Affairs’ assessment as to 
whether the international treaty in question was applicable was binding on the Conseil 
d’Etat, which drew automatic inferences from it, was incompatible with judicial 
independence. The ECtHR agreed with the applicant: 
 
‘The Court notes that in the instant case the Conseil d’Etat (…) relied entirely on a represen-
tative of the executive for a solution to the problem before it, concerning the applicability of 
treaties. It dismissed the applicant’s application purely on the ground that the Minister for For-
eign Affairs had stated that Article 5 of the 1962 Government Declaration could not be regard-
ed as having been in force on the relevant date, as it had not been applied by Algeria. However, 
even if consultation of the minister by the Conseil d’Etat may appear necessary in order to as-
                                                        
163 ECtHR, Terra Woningen B.V. v. the Netherlands, 28 November 1996, Appl. No. 49/1995/555/64, 
paras. 46 and 51-55. 
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sess whether the reciprocity requirement has been satisfied, that court’s current practice of re-
ferring a preliminary question for interpretation, as in the instant case, obliges it to abide by the 
opinion of the minister – an external authority who is also a representative of the executive – 
without subjecting that opinion to any criticism or discussion by the parties. The Court ob-
serves, in addition, that the minister’s involvement, which was decisive for the outcome of the 
legal proceedings, was not open to challenge by the applicant (…). In fact, when the applicant 
was apprised of the Minister for Foreign Affairs’ observations, she produced to the Conseil 
d’Etat several pieces of factual evidence to show that the 1962 Government Declaration had 
indeed been applied by the Algerian government. (…). However, the Conseil d’Etat did not 
even consider that evidence (…) it based its decision solely on the opinion of the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs. In so doing, the Conseil d’Etat considered itself to be bound by this opinion, 
thereby voluntarily depriving itself of the power to examine and take into account factual evi-
dence that could have been crucial for the practical resolution of the dispute before it. That be-
ing so, the applicant cannot be considered to have had access to a tribunal which had (…) suf-
ficient jurisdiction to examine all the factual and legal issues relevant to the determination of 
the dispute (…). There has accordingly been a violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention in 
that the applicant’s case was not heard by a “tribunal” with full jurisdiction.’164 
 
Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria (2005) concerned the liquidation of a private bank due to 
insolvency. The applicant bank had set up and acquired a banking license in 1993. On 
20 November 1997, its license was revoked by the Bulgarian National Bank (BNB) 
after the BNB established its insolvency. On 6 January 1998, it was put into com-
pulsory liquidation and on 20 April 2005, the bank was wound up and struck off the 
register of companies. The applicant bank lodged appeals against the decisions taken 
by the BNB to the Sofia City Court and, subsequently, to a five-member panel of the 
Supreme Court of Cassation. Both courts, however, considered themselves precluded 
from conducting their own examination of whether the bank was in fact insolvent 
after it had been found to be insolvent by the BNB. As a result, the Sofia City Court 
expressly held that the evidence adduced by the applicant bank and by the prose-
cutor’s office with a view to challenging the BNB’s findings should not be taken into 
account, as it was irrelevant to the dispute before it. The outcome of the case was, 
thus, in the end determined solely on the basis of the BNB’s finding that the appli-
cant bank was insolvent.165 The ECtHR found that the BNB’s determination in the 
case at hand had not been subject to judicial scrutiny of the scope required by Article 
6, first paragraph.166 It appears from the judgment that in the course of the proceed-
ings before the ECtHR, the Bulgarian Government tried to convince the ECtHR of 
the need for the national Bulgarian courts to defer to the BNB’s findings. It referred 
to the ‘specific character of the banking business’, the special position and functions 
of the BNB as a national supervisor, and, lastly, to the serious banking and financial 
crisis in Bulgaria which had prompted a quick regulatory response from the authori-
                                                        
164 ECtHR, Chevrol v. France, 13 February 2003, Appl. No. 49636/99, paras. 81-84. 
165 ECtHR, Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria, 24 November 2005, Appl. No. 49429/99, para. 99. 
166 Ibidem, paras 100-108. 
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ties.167 The ECtHR did not accept these arguments as valid reasons for judicial de-
ference by the national courts towards the BNB. It considered: 
 
‘The Court (…) is prepared to accept that the BNB’s opinion on this issue carries significant 
weight because of its special expertise in this area. However, it is not persuaded that the na-
tional courts, if need be with the assistance of expert opinion, could not themselves ascertain 
whether the applicant bank was insolvent or not. The difficulties encountered in this respect 
could also be overcome through the provision of a right of appeal against the BNB’s decision 
to an adjudicatory body other than a traditional court integrated within the standard judicial 
machinery of the country, but which otherwise fully complies with all the requirements of Ar-
ticle 6(1), or whose decision is subject to review by a judicial body with full jurisdiction which 
itself provides the safeguards required by that provision. Indeed, as is apparent from the 
Court’s case-law, similar systems exist in many States Parties in domains in which special ex-
pertise is needed.’168 
 
Just as in Capital Bank AD v. Bulgaria (2005), in the case of Druzstevni Zálozna Pria and 
others v. The Czech Republic (2008),169 the national court relied heavily on the determina-
tion made by the administrative authority – the Office for the Supervision of Credit 
Unions (OSCU) – that the situation of the applicant credit union called for a receiver-
ship. The applicant’s national appeal was twofold. Firstly, the applicant contested the 
legal assessment of the OSCU declaring the transactions entered into by the applicant 
credit union contrary to national legislation. Secondly, it was asserted in the appeal 
that the OSCU had imposed on the applicant credit union a disproportionate meas-
ure when opting for receivership, although other less strict measures had been avail-
able. According to the applicant credit union, that decision had been partly due to an 
erroneous assessment of the facts, namely of its economic standing, by the OSCU. 
Due to its jurisdiction being limited to review of legality, the Prague High Court 
(hereafter: the national court) when dealing with the second limb of the appeal, ab-
stained from conducting its own examination of whether the applicant credit union 
was in fact in a situation justifying the imposition of receivership. Admitting that 
receivership was the strictest measure available, the national court held that national 
legislation reserved for the OSCU acting within its discretionary power the decision 
as to what measure to adopt in cases of breach of statutory provisions. Instead of 
ruling on the question of proportionality of the receivership, it confined itself only to 
verification that the OSCU had not acted beyond its discretionary power reserved by 
the Act when imposing the receivership. That finding was made on the assumption, 
not verification, that the economic standing of the applicant credit union as assessed 
by the OSCU had been accurate.170 The ECtHR found this limited jurisdiction of the 
national court incompatible with Article 6, first paragraph. It ruled: 
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‘It ensues that the High Court, prevented from assessing whether there was indeed any factual 
basis for imposing the receivership, and limited to reviewing whether the impugned decision 
was adopted within the OSCU’s discretionary power instead of examining the lawfulness of 
that decision, did not exercise full judicial review. The Court therefore finds that the OSCU’s 
determination of the applicant company’s civil rights in the case at hand was not subject to 
judicial scrutiny of the scope required by Article 6 § 1.’171 
5.4.2  Required national judicial scrutiny under Article 6, first paragraph: 
interim conclusions 
Article 6, first paragraph, requires that administrative decisions can generally be chal-
lenged before a tribunal having full judicial jurisdiction on points of fact and points 
of law. Full jurisdiction implies that the national court is able to make an independent 
determination of the disputed facts and of the credibility of a claimant. It also implies 
that the national court subjects to a debate with both parties advisory information 
invoked and relied on by the administrative decision maker or the applicant. Limited 
jurisdiction is, exceptionally, permitted, when a number of specific conditions are ful-
filled. First, the particular subject-matter of the proceedings is of importance. In cases 
where the subject-matter belongs to the classical exercise of administrative discretion, 
such as land planning, environmental protection and the regulation of gaming, and in 
cases where the subject matter involves a specialised issue requiring professional 
knowledge or experience, limited judicial scrutiny at national level may be per-
missible. Other conditions must be met as well. These are that the national proceed-
ings centre upon points of law and not facts, the preceding administrative proce-
dure(s) is governed by many Article 6-safeguards, and the national judicial scrutiny re-
view is, nevertheless, meaningful in the sense that it entails real scrutiny of the points 
of law and the procedural points raised by the applicant. 
5.4.3 The Zumtobel doctrine and national asylum court proceedings 
It may be argued that asylum cases do not fit the category of cases in which limited 
national court jurisdiction, in the form of a restriction on the court’s competence as 
to questions of facts, is acceptable. As Judge Martens sharply clarified in his separate 
opinion to Fischer v. Austria (1995),172 there are certain obvious areas where it is im-
perative that administrative courts should be in a position to leave sufficient freedom 
of manoeuvre to the executive authorities where it concerns issues of expediency. 
Martens mentioned as obvious examples areas in which highly technical questions or 
important diplomatic issues are decisive, and also cases where the administrative au-
thorities may legitimately maintain secrecy even towards the courts. Other areas are 
those which have classically belonged to the exercise of administrative discretion, 
such as land planning. Land planning is a classical administrative task and the admin-
istration will normally be much better positioned than the judiciary to determine the 
                                                        
171 Ibidem, paras.113, 114. 
172 Separate opinion of Judge Martens to the judgment in the case of Fischer v. Austria, 26 April 1995, 
Appl. No. 16922/90.  
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expediency of its decisions in this area. According to Martens, at the other end of the 
spectrum we find those cases where the proceedings directly concern rights coming 
within the ambit of Article 8 (protecting the right to private life and the right to fami-
ly life), or cases where – more generally – the general interest is clearly much less in-
volved than that of the individual. Martens referred to the case of W. v. the UK (1987), 
discussed above, which concerned parental access to a child in public care. In that 
case, the ECtHR ruled that both available national judicial remedies were not com-
pliant with Article 6, first paragraph, as they were not competent to examine the mer-
its of the case.173 
It would seem more logical to place Article 3-cases concerning the expulsion of 
asylum seekers in the second category of cases which require full judicial scrutiny on 
points of fact and points of law. As in the Article 8-cases, such as W. v. the UK (1987), 
in asylum cases a very significant, and perhaps even greater, individual interest is at 
stake. Article 3 contains a fundamental, absolute and non-derogable right.174 Most 
Article 3-cases of asylum seekers will not be of a highly technical nature in the sense 
that complex technical issues are involved, and in only a very limited number of cases 
will important diplomatic issues be at stake. Taking into account that the require-
ments of Article 13 reinforce those of Article 6,175 it may be argued that the require-
ment of an independent and rigorous scrutiny (Article 13) reinforces the requirement 
of full jurisdiction on points of fact and points of law (Article 6). Given what Article 
13 requires from national courts, it would not be logical to place cases concerning the 
expulsion of asylum seekers in the category of cases involving the classical exercise of 
administrative discretion for the purposes of Article 6, first paragraph. 
5.5  Article 6, first paragraph: evidentiary issues in national court 
proceedings 
5.5.1  National procedural autonomy 
The ECtHR normally regards the determination of the relevant facts of the case – 
whether criminal, civil or administrative – and the means and rules to determine the 
relevant facts, as primarily a matter for the national authorities, including the national 
courts. It will, therefore, generally not substitute its own assessment of the facts for 
that of the national authorities, including the national courts. The ECtHR is not a 
fourth instance, but is only called upon to determine whether or not the national 
proceedings as a whole were fair. A logical consequence of this is that the ECtHR 
will not generally review the admission, ordering, exclusion and evaluation of evi-
dence by national courts. For example, it will not generally question a national court’s 
                                                        
173 ECtHR, W. v. the UK, 8 July 1987, Appl. No. 9749/82, paras. 81-83. 
174 Examples of judgments concerning expulsion in which the absolute nature of Article 3 was stressed 
by the ECtHR are Saadi v. Italy 28 February 2008, Appl. No. 37201/06, paras. 137-141, A. v. the 
Netherlands, 20 July 2010, Appl. No. 4900/06, paras. 142-143, Charahili v. Turkey, 13 April 2010, Appl. 
No. 46605/07, para. 58. See also Harris, O’Boyle, Bates & Buckley 2009, p. 87. 
175 ECtHR, Kudla v. Poland, 26 October 2000, Appl. No. 30210/96, para. 152. See also Van Dijk et al. 
2006, p. 1019. 
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decision as to the calling of an expert report or witness. This basic principle is reiter-
ated in many judgments and decisions. For example, in the case of Dombo Beheer B.V. 
v. the Netherlands (1993)176 the Court ruled: 
 
‘The Court notes at the outset that it is not called upon to rule in general whether it is per-
missible to exclude the evidence of a person in civil proceedings to which he is a party. Nor is 
it called upon to examine the Netherlands law of evidence in civil procedure in abstracto. The 
applicant company does not claim that the law itself was in violation of the Convention; be-
sides, the law under which the decisions complained of were given has since been replaced. In 
any event, the competence of witnesses is primarily governed by national law. (…). It is not 
within the province of the Court to substitute its own assessment of the facts for that of the 
national courts.’177 
 
And in Elsholz v. Germany (2000),178 the Court considered: 
 
‘The Court recalls that the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by na-
tional law and that, as a general rule, it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before 
them. The Court’s task under the Convention is rather to ascertain whether the proceedings as 
a whole, including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair (see (...) the Schenk v. 
Switzerland judgment (…).’179 
 
Under certain circumstances, however, the ECtHR relinquishes this ‘hands off’ ap-
proach and embarks upon answering the question of whether the determination of 
the facts by the national authorities has been correct and fair. At least two categories 
of cases can be distinguished in which this happens. The first category comprises 
cases in which no proper examination of the case by the national court took place, 
for example because it overlooked submitted evidence or refused to allow serious evi-
dence into the proceedings. The second category comprises cases in which the op-
portunities to submit evidence to the national court and to react to evidence and 
statements of the other party were clearly unequal for the parties to the case. Each of 
these categories is discussed in more detail below. 
5.5.2  The obligation on national courts to conduct a proper examination of 
submissions, arguments and evidence 
Article 6, first paragraph, places the national court under a duty to conduct a proper 
examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the parties.180 If 
the national court fails to conduct such an examination, the ECtHR may conclude 
that the national proceedings were unfair. Some examples of cases where this was 
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assumed were analysed above, where the doctrine of full jurisdiction was discussed. 
Another interesting example is the case of Elsholz v. Germany (2000).181 In this case, 
the ECtHR concluded that no proper examination of the case had taken place by the 
national court because that court had refused to obtain expert evidence. The case 
concerned an application to a district court for a decision granting the applicant a 
right of access to his child C, born out of wedlock. The court had dismissed a pre-
vious application for access because it had concluded that contact with the father 
would not enhance the child’s wellbeing. In reaction to the current application, the 
court referred to this previous decision, without holding an oral hearing and without 
obtaining a psychological expert opinion on the question of access rights, although 
the local Youth Office had recommended that the court obtain such advice before 
taking a decision. The ECtHR concluded on this basis that the court proceedings had 
been unfair: 
 
‘The Court recalls that the admissibility of evidence is primarily a matter for regulation by na-
tional law and that, as a general rule, it is for the national courts to assess the evidence before 
them. The Court’s task under the Convention is rather to ascertain whether the proceedings as 
a whole, including the way in which evidence was taken, were fair (see (…) the Schenk v. Swit-
zerland judgment (…).The Court (…) considers that in the present case, because of the lack of 
psychological expert evidence and the circumstance that the Regional Court did not conduct a 
further hearing although, in the Court’s view, the applicant’s appeal raised questions of fact 
and law which could not adequately be resolved on the basis of the written material at the dis-
posal of the Regional Court, the proceedings, taken as a whole, did not satisfy the requirements 
of a fair and public hearing within the meaning of Article 6(1). There has thus been a breach of 
this provision.’182 
5.5.3  Equality of arms, adversariality 
As was said above in 5.2.3, ‘fair’ in Article 6, first paragraph, means, inter alia, that the 
parties to the case have equal arms, meaning that each party is afforded a reasonable 
opportunity to present his or her case, including his or her evidence, under condi-
tions that do not place him or her at a substantial disadvantage vis-à-vis the other 
side.183 ‘Fair’ also means that proceedings are adversarial: parties must have knowl-
edge of and must be able to comment on the observations filed or evidence adduced 
by the other party.184 
A clear example of unequal opportunities to submit evidence to the national 
court, resulting in a violation of Article 6, first paragraph, is the case of Dombo Beheer 
B.V. v. the Netherlands (1993).185 The case revolved around a dispute between the ap-
plicant company, Dombo Beheer B.V., and a bank concerning an agreement to ex-
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tend existing credit facilities. In the national judicial proceedings, it was incumbent 
upon the applicant company to prove that there was an oral agreement between it 
and the bank to extend the credit facilities. Only two persons had been present at the 
meeting at which this agreement had allegedly been reached, a manager of Dombo 
and a representative of the bank. Yet only the bank’s representative had been per-
mitted to be heard in court. The ECtHR ruled that this unequal treatment by the 
Court of Appeal constituted a breach of the principle of equality of arms, and, there-
fore, a violation of Article 6.186 Similarly, in the case of De Haes and Gijsels v. Belgium 
(1997),187 the ECtHR ruled that equality of arms required that a party to national civil 
proceedings be permitted to have material evidence in support of his or her case 
admitted in court.188 
5.5.4  Secret evidence189 
The requirements of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings are not absolute, 
though. Non-disclosure of evidentiary materials may be justified if this is strictly nec-
essary to preserve the fundamental rights of another individual or to safeguard an im-
portant public interest, such as the protection of national security. A weighing of in-
terests then needs to be made: the interest of the particular party to have knowledge 
of the evidence must be weighed against the interest of the other party to keep this 
evidence secret, for example, in order to protect the security of certain other persons, 
sources of information or to protect national security. If a court allows secret evi-
dence to the proceedings and accepts that this evidence has not been disclosed to the 
other party, difficulties caused to a party by the non-disclosure of this evidence must 
be sufficiently counterbalanced by the procedures followed by the judicial authori-
ties.190 
The ECtHR first developed these principles in the context of criminal cases. Rowe 
and Davis v. the UK (2000) and Edwards and Lewis v. the UK (2004) were both criminal 
cases in which important incriminating evidence had been withheld from the defence. 
In both cases, the ECtHR found this to be at variance with Article 6, first paragraph, 
because no counterbalancing measures whatsoever had been taken to protect the 
interests of the defence. In Rowe and Davis v. the UK (2000), the public prosecutor had 
not even informed the first instance court of the existence of the non-disclosed evi-
dence. It was only at the stage of higher appeal that the public prosecutor had in-
formed the appeal court and requested approval for further non-disclosure. The 
ECtHR made clear that it had been the task of the first instance national court (not 
the appellate court) to examine the secret evidence, to determine whether non-dis-
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closure of this evidence to the defence had been strictly necessary, and to take appro-
priate compensating measures.191 
The question arises as to whether examination of the secret evidence by the first 
instance national court always offers a sufficient counterbalancing measure for the 
non-disclosure of the evidence to the defence, and, thus, sufficient compensation for 
the lack of adversariality. The case of A. v. the Netherlands (2010)192 concerned a re-
fusal of asylum and an exclusion order resting on information from the Dutch Intel-
ligence Service AIVD that Mr. A. was a danger to national security. The AIVD infor-
mation underpinning this allegation had not been accessible to the applicant. It had 
been accessible to the national first instance provisional measures judge (voorlopige voor-
zieningenrechter). This judge had examined the closed evidence at the AIVD premises 
and had concluded that it constituted a sufficient basis for the conclusion that Mr. A. 
indeed constituted a danger to the national security of the Netherlands, without dis-
closing any details in his judgment. The provisional measures judge had also con-
cluded that no Article 3-risk was present.193 In the proceedings before the ECtHR, 
the applicant complained that he had not had an effective national remedy for this 
Article 3-complaint, in that he could not effectively challenge the national authorities’ 
assertion that he posed a threat to national security.194 
In this case, the ECtHR did not share the applicant’s opinion that no effective 
national remedy had been available. The Court did not find it problematic that the 
AIVD information had not been disclosed to the applicant. Although it did not expli-
citly say so, it seems that the Court was satisfied that the national court could exam-
ine, and had actually examined, the closed evidence: 
 
‘Concerning the underlying materials of the AIVD (…) the Court notes that with the parties’ 
consent these materials were disclosed to the provisional measures judge (…) which in the 
Court’s view has not compromised the independence of the national courts involved in the 
proceedings concerned and neither can it be said that these courts have given less rigorous 
scrutiny to the applicant’s Article 3 claim (...). Furthermore, the Court notes that this report 
and the underlying materials did not, as such, concern the applicant’s fear of being subjected to 
ill-treatment in Libya but whether he was posing a threat to the Netherlands national secu-
rity.’195 
 
The Court’s reasoning on the issue of the use of secret evidence was remarkably 
short in the light of the more elaborate considerations in the criminal cases men-
tioned above. This can probably be explained by the fact that the applicant had com-
plained that he had not had an effective national remedy for his Article 3-complaint, 
whereas the secret evidence underpinned the exclusion order and not the decision 
that no Article 3-risk was imminent. In other words, the lack of adversariality had oc-
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curred in the proceedings concerning the exclusion order, and not in the proceedings 
concerning the alleged Article 3-risk. 
It is, so far, not clear whether – in the context of cases concerning migration – 
examination of closed evidence by the national first instance judge always and under 
all circumstances offers a sufficient counterbalancing measure. A. and Others v. the UK 
(2009)196 is an example of a case in which, as well as examination of the closed evi-
dence by the national first instance judge, more counterbalancing measures were 
taken to compensate the lack of adversariality. These additional counterbalancing 
measures took the shape of participation in the proceedings of so-called ‘special ad-
vocates’. The case of A. and others v. the UK (2009) revolved around the question of 
compatibility of detention of alleged foreign terrorists in the UK with Articles 3 and 5 
ECHR.197 One of the main issues before the ECtHR in this case was the compliance 
of the system of special advocates with Article 5, paragraph 4, ECHR on the right to 
a speedy court trial in cases of detention, a lex specialis of Article 6. The system of spe-
cial advocates operates in certain cases involving the use of secret evidence, including 
cases of alleged involvement in terrorist activities. In these cases, a special procedure 
is applied by the Special Immigration Appeals Commission (SIAC), which enables it 
to consider not only material which can be made public (‘open material’) but also 
material which, for reasons of national security, cannot (‘closed material’). Neither the 
appellant nor his or her legal advisor can see the closed material. Accordingly, one or 
more security-cleared counsel, referred to as ‘special advocates’, are appointed by the 
Solicitor General to act on behalf of each appellant. In the appeals before the SIAC 
in the case of A. v. the UK (2009), the open statements and evidence concerning each 
appellant had been served first, and the special advocate had been able to discuss this 
material with the appellant and his legal advisors and to take instructions. The closed 
material had then been disclosed to the judges and the special advocate, from which 
point there could be no further contact between the latter and the appellant and/or 
his representatives, save with the permission of the SIAC. It was the special advo-
cate’s role during the closed sessions to make submissions on behalf of the appellant, 
both as regards procedural matters, such as the need for further disclosure, and the 
substance of the case.198 
The ECtHR accepted that the perceived need to protect the population of the 
United Kingdom from terrorist attacks meant that there was a ‘strong public interest’ 
in maintaining the secrecy of sources of information concerning Al-Qaida and its as-
sociates.199 The Court did not find that the system of special advocates was, of itself, 
non-compliant with Article 5, paragraph 4:  
 
‘The Court (…) considers that the special advocate could perform an important role in coun-
terbalancing the lack of full disclosure and the lack of a full, open, adversarial hearing by test-
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ing the evidence and putting arguments on behalf of the detainee during the closed hear-
ings.’200 
 
The Court also noted, however, that the special advocate could not perform this 
function in any useful way unless the detainee was provided with sufficient informa-
tion about the allegations against him to enable him to give effective instructions to 
the special advocate. The Court observed that, where the evidence was disclosed to a 
large extent and the open material played the predominant role in the determination, 
it could not be said that the applicant had been denied an opportunity effectively to 
challenge the Secretary of State’s suspicions about him. In other cases, even where all 
or most of the underlying evidence remained undisclosed, if the allegations contained 
in the open material were sufficiently specific, it should have been possible for the 
applicant to provide his representatives and the special advocate with information 
with which to refute them, if such information existed, without his having to know 
the detail or sources of the evidence which formed the basis of the allegations.201 The 
Court thus made clear that the national court must look at the proportional 
relationship between the open (or accessible) evidence and the closed (or non-dis-
closed) evidence, and test the specificity and level of detail of the allegations in the 
open evidence. The more detailed and specific the open evidence was, the easier it 
would be for the other party to challenge the allegations and the less problematic the 
use of the non-disclosed evidence would be. When, to the contrary, all the specific 
details underpinning the allegations were contained in the closed evidence, whereas 
the open evidence was in fact no more than a bare accusation, possibilities to chal-
lenge the accusation were almost non-existent. In such a situation, the use of secret 
evidence was problematic. 
In the specific case of A. and Others v. the UK (2009), the ECtHR concluded that, 
under the particular circumstances, the system of special advocates did not offer a 
sufficient counterbalance for the lack of adversariality affecting a number of 
applicants. The problem was that the open evidence was not specific enough, where-
as important and specific details were laid down in the closed evidence:  
 
‘The principal allegations against the first and tenth applicants were that they had been in-
volved in fund-raising for terrorist groups linked to al ’Qaeda. In the first applicant’s case there 
was open evidence of large sums of money moving through his bank account and in respect of 
the tenth applicant there was open evidence that he had been involved in raising money 
through fraud. However, in each case the evidence which allegedly provided the link between 
the money raised and terrorism was not disclosed to either applicant. In these circumstances, 
the Court does not consider that these applicants were in a position effectively to challenge the 
allegations against them. There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 4 in respect of the 
first and tenth applicants. 
The open allegations in respect of the third and fifth applicants were of a general nature, prin-
cipally that they were members of named extremist Islamist groups linked to al ’Qaeda. SIAC 
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observed in its judgments dismissing each of these applicants’ appeals that the open evidence 
was insubstantial and that the evidence on which it relied against them was largely to be found 
in the closed material. Again, the Court does not consider that these applicants were in a posi-
tion effectively to challenge the allegations against them. There has therefore been a violation 
of Article 5 § 4 in respect of the third and fifth applicants.’202 
 
The ECtHR has dealt with a number of cases concerning the expulsion of migrants 
(not asylum seekers) on grounds of national security, where the national administra-
tion or national prosecutor used secret evidence. Within the framework of Article 8 
(containing the right to protection of family life and private life) the ECtHR has 
stressed the crucial role of the national first instance court in examining the secret 
evidence and determining whether non-disclosure is justified. Examples are the cases 
of Al Nashif v. Bulgaria (2002)203 and Lupsa v. Romania (2006).204 In these cases, neither 
the applicants nor the national judicial authorities had been provided with the in-
formation underpinning the allegation that the applicants constituted a threat to the 
national security of, respectively, Bulgaria and Romania. As a result, the non-disclo-
sure of evidence to the applicants had in no way been counterbalanced by the proce-
dures followed by the national courts. The national courts had not gone beyond the 
assertions of the public prosecutor’s office for the purpose of verifying whether the 
applicants really represented a danger to national security or public order. The 
ECtHR found this totally unacceptable and in violation of Article 8.205 Importantly, 
in Lupsa v. Romania (2006), the Court ruled: 
 
‘The existence of adequate and effective safeguards against abuse, including in particular proce-
dures for effective scrutiny by the courts, is all the more important since a system of secret sur-
veillance designed to protect national security entails the risk of undermining or even destroy-
ing democracy on the ground of defending it.’206 
 
It is clear from this consideration that the ECtHR sees national courts as the primary 
guardians of adversariality and equality of arms and that national courts must be very 
careful in accepting secret evidence. 
5.5.5  Evidentiary issues in national proceedings under Article 6: interim 
conclusions 
To sum up, Article 6, first paragraph, places national courts under a duty to conduct a 
proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced by the 
parties. Where no proper examination has taken place by the national court, either 
because that court did not properly examine party evidence or because it did not use 
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its investigative powers in order to determine disputed facts independently, this may 
lead the ECtHR to conclude that there have been unfair national proceedings in 
violation of Article 6, first paragraph. 
Article 6, first paragraph, also requires that the parties to the case normally have 
equal opportunities to bring in evidence, equal knowledge of evidence and equal op-
portunities to comment on the observations or evidence adduced by the other party. 
The requirements of adversariality and equality of arms are not absolute, though. 
Non-disclosure of evidentiary materials may be justified if this is strictly necessary to 
preserve the fundamental rights of another individual or to safeguard an important 
public interest, such as the protection of national security. A weighing of interests 
then needs to be made: the interest of the particular party to have knowledge of the 
evidence must be weighed against the interest of the other party to keep this evidence 
secret, for example, in order to protect the security of certain other persons, sources 
of information or to protect national security. If a national court allows secret evi-
dence into the proceedings and accepts that this evidence has not been disclosed to 
the other party, it must follow special procedures to counterbalance the lack of adver-
sariality. This means, at least, that the national court itself examines the secret evi-
dence, and, if possible, takes additional counterbalancing measures. An example of 
such an additional counterbalancing measure is the system of special advocates as it 
functions in the UK. In taking additional counterbalancing measures, the national 
court will have to look at the proportional relationship between the open (accessible) 
evidence and the closed (non-disclosed) evidence, and must test the specificity and 
level of detail of the allegations in the open evidence. Where all, or most, of the speci-
fic details underpinning the allegations are contained in the closed evidence, whereas 
the open evidence is in fact nothing but a mere accusation or allegation, the possibil-
ity to challenge it is almost non-existent. In such situations, the use of secret evidence 
is problematic under Article 6, first paragraph.  
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ECHR, Part 2: 
The assessment performed by the ECtHR in cases on expulsion of asylum 
seekers 
5.6 Rigorous scrutiny 
To describe the assessment it carries out in expulsion cases, the ECtHR uses the term 
‘rigorous scrutiny’.207 It is important to note that this criterion is in its terminology 
identical to the requirement applicable to national court proceedings under Articles 3, 
13 and 35, first paragraph – ‘independent and rigorous scrutiny’ – described in Part 1, 
section 5.3.  
The ECtHR explained the need for it to conduct a rigorous examination or rigor-
ous scrutiny for the first time in Vilvarajah and others v. the UK (1991). The Court pro-
vided two reasons: the absolute character of Article 3 and the fundamental nature of 
Article 3, being a right which enshrines one of the fundamental values of the demo-
cratic societies making up the Council of Europe.208 A third reason for a rigorous 
scrutiny, mentioned by the Court not in considerations about its own test, but in 
considerations about the rigorous scrutiny to be performed under Article 13 by the 
national authorities, was the irreversible nature of the harm that might occur if the 
risk of ill-treatment materialises.209 
In order to better understand how the ECtHR itself performs its rigorous scru-
tiny, a step by step analysis is now made of the assessment performed by the ECtHR 
in cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers. The analysis is made with the aid 
of the eleven aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny introduced in Chapter 1. 
5.6.1  Standard of proof 
It is settled case law that substantial grounds have to be shown for believing that 
upon expulsion there is a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3.210 
In Saadi v. Italy (2008), a case concerning an asylum seeker suspected of interna-
tional terrorism, the UK Government, intervening as a third party, tried to persuade 
the ECtHR to modify this standard of proof by requiring that it ‘be proved that sub-
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jection to ill-treatment is more likely than not’.211 Such a higher standard of proof 
would make it easier for States to expel persons like Saadi. The Court rejected this 
and reaffirmed that 
 
‘It is necessary – and sufficient – for substantial grounds to have been shown for believing that 
there is a real risk that the person concerned will be subjected in the receiving country to treat-
ment prohibited by Article 3.’212 
 
In another case concerning an asylum seeker suspected of terrorism, A. v. the Nether-
lands (2010), the ECtHR once more reiterated this standard of proof. The Court 
stressed in this judgment that it was acutely conscious of the difficulties faced by 
States in protecting their populations from terrorist violence, but that this made it all 
the more important to underline the important and absolute nature of Article 3 and 
that given this nature, there was no room for a higher standard of proof.213 
The level of risk required is a real (not fictional), personal (relating to the individ-
ual), and foreseeable risk exceeding the mere possibility of being subjected to pro-
scribed ill-treatment.214 The risk does not need to be certain or highly probable.215 
It seems that in Article 3-cases concerning extradition, the ECtHR applies a 
second standard of proof, as well as the standard that substantial grounds have to be 
shown for believing that upon expulsion there is a real risk of treatment contrary to 
Article 3. This second standard is ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.216 The Court has con-
sidered in a number of extradition cases that:  
 
‘In assessing the evidence on which to base the decision whether there has been a violation of 
Article 3, the Court adopts the standard of proof “beyond reasonable doubt”.’ 
 
Immediately added to this was that such proof may follow from the coexistence of 
sufficiently strong, clear and concordant inferences or of similar unrebutted presump-
tions of fact.217  
Spijkerboer (2010) assumes that the inclusion of this second standard must be a 
slip of the pen.218 He argues that this standard of proof stems from cases in which it 
is alleged that a violation of a right occurred in the past; in such cases the facts have 
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to be ascertained ‘beyond reasonable doubt’.219 In most cases concerning the expul-
sion of asylum seekers, a violation has not yet occurred, but there is a risk that a vio-
lation will occur in the future. According to Spijkerboer and also Wouters (2009), the 
concepts of real risk and beyond reasonable doubt do not go well together.220 Spijker-
boer refers to Saadi v. Italy (2008), mentioned above, in which the Court refused to 
modify the standard of proof. The standard of proof ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ does 
not feature in Article 3-cases concerning the expulsion (not extradition) of asylum 
seekers. It is, therefore, of no further relevance. 
5.6.2  Burden of proof 
It is settled case law that the burden of proof rests initially with the applicant. In Said 
v. the Netherlands (2005), the Court expressed this principle as follows: 
 
‘it is incumbent on persons who allege that their expulsion would amount to a breach of Ar-
ticle 3 to adduce, to the greatest extent practically possible, material and information allowing 
the authorities of the Contracting State concerned, as well as the Court, to assess the risk a re-
moval may entail’.221 
 
In Saadi v. Italy (2008), the ECtHR used the following consideration on the burden of 
proof and the distribution of the burden of proof for the first time:  
 
‘It is in principle for the applicant to adduce evidence capable of proving that there are sub-
stantial grounds to believing that (…) he would be exposed to a real risk of being subjected to 
treatment contrary to Article 3. Where such evidence is adduced, it is for the Government to 
dispel any doubts about it.’222 
 
This principle is reiterated in many later judgments.223 It implies that the claimant has 
to make an arguable claim by submitting statements which can, in general, be con-
sidered credible and by providing corroborating evidence which is capable of proving 
that there are substantial grounds for believing in a real Article 3-risk.224 This ‘argu-
able claim test’ is a threshold below the ‘substantial grounds test’ (the standard of 
proof). This follows from the fact that ‘evidence capable of proving that there are 
substantial grounds’ is to be submitted, and not ‘evidence proving that there are 
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substantial grounds’. When this initial burden of proof, or arguability test, is met, the 
burden shifts, as a burden of investigation, towards the State and the conclusions 
drawn in section 5.3.5 come into play: the State now has to conduct active investiga-
tions to establish whether the application is well-founded; the State has to ‘dispel any 
doubts’ about the applicability of Article 3. It can do so, for example, by submitting 
country information which contradicts the applicant’s claim, by subjecting documents 
provided by the asylum seeker to an investigation of authenticity and concluding that 
the documents are not authentic, by hearing witnesses and concluding on the basis of 
witness statements that the flight narrative of the applicant is not credible, by obtain-
ing expert (medical) opinions, et cetera.225 
The judgment in R.C. v. Sweden (2010)226 is interesting to mention here once again 
as it illustrates when a claim may be considered arguable and, as a consequence, a 
shift of the burden towards the authorities takes place. Reference is made to section 
5.3.3 above for the facts of this case and the ECtHR’s judgment. The ECtHR clearly 
found that the applicant had made an arguable claim and that the national adminis-
trative and judicial authorities ought to have directed that an expert medical opinion 
be obtained as to the probable cause of his scars. From this judgment, we may draw 
the conclusion that, to be arguable, the claim must reach a basic level of substantia-
tion, meaning that the claim must contain a certain number – not necessarily a very 
high number – of verifiable details and must be supported by some – not necessarily 
a very large amount of – evidence. Where the applicant has provided this basic level 
of substantiation, the burden of proof shifts to the national authorities. 
Noteworthy to mention in respect of the burden of proof is also a consideration 
from Iskandarov v. Russia (2010).227 The applicant in this case had been unlawfully 
extradited from Russia to Tajikistan. Both parties to the case were in strong disagree-
ment in their respective accounts of the circumstances surrounding the applicant’s 
transfer. The applicant stated that he had been abducted and secretly transferred to 
Tajikistan by law enforcement officials, whereas the respondent State maintained that 
the applicant had been abducted by unidentified people and had subsequently been 
arrested in Dushanbe by the Tajik authorities. The ECtHR considered in relation to 
the burden of proof: 
 
‘The Court has also recognised that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend them-
selves to a rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges some-
thing must prove that allegation). In certain circumstances, where the events in issue lie wholly, 
or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, the burden of proof may be 
regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation 
(…).’228 
 
                                                        
225 See the case of ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, discussed in detail above 
in section 5.3.3. 
226 Ibidem. 
227 ECtHR, Iskandarov v. Russia, 23 September 2010, Appl. No. 17185/05. 
228 Ibidem, para. 108. 
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The ECtHR found it established that the applicant had been illegally extradited by 
Russian officials, based on the clear and coherent description of the events by the 
applicant, information from the Tajik Ministry of Foreign Affairs to the UNHCR that 
the applicant had been ‘officially extradited’, and the fact that the Russian Govern-
ment had provided no version capable of explaining how the applicant, last seen in 
the Moscow Region in the evening of 15 April 2005 and admitted to the Tajik prison 
on 17 April 2005, had arrived in Tajikistan.229 The consideration of the burden of 
proof explicated in Iskandarov nuances the general principle that it is, in principle, for 
the applicant to adduce evidence in support of his or her claim. It must be borne in 
mind that certain aspects of a claim might be extremely difficult for an applicant to 
prove and that such aspects may probably be rather within the realm of knowledge of 
the authorities, so that it is more logical to require evidence from the authorities. 
Finally, the ECtHR has made clear that there is an inversely proportional rela-
tionship between the onus on the claimant and the general human rights situation in 
the country of origin. The poorer this situation, the sooner it is assumed that the 
claimant runs a risk, the less he or she has to ‘prove’ and the sooner the onus shifts to 
the State party. If the human rights situation is not obviously poor, the onus shifts 
more towards the claimant, which means that more evidence is expected.230 
5.6.3  Relevant facts and circumstances 
The relevant facts and circumstances can be divided into two categories. First, per-
sonal circumstances are relevant, such as background, gender, ethnicity, age, sexual 
orientation, beliefs, activities, personal profile, and experiences. Second, the general 
human rights situation in the country of origin is relevant. The ECtHR has made 
clear that personal circumstances and the general situation in the country of origin 
must always be seen in conjunction: the personal facts must be assessed in the light 
of the general situation in the country of origin.231 From the case law, it also becomes 
clear that it is normally a combination of facts and circumstances, and not a single 
fact, which establish that there are substantial grounds for assuming a real Article 3-
risk.232 
Some examples of relevant personal facts, and facts and circumstances concern-
ing the country of origin, are provided below, to give an impression of what the 
ECtHR finds particularly relevant and important. The description is illustrative, but 
                                                        
229 Ibidem, paras. 109-115. 
230 This notion of a gradual scale is expressed in case law. See, for example, ECtHR, NA v. the United 
Kingdom, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, paras.115-117. See also Battjes 2009, p. 82, Cox 2010, 
p. 392, Van Bennekom & Van der Winden 2011, p. 220. 
231 See, for example, ECtHR, NA v. the United Kingdom, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, para. 113, in 
which the Court ruled that: ‘this assessment must focus on the foreseeable consequences of the re-
moval of the applicant to the country of destination. This in turn must be considered in the light of 
the general situation there as well as the applicant’s personal circumstances’. See also Battjes 2009, 
p. 80, Wouters 2009, p. 264. 
232 Wouters 2009, p. 255: ‘in most cases a single fact will not suffice to show the existence of a real risk, 
but rather a combination of facts and circumstances must be put forward’. 
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by no means exhaustive, and I also refer to Wouters (2009) for an extensive discus-
sion of relevant facts and circumstances.233 
5.6.3.1  Personal facts 
Important personal facts and circumstances are engagement in oppositional political 
or other activities and the level, type and scale of these activities. For example, in 
Chahal v. the UK (1996), the applicant occupied a high-profile position as an advocate 
of Sikh separatism in India.234 In N. v. Finland, the claimant’s special activities as an 
infiltrator and informant in President Mobutu’s special protection force were found 
to be important.235 In Kandomabadi v. the Netherlands (2004), the minimal role of the 
Iranian applicant in student demonstrations in 1999 was considered a relevant fac-
tor.236 Political activities in the country of refuge may be a relevant factor.237 Arrest, 
criminal charges and detention are, likewise, considered important; in the case of 
Hilal v. the United Kingdom (2001), the applicant had been arrested and detained for 
being a member of an opposition party.238 
Past experiences of torture, ill-treatment, persecution or other serious human 
rights violations, the experiences of either the applicant or his or her relatives, in de-
tention or not, are considered relevant to the extent that they may indicate a risk of 
future subjection to proscribed ill-treatment.239 To mention just a few examples: in 
Hilal v. the United Kingdom (2001) the applicant, who had been arrested and detained 
for membership of an opposition party, was ill-treated in detention and his brother 
died in detention as a result of torture.240 And in Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands (2007), 
the rape of the applicant’s sister and the killing of his father were found relevant, in 
combination with different forms of ill-treatment meted out to the applicant himself, 
such as beating, kicking, harassment, intimidation and forced labour. These facts were 
seen in the light of information on violence directed towards the applicant’s clan, the 
Ashraf, in Somalia.241 
                                                        
233 Wouters 2009, pp. 255-265. 
234 ECtHR, Chahal v. the UK, 15 November 1996, Appl. No. 22414/93, paras. 98, 105, 106. 
235 ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/01, para. 162. 
236 Admissibility decision ECtHR, Kandomabadi v. the Netherlands, 29 June 2004, Appl. Nos. 6276/03 and 
6122/04. 
237 See, for an example of a case in which the Court considered such activities, ECtHR, A.B. v. Sweden, 
admissibility decision, 31 August 2004, Appl. No. 24697/04. In this case the political activities of the 
applicant in Sweden were not found decisive as they dated back almost ten years and as the book 
written by the applicant in Sweden was in Swedish, and only 1,000 copies of it had been printed; 
moreover, the activities described in the book were old and described in a vague and summary 
manner.  
238 ECtHR, Hilal v. the United Kingdom, 6 March 2001,Appl. No. 45276/99, para. 64.  
239 See, for example, ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04. para. 
147, in which the ECtHR referred to the ill-treatment of the applicant in the past and considered 
that it was not persuaded that the situation in the country of origin had changed. See also Wouters 
2009, p. 263. 
240 ECtHR, Hilal v. the United Kingdom, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, para. 64. 
241 See, for example, ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04, para. 
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Army desertion may be an important fact. In the case of Said v. the Netherlands 
(2005), the fact that the applicant had deserted from the Eritrean army before demo-
bilisation, seen in combination with the ill-treatment often inflicted upon deserters in 
the country of origin were found to be decisive.242 
An example of a case in which the risk of being exposed to corporal punishment 
after conviction was found a relevant fact is the case of D. and others v. Turkey (2006). 
In that case the risk of twice being subjected to fifty lashes in the execution of a 
criminal sentence was certain for one of the applicants, who had been convicted of 
fornication in Iran.243 
In a number of cases, it is decisive that the applicant has been sentenced to im-
prisonment in the country of origin and that it is well-known that persons in deten-
tion in the particular country are tortured and ill-treated. Examples of such cases are 
Saadi v. Italy (2008),244 Ismoilov and others v. Russia (2008),245 Abdulazhon Isakov v. Russia 
(2010).246 
Recognition as a refugee by a State, in combination with (largely) unchanged cir-
cumstances in the country of origin, is often a serious indication of a real risk of 
serious harm under Article 3 ECHR. In Ahmed v. Austria (1996), the fact that the 
applicant had been granted refugee status in Austria was found highly relevant.247 In a 
number of cases, the ECtHR has found refugee status determination by the UNHCR 
a highly relevant factor to which much weight is attached in assuming an Article 3-
risk. This happened, for example, in Jabari v. Turkey (2000), Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. 
Turkey (2009), Khaydarov v. Russia (2010) and Dbouba v. Turkey (2010).248 
Being a failed asylum seeker may be a relevant factor; in F. v. the UK (2004) the 
applicant based his fear on this very fact. The ECtHR referred to documents sub-
mitted by the UK that failed asylum seekers were no longer subjected to ill-treatment 
in Iran.249 
5.6.3.2  Facts and circumstances concerning the situation in country of origin 
Relevant circumstances concerning the country of origin are the general human rights 
situation, the plight of refugees, the level of violence in the country and control there-
of by the authorities. Illustrative is the case of Al Hanchi v. Bosnia and Herzegovina 
(2012), in which the ECtHR found it important that a process of democratic transi-
tion was going on in Tunisia and that steps had been taken to dismantle the oppres-
                                                        
242 ECtHR, Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02, para. 52.  
243 ECtHR, D. and others v. Turkey, 22 June 2006, Appl. No. 24245/03, para. 47. 
244 ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, Appl. No. 37201/06, paras. 143-146. 
245 ECtHR, Ismoilov and others v. Russia, 24 April 2008, Appl. No. 2947/06, paras. 120-121. 
246 ECtHR, Abdulazhon Isakov v. Russia, 8 July 2010, Appl. No. 14049/08, para. 109. 
247 ECtHR, Ahmed v. Austria, 17 December 1996, Appl. No. 25964/94, para. 42. 
248 ECtHR, Jabari v. Turkey, 11 July 2000, Appl. No. 40035/98, paras. 40 and 41; ECtHR, Abdolkhani and 
Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 2009, Application No. 30471/08, para. 82; ECtHR, Khaydarov v. 
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249 ECtHR, F. v. the United Kingdom, admissibility decision, 31 August 2004, Appl. No. 36812/02. 
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sive structures of the former regime.250 In H.L.R. v. France (1997) the applicant feared 
ill-treatment by drug traffickers, for revenge, upon return to Colombia. The ECtHR 
found it insufficiently demonstrated that the Colombian authorities would not be able 
to protect the applicant.251 Other relevant facts are changes in government or poli-
cies, the existence of a peace process or an agreed ceasefire, the repatriation of refu-
gees under the supervision of the UNHCR. In Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden (1991), 
the ECtHR noted that ‘a democratic evolution was in the process of taking place in 
Chile which had led to improvements in the political situation and, indeed, to the 
voluntary return of refugees from Sweden and elsewhere’.252 And in Vilvarajah and 
others v. the UK (1991), the Court considered it important that there had been an im-
provement in the situation in the north and east of Sri Lanka and that the UNHCR’s 
voluntary repatriation programme had begun to operate.253 
Conditions in detention in the country of origin have already been mentioned 
above as an important factor. Cases such as Saadi v. Italy (2008),254 Ismoilov and others v. 
Russia (2008)255 and Abdulazhon Isakov v. Russia (2010)256 demonstrate that when a par-
ticular country of origin is known to be perpetrating torture and ill-treatment in pris-
ons, and it is likely that the applicant will end up in detention upon expulsion, the 
ECtHR readily assumes an Article 3-risk. 
Diplomatic assurances guaranteeing that the expelled (or extradited) applicant 
will not be subjected to treatment proscribed by Article 3 have played an important 
role in a number of cases. To be of serious value, diplomatic assurances must, first, 
specifically exclude that the applicant would be subjected to treatment contrary to 
Article 3.257 In addition, the value of diplomatic assurances will depend on whether it 
can be established, on the basis of objective information, such as reports from human 
rights organisations, that the government in question will really be able to prevent 
torture, and has the sincere intention to fight against it. In Chahal v. the UK (1996), the 
ECtHR did not find the diplomatic assurances provided by the Indian Government 
convincing. The Court considered that, despite the efforts by that government, the 
NHRC and the Indian courts to bring about reform, the violation of human rights by 
certain members of the security forces in Punjab and elsewhere in India was a recal-
citrant and enduring problem. Against this background, the Court was not persuaded 
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that the above assurances would provide Mr. Chahal with an adequate guarantee of 
safety.258 
However, in some other cases the ECtHR has found diplomatic assurances 
convincing. An example is Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (2005).259 In this case, 
the Court found assurances issued by the Public Prosecutor of Uzbekistan persuasive, 
first, because they excluded specifically that the applicants would be subjected to 
treatment contrary to Article 3 or the death penalty. Importantly, the assurances also 
stressed that ‘the Republic of Uzbekistan is a party to the United Nations Convention 
against Torture and accepts and reaffirms its obligation to comply with the require-
ments of the provisions of that Convention as regards both Turkey and the interna-
tional community as a whole’. Finally, the Turkish Government produced medical re-
ports from the doctors of the Uzbek prisons in which the applicants had been held. 
These reports did not reveal any indication of torture or ill-treatment.260 For a more 
detailed study of the role of diplomatic assurances in Article 3 expulsion and extradi-
tion cases, I refer to Cox (2010) and to Battjes (2012).261 
A final example of a relevant circumstance concerning the country of origin is 
the existence of an internal relocation alternative. It is constant jurisprudence of the 
ECtHR that as a precondition for relying on an internal relocation alternative, certain 
guarantees have to be in place: the person to be expelled must be able to travel to the 
area concerned, gain admittance and settle there, failing which an issue under Article 
3 may arise, the more so if in the absence of such guarantees there is a possibility of 
an applicant ending up in a part of the country where he or she may be subjected to 
treatment prohibited by Article 3.262 In Sufi and Elmi v. the UK (2011),263 the ECtHR 
examined whether certain parts of southern and central Somalia met the mentioned 
criteria of an internal relocation alternative for people expelled to Mogadishu. It con-
cluded that certain parts of southern and central Somalia were suitable only for those 
people having close family connections in the area concerned, where they could ef-
fectively seek refuge.264 Another recent example of a case in which the Court examin-
ed the question of the availability of a reliable internal relocation alternative is Izev-
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bekhai and others v. Ireland (2011).265 The question in this case was whether the daugh-
ters of the applicant would run a real risk of subjection to female genital mutilation 
(FGM) if expelled to Nigeria. The ECtHR followed information from UN organisa-
tions as well as NGOs that internal re-location to escape FGM was indeed an option 
in Nigeria.266 
5.6.4  Required degree of individual risk 
As has been said above, it is normally a combination of personal facts and conditions 
in the country of origin which constitute substantial grounds for assuming a real 
Article 3-risk. Since Vilvarajah v. the UK (1991),267 the question to what extent an asy-
lum seeker invoking Article 3 must demonstrate that he or she has been specifically 
singled out or targeted has, however, been a topic of fierce debate.268 This is because 
in Vilvarajah the ECtHR used the phrase ‘special distinguishing features’, which seem-
ed to indicate that, to successfully invoke Article 3, the applicant needed to be really 
singled out as an individual. Case law from 2007 onwards has brought some clarity to 
this issue. Three main categories of cases can now be distinguished: 
-  Cases in which there is extreme general violence in the country of origin, to such 
an extent that a real risk of ill-treatment would occur simply by virtue of an in-
dividual being exposed to such violence on return. Special distinguishing features, 
meaning special personal facts and circumstances, are not required. The ECtHR 
explicitly mentioned this possibility for the first time in NA v. the UK (2008). 
From NA v. the UK and subsequent case law it became clear, however, that a gen-
eral situation of violence would not normally in itself entail a violation of Article 
3 in the event of an expulsion and that the Court would only in the most extreme 
cases of violence adopt the approach that every returnee ran an Article 3-risk.269 
The ECtHR explicitly ruled that such a situation of extreme general violence did 
not prevail in Sri Lanka in relation to returning Tamils in NA v. the UK (2008)270 
and in the subsequent series of judgments on the expulsion of Tamils to Sri 
Lanka: T.N. v. Denmark, T.N. and S.N. v. Denmark, S.S. and others v. Denmark, P.K. 
v. Denmark and N.S. v. Denmark (all 2011),271 and to Iraq in F.H. v. Sweden 
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(2009).272 The same conclusion of absence of a situation of extreme general vio-
lence was drawn by the Court in relation to the situation in Afghanistan in Ghu-
lami v. France (2009),273 the situation in Kosovo in Gashi and others v. Sweden,274 the 
situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo in Mawaka v. the Netherlands 
(2010)275 and the situation in the West Bank in Al-Zawatia v. Sweden.276 The 
ECtHR has, so far, assumed the existence of extreme violence resulting in an Ar-
ticle 3-risk for every returnee in only one case, Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom 
(2011).277 The case concerned the expulsion of two Somali applicants to Moga-
dishu. The Court considered in this case that the large quantity of objective infor-
mation overwhelmingly indicated that the level of violence in Mogadishu was of 
sufficient intensity to pose a real risk of treatment reaching the Article 3 thresh-
old to anyone in the capital, except possibly those who were exceptionally well-
connected to ‘powerful actors’.278 
-  Cases in which the applicant belongs to a group of persons systematically ex-
posed to ill-treatment. The very fact that an applicant belongs to such a targeted 
group seems to constitute a special distinguishing feature in itself. It is, so far, not 
entirely clear whether the Court does or does not require any further special 
distinguishing features.279 The reason for this uncertainty is that in Salah Sheekh v. 
the Netherlands (2007)280 and, one year later, in NA v. the UK (2008) the Court said 
two different things on this. In Salah Sheekh, the Somali applicant belonged to the 
targeted Ashraf minority. In its judgment the Court considered that  
 
‘In the present case, on the basis of the applicant’s account and the information about the 
situation in the relatively unsafe areas of Somalia in so far as members of the Ashraf minority 
are concerned, it is foreseeable that on his return the applicant would be exposed to treatment 
in breach of Article 3.’281 
 
It follows from this consideration that the Court attached importance to the par-
ticular personal experiences of the applicant, which included ill-treatment meted 
out to him and his relatives. This meant that the single fact that the applicant 
belonged to a targeted group was not sufficient in itself and that (certain) further 
special distinguishing features were required. In NA v. the UK (2008), however, 
                                                        
uary 2011, Appl. No. 54703/08, para. 94; ECtHR, P.K. v. Denmark, 20 January 2011, Appl. No. 
54705/08, para. 81; ECtHR, N.S. v. Denmark, 20 January 2011, Appl. No. 58359/08, para. 82. 
272 ECtHR, F.H. v. Sweden, 20 January 2009, Appl. No. 32621/06, paras. 91-93. 
273 ECtHR, Ghulami v. France, admissibility decision, 7 April 2009, Appl. No. 45302/05. 
274 ECtHR, Gashi and others v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 4 May 2010, Appl. No. 61167/08. 
275 ECtHR, Mawaka v. the Netherlands, 1 June 2010, Appl. No. 29031/04, para. 44. 
276 ECtHR, Al-Zawatia v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 22 June 2010, Appl. No. 50068/08. 
277 ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 June 2011, Appl. Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07. 
278 Ibidem, paras. 248, 250. 
279 See also Van Bennekom & Van der Winden 2011, pp. 218-220; these authors raise the same ques-
tion and are so far not sure about the answer. 
280 ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04. 
281 Ibidem, para. 148. 
ECHR 
 
 
 
245 
the Court came back to this consideration from the Salah Sheekh judgment and 
stated: 
 
‘The Court’s findings in that case (Salah Sheekh) as to the treatment of the Ashraf clan in cer-
tain parts of Somalia, and the fact that the applicant’s membership of the Ashraf clan was not 
disputed, were sufficient to conclude that his expulsion would be in violation of Article 3.282 
 
This consideration implies that the single fact of belonging to the targeted group 
was sufficient and no further special distinguishing features were necessary.283 As 
the Court clearly deemed it necessary, one year after Salah Sheekh, to further ex-
plain, in NA v. the UK, the line of reasoning followed in Salah Sheekh, it is safe to 
conclude that it accepts certain situations in which a (minority) group is so sys-
tematically targeted that merely belonging to such a group results in an Article 3-
risk. 
-  Cases in which there is no extreme general violence in the country of origin and 
the applicant does not belong to a specially targeted group. In such cases, the 
general situation in the country of origin does play a more or less important role, 
but there must also be special personal facts and circumstances (special distin-
guishing features) which establish that this very applicant runs a risk. A good 
example of such a case is Hilal v. the UK (2001), in which it was a combination of 
personal facts and circumstances, which against the background of information 
on the situation in the country of origin, constituted substantial grounds for as-
suming a real Article 3-risk. The applicant was a member of an opposition party 
for which he had been arrested and detained, he had been ill-treated during his 
detention, his brother had also been detained and had died in prison, and the 
police had gone to his wife’s house on a number of occasions looking for him 
and making threats.284 
 
It may sometimes be difficult to place a concrete case in one of the above categories 
and the boundaries may not always be very clear. What may be helpful to remember 
is the notion of the gradual scale. The poorer the general human rights situation in 
the country of origin, the more significant this situation becomes in assessing the risk 
and the less individual facts and circumstances, including evidence thereof, are 
required. In line with this principle it may be argued that the more a certain group or 
category of persons is targeted, the less individual facts and circumstances, including 
evidence thereof, are required.285 
                                                        
282 ECtHR, NA v. the UK, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, para, 116. 
283 See on this question (whether or not further special distinguishing features are required if an appli-
cant belongs to a targeted group) also Van Bennekom & Van der Winden 2011, pp. 217-220. 
284 ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, paras. 64 to 66. 
285 This notion of a gradual scale is expressed in NA v. the United Kingdom, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 
25904/07, paras. 115-117, and also in literature. See, for example, Battjes 2009, p. 82, Cox 2010, 
p. 392, Van Bennekom & Van der Winden 2011, p. 220. 
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5.6.5  Credibility assessment 
The ECtHR tries to strike a difficult balance when it comes to assessing the credi-
bility of the claim.286 On the one hand, it stresses its subsidiary role and considers 
that the credibility assessment is primarily a matter for the authorities of the Con-
tracting States: 
 
‘the Court accepts that, as a general principle, the national authorities are best placed to assess 
not just the facts but, more particularly, the credibility of witnesses since it is they who have 
had the opportunity to see, hear and assess the demeanour of the individual concerned.’287 
 
In line with this general principle, in a number of admissibility decisions the Court 
has relied on the credibility assessment made by the respondent State.288 For example, 
in Damla and others v. Germany (2006), the Court considered as follows: 
 
‘It notes in this regard that the German authorities had due regard to the arguments submitted 
by the applicants in the administrative court proceedings as well as to the past and current situ-
ation in the receiving country. It also observes that the Federal Office for Refugees found that 
the applicant’s recollection of the events which led them to leave Turkey was unreliable and 
that it had serious reservations about the credibility of the applicants’ account in general. Fur-
thermore, the Federal Office for Refugees carefully evaluated the evidence which the appli-
cants submitted in support of their renewed asylum request. Furthermore, the Court observes 
that altogether three different asylum proceedings have been carried out by the German courts 
in the applicants’ case. They carefully evaluated the evidence which the applicants submitted in 
support of their asylum requests.’289 
 
On the other hand, the ECtHR acknowledges the absolute nature and the funda-
mental value of Article 3 and considers on that basis that the Court itself must make a 
thorough (or rigorous) examination of the existence of a real risk: 
 
‘Its examination of the existence of a real risk of ill-treatment must necessarily be a rigorous 
one in view of the absolute character of Article 3 (…).’290 
                                                        
286 For the same conclusion: see Geertsema 2010. See on this also Essakkili & Spijkerboer 2005, p. 44 
and Spijkerboer 2009; Essakkili & Spijkerboer use the term ‘inconsistency’. With Geertsema, I would 
rather speak of a difficult search for a balance between avoiding becoming a fourth instance and 
applying a rigorous scrutiny because Article 3 is a fundamental absolute right. 
287 See, for example, ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, para. 52; ECtHR, 
A.A. and Others v. Sweden, 28 June 2012, Appl. Nr. 14499/09. See also admissibility decisions ECtHR, 
Damla and others v. Germany 26 October 2006, Appl. No. 61479/00;ECtHR, F. v. the UK, 22 June 
2004, Appl. No. 17341/03; ECtHR, Harutioenyan and others v. the Netherlands, 1 September 2009, Appl. 
No. 43700/07. 
288 Examples are admissibility decisions ECtHR, F. v. the UK, 22 June 2004, Appl. No. 17341/03; 
ECtHR, Damla and others v. Germany 26 October 2006, Appl. No. 61479/00; ECtHR, Harutioenyan and 
others v. the Netherlands, 1 September 2009, Appl. No. 43700/07. 
289 ECtHR, Damla and others v. Germany 26 October 2006, Appl. No. 61479/00. 
290 See, for example, ECtHR, Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Appl. No. 22414/93, 
para. 96; ECtHR, Jabari v. Turkey,11 July 2000, Appl. No. 40035/98, para. 39; ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 
→ 
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Part of this rigorous examination is an independent assessment of credibility when 
this credibility is in dispute between the parties. The Court has made such an inde-
pendent credibility assessment in a significant number of final judgments291 and in 
some admissibility decisions.292 
In Iskandarov v. Russia (2010),293 the Court once again, this time in even more 
precise words, expressed the difficult balancing exercise it makes when it comes to 
the determination of the facts: 
 
‘The Court notes at the outset that it is sensitive to the subsidiary nature of its role and recog-
nises that it must be cautious in taking on the role of a first-instance tribunal of fact, where this 
is not rendered unavoidable by the circumstances of a particular case (…). Nonetheless, where 
allegations are made under Article 3 of the Convention the Court must apply a particularly 
thorough scrutiny even if certain national proceedings and investigations have already taken 
place (…).’294 
 
Finally, the consideration about the intensity of scrutiny used in A.A. and Others v. 
Sweden (2012) is interesting: 
 
‘It observes that the applicants’ case was thoroughly examined by both the Migration Board 
and the Migration Court, which included several interviews before the Board. They further ap-
pealed against the Migration Court’s judgment to the Migration Court of Appeal, which de-
cided to refuse leave to appeal. Before all instances the applicants were assisted by female legal 
counsel. Furthermore, apart from the ordinary asylum proceedings, which went through three 
instances, both the Migration Board and the Migration Court have examined the applicants’ 
application for subsequent review of the enforcement order. There are no indications that the 
proceedings before the domestic authorities lacked effective guarantees to protect the appli-
cants against arbitrary refoulement or were otherwise flawed. Against this background, the 
Court will continue by examining whether the information presented before this Court would 
lead it to depart from the domestic authorities’ conclusions.’295 
 
This consideration reveals two things. First, that the Court, in making up its mind on 
whether to rely on the respondent State party’s determination of the facts or make a 
                                                        
26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02, para. 160 (here the Court uses the term ‘thorough’ instead of the 
term ‘rigorous’); ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, Appl. No. 37201/06, para. 128. 
291 Geertsema 2010 also states that a rigorous examination implies an independent assessment of the 
claimant’s credibility by the Court. An independent assessment of the claimant’s credibility by the 
Court itself was made in, for example, ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. 
No. 15576/89; ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99; ECtHR, Said v. the Neth-
erlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02; ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02; 
ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07. 
292 See, for example, admissibility decision ECtHR, Nasimi v. Sweden, 16 March 2004, Appl. No. 38865/ 
02. 
293 ECtHR, Iskandarov v. Russia, 23 September 2010, Appl. No. 17185/05. 
294 Ibidem, para. 106. 
295  ECtHR, A.A. and Others v. Sweden, 28 June 2012, Appl. No. 14499/09, para. 77. See also ECtHR, 
J.H. v. the UK, 20 December 2011, Appl. No. 48839/09, para. 58. 
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fresh factual determination of itself, takes a close look at the quality of the national 
proceedings in the case at hand. If the national proceedings were thorough, the Court 
will see less room for an independent and fresh determination of the facts. Second, 
the last sentence of the consideration quoted above reveals that the Court is in 
principle always free to proceed to a fresh determination of the facts on the basis of 
all the materials before it and depart from the national authorities’ conclusions. The 
consideration quoted above makes very clear that, also in situations where the na-
tional proceedings were adequate, the Court nevertheless has the choice to proceed 
to an independent, fresh determination of the facts. Like the ComAT (see Chapter 4, 
section 4.5.5), the ECtHR is, thus, fully free to determine the intensity of its factual 
scrutiny, depending on the particular circumstances of the case at hand. 
The question remains under what circumstances the ECtHR chooses one of 
these two approaches: reliance on the respondent State’s credibility assessment or 
independent assessment of the credibility on its own account? Unfortunately, so far, 
it has not developed an elaborate doctrinal position on this issue. From the case law, 
it may be inferred, however, that at least three circumstances, individually or in com-
bination, may, in particular, trigger the Court to proceed to an independent assess-
ment of the claimant’s credibility on its own account. These triggers are the follow-
ing: 
1) Insufficient national proceedings, for example, evidence was overlooked or not 
taken seriously, or the assessment made at national level was insufficiently sup-
ported by relevant country of origin materials; 
2) New facts, circumstances and developments, including evidence thereof, or new 
information which casts doubt on the information relied on by the government; 
and  
3) The absolute nature of Article 3 was disrespected, for example, a weighing of na-
tional security considerations against the Article 3-risk took place, or an incorrect 
application of the standard of proof or another evidentiary standard took place, 
for example, a too strict standard of proof or a too strict standard on individuali-
sation.296 
 
Examples of the first trigger – insufficient national proceedings – are Jabari v. Turkey 
(2000),297 in which no material assessment at all had been made by the national 
authorities, and R.C. v. Sweden (2010),298 in which the Court found that no serious in-
vestigation at national level had taken place as medical evidence (a report from a 
physician at a local health care centre) had not been taken seriously. These two cases 
were discussed above in sections 5.3.2 and 5.3.3. Another illustration of this first 
trigger is Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands (2007), in which the national authorities relied 
                                                        
296 See also Wouters 2009, p. 284: ‘it seems that the Court is willing to conduct a full assessment of its 
own when the national proceedings followed give it reason to so so, for example because the claim 
was assessed in an accelerated procedure, or because doubts have been cast on the information re-
lied on by the national authorities, in particular because the situation in the country of destination 
may have changed since the national proceedings ended’. 
297 ECtHR, Jabari v. Turkey, 11 July 2000, Appl. No. 40035/98. 
298 ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07. 
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on information regarding the country of origin from only one single source, being the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, whereas the ECtHR relied on information from a 
variety of different sources.299 
Illustrations of the second trigger – new facts and developments, including new 
evidence which has not been assessed by the national authorities – are Hilal v. the UK 
(2001) and N. v. Finland (2005). In Hilal, the Court explicitly considered that it saw fit 
to proceed to an independent assessment of the claimant’s credibility because since 
the national special adjudicator’s decision, which relied, inter alia, on a lack of sub-
stantiating evidence, the applicant had produced further documentation.300 In N. v. 
Finland, the ECtHR heard a new witness, K.K., whom the national authorities had 
not been able to hear. K.K.’s testimony shed new light on the applicant’s account.301 
New facts or developments may also concern the situation in the country of origin. 
The Court is of the opinion that ‘a full and ex nunc assessment is called for as the 
situation in a country of destination may change in the course of time’.302 Finally, in 
J.H. v. the UK (2011), a case concerning an Afghan applicant who contended that his 
expulsion to Afghanistan would expose him to a real risk of ill-treatment due to the 
high and visible profile of his father in Afghanistan, the ECtHR stressed that there 
was no new evidence before it causing it to depart from the findings arrived at by the 
national authorities.303 
An illustration of the third trigger – disrespect for the absolute nature of Article 3 
– is Chahal v. the UK (1996). Strictly speaking, there were no credibility issues concern-
ing stated past facts in this case; the parties were, instead, mainly divided over the fate 
that would await the applicant, a well-known supporter of Sikh separatism, if he was 
expelled to India. Nevertheless, this case does form a good illustration of the third 
trigger. As the UK had weighed the Article 3-risk against national security considera-
tions, and had, therefore, applied an incorrect standard of proof, the ECtHR deemed 
it necessary to make a completely new and independent examination of the alleged 
real risk.304 
Interestingly, within the ECtHR opinions are sometimes strongly divided over 
the question of which of the two avenues to choose: reliance on the credibility as-
sessment made by the national authorities or an independent credibility assessment of 
its own. This appears from a number of dissenting opinions to final judgments.305 
                                                        
299 ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04, paras. 136 and 138-149. 
300 ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, para. 62. 
301 ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02, para. 157: ‘moreover, the Finnish authori-
ties and courts did not have an opportunity to hear K.K.’s testimony with regard to the applicant’s 
background in the DRC’. 
302 ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04, para. 136. 
303  ECtHR, J.H. v. the UK, 20 December 2011, Appl. No. 48839/09, para. 59. 
304 ECtHR, Chahal v. the UK, 15 November 1996, Appl. No. 22414/93, para. 76. 
305 See, for example, the dissenting opinion of Judge Maruste to ECtHR, N. v. Finland (2005), stating 
that ‘in essence this is a case of assessment of credibility and risk and I believe that in such situations 
the national authorities are much better placed than international judges’, and the dissenting opinion 
of Judge Fura to R.C. v. Sweden (2010) stating that ‘National courts are normally better placed to do 
this than an international court, since they have had the opportunity to see and hear the parties.’ 
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It is important to mention here that in a number of cases the ECtHR has not 
determined the facts, and, as part of this, assessed the credibility of the applicant fully 
independently, but has relied to a large extent on the determination of the facts made 
by the UNHCR. Examples of such cases are Jabari v. Turkey (2000), Abdolkhani and 
Karimnia v. Turkey (2009), Charahili v. Turkey (2010), Ayatollahi and Hosseinzadeh v. Tur-
key (2010), M.B. and others v. Turkey (2010), Khaydarov v. Russia (2010) and Dbouba v. 
Turkey (2010).306 This does not always mean, however, that the ECtHR fully follows 
the stance taken by the UNHCR, but it does attach significant weight to the position 
taken by the UNHCR.307 An example of a case in which the ECtHR did not follow 
the assessment made by the UNHCR is Y. v. Russia (2010). In that case, which con-
cerned a Chinese Falung Gong practitioner, the ECtHR concluded that there were 
insufficient grounds for assuming an Article 3-risk whereas the Moscow UNHCR 
office delivered refugee status. What was important was the fact that the refugee 
status had been delivered by the UNHCR before the national refugee status deter-
mination had begun, that it was not clear whether the same grounds served as a basis 
for both claims and, finally, that the UNHCR had not intervened in any way during 
the subsequent appeals or proceedings.308 
When the ECtHR decides to proceed to an independent assessment of the credi-
bility on its own account, how does it go about this, and which principles does it fol-
low? An important general principle, expressed in a significant number of recent 
decisions and judgments, is the principle of the benefit of the doubt: 
 
‘owing to the special situation in which asylum seekers often find themselves, it is frequently 
necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility of 
their statements’.309 
 
This general principle, which echoes the principle of the benefit of the doubt ex-
pressed in the UNHCR’s Handbook,310 requires that the assessment of the credibility 
                                                        
306 ECtHR, Jabari v. Turkey, 11 July 2000, Appl. No. 40035/98, para. 41; ECtHR, Abdolkhani and 
Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 2009, Appl. No. 30471/08, para. 82; ECtHR, Ayatollahi and Hossein-
zadeh v. Turkey, admissibility decision, 23 March 2010, Appl. No. 32971/98; ECtHR, Charahili v. Tur-
key, 13 April 2010, Appl. No. 46605/07, para. 59; ECtHR, Khaydarov v. Russia, 20 May 2010, Appl. 
No. 21055/09, para. 109; ECtHR, M.B. and others v. Turkey, 15 June 2010, Appl. No. 36009/08, 
paras. 14 and 33-34; ECtHR, Dbouba v. Turkey, 13 July 2010, Appl. No. 15916/09, paras. 42, 43. 
307 See on this also Bruin 2011, pp. 244, 245. 
308 ECtHR, Y. v. Russia, 4 December 2008, Appl. No. 20113/07, para. 90. See for more examples also 
Bruin 2011, p. 245. 
309 See, for example, admissibility decisions ECtHR, Matsiukhina and Matsiukhin v. Sweden, 21 June 2005, 
Appl. No. 31260/04; ECtHR, Mahin Ayegh v. Sweden, 7 November 2006, Appl. No. 4701/05; 
ECtHR, Collins and Akasiebie v. Sweden 8 March 2007, Appl.No. 23944/05; ECtHR, Achmadov and 
Bagurova v. Sweden, 10 July 2007, Appl. No. 34081/05; ECtHR, M. v. Sweden 6 September 2007, Appl. 
No. 22556/05; ECtHR, Elezaj and others v. Sweden, 20 September 2007, Appl. No. 17654/095; 
ECtHR, Limoni and others v. Sweden, 4 October 2007, Appl. No. 6576/05, and the judgments ECtHR, 
F.H. v. Sweden, 20 January 2009, Appl. No. 32621/06/06, para. 95; ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 
2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, para. 50. 
310 UNHCR Handbook paras. 197, 204, UNHCR Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee 
Claims of 16 December 1998, paras. 11, 12. See Chapter 2 on the RC. 
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should not be too strict. The ECtHR requires ‘general credibility’.311 General credibil-
ity does not mean complete accuracy and consistency of every single aspect and detail 
of the flight narrative. In the admissibility decision of Bello v. Sweden (2006), the Court 
stated:  
 
‘The Court acknowledges that complete accuracy as to dates and events cannot be expected in 
all circumstances from a person seeking asylum.’312 
 
The statements made by the asylum seeker may contain some incredible or not en-
tirely credible aspects, but the core aspects – the ‘basic story’313 – must be credible. 
The Court decides on a case by case basis when incredible or not entirely credible as-
pects of a flight narrative undermine the general credibility. Much depends on wheth-
er these problematic aspects relate to the core of the flight narrative, the basic story, 
or may be regarded as more peripheral. The ECtHR regards the journey from the 
country of origin to the country of refuge as peripheral and, therefore, not very 
relevant; in N. v. Finland (2005), it found that doubts about the journey did not affect 
the general credibility of the basic story:  
 
‘the Court has certain reservations about the applicant’s own testimony before the Delegates 
which it considers to have been evasive on many points and is not prepared to accept every 
statement of his as fact. In particular, his account of the journey to Finland is not credible. In 
light of the overall evidence now before it the Court finds however that the applicant’s account 
of his background in the DRC must, on the whole, be considered sufficiently consistent and 
credible.’314 
 
In Said v. the Netherlands (2005) and R.C. v. Sweden (2010), the Court doubted the credi-
bility of the applicants’ statements regarding the escape from armed guards in Eritrea 
(Said) and the escape from a revolutionary court in Iran (R.C.), but these uncertainties 
did not undermine the overall credibility of the basic story.315 
For the basic story to be credible, it must be consistent with country informa-
tion.316 It must also remain consistent throughout the proceedings;317 numerous 
                                                        
311 See, for example, ECtHR, Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02, para. 51: ‘(…) the 
Court must proceed, as far as possible, to an assessment of the general credibility of the statements 
made by the applicant before the Netherlands authorities and during the present proceedings’. See 
also the judgment in ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, para. 52, and 
admissibility decisions ECtHR, Nasimi v. Sweden, 16 March 2004, Appl. No. 38865/02; ECtHR, M. v. 
Sweden, 6 September 2007, Appl. No. 22556/05. 
312 ECtHR, Bello v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 17 January 2006, Appl. No. 32213/04. In the case of 
Bello, however, the general principle did not help the applicant, as the Court was struck by the large 
number of major inconsistencies in the applicant’s story. 
313 The term ‘basic story’ is used in ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, para. 
52. 
314 ECtHR, N. v. Finland (2005), 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02, paras. 154 and 155. 
315 ECtHR, Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No, 2345/02, para.53, ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 
March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, para. 52. 
316 See, for example, ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, para. 54, in which the 
Court noted that it was evident from the information available on Iran that the Iranian authorities 
→ 
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alterations in statements may make these statements incredible.318 Numerous major 
inconsistencies also make the statements incredible.319 The basic story must be 
brought forward in a timely manner; late submission of statements may negatively af-
fect the general credibility, particularly when no sound reason is given.320 The total 
absence of corroborative evidence may also affect credibility; more will be said on 
this in the next section below on the admission of evidence. When the ECtHR speci-
fically asks the applicant to submit certain documents and he or she does not fulfill 
this request, this adversely affects the general credibility of the applicant’s basic 
story.321 The list of examples provided here is by no means exhaustive, but it does 
provide an impression of the factors taken into account by the ECtHR when assess-
ing the credibility of the claimant’s story.322 
In the assessment of the facts and circumstances of a case, including the assess-
ment of credibility, the Court actively gathers and checks information. This appli-
cation of investigative powers for the purpose of independent fact finding will be 
discussed in detail below in section 5.6.9. 
5.6.6  Admission of evidence, means and sources of evidence, minimum 
quantity and quality of evidence 
5.6.6.1  Admission of evidence 
The ECtHR demands ‘evidence capable of proving’ that there is a real Article 3-risk. 
This is an open and flexible criterion for the admissibility and admission of evidence. 
It means that, in principle, the Court admits to the proceedings every form of 
                                                        
frequently detain and ill-treat persons who participate in peaceful demonstrations in the country, not 
only the leaders of political organisations or other high profile persons who are detained but anyone 
who demonstrates or in any way opposes the current regime. As the applicant had maintained that 
he was arrested with many others when he participated in a demonstration against the regime in July 
2001 and that the torture he endured occurred in the months following his arrest, his account was 
consistent with the information available from independent sources concerning Iran. 
317 Ibidem, para. 52. 
318 See, for example, ECtHR, B. v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 26 October 2004, Appl. No. 16578/03, 
in which decision the Court noted that the applicant had changed his story on many occasions 
during the national proceedings. 
319 See, for example, ECtHR, Bello v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 17 January 2006, Appl. No. 32213/ 
04. 
320 See ECtHR, B. v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 26 October 2004, Appl. No. 16578/03, in which the 
Court noted that the applicant’s allegation that he was tortured during his detention had not been 
made to the Swedish authorities but only to the ECtHR. In ECtHR, Tekdemir v. the Netherlands, 1 Oc-
tober 2002, Appl. No. 49823/99, the Court noted that it was only in the course of national pro-
ceedings following a second asylum application that the applicant had raised and relied on his kin-
ship with the brothers A.X. and B.X., one of whom had obtained a residence permit and the other a 
favourable ruling in the proceedings on his asylum request. It was only in the course of third na-
tional proceedings that the applicant claimed that he had been tortured in Turkey, a fact which he 
had not raised in his previous asylum requests.  
321 See, for example, ECtHR, S.A. v. the Netherlands, admissibility decision, 12 December 2006, Appl. 
No. 3049/06. 
322 See on the Court’s credibility assessment also Geertsema 2010 and Wouters 2009, pp. 283-287. 
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evidence capable of proving an Article 3-risk. In Iskandarov v. Russia (2010), the Court 
stated literally that  
 
‘In the proceedings before the Court, there are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of 
evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. It adopts the conclusions that are, in 
its view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow 
from the facts and the parties’ submissions.’323 
 
All materials presented by the parties and, possibly, obtained proprio motu, are normally 
considered materially by the Court. It has reiterated in many judgments and admis-
sibility decisions that: 
 
‘The Court will assess the issue in light of all the material placed before it (…).’324 
5.6.6.2  Means and sources of evidence 
Examples of evidentiary materials are: documentary evidence from state organs stat-
ing that a person is being sought, or is wanted (arrest warrants, police reports);325 
medical reports corroborating statements on past ill-treatment;326 written or oral 
statements made by family members or other witnesses (individuals or organisa-
tions);327 and, of course, reports from various sources containing information on the 
situation in the country of origin, as the individual claim needs to be assessed in the 
light of the situation in the country of origin.  
                                                        
323 ECtHR, Iskandarov v. Russia, 23 September 2010, Appl. No. 17185/05, para. 107. 
324 This is stated in the first Article 3-judgment concerning asylum ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. 
Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, paras. 75 and 78, and is reiterated in almost all the sub-
sequent judgments concerning asylum seekers, and also in some admissibility decisions. I will men-
tion some older and some more recent examples: ECtHR, Vilvarajah and others v. the UK, 30 October 
1991, Appl. Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87 and 13448/87, para. 107; ECtHR, 
Chahal v. the UK, 15 November 1996, Appl. No. 22414/93, para. 97; ECtHR, Mamatkulov and 
Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, (2003), para. 67; ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005, 
Appl. Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, para. 69; ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/ 
02, paras. 160 and 167; ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, Appl. No. 37201/06, para. 128; 
ECtHR, Baysakov v. Ukraine, 18 February 2010, Appl. No. 54131/08, para. 91. 
325 See, for example, ECtHR, Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, 8 November 2005, Appl. No. 13284/04, para. 
44. 
326 Examples of cases in which statements by medical staff were seen as corroboration of statements on 
past ill-treatment are ECtHR, T.I. v. the UK, 7 March 2000, Appl. No. 43844/98, ECtHR, Hilal v. the 
UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, and ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 
41827/07. 
327 Examples of cases in which the ECtHR accepted statements of family members as evidence sup-
porting the Article 3-claim are ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, para. 66, 
and ECtHR, N. v. Finland,26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02, para. 153. See also ECtHR, Thampibillai 
v. the Netherlands, 17 February 2004, Appl. No. 61350/00, para. 66, in which the Court remarked that 
‘the applicant submitted that, following his flight and his failure to report to the army, his mother 
had been arrested and detained for two days. However, the applicant did not keep the letters in 
which his mother communicated these events to him’. See for an example of a case in which the 
Court looked at written witness statements by other persons (not relatives): ECtHR, Shikpohkt and 
Sholeh v. the Netherlands, admissibility decision, 27 January 2005, Appl. No. 39349/03. 
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5.6.6.3  Minimum quantity and quality of evidence 
How much evidence corroborating the individual claim can reasonably be expected is 
decided on a case by case basis and depends very much on the particular case. As has 
been said above, the burden of proof rests initially with the applicant and it is, there-
fore, incumbent on him or her to adduce, to the greatest extent practically possible, 
material and information allowing the authorities of the Contracting State concerned, 
as well as the ECtHR, to assess the risk a removal may entail.328 In line with this 
principle, the ECtHR normally demands from the asylum seeker documentary or 
other evidence corroborating his or her statements. The Court has noted in a number 
of cases that it must take into account two particularities of asylum cases: the diffi-
culty of substantiating asylum claims with direct documentary evidence329 and the dif-
ficulty of doing this within a short time frame.330 In spite of these principles, how-
ever, the ECtHR normally demands a significant amount of strong evidentiary mate-
rials. The Court’s case law shows examples of cases where, apart from statements by 
the asylum seeker, no corroborating evidence whatsoever was submitted and no rea-
sons were provided for the total lack of evidence. This led to the conclusion that the 
Article 3-claim was manifestly ill-founded and, therefore, inadmissible.331 We may 
conclude from these decisions that statements must generally at least be supported by 
some other corroborating evidence.  
In sections 5.6.2 and 5.6.4 above, it was made clear that the graver the general 
human rights situation in the country of origin, the more significant this situation 
becomes in assessing the risk and the less individual facts and circumstances, and also 
evidence corroborating these individual facts and circumstances, are required.332 
Thus, the graver the general human rights situation in the applicant’s country of 
origin, the less individual evidence is required from the applicant.  
Although information on conditions in the country of origin is important for the 
assessment of the situation there, this information alone is generally not sufficient to 
                                                        
328 ECtHR, Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02, para. 49. 
329 Ibidem, para. 49: ‘direct documentary evidence proving that an applicant is wanted for any reason by 
the authorities of the country of origin may well be difficult to obtain’; admissibility decision 
ECtHR, Shikpohkt and Sholeh v. the Netherlands, 27 January 2005, Appl. No. 39349/03: ‘The Court has 
recognised that in cases of this nature such evidence may well be difficult to obtain.’ 
330 See ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, para: 78: ‘even if 
allowances are made for (…) the difficulties of substantiating their claims with documentary evi-
dence (…)’; ECtHR, Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, 19 February 1998, Appl. No. 25894/94, para. 45: ‘in 
applications for recognition of refugee status it may be difficult, if not impossible, for the person 
concerned to supply evidence within a short time, especially if (…) such evidence must be obtained 
from the country from which he or she claims to have fled’. 
331 See, for example, the admissibility decisions ECtHR, Amrollahi v. Denmark, 28 June 2001, Appl. No. 
56811/02; ECtHR, Ammari v. Sweden, 22 October 2002, Appl. No. 60959/00; ECtHR, Fofana Hussein 
Mossi and others against Sweden, 8 March 2005, Appl. No. 15017/03; ECtHR, Gordyeyev v. Poland, 3 May 
2005, Appl. Nos. 43369/98 and 51777/99; ECtHR, Hukic v. Sweden, 27 September 2005, Appl. No. 
17416/05; ECtHR, Jeltsujeva v. the Netherlands, 1 June 2006, Appl. No. 39858/04; ECtHR, Fazlul 
Karim v. Sweden, 4 July 2006, Appl. No. 24171/05; ECtHR, S.A. v. the Netherlands, 12 December 2006, 
Appl. No. 3049/06; ECtHR, Achmadov and Bagurova v. Sweden, 10 July 2007, Appl. No. 34081/05. 
332 ECtHR, NA v. the United Kingdom, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, paras. 115-117. Battjes 2009, 
p. 82, Cox 2010, p. 392. 
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assume that an individual runs an Article 3-risk upon expulsion. A possible exception 
to this would be the situation of extreme general violence mentioned above in the 
section on individualisation. So far, the ECtHR has assumed such a situation to exist 
in only one case (see section 5.6.4 above).333 This means that it tends to demand evi-
dence corroborating the individual flight narrative. To put it differently, the Court 
normally requires the submitted documentary or other evidence to have a certain di-
rect bearing on the applicant’s personal situation. An example of a case in which the 
Court explicitly ruled that the available country information was insufficient to 
assume an Article 3-risk is Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic (2003).334 The evidence sub-
mitted by the applicants consisted of general information on the situation (in prisons) 
in Uzbekistan. The ECtHR ruled:  
 
‘In the instant case, the Court considers that, in spite of the serious concerns to which they 
give rise, the reports only describe the general situation in the Republic of Uzbekistan. There is 
nothing in them to support the specific allegations made by the applicants in the instant case, 
which require corroboration by other evidence.’ 
 
The specific allegations by the applicants were that, before they fled to Turkey, they 
had been forced by torture to ‘confess’ to crimes which they had not committed in 
Uzbekistan, and that, while in detention after extradition to Uzbekistan, they again 
ran the risk of being subjected to torture. The Grand Chamber of the Court had 
concluded in the same way that the country information provided had constituted 
insufficient evidence in Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey (2005).335 Finally, in Ryabikin 
v. Russia (2008), the Court considered that  
 
‘The evidence from a range of objective sources demonstrates that extremely poor 
conditions of detention, as well as ill-treatment and torture, remain a great concern 
for all observers of the situation in Turkmenistan. However, these findings attest to 
the general situation in Turkmenistan. They should be supported by specific allega-
tions and require corroboration by other evidence.’336 
 
It is not necessary for every single detail of the individual account to be supported by 
evidence. What generally needs to be substantiated by evidentiary materials is the 
basic story, the core of the individual account. Again, the approach of the ECtHR is 
strict; it generally requires extensive evidence. It seems that the general principle that 
account should be taken of the difficulties of substantiating claims with direct docu-
mentary evidence is not often applied in concreto. For example, in Cruz Varas v. Sweden 
(1991), the ECtHR noted that the applicant had been unable to locate any witnesses 
or adduce any other evidence which might have corroborated to some degree his 
                                                        
333 ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 June 2011, Appl. Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07. 
334 ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Abdurasulovic 6 February 2003, Appl. Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99. 
335 ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005, Appl. Nos. 46827/99, 46951/99, para. 
73. 
336 ECtHR, Ryabikin v. Russia, 19 June 2008, Appl. No. 8320/04, paras. 116 and 117. 
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claims of clandestine political activity.337 In Fazlul Karim v. Sweden (2006), the applicant 
alleged that he would risk arrest and imprisonment on return to Bangladesh because 
of a murder charge. The ECtHR reproached the applicant for not submitting docu-
mentary proof, such as a formal warrant for his arrest, which he could reasonably 
have been expected to obtain through his family.338 In the same way, in Gomes v. 
Sweden (2006), the applicant alleged that he had been sentenced to death by a court in 
Bangladesh. The Court reprimanded the applicant for not submitting any documents 
as proof of the alleged death sentence.339 An extremely strict approach was taken in 
Shikpohkt and Sholeh v. the Netherlands (2005).340 The basic story of the Iranian ap-
plicant was that she came from a family which had always opposed the sitting Iranian 
regime, that she had taken over oppositional activities from her stepfather, including 
the distribution of oppositional pamphlets, and that she had received a written threat 
that had caused her to go into hiding. She had substantiated her claim before the 
national authorities and the ECtHR with an impressive amount of evidentiary 
material. The ECtHR found it problematic that she had not, however, submitted the 
written threat, or the oppositional material she stated she had distributed.  
However, not every single detail of the basic story needs to be completely sup-
ported by corroborating evidence. In Hilal v. the UK (2001), during the second nation-
al asylum procedure, the applicant submitted a copy of his brother’s death certificate, 
a medical report about the circumstances of his brother’s death, a summons from the 
police to his parents and a medical report about his treatment in hospital following 
his detention, during which he had allegedly been tortured.341 The national authorities 
found that the death certificate did not have much evidentiary value as it did not 
indicate that torture or ill-treatment had been a contributory factor in the death of the 
applicant’s brother. The ECtHR considered: 
 
‘while it is correct that the medical notes and death certificate of his brother do not indicate 
that torture or ill-treatment was a contributory factor in his death, they did give further cor-
roboration to the applicant’s account which the special adjudicator had found so lacking in 
substantiation. They showed that his brother, who was also a CUF supporter, had been de-
tained in prison and that he had been taken from the prison to hospital, where he died. This is 
not inconsistent with the applicant’s allegation that his brother had been ill-treated in pris-
on.’342 
 
It is not only necessary to submit evidence corroborating the individual account. 
Equally important is evidence about the human rights situation in the country of ori-
gin. No judgments or decisions have been found in which the ECtHR has explicitly 
explained which of the parties – the applicant or the State party’s authorities – is 
responsible for submitting recent information about the general human rights 
                                                        
337 ECtHR, Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, para. 79. 
338 ECtHR, Fazlul Karim v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 4 July 2006, Appl. No. 24171/05. 
339 ECtHR, Gomes v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 7 February 2006, Appl. No. 34566/04. 
340 ECtHR, Shikpohkt and Sholeh v. the Netherlands, 27 January 2005, Appl. No. 39349/03. 
341 ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, paras. 18 and 21. 
342 Ibidem, para. 65. 
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situation in the country of origin. It may be argued that, although the burden of proof 
remains a shared one, in cases where there is an arguable claim particular responsi-
bility for obtaining clarity on the general human rights situation in the country of 
origin lies with the administrative and judicial authorities of the State. This follows 
from the fact that where the arguability test has been met, the authorities of the State 
have to conduct active investigations to establish whether the application is well-
founded; the State has to ‘dispel any doubts’ about the applicability of Article 3.343 
The authorities, thus, have an active role not only in verifying information put for-
ward by the complainant, but also in collecting and presenting evidence regarding the 
general human rights situation in the country of origin. With regard to the particular 
responsibility resting on the national authorities for shaping clarity on the situation in 
the country of origin, reference is also made to chapter 6 on EU asylum law, section 
6.4.4. 
5.6.7  Appreciation and weighing of evidence 
In Iskandarov v. Russia (2010), the Court stated that  
 
‘In the proceedings before the Court, there are no (…) pre-determined formulae for its assess-
ment [author: this means the assessment of evidence]. It adopts the conclusions that are, in its 
view, supported by the free evaluation of all evidence, including such inferences as may flow 
from the facts and the parties’ submissions.’344 
 
This means that all the evidence brought forward and gathered in a case is evaluated 
in a free manner.  
5.6.7.1  Factors determining the probative value and persuasiveness of evidence 
We can, however, distinguish a number of factors determining the exact probative 
value and persuasiveness of evidence. Important factors are the authenticity of sub-
mitted documents, the specificity, comprehensiveness and consistency of the infor-
mation contained in evidentiary materials or given by witnesses, the independence, 
and the reliability, objectiveness and authority of the source or author of the evi-
dence.345 These factors are discussed in more detail below. After that, we will look in 
more detail at three particular categories of evidence, being witness statements by 
family members, medical reports, and reports about the situation in the country of 
origin. 
                                                        
343 See, for example, ECtHR, NAv. the UK, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, para. 111; ECtHR, 
Muminov v. Russia, 11 December 2008, Appl. No. 42502/06, para. 87; ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 
March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, para. 50; ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 June 2008, Appl. 
Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, para. 214. 
344 ECtHR, Iskandarov v. Russia, 23 September 2010, Appl. No. 17185/05, para. 107. 
345 See, for example,ECtHR, Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, 8 November 2005, Appl. No. 13284/04, para. 
44; ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, Appl. No. 37201/06, para. 143; ECtHR, NA v. the UK, 
17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, para. 120. See also Wouters 2009, p. 271. 
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5.6.7.1.a Authenticity of documents 
In a number of judgments and decisions, the ECtHR has used a ‘benefit of the 
doubt’ consideration concerning, specifically, evaluation of the reliability of docu-
ments submitted by claimants:  
 
‘Owing to the special situation in which asylum seekers often find themselves, it is frequently 
necessary to give them the benefit of the doubt when it comes to assessing the credibility of 
(…) documents submitted in support (of statements).’346 
 
By virtue of its reiteration in a considerable number of judgments and decisions, this 
consideration may be regarded as a general principle. It entails that, in principle, the 
ECtHR holds documents submitted by the claimant to be real and genuine. However, 
if at national level documents were held to be non-authentic or forged following 
investigations into their authenticity, the claimant is required to address the specific 
problematic points found in the documents and to come up with very good reasons 
as to why the result of the investigation is incorrect. If the applicant does not respond 
in this way, this undermines the reliability of the claim.347 
Authentic documents from the authorities of the country of origin containing 
specific indications of an Article 3-risk may play a decisive role, as the case of Bader 
and Kanbor v. Sweden (2005) illustrates. In that case, the first applicant was convicted in 
absentia of complicity in a murder and sentenced to death by judgment of a Syrian 
court. The judgment, submitted in the national proceedings, was found to be authen-
tic after an investigation conducted by the Swedish embassy in Syria. Based on this 
document and the finding that the death penalty is enforced for serious crimes in 
Syria, the ECtHR concluded that deportation of the applicants to Syria would give 
rise to a violation of Article 3 (and Article 2, containing the right to life).348 
If there are doubts about the authenticity of submitted documents, much de-
pends on the quantity and quality of the other available evidentiary materials, and on 
other circumstances surrounding the submission of the documents. In the case of 
Hilal v. the UK(2001), a summons to appear before the police was discarded as incred-
ible by the national authorities. However, on the basis of other evidence – the medi-
cal record of the hospital that had treated the applicant after he was released from 
                                                        
346 See, for example, admissibility decisions ECtHR, Matsiukhina and Matsiukhin v. Sweden, 21 June 2005, 
Appl. No. 31260/04; ECtHR, Mahin Ayegh v. Sweden, 7 November 2006, Appl. No. 4701/05; 
ECtHR, Collins and Akasiebie v. Sweden, 8 March 2007, Appl. No. 23944/05; ECtHR, Achmadov and 
Bagurova v. Sweden, 10 July 2007, Appl. No. 34081/05; ECtHR, M. v. Sweden, 6 September 2007, Appl. 
No. 22556/05; ECtHR, Elezaj and others v. Sweden, 20 September 2007, Appl. No. 17654/05; ECtHR, 
Limoni and others v. Sweden, 4 October 2007, Appl. No. 6576/05; and judgments ECtHR, F.H. v. 
Sweden, 20 January2009, Appl. No. 32621/06, para. 95 and ECtHR, R.C.v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, 
Appl. No. 41827/07, para. 50. 
347 See, for example, the following admissibility decisions: ECtHR, Matsiukhina and Matsiukhin v. Sweden, 
21 June 2005, Appl. No. 31260/04; ECtHR, Gomes v. Sweden, 7 February 2006, Appl. No. 34566/04; 
ECtHR, Mahin Ayegh v. Sweden, 7 November 2006, Appl. No. 4701/05; ECtHR, Bagheri and Maliki v. 
the Netherlands, 15 May 2007, Appl. No. 30164/06; ECtHR, I.N. v. Sweden, 15 September 2009, Appl. 
No. 1334/09; ECtHR, Izevbekhai and others v. Ireland, 17 May 2011, Appl. No. 43408/08, paras. 78, 
79. 
348 ECtHR, Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, 8 November 2005, Appl. No. 13284/04, paras. 44-48. 
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prison where he had been tortured –the ECtHR accepted that the applicant had been 
detained and during that detention had indeed been tortured, as he had stated. Unlike 
the national authorities, the ECtHR did attach weight to the police summons.349 
In the case of B. v. Sweden (2004), the national authorities maintained, on the basis 
of an unofficial investigation in Tripoli, that a number of Libyan documents adduced 
to support the asylum request were false. The ECtHR apparently gave the documents 
the benefit of the doubt, but attached great importance to their late submission:  
 
‘While there is some uncertainty as to whether some authorities named in the documents had 
jurisdiction in the matter, their general appearance is not such that they, in and of themselves, 
can be discounted as falsifications. However, in assessing their authenticity, the circumstances 
surrounding their submission are of importance. In this respect, the Court notes that they were 
all submitted to the Swedish authorities and the Court long after their date of issuance. (…) 
While the Court appreciates the difficulty in obtaining such documents in Libya and to send 
them abroad, it notes that some of them were purportedly issued when the applicant was still 
in Libya and generally considers that the delays in submitting the documents are rather re-
markable. As an explanation for these delays, the applicant has, inter alia, claimed before the 
Court that he was unable to contact his family while he was in hiding with his friend in Sabrata 
and that he has had contact with members of his family only on rare occasions even during his 
stay in Sweden. However, this assertion is difficult to reconcile with the statement given by his 
counsel to the Migration Board on 16 April 2002 that his friend had visited the applicant’s 
parents a couple of times and had then received information and the applicant’s allegedly false 
passport. The Court further notes that the documents in question have been submitted by the 
applicant at different stages of the proceedings, following the rejection of his applications by 
the Migration Board and the Aliens Appeals Board.’350 
 
The submission of copies of documents instead of originals diminishes the probative 
value of such documents. In the case of S.M. v. Sweden (2009), the Court concluded 
that the applicant had not sufficiently substantiated her story and had, therefore, 
failed to show a real Article 3-risk. This conclusion was based on the fact that only 
copies of alleged search warrants had been submitted, that the basic story and travel 
route had been rather vague, and that the applicant had remained in Brazzaville for 
almost five months following her escape, without any incidents.351 
5.6.7.1.b Specificity, comprehensiveness and consistency of information contained in evidentiary 
materials 
The more specific and comprehensive the evidentiary materials are about the stated 
past facts and about the future risk, the more probative value is attached to them. 
The case of Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden (2005) was mentioned above, in which a judg-
ment of a Syrian court stated that the first applicant had been sentenced to death for 
complicity in a murder. Based on this document and the finding that the death 
                                                        
349 ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, paras. 63 and 64. 
350 ECtHR, B. v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 26 October 2004, Appl. No. 16578/03. 
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penalty is enforced for serious crimes in Syria, the Court concluded that deportation 
of the applicants to Syria would give rise to a violation of Article 3 (and Article 2, 
containing the right to life).352 In Garabayev v. Russia (2007), the applicant submitted in 
support of his claim several letters written by his lawyer, a member of the Russian 
State Duma (Parliament) and the Human Rights Centre Memorial, a Russian NGO, 
addressed to the Russian Public Prosecutor. In these letters, strong fears were ex-
pressed that the applicant would be tortured and personally persecuted for political 
motives. The letters also gave specific information on the general situation in prisons 
in Turkmenistan. The different letters were consistent with each other, were com-
prehensive and focused specifically on the applicant’s precarious situation and the 
real personal risk to the applicant.353 
When the information contained in evidentiary materials is unspecific and vague, 
little or no evidentiary value is accorded to them. A very strict approach was adopted 
in Shikpohkt and Sholeh v. the Netherlands (2005).354 In that case, a large amount of evi-
dentiary materials was submitted by the applicants but the ECtHR found these ma-
terials lacking in specificity and comprehensiveness and, therefore, insufficient. The 
basic story of the Iranian applicant was that she came from a family which had always 
opposed the sitting Iranian regime, that she had taken over from her stepfather op-
positional activities, including the distribution of oppositional pamphlets, and that she 
had received a written threat that had caused her to go into hiding. The ECtHR was 
not satisfied with this large amount of evidence. It considered as follows: 
 
‘It would have been helpful had the Court been provided with (…) the written threat that 
caused her to go into hiding – or at least, plausible information which would enable the Court 
to assess prima facie the nature and seriousness of the threat which it represented to Ms. 
Mahkamat Sholeh herself – or if she had been able to provide more detailed information on 
the written materials which she states she held for Rah-e-Kargar and some of which she states 
she wrote. It is true that documents have been submitted in support of Ms. Mahkamat 
Sholeh’s allegations. These, in the Court’s view, would at most tend to bear out that Ms. 
Mahkamat Sholeh’s stepfather and mother were at one time during the 1980s detained on 
grounds related to political activities. They contain little of any direct relevance to Ms. 
Mahkamat Sholeh herself. In so far as they express any fears on her behalf, they are, in the 
Court’s view, vague and speculative.’355 
 
Crucial in the Court’s reasoning was that the submitted evidence did not focus on the 
applicant herself, but rather on her stepfather, and that the evidence was unspecific 
about her political activities. 
5.6.7.1.c Independence, reliability, objectiveness and authority of the source or author 
Another important factor determining the probative value of evidence is the inde-
pendence, reliability and objectiveness of the source or author of the information. In 
                                                        
352 ECtHR, Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, 8 November 2005, Appl. No. 13284/04, para. 44. 
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particular, when witness statements by family members are submitted as corroborat-
ing evidence, the question arises of whether such statements can be seen as inde-
pendent, reliable and objective. Provided that they are specific, comprehensive and 
consistent, written and oral statements by family members have considerable evi-
dentiary value in the case law of the ECtHR. I did not come across judgments or 
decisions in which the Court had ruled that such statements could not be admitted as 
evidence or were of no evidentiary value because they could not be deemed to be 
objective sources, given the relationship with the applicant. More will be said about 
witness statements by family members below in 5.6.7.2. 
The issue of the independence, reliability and objectivity of the source is also 
particularly present when information compiled by scholars, human rights organisa-
tions and refugee support organisations is submitted. In the case of S.H. v. the UK 
(2010), the Bhutanese applicant of Nepalese ethnic origin claimed that he would be at 
risk of imprisonment and ill-treatment in Bhutan, both as an involuntary returnee and 
as someone who had made representations about the human rights situation there 
while out of the country. The applicant submitted to the ECtHR a number of expert 
reports prepared for the purposes of the national proceedings which considered the 
specific risk to him on return to Bhutan. These included a report prepared by a pro-
fessor of Nepali and Himalayan studies at the School of Oriental and Asian Studies at 
the University of London, which stated that it was difficult to predict precisely what 
would happen to the applicant were he to be returned to Bhutan. However, the fact 
that the government of Bhutan was willing to facilitate his return by issuing a travel 
document should not be taken as an indication that he would be able to resume 
anything resembling his former life. The materials also included two statements made 
by Amnesty International and a statement by Human Rights Watch on the conse-
quences of deporting the applicant, a more general letter from the UNHCR indicat-
ing that no monitoring possibilities for returnees existed, and five reports by Rachel 
Carnegie, coordinator of the Bhutanese Refugee Support Group (UK), which ad-
dressed the plight of southern Bhutanese in general and the situation of the applicant 
in particular. The Carnegie reports stated that it was not possible to determine exactly 
what the applicant’s fate would be but that it was reasonable to conclude that he 
would be at significant risk as a failed asylum seeker for whom the Home Office had 
twice applied for travel documents.  
The ECtHR stressed that Bhutan was a closed country, that the UNHCR was 
unable to monitor returns and that there was a paucity of objective country informa-
tion which would either confirm or contradict the applicant’s allegations. The Court 
then stated that, nevertheless, all of the expert reports submitted by the applicant had 
supported his claim that he would be at risk of imprisonment and ill-treatment. Seen 
in combination with the available general country information reports (mainly reports 
by the US State Department) the Court found that there were substantial grounds for 
assuming a real Article 3-risk.356 
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The expert reports thus played a very important role as corroborating evidence. 
From the Court’s considerations, it became clear that the Court found important that 
all the expert reports were consistent with each other, consistent with other country 
information and consistent with the applicant’s statements. Although the Court did 
not specifically mention it, the fact that the expert reports specifically focused on the 
applicant and were comprehensive must also have contributed to their significant 
evidentiary value. 
A final example worthwhile mentioning here is N.M. and M.M. v. the United 
Kingdom (2011).357 This case sharply demonstrates the importance of the reliability of 
a particular source who states in firm and persuasive language that an Article 3-risk is 
imminent upon the expulsion of an applicant. The applicants in this case alleged that 
they would be at risk of ill-treatment in Uzbekistan both because their exit visas had 
expired and because they had claimed asylum in the UK. Among the evidence in the 
possession of the ECtHR was a letter from Mr. Murray, the former British Ambas-
sador to Uzbekistan, in which he stated that the applicants would almost certainly be 
at risk of torture if the Uzbek authorities became aware that they had claimed asylum 
abroad. The Court did not attach substantial evidentiary weight to this statement, 
however, for two reasons. First, the statement by Mr. Murray was not consistent with 
all the other evidence available that described that the detention, torture and ill-treat-
ment of forcibly returned Uzbek refugees and asylum seekers related to cases where 
the Uzbek authorities had a pre-existing interest in the individuals concerned, either 
because they had been returned pursuant to an extradition request or because they 
were believed to be connected to the events at Andijan in May 2005. Second, the 
Court followed the UK Asylum and Immigration Tribunal (AIT) in its conclusion 
that Mr. Murray’s evidence should be approached with some circumspection, given 
that he had interests of his own, which affected, consciously or otherwise, his inter-
pretation of facts and events.358 
5.6.7.2  Witness statements by family members 
Provided that they are specific, comprehensive and consistent, written or oral state-
ments by family members seem to have considerable evidentiary value in the case law 
of the ECtHR. Statements by family members must normally be supported by other, 
more objective, evidentiary materials. In H.L.R. v. France (1997), a case concerning a 
Colombian drug smuggler who feared that upon deportation to Colombia he would 
be exposed to vengeance by the drug traffickers who had recruited him as a smuggler, 
the Court considered:  
 
‘The documents from various sources produced in support of the applicant’s memorial pro-
vide insight into the tense atmosphere in Colombia, but do not contain any indication of the 
existence of a situation comparable to his own. Although drug traffickers sometimes take re-
venge on informers, there is no relevant evidence to show in H.L.R.’s case that the alleged risk 
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is real. His aunt’s letters cannot by themselves suffice to show that the threat is real. Moreover, 
there are no documents to support the claim that the applicant’s personal situation would be 
worse than that of other Colombians, were he to be deported.’359 
 
Some examples will be given here to illustrate the considerable weight accorded to 
consistent, specific and comprehensive statements by family members. In Hilal v. the 
UK (2001), part of the applicant’s basic story was that the police had gone to his 
wife’s house on a number of occasions looking for him and making threats. This in-
formation had been confirmed by statements by the applicant’s wife in her own na-
tional asylum procedure. The Court compared this information to country infor-
mation and concluded that it was consistent. Combined with the past detention and 
torture in detention experienced by the applicant and the death of his brother in 
detention, this yielded sufficient substantial grounds for a real Article 3-risk: 
 
‘the Court recalls that the applicant’s wife, who has now also claimed asylum in the UK, in-
formed the immigration officer in her interview that the police came to her house on a number 
of occasions looking for her husband and making threats. This is consistent with the informa-
tion provided about the situation in Pemba and Zanzibar, where CUF members have in the 
past suffered serious harassment, arbitrary detention, torture and ill-treatment by the authori-
ties (see paragraphs 38-46 above). This involves ordinary members of the CUF and not only its 
leaders or high-profile activists. The situation has improved to some extent, but the latest re-
ports cast doubt on the seriousness of reform efforts and refer to continued problems faced by 
CUF members (see paragraph 46 above). The Court concludes that the applicant would be at 
risk of being arrested and detained, and of suffering a recurrence of ill-treatment if returned to 
Zanzibar.’360 
 
In the admissibility decision in Ammari v. Sweden (2002), the Court noted that  
 
‘the applicant had submitted no evidence at all – whether (…) or letters from relatives remain-
ing in the country (…) which would have substantiated his allegations that, if returned to Alge-
ria, he would be subjected to treatment contrary to Article 3 on account of activities for the 
GIA (Groupe Islamique Armé)’ (…).361 
 
And in Thampibillai v. the Netherlands (2004), the Court considered:  
 
‘the Court notes that the applicant submitted that, following his flight and his failure to report 
to the army, his mother had been arrested and detained for two days. However, the applicant 
did not keep the letters in which his mother communicated these events to him.’362 
 
                                                        
359 ECtHR, H.L.R.v. France, 29 April 1997, Appl. No. 24573/1994, para. 42. 
360 ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, para. 66. 
361 Admissibility decision ECtHR, Ammari v. Sweden, 22 October 2002, Appl. No. 60959/00. 
362 ECtHR, Thampibillai v. the Netherlands, 17 February 2004, Appl. No. 61350/00, para. 66. 
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Both considerations clearly indicate that the Court would have taken written state-
ments by the mentioned family members into account and seriously assessed them, 
had they been submitted.  
5.6.7.3 Medico-legal reports363 
In a number of cases before the ECtHR, the applicant has relied on medico-legal re-
ports to corroborate statements that he or she has been subjected to torture in the 
past. In some cases, medical evidence stating a post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) 
has also been relied on by the applicant to explain the tardy presentation of state-
ments on past torture and evidence of such torture, or to explain inconsistencies in 
the flight narrative. 
5.6.7.3.a Medico-legal reports to explain the tardy presentation of statements and evidence 
The ECtHR is generally reluctant to accept medico-legal reports (stating PTSD or 
other mental disturbance or disorders) as an explanation for the tardy presentation of 
statements on past torture.364 In Cruz Varas v. Sweden (1991), the applicant stated two 
years after his initial application for asylum that he had been tortured and sexually 
abused by the Chilean police on several occasions. He submitted several medical 
reports which conclusively confirmed his statements and mentioned the presence of 
PTSD. The Court considered, however, that  
 
‘Moreover, even if allowances are made for the apprehension that asylum-seekers may have 
towards the authorities and the difficulties of substantiating their claims with documentary evi-
dence, the first applicant’s complete silence as to (...) torture by the Chilean police until more 
than eighteen months after his first interrogation (…) casts considerable doubt on his credibil-
ity in this respect.’365 
 
The case of Nasimi v. Sweden (2004) is also illustrative of the Court’s strict approach. 
Nasimi went through four asylum application procedures in Sweden. It was more 
than a year after he had initially applied for asylum that he mentioned past torture. In 
the second, third and fourth procedure, he had also submitted statements from a 
psychologist and psychotherapist mentioning PTSD. The Court had to deal with the 
question of whether the late mention of torture could possibly be explained by the 
applicant’s medical state. However, it did not even mention the presented medical 
evidence when answering this question. It considered only that:  
 
‘Moreover, although it recognises that it may be an ordeal to talk about experiences of torture, 
the Court is struck by the fact that the applicant did not make any specific allegations of tor-
                                                        
363 See on the role of medico-legal reports in the case law of the ECtHR also Bruin & Reneman 2006. 
364 Bruin & Reneman 2006 draw the same conclusion. 
365 ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, para. 78. 
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ture until (…) more than a year after he applied for asylum, although he must have been aware 
that such information would be of importance to the immigration authorities.’366 
 
However, in Hilal v. the UK (2001) the Court did not find the tardy mention of torture 
problematic. The Court considered in this case that  
 
‘In the light of the medical record of the hospital which treated him, the apparent failure of the 
applicant to mention torture at his first immigration interview becomes less significant and his 
explanation to the special adjudicator – that he did not think he had to give all the details until 
the full interview a month later – becomes far less incredible.’367 
 
The different approach in Hilal may well be explained by the fact that the delay in 
mentioning past torture was very insignificant in this case. In February 1995, a so-
called pro forma asylum interview had been held, during which the applicant had not 
mentioned his past torture. One month later, in March 1995, a full interview had 
been held in which the applicant had come forward with his statements on past 
torture. 
5.6.7.3.b Medico-legal reports to explain inconsistencies in the personal account 
In its decision in Hatami v. Sweden (1998), the European Commission considered that 
‘complete accuracy is seldom to be expected by victims of torture’.368 This is the same 
consideration as the one used by the Committee against Torture in many (mainly 
early) decisions in cases where the respondent State party pointed out inconsistencies 
in the personal account and the complainant, in reply, referred to medical evidence to 
explain the inaccuracies (see Chapter 4, section 4.5.7.4.a).369 No decisions or judg-
ments of the ECtHR have been found in which this consideration has been used, 
which suggests that the ECtHR is not willing to accept medical evidence to explain 
inconsistencies. 
5.6.7.3.c Medico-legal reports as corroboration of experiences of torture or ill-treatment in the past 
In a number of cases, the ECtHR has attached considerable probative value to medi-
cal reports submitted by applicants to corroborate past torture or ill-treatment. In the 
                                                        
366 ECtHR, Nasimi v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 16 March 2004, Appl. No. 38865/02. The Court 
considered similarly in its admissibility decisions in Ovdienko v. Finland, 31 May 2005, Appl. No. 
1383/04 and Paramsothy v. the Netherlands, 10 November 2005, Appl. No. 14492/03. 
367 ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, para. 64. 
368 ECtHR, Hatami v. Sweden, European Commission, 23 April 1998, Appl. No. 32448/96, para. 106. 
369 See, for example, ComAT, Alan v. Switzerland, 8 May 1996, No. 021/1995, para. 11.3; ComAT, Kisoki 
v. Sweden, 8 May 1996, No. 041/1996, para. 9.3; ComAT, Tala v. Sweden, 15 November 1996, No. 
043/1996, para. 10.3; ComAT, Haydin v. Sweden, 20 November 1998, No. 101/1997, para. 6.7; 
ComAT, E.T.B. v. Denmark, 30 April 2002, No. 146/1999, para. 10: ‘the Committee recalls its 
jurisprudence that torture victims cannot be expected to recall entirely consistent facts relating to 
events of extreme trauma. But they must be prepared to advance such evidence as there is in sup-
port of a claim’; ComAT, Karoui v.Sweden, 8 May 2002, No. 185/2001, para. 10; ComAT, C.T. and 
K.M. v. Sweden, 17 November 2006, No. 279/2005, para. 7.6; ComAT, Falcon Rios v. Canada, 23 No-
vember 2004, No. 133/1999, para. 8.5 (gaps and vague points are explained away by referring to me-
dical evidence). 
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evaluation of medical reports, the same requirements play a role as the ones 
mentioned above in 5.6.7.1: the specificity, comprehensiveness and consistency of the 
information contained in the medical reports, the independence, reliability and ob-
jectiveness of the source and the authority and reputation of the author. Logically, an 
important factor in determining the probative value is also whether the information 
contained in the medical reports conclusively identifies a causal link between the in-
dividual’s bodily or mental injuries and the alleged past ill-treatment. 
In Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden (1991), the Court assumed on the basis of the 
available medical evidence, particularly the witness statement of Dr. Jacobsson before 
the Commission of Human Rights, that the applicant had, at some stage in the past, 
been subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment. The fact that the Court did not 
assume an Article 3-risk in this case was due to the absence of direct evidence that 
the past torture or ill-treatment had been inflicted by the Chilean authorities.370 In 
Hilal v. the UK (2001), it was accepted by the Court, on the basis of the medical record 
from the hospital which had treated the applicant after he had been released from the 
prison where he had been tortured, that he had been detained and during that 
detention had, indeed, been tortured as he had stated.371 
In R.C. v. Sweden (2010), discussed above in section 5.3.3, the applicant stated in 
the national proceedings before the Swedish authorities that he suffered from medical 
and psychiatric problems resulting from torture and ill-treatment in prison. He sub-
mitted a medical certificate issued by a physician at a local health care centre. The cer-
tificate stated that the applicant had various scars which could, in the physician’s 
opinion, very well have originated from the torture to which the applicant claimed he 
had been subjected in Iran.372 The ECtHR requested that the applicant submit a 
forensic medical report. The applicant submitted a report from a specialist in forensic 
medicine at the Crisis and Trauma Centre of a Swedish hospital. This report noted 
that in cases like this, alternative causes for the origins of scars could not be com-
pletely excluded, but that experience showed that self-inflicted injuries and injuries 
resulting from accidents normally had a different distribution to those shown by the 
applicant. The conclusion of the report was that the findings strongly indicated that 
the applicant had been tortured.373 The Court attached great value to this medical re-
port and accepted its general conclusion that the injuries, to a large extent, were con-
sistent with having been inflicted on the applicant by other persons and in the man-
ner described by him, thereby strongly indicating that he had been a victim of torture. 
Based on this, the very tense human rights situation in Iran and the particular im-
minent risk for Iranians who could not prove that they had left the country legally, 
the Court concluded that substantial grounds were present to assume a real Article 3-
risk.374 
                                                        
370 ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, para. 77. 
371 ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, para. 64. 
372 ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, para. 11. 
373 Ibidem, paras. 23-25. 
374 ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, paras. 53-56. 
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5.6.7.4  Reports on the situation in the country of origin 
All the judgments of the ECtHR, and many admissibility decisions, in cases con-
cerning the expulsion of asylum seekers demonstrate that information on the situa-
tion in the countries of origin plays a very important role. The assessment of whether 
there are substantial grounds for believing that the applicant faces a real risk inevita-
bly requires the Court to assess the conditions in the receiving country against the 
standards of Article 3.375 In assessing the evidentiary value of the country of origin in-
formation, the ECtHR gives consideration to its source, in particular its independ-
ence, reliability and objectivity. The authority and reputation of the author of the 
reports, the seriousness of the investigations by means of which the reports were 
compiled, the consistency of the conclusions, the corroboration by other sources, the 
presence and the reporting capacities of the author in the country in question are all 
taken into account.376 
It seems that four main sources of country of origin information used by the 
ECtHR can be distinguished, namely: 
1. Information compiled by organs, organisations and agencies of the United Na-
tions and the Council of Europe; 
2. Information compiled by States (whether respondent in a particular case or any 
other Contracting or non-Contracting State such as the US); 
3. Information from independent international human rights protection organisa-
tions such as Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch; and  
4. Information from the media and other sources.377 
 
The ECtHR has not developed a hierarchy of sources. What is clear, however, is that 
reports by UN organs, organisations and agencies rank highly and are considered to 
be important sources.
378
 The reasons for this are that United Nations agencies have 
direct access to the authorities of the country of destination as well as the ability to 
carry out on-site inspections and assessments in a manner which States and non-gov-
ernmental organisations may not be able to do. Reports by States also rank highly, 
because States have the ability to gather information through their diplomatic mis-
sions.379 The precise probative value accorded to country of origin information is not 
                                                        
375 See, for example, ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005, Appl. Nos. 46827/99 
and 46951/99, para. 67; ECtHR, NA v. the UK, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, para. 110. 
376 See, for example, ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, Appl. No. 37201/06, para. 143; ECtHR, 
NA v. the UK, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, para. 120; ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 June 
2011, Appl. Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, paras. 230 and 231. 
377 See, for example, ECtHR, NA v. the UK, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 2590/07, in which the Court used 
country of origin information from all these four sources: United Kingdom Government Reports, 
one US Department of State Report, some information from the Sri Lankan Government, informa-
tion from the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada, some information from the British Broad-
casting Corporation, United Nations Reports, and reports drawn up by Amnesty International, Hu-
man Rights Watch, the International Crisis Group, the Medical Foundation for the Care of Victims 
of Torture. See also ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 June 2011, Appl. Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/ 
07, in which also information from the four categories of sources was used by the Court. 
378 ECtHR, NA v. the UK, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, paras. 121 and 122. 
379 ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 June 2011, Appl. Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, para. 231. 
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only determined by the source, but, logically, also very much by the specific content 
of it. The ECtHR distinguishes between more general reports on the socio-economic 
and humanitarian situation on the one hand, and reports specifically concerning the 
human rights situation, with a focus on the risk for the particular applicant, on the 
other hand. The latter category of reports is given greater evidentiary weight: 
 
‘While the Court accepts that many reports are, by their very nature, general assessments, 
greater importance must necessarily be attached to reports which consider the human rights 
situation in the country of destination and directly address the grounds for the alleged real risk 
of ill-treatment in the case before the Court. Ultimately, the Court’s own assessment of the hu-
man rights situation in a country of destination is carried out only to determine whether there 
would be a violation of Article 3 if the applicant in the case before it were to be returned to 
that country. Thus the weight to be attached to independent assessments must inevitably de-
pend on the extent to which those assessments are couched in terms similar to Article 3. Thus 
in respect of the UNHCR, due weight has been given by the Court to the UNHCR’s own as-
sessment of an applicant’s claims when the Court determined the merits of her complaint un-
der Article 3 (see Jabari v. Turkey, no. 40035/98, § 41, ECHR 2000-VIII). Conversely, where 
the UNHCR’s concerns are focused on general socio-economic and humanitarian considera-
tions, the Court has been inclined to accord less weight to them, since such considerations do 
not necessarily have a bearing on the question of a real risk to an individual applicant of ill-
treatment within the meaning of Article 3 (see Salah Sheekh, cited above, § 141).’380 
 
Finally, it is interesting to mention the case of Sufi and Elmi v. the United Kingdom 
(2011),381 in which the ECtHR developed a rule of evidence concerning State reports 
based on anonymous sources. In this case, the respondent State submitted a report 
on a fact-finding mission to Somalia, based on information stemming from sources 
described as ‘international NGO’, ‘a diplomatic source’, ‘a security advisor’.
382
 The 
Court stated: 
 
‘(…) where a report is wholly reliant on information provided by sources, the authority and 
reputation of those sources and the extent of their presence in the relevant area will be relevant 
factors for the Court in assessing the weight to be attributed to their evidence. The Court rec-
ognises that where there are legitimate security concerns, sources may wish to remain anony-
mous. However, in the absence of any information about the nature of the sources’ operations 
in the relevant area, it will be virtually impossible for the Court to assess their reliability. Con-
sequently, the approach taken by the Court will depend on the consistency of the sources’ con-
clusions with the remainder of the available information. Where the sources’ conclusions are 
consistent with other country information, their evidence may be of corroborative weight. 
                                                        
380 See, for example, ECtHR, F.H.v. Sweden, 20 January 2009, Appl. No. 32621/06, para. 92, where the 
Court stated that where reports focus on general socio-economic and humanitarian conditions, the 
Court has been inclined to accord less weight to them, since such conditions do not necessarily have 
a bearing on the question of a real risk of ill-treatment to an individual applicant within the meaning 
of Article 3. 
381 ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 June 2011, Appl. Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07. 
382 Ibidem, para. 234. 
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However, the Court will generally exercise caution when considering reports from anonymous 
sources which are inconsistent with the remainder of the information before it.’383 
 
It may be concluded from this ruling that evidence based on anonymous sources 
cannot be the only source of evidence but must normally be accompanied by other 
evidentiary materials. 
5.6.8  Opportunities for presenting evidence and reacting to evidence 
In its proceedings, the ECtHR adheres to the principle of adversarial proceedings. 
The relevant Rules of Procedure of the Court stipulate that, at both the admissibility 
stage and the merits stage, both parties to the case are allowed to submit their obser-
vations and evidence and to react to the observations and evidence lodged by the 
other party. For example, under Rule 54, the Chamber or its President gives notice of 
the application to the respondent Contracting Party and invites that Party to submit 
written observations on the application. Upon receipt thereof, the Chamber or its 
President invites the applicant to submit observations in reply. The parties may also 
be invited to submit further observations in writing. When this happens, a possibility 
to react is normally provided to the other party.384 
The structure of the judgments of the Court reflects the principle of adversari-
ality. In the Court’s judgments, under the heading ‘the parties’ submissions’ (in most 
judgments this heading is part of the section THE LAW), the final positions of both 
parties are reflected. 
It seems that the ECtHR does not have a problem with the submission of new 
evidence which was not presented in the national proceedings. The Court then pro-
vides the State party an opportunity to react to this new evidence. This clearly dis-
tinguishes the ECtHR from the HRC and the ComAT, which, in principle, do not 
allow the complainant or the respondent State to submit new statements and evi-
                                                        
383 Ibidem, para. 233. 
384 Rules of Court, 1 April 2011, to be found at: http://www.echr.coe.int, Rules of Court. Rule 54 stip-
ulates: 
‘1. The Chamber may at once declare the application inadmissible or strike it out of the Court’s list 
of cases.  
2. Alternatively, the Chamber or its President may decide to  
(a) request the parties to submit any factual information, documents or other material considered by 
the Chamber or its President to be relevant;  
(b) give notice of the application to the respondent Contracting Party and invite that Party to submit 
written observations on the application and, upon receipt thereof, invite the applicant to submit ob-
servations in reply;  
(c) invite the parties to submit further observations in writing.  
3. Before taking its decision on the admissibility, the Chamber may decide, either at the request of a 
party or of its own motion, to hold a hearing if it considers that the discharge of its functions under 
the Convention so requires. In that event, unless the Chamber shall exceptionally decide otherwise, 
the parties shall also be invited to address the issues arising in relation to the merits of the applica-
tion.’ 
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dence which were not presented in the national proceedings.385 These Committees do 
not normally take into account such statements and evidence, but will, instead, refer 
the complainant back to national remedies and conclude that the national remedies 
have not been exhausted. The ECtHR follows a different approach. In Cruz Varas v. 
Sweden (1991), both the applicant and the Swedish Government submitted large quan-
tities of new evidentiary materials to the ECtHR. The applicant submitted two new 
medical reports and the Swedish Government also submitted completely new mate-
rials which had not been available during the national proceedings: after the appli-
cant’s expulsion from Sweden to Chile on 6 October 1989 (the case had been 
brought to the Commission of Human Rights on 5 October 1989), the Swedish 
authorities had submitted to the Court a report and a number of affidavits resulting 
from an inquiry conducted in Chile by the Swedish embassy. The Court examined all 
this evidence materially and used it in order to assess the alleged Article 3-risk.It is 
obvious that the Court did not find it problematic that part of the evidence had not 
been made available earlier, during the national proceedings. From the judgment it 
also becomes clear that, had the claimant presented additional evidence obtained after 
his expulsion to Chile, the Court would have taken it into account.386 Said v. the 
Netherlands (2005) demonstrates the same flexible approach. In this case, crucial evi-
dence was brought in by the applicant after the national proceedings had ended; the 
ECtHR attached significant value to this evidence.387 
5.6.9  Judicial application of investigative powers 
In section 5.6.5 on the credibility assessment, it was noted that the ECtHR tries to 
strike a difficult balance between an active approach towards determination of the 
facts and reliance on the facts as presented by the respondent State.388 On the one 
hand, the Court stresses its subsidiary role and considers that determination of the 
facts is primarily a matter for the authorities of the Contracting States: 
 
‘the Court accepts that, as a general principle, the national authorities are best placed to assess 
(…) the facts (…).’389 
 
                                                        
385 See, for example, ComAT, M.X. v. Switzerland, 7 May 2008, No. 311/2007, para. 9.4 (detention and 
sexual assault were not mentioned before the national Swiss asylum authorities); HRC, A.Cv. the 
Netherlands, 22 July 2008, No. 1494/2006, para. 8.3. 
386 ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, paras. 26, 27, 29, 30, 
41-46, 77, 79. 
387 See ECtHR, Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02, paras. 28, 29, 51. 
388 For the same conclusion: see Geertsema 2010. See on this also Essakkili & Spijkerboer 2005, p. 44 
and Spijkerboer 2009. Essakkili & Spijkerboer use the term ‘inconsistency’. With Geertsema, I would 
rather speak of a difficult search for a balance between avoiding becoming a fourth instance and 
applying a rigorous scrutiny because Article 3 is a fundamental absolute and non-derogable right. 
389 ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, para. 52. See also admissibility decisions ECtHR, Damla and others v. Germany, 
26 October 2006, Appl. No. 61479/00; ECtHR, F. v. the UK, 22 June 2004, Appl. No. 17341/03; 
ECtHR, Harutioenyan and others v. the Netherlands, 1 September 2009, Appl. No. 43700/07. 
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On the other hand, the Court acknowledges the absolute nature and the fundamental 
value of Article 3 and considers on that basis that the Court itself must make a thor-
ough (or rigorous) examination of the existence of a real risk: 
 
‘Its examination of the existence of a real risk of ill-treatment must necessarily be a rigorous 
one in view of the absolute character of Article 3 (…).’390 
 
Part of this rigorous examination is an independent determination of the facts where 
these are in dispute between the parties. Within the framework of this rigorous 
examination, the ECtHR allows itself to gather and verify relevant facts and to 
conduct a rigorous assessment of them. In order to determine the facts, the ECtHR 
may apply any investigative measure which it considers capable of clarifying them. 
The application of investigative measures by the Court is governed by two specific 
provisions in the Rules of Court. Rule A1 in Annex 1 to the Rules of Court391 stipu-
lates: 
 
‘Rule A1 (Investigative measures) 
1. The Chamber may, at the request of a party or of its own motion, adopt any investigative 
measure which it considers capable of clarifying the facts of the case. The Chamber may, inter 
alia, invite the parties to produce documentary evidence and decide to hear as a witness or ex-
pert or in any other capacity any person whose evidence or statements seem likely to assist it in 
carrying out its tasks. 
2. The Chamber may also ask any person or institution of its choice to express an opinion or 
make a written report on any matter considered by it to be relevant to the case. 
3. After a case has been declared admissible or, exceptionally, before the decision on admissi-
bility, the Chamber may appoint one or more of its members or of the other judges of the 
Court, as its delegate or delegates, to conduct an inquiry, carry out an on-site investigation or 
take evidence in some other manner. The Chamber may also appoint any person or institution 
of its choice to assist the delegation in such manner as it sees fit. 
4. The provisions of this Chapter concerning investigative measures by a delegation shall apply, 
mutatis mutandis, to any such proceedings conducted by the Chamber itself. 
5. Proceedings forming part of any investigation by a Chamber or its delegation shall be held in 
camera, save in so far as the President of the Chamber or the head of the delegation decides 
otherwise. 
6. The President of the Chamber may, as he or she considers appropriate, invite, or grant leave 
to, any third party to participate in an investigative measure. The President shall lay down the 
conditions of any such participation and may limit that participation if those conditions are not 
complied with.’ 
 
                                                        
390 See, for example, ECtHR, Chahal v. the United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Appl. No. 22414/93, 
para. 96; ECtHR, Jabari v. Turkey,11 July 2000, Appl. No. 40035/98, para. 39; ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 
26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02, para. 160; ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 June 2008, Appl. 
Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, para. 214. 
391 Rules of Court, 1 April 2011, to be found at: http://www.echr.coe.int, Rules of Court.  
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And according to Rule 19, paragraph 2, the ECtHR may decide, at any stage of the 
examination of an application, that it is necessary that an investigation or any other 
function be carried out elsewhere by it or one or more of its members. From these 
provisions it follows that, in order to clarify the facts of the case, the Court may at 
any stage of the proceedings apply investigative powers, such as hearing witnesses 
and experts, conducting fact finding missions, and requesting the parties to submit 
additional information.  
In section 5.6.5 above on the credibility assessment, it was noted that there seem 
to be three triggers which particularly make the ECtHR proceed to an independent 
determination of the facts and to apply investigative powers to that end. These trig-
gers are the following: 
1) Insufficient national proceedings, for example, evidence was overlooked or not 
taken seriously, or the assessment made at national level was insufficiently sup-
ported by relevant country of origin materials; 
2) New facts, circumstances and developments, including evidence thereof, or new 
information which casts doubt on the information relied on by the government; 
and  
3) The absolute nature of Article 3 was disrespected in the national proceedings, for 
example, a weighing of national security considerations against the Article 3-risk 
took place; or an incorrect application of the standard of proof or another evi-
dentiary standard took place, for example, a too strict standard of proof or a too 
strict standard on individualisation.392 
 
A good example in which all three triggers came together and pushed the Court to 
proceed towards an independent determination of the facts is Salah Sheekh v. the 
Netherlands (2007). The national proceedings in this case were insufficient, as a higher 
appeal to the Council of State would have stood no chance of success. Therefore, this 
higher appeal did not constitute an effective remedy. At the same time, the adminis-
tration and the first instance national court had assessed the situation in Somalia 
mainly on the basis of one source, that being the country of origin reports by the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which was, in the ECtHR’s opinion, an insuffi-
cient basis (trigger 1: insufficient national proceedings). In addition, new develop-
ments had taken place while the case was pending in Strasbourg (trigger 2: new 
developments). Finally, a higher appeal to the Council of State was bound to fail 
because the Council of State applied a steady jurisprudential line, which incorporated 
a too strict requirement of individualisation of a claim (trigger 3: an incorrect evi-
dentiary standard, being the standard on individualisation).393 
                                                        
392 See also Wouters 2009, p. 284: ‘it seems that the Court is willing to conduct a full assessment of its 
own when the national proceedings followed give it reason to so so, for example because the claim 
was assessed in an accelerated procedure, or because doubts have been cast on the information re-
lied on by the national authorities, in particular because the situation in the country of destination 
may have changed since the national proceedings ended’. 
393 ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04, paras. 123, 136, 148 
(trigger 1: insufficient national proceedings and trigger 3: a too strict standard of individualisation), 
paras. 52-84, 94-95, 101, 105-113 (trigger 2: new developments).  
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In Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands (2007), and many other cases, the ECtHR gather-
ed of its own motion substantial additional information on the conditions in the 
countries of origin. In Salah Sheekh, the Court explained why it did so, and when:  
 
‘The establishment of any responsibility of the expelling State under Article 3 inevitably in-
volves an assessment of conditions in the receiving country against the standards of Article 3 
of the Convention (…). In determining whether it has been shown that the applicant runs a 
real risk, if expelled, of suffering treatment proscribed by Article 3, the Court will assess the 
issue in the light of all the material placed before it, or, if necessary, material obtained proprio 
motu, in particular where the applicant – or a third party within the meaning of Article 36 of the 
Convention – provides reasoned grounds which cast doubt on the accuracy of the information 
relied on by the respondent Government. In respect of materials obtained proprio motu, the Court 
considers that, given the absolute nature of the protection afforded by Article 3, it must be 
satisfied that the assessment made by the authorities of the Contracting State is adequate and 
sufficiently supported by national materials as well as by materials originating from other reli-
able and objective sources such as, for instance, other Contracting or non-Contracting States, 
agencies of the United Nations and reputable non-governmental organisations. In its super-
visory task under Article 19 of the Convention, it would be too narrow an approach under Ar-
ticle 3 in cases concerning aliens facing expulsion or extradition if the Court, as an international 
human rights court, were only to take into account materials made available by the national 
authorities of the Contracting State concerned, without comparing these with materials from 
other reliable and objective sources.’394 
 
In a number of cases, the Court has reiterated that it will particularly obtain materials 
on conditions in the country of origin proprio motu when the applicant or a third party 
provides reasoned grounds which cast doubt on the accuracy of the information 
relied on by the respondent government.395 
The ECtHR does not always make explicit which reports on conditions in a 
country of origin have been submitted by a party and which reports have been ob-
tained by the Court proprio motu. In a number of recent judgments, however, the 
Court has explicitly stated that it worked both with the evidence submitted by the 
parties and the evidence gathered of its own motion.396 
In a number of cases, the Court has not only obtained information on the coun-
try of origin proprio motu, but has also used other investigative powers of its own mo-
tion. In N. v. Finland (2005), after the application had been declared admissible, the 
Court decided to pursue its examination by taking oral evidence in Finland. Two 
judges were appointed as Delegates and, together with the Registrar and several 
                                                        
394 ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04, para. 136. 
395 See, for example, ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, Appl. No. 37201/06, para. 131; ECtHR, 
Ismoilov and others v. Russia, 24 April 2008, Appl. No. 2947/06, para. 120 and ECtHR, NA v. the UK, 
17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, para. 119. 
396 See, for example, ECtHR, Muminov v. Russia, 11 December 2008, Appl. No. 42502/06, para. 95; 
ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 2009, Appl. No. 30471/08, para. 90; 
ECtHR, Mawaka v. the Netherlands, 1 June 2010, Appl. No. 29031/04, para. 41: ‘the Court observes 
from the materials in its possession and the materials submitted by the Government (…)’. 
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members of the Registry, they conducted a fact-finding mission in Finland for two 
days.397 The delegation took testimony from the applicant himself, his common-law 
wife, the Head of the Africa section in the Finnish Directorate of Immigration and an 
acquaintance of the applicant.398 Another Article 3-case, concerning extradition, in 
which a fact-finding mission was conducted, this time to Russia and Georgia, is Sha-
mayev and others v. Georgia and Russia (2005).399 During this mission, Delegates of the 
Court heard many of the applicants, prison staff and certain administrative officials; 
the Court also examined prison files.400 
In other cases, the Court has requested one of the parties to submit (additional) 
expert information. For example, in R.C. v. Sweden (2010), the Court requested the 
applicant to submit to it an expert medical opinion. In the opinion of the Court, the 
Swedish authorities should have ordered an expert medical opinion in the national 
proceedings.401 In T.I. v. the United Kingdom (2000), the Court requested the German 
authorities to provide information on its asylum law and its enforcement.402 This case 
concerned possible indirect refoulement from the United Kingdom via Germany to Sri 
Lanka. In other cases, the ECtHR invited the UNHCR to submit a written interven-
tion as a third party.403 
In sum, in a significant number of cases concerning the expulsion of asylum 
seekers the ECtHR has played a very active role in the gathering and verification of 
facts and circumstances. The Court has been increasingly active in this regard since 
the abolition of the Commission of Human Rights in 1998.404 
5.6.10  Time limits for the presentation of statements and evidence 
5.6.10.1 Time limits for the presentation of statements 
All relevant statements should, in principle, be made as early in the national proce-
dure as possible. Belated statements may cast serious doubt on the credibility of the 
applicant. Exceptions to this rule can be made where there is very persuasive evi-
dence that a person could not speak about a certain aspect earlier, for example, be-
cause of psychological problems as a result of torture or maltreatment in the past; it 
seems, however, that the ECtHR does not easily assume that this is the case. 
For example, in Cruz Varas v. Sweden (1991), the ECtHR found it problematic 
that the applicant had made statements to the national authorities about clandestine 
political activities and about torture by the Chilean police eighteen months after the 
first police interrogation following his request for asylum. The Court considered that 
                                                        
397 ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02, paras. 7, 8, 152. 
398 Ibidem, paras. 9, 77-116. 
399 ECtHR, Shamayev and others v. Georgia and Russia, 12 April 2005, Appl. No. 36378/02. 
400 Ibidem, para. 26, paras. 110-216. 
401 ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, paras. 23-25, 53. 
402 ECtHR, T.I. v. the United Kingdom, admissibility decision, 7 March 2000, Appl. No. 43844/98. 
403 See, for example, ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 2009, Appl. No. 30471/ 
08, para. 5. The Submission by UNHCR in the case of Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey (2009) is 
available at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4991ad9f2.html. 
404 Wouters 2009, p. 286. 
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this tardy presentation cast considerable doubt on his credibility. Importance was 
attached to the fact that the applicant had been legally represented at all stages during 
the national proceedings. In reaching its conclusion on the tardy statements, the 
Court did not (at least not explicitly) pay attention to the information provided in the 
medical reports and in the witness statements by Dr. Jacobsson, who had stated that 
victims of sexual torture are often so damaged that they are not prepared to talk 
about it even to their husbands or wives.405 
In a number of admissibility decisions, the late submission of statements on past 
torture has cast such serious doubt on the credibility of these statements that the 
claim has been considered to be manifestly ill-founded and, therefore, inadmissible. 
In Nasimi v. Sweden (2004), the Court considered: 
 
‘Moreover, although it recognises that it may be an ordeal to talk about experiences of torture, 
the Court is struck by the fact that the applicant did not make any specific allegations of tor-
ture until (…) more than a year after he applied for asylum, although he must have been aware 
that such information would be of importance to the immigration authorities.’406 
 
Nasimi had gone through four asylum application procedures in Sweden and in the 
second, third and fourth procedure he submitted statements from a psychologist and 
psychotherapist mentioning PTSD. The Court did not refer to this medical evidence 
when dealing with the question of whether the tardy statement on past torture could 
have possibly been explained by the applicant’s medical state. The Court made a 
similar consideration as the one quoted from Nasimi v. Sweden (2004) in Ovdienko v. 
Finland (2005).407 Similarly, in B. v. Sweden (2004), the Court noted that the applicant’s 
allegation that he had been tortured during his detention had not been made to the 
Swedish authorities; B. had given this information to the ECtHR. And in Tekdemir v. 
the Netherlands (2002), the Court noted that it had been only in the course of national 
proceedings following a second asylum application that the applicant had raised and 
relied on his kinship with the brothers A.X. and B.X., one of whom had obtained a 
residence permit and the other a favourable ruling in the proceedings on his asylum 
request. Only in the course of third national proceedings had the applicant claimed 
that he had been tortured in Turkey, a fact which he had not raised in his previous 
asylum requests.408 
In Hilal v. the UK (2001), the ECtHR made an exception to the general rule that 
all the relevant statements should be made as soon as possible. The applicant from 
Zanzibar had attended a pro forma interview with a UK immigration officer and one 
month later a full asylum interview had been held. According to the form used, the 
purpose of the pro forma interview was to take down the initial details of the asylum 
application. The applicant had failed to mention torture at this pro forma interview 
and mentioned it only in the second interview. This was held against him in the na-
                                                        
405 ECtHR, Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, para. 78. 
406 ECtHR, Nasimi v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 16 March 2004, Appl. No. 38865/02. 
407 ECtHR, Ovdienko v. Finland, 31 May 2005, Appl. No. 1383/04. 
408 ECtHR, B. v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 26 October 2004, Appl. No. 16578/03; ECtHR, Tekdemir 
v. the Netherlands, 1 October 2002, Appl. No. 49823/99. 
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tional proceedings. The Court ruled that in the light of the medical record from the 
hospital which had treated the applicant, submitted in the second national asylum 
procedure, his apparent failure to mention torture at his first immigration interview 
became less significant and his explanation to the special adjudicator that he did not 
think he had to give all the details until the full interview a month later became far 
less incredible.409 Taking into account that there had been only a one-month delay in 
presenting statements, that the pro forma interview in fact had served only to take 
down initial details of the asylum application and that there was a medical report 
from the hospital concerning the applicant and indicating past torture, the flexible ap-
proach adopted by the Court is very understandable. 
5.6.10.2  Time limits for the presentation of corroborating evidence 
The approach to evidence submitted to corroborate statements seems to be consider-
ably more flexible. The point in time at which evidentiary materials were submitted 
by the parties is, seen as a factor alone and in itself, not a relevant consideration, as 
long as the procedural time limit laid down in Rule 38 of the Rules of Court410 is ob-
served. Rule 38 stipulates that 
 
‘No written observations or other documents may be filed after the time-limit set by the Presi-
dent of the Chamber or the Judge Rapporteur, as the case may be, in accordance with these 
Rules. No written observations or other documents filed outside that time-limit or contrary to 
any practice direction issued under Rule 32 shall be included in the case file unless the Presi-
dent of the Chamber decides otherwise.’ 
 
This rule serves to protect the procedure before the Court in the sense that the judges 
of the Court and the parties to the case are able to read all the materials in the case 
file before closure of a certain phase of the proceedings (for example, before a hear-
ing takes place). An example of a case in which the Court excluded from the pro-
ceedings materials submitted by the applicant, because of late submission, is H.L.R. v. 
France (1997); the hearing by the Chamber of the Court sitting on the case took place 
on 25 November 1996. The Chamber decided not to include in the case file the 
documents lodged by the applicant on 24 October and 12, 20 and 22 November 
1996, since they were late and as the government had objected.411 
It seems that as long as Rule 38 is abided by, the precise moment of presentation 
of evidence is not, in itself and alone, a decisive factor. In Bahaddar v. Netherlands 
(1998), a case concerning a Bangladeshi asylum seeker, the ECtHR expressed that 
account must be taken of the fact that it may be difficult for asylum seekers to pro-
vide evidence within a short time frame:  
 
‘It should be borne in mind in this regard that in applications for recognition of refugee status 
it may be difficult, if not impossible, for the person concerned to supply evidence within a 
                                                        
409 ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 June 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, para. 64. 
410 Rules of Court, 1 April 2011, to be found at: http://www.echr.coe.int, Rules of Court. 
411 ECtHR, H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, Appl. No. 24573/94, para. 7. 
ECHR 
 
 
 
277 
short time, especially if – as in the present case – such evidence must be obtained from the 
country from which he or she claims to have fled. Accordingly, time-limits should not be so 
short, or applied so inflexibly, as to deny an applicant for recognition of refugee status a realis-
tic opportunity to prove his or her claim.’412 
 
In Cruz Varas v. Sweden (1991), both the applicant and the Swedish Government sub-
mitted large quantities of evidentiary materials to the ECtHR. The Court materially 
examined all this evidence and used it in order to assess the alleged Article 3-risk. It 
was obvious that the Court did not find it problematic that part of the evidence had 
not been made available earlier, during the national proceedings. From the judgment, 
it also became clear that, had the claimant presented additional evidence obtained 
after his expulsion to Chile, the Court would have taken it into account.413 
In Hilal v. the UK (2001), crucial evidence corroborating the flight narrative was 
submitted only in second (repeat) national asylum proceedings. It was only after his 
national appeal against the negative administrative decision had been rejected by the 
special adjudicator, in part because of a lack of documentary evidence, that Hilal had 
obtained and submitted a copy of his brother’s death certificate, a medical report 
about the circumstances of his brother’s death, as well as a summons from the police 
to his parents.414 Without devoting explicit consideration to the late submission of 
key corroborating evidence in the national proceedings, the ECtHR assessed the 
genuineness and evidentiary value of the documents. It attached great value to them 
as it found the applicant’s account credible on their basis and assumed an Article 3-
risk.415 
Said v. the Netherlands (2005) and Bader and Kanbor (2005) demonstrate the same 
flexible approach and reaffirm that the point in time at which evidentiary materials 
were submitted by the parties is, seen as a factor alone and in itself, not a relevant 
consideration. In Said v. the Netherlands (2005), crucial evidence was brought in by the 
applicant after the national proceedings had ended.416 The ECtHR attached signifi-
cant value to this evidence. In Bader and Kanbor (2005),417 the applicants submitted 
crucial evidence only after a third application for asylum. In this third procedure, they 
referred to a judgment delivered by the Regional Court of Aleppo, Syria, which stated 
that applicant Bader had been convicted in absentia of complicity in a murder and 
sentenced to death. The Aliens Appeals Board requested the applicants to submit the 
original judgment and other relevant documents in support of their application. The 
applicants submitted a certified copy of the judgment and also a summons requiring 
the first applicant to present himself before the court within ten days. An inquiry by 
the Swedish embassy in Syria showed the judgment to be authentic. The ECtHR at-
tached ‘particular weight’ to this evidence and nothing was said about the fact that 
                                                        
412 ECtHR, Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, 19 February 1998, Appl. No. 25894/94, para. 45. 
413 ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, paras. 26, 27, 29, 30, 
41-46, 77, 79. 
414 Ibidem, para. 18. 
415 Ibidem, para. 62. 
416 See ECtHR, Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02, paras. 28, 29, 51. 
417 ECtHR, Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, 8 November 2005, Appl. No. 13284/04, paras. 11-23,44.  
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key corroborating evidence had been submitted by the applicants to the national 
authorities only in a third asylum procedure.418 
We may conclude that tardy presentation of evidence, in itself and alone, is, in 
principle, not seen as problematic per se by the ECtHR. Late submission of evidence 
may, however, become problematic where the procedural conduct of the applicant – 
whether before the national authorities or before the ECtHR itself – exhibits other 
problematic aspects as well, such as late statements, numerous inconsistencies and 
discrepancies, vague statements, escalation of a flight narrative in the different stages 
of the proceedings, or submission of forged documents. The combination of such 
features may lead the Court to determine that evidence was produced at a very late 
moment, and this works to the detriment of the applicant. For example, in the admis-
sibility decision in Nasimi v. Sweden (2004), the ECtHR found a combination of the 
following features problematic: 
1. Late statements about torture in the past; 
2. Late mention of an important document; and 
3. Tardy presentation of this document. 
 
The Court noted the following about this:  
 
‘The Court is struck by the fact that the applicant did not make any specific allegations of tor-
ture until (…) more than a year after he first applied for asylum (…) Similarly, a copy of the 
purported revolutionary court summons was submitted to the Aliens Appeals Board in June 
2002, one year and eight months after its date of issuance. Notwithstanding the difficulties of 
obtaining a copy of such a document in Iran, the applicant has acknowledged, in his submis-
sions to the Court, that he was aware of the existence of the summons long before he received 
a copy of it. In these circumstances, the Court finds it remarkable that he apparently failed to 
even mention the document to the immigration authorities before June 2002. It notes, more-
over, that he submitted the summons at a time when he had already had two asylum applica-
tions rejected.’419 
 
Similarly, in the admissibility decision in Mahin Ayegh v. Sweden (2006), the Court 
found the documentary evidence submitted by the applicant (a summons application 
and three court summonses) problematic and insufficient to assume an Article 3-risk 
for three reasons: 
1. Its tardy presentation: the applicant had submitted the documents after his asy-
lum claim had been rejected by the administration and had been rejected on ap-
peal;  
2. Only copies of the documents were provided;420 and  
                                                        
418 According to Judge Myjer of the ECtHR in an interview (Myjer 2008, p. 490), in asylum cases funda-
mental rights are at stake and for that reason there is ‘less room for a formalistic approach with re-
gard to the acceptance of documents submitted by an applicant at a late moment’. 
419 ECtHR, Nasimi v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 16 March 2004, Appl. No. 38865/02. 
420 See about the question of probative value of copies of documents also however, ECtHR, Singh and 
Others v. Belgium, 2 October 2012, Appl. No 33210/11. In that case, the applicants submitted copies 
→ 
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3. The respondent government had established that the forms used for the 
documents could have been easily obtained in the Iranian courts for a fee.421 
 
In the admissibility decision of Elezaj and others v. Sweden (2007), the Court found the 
combination of a tardy production of documentary evidence and a lack of detailed 
information in the statements (vague statements) problematic.422 
A final example of a case in which a combination of circumstances, including late 
presentation of evidence in the national proceedings, were found problematic is A.A. 
and Others v. Sweden (2012). The first applicant in that case feared that she would run 
an Article 3 ECHR-risk if returned to Yemen because she feared violence from her 
husband, while nobody would be able to protect her against this. To corroborate this 
fear, she presented, inter alia, a record of a Yemeni court according to which her hus-
band had requested that the applicants be returned home. Paradoxically, the Court 
concluded in that case that this crucial evidence was presented too early, that is, too 
soon (within two weeks) after the date of its issuance, and, at the same time, too late 
in the national proceedings, that is, after the final decision by the Migration Court of 
Appeal, and was invoked as a new ground in a request for reconsideration of the case. 
An important factor for the Court was that the applicants had not presented any 
information about how they obtained this document within a few weeks of its issu-
ance. Finally, the Court made clear that the content of the Yemeni court record did 
not logically fit with the flight narrative: the applicants had not offered any explana-
tion as to why the first applicant’s husband would wait until almost three years after 
the first and fifth applicant’s departure from Yemen before reporting their absence to 
the court if he was seriously offended by their departure.423 
5.6.11  Point in time for the risk assessment 
In cases where the applicant has not yet been expelled from the respondent State at 
the moment of examination by the ECtHR, the Court assesses the existence of the 
alleged Article 3-risk on an ex nunc basis, which means that the material point in time 
is the moment at which the Court examines the case. The assessment of the risk is 
made on the basis of all the information available at the moment of consideration of 
the case by the ECtHR.424 
                                                        
of a number of pages from Afghan passports and copies of UNHCR attestations. The ECtHR con-
cluded that the national Belgian authorities should have made further inquiries with the UNHCR.  
421 ECtHR, Mahin Ayegh v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 7 November 2006, Appl. No. 4701/05. 
422 ECtHR, Elezaj and others v. Sweden, 20 September 2007, Appl. No. 17654/05. 
423  ECtHR, A.A. and Others v. Sweden, 28 June 2012, Appl. No. 14499/09, para. 81. 
424 This is a steady consideration reiterated in many judgments and decisions. See, for some examples, 
ECtHR, Chahal v. United Kingdom, 15 November 1996, Appl. No. 22414/93, para. 86; ECtHR, Ahmed 
v. Austria, 17 December 1996, Appl. No. 25964/94, para. 43; ECtHR, Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 
2005, Appl. No. 2345/02, para. 48; ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. 
No. 1948/04, para. 136; ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, Appl. No. 37201/06, para. 133; 
ECtHR, NA. v. UK, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, para. 112; ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 
June 2008, Appl. Nos. 8319/07 and 11449/07, para. 215. 
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In cases where deportation from the respondent State has already been effectu-
ated, the point in time for the consideration by the Court remains the moment of that 
deportation, but the Court may, and actually does, have regard to information that 
came to light subsequent to the removal. Facts and circumstances which become 
known after the removal are relevant only in that they may confirm or refute what the 
State party knew or ought to have known at the time of removal.425 
5.7 Final concluding remarks 
The large number of States parties to the ECHR, the long history and the impressive 
body of binding case law of the ECtHR make the ECHR a very important human 
rights treaty in Europe. It is also a very important instrument in international and 
European asylum law. The ECHR does not contain a right to asylum, but the ECtHR 
has developed a prohibition on refoulement under Article 3. As a result, the (intended) 
expulsion of a failed asylum seeker is in breach of Article 3 and, therefore, unlawful 
where substantial grounds have been shown for believing that upon expulsion there 
is a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3.  
In asylum cases under Article 3 ECHR, the notion of an effective national 
remedy in the sense of Articles 13 and 35, first paragraph, ECHR requires that na-
tional asylum courts undertake independent and rigorous scrutiny. This means a se-
rious, individual, case-specific, factual examination on the merits of the claim, based 
on a correct standard and burden of proof. In assessing whether national proceedings 
were adequate, the ECtHR takes into consideration whether an applicant was heard 
(several times), whether he or she was assisted by appointed counsel, whether the 
national authorities had the benefit of seeing, hearing and questioning the applicant in 
person, and of assessing directly the information and documents submitted by him or 
her, before deciding the case. The ECtHR also takes into account whether the assess-
ment of the national authorities was sufficiently supported by both national materials 
as well as materials originating from other reliable and objective sources. The cases of 
R.C. v. Sweden (2010) and Singh and Others v. Belgium (2012) have clearly illustrated that 
the national authorities, including the reviewing courts, must carefully and seriously 
examine evidence submitted by applicants. When and if such evidence leaves ques-
tions unanswered, the national authorities, including the reviewing courts, must try to 
find answers by applying investigative powers in order to further clarify the facts. 
This is particularly necessary when it is rather easy to make further inquiries, as was 
the case in Singh and Others v. Belgium, where the national authorities could easily have 
made inquiries with the UNHCR.  
                                                        
425 See, for example, the cases of ECtHR, Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 
15576/89, para. 76; ECtHR, Vilvarajah and others v. United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, Appl. Nos. 
13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87, 13448/87, para. 107; ECtHR, Ahmed v. Austria, 17 De-
cember 1996, Appl. No. 25964/94, para. 43; ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 
2005, Appl. Nos. 46827/99, 46951/99, para. 69; ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 Sep-
tember 2009, Appl. No. 30471/08, para. 76. 
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The requirement of an independent and rigorous scrutiny also implies that con-
stant national jurisprudential lines may not normally bar an individual, case-specific 
and factual examination on the merits by the national authorities. 
The requirement of an independent and rigorous scrutiny places direct restric-
tions on national procedural autonomy. It follows from Bahaddar v. the Netherlands 
(1998) and Jabari v. Turkey (2000) that the automatic and mechanical application of 
procedural rules, for example, rules on times limits, barring an examination of the 
merits of the asylum claim, is at variance with the requirement to conduct an inde-
pendent and rigorous scrutiny of the claim. Asylum seekers must normally comply 
with procedural rules but when these rules are not complied with, regard must be had 
to the reasons for non-compliance, and the question must be raised whether the par-
ticular procedural rule is not too strict, given the difficult evidentiary position of asy-
lum seekers. There should always be room for flexibility in applying national proce-
dural rules. 
Finally, independent and rigorous scrutiny also means that the correct evidentiary 
standards and principles are to be applied by the national court in assessing the 
Article 3-risk. As was shown above, it follows from M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (2011) 
that national courts are not allowed to apply, for example, a stricter standard of proof 
than the one applied by the ECtHR. For national courts to comply with the re-
quirement of independent and rigorous scrutiny it is, therefore, essential to know 
exactly what these evidentiary standards are.  
Article 6, first paragraph, ECHR is relevant for national asylum courts for two 
reasons. First, since Kudla v. Poland (2000), the ECtHR has held that the requirements 
of Article 13 should be considered as ‘reinforcing’ those of Article 6(1), so that the 
requirements developed under Article 6(1) in fact also form part of Article 13. 
Second, the case law of the ECtHR under Article 6(1) defines to a large extent the 
content of Article 47, paragraph 2, of the EU Charter on Fundamental Rights, con-
taining the right to a fair hearing (see Chapter 6); Article 47, paragraph 2, of the EU 
Charter will almost always be relevant for asylum cases. 
Article 6, first paragraph, ECHR requires that administrative decisions can gen-
erally be challenged before a tribunal having full jurisdiction on points of law and 
points of fact. Full jurisdiction includes the power to make an independent deter-
mination of the disputed facts and of the credibility of a claimant, and the power to 
critically question advisory information used by the administrative decision maker or 
the other party. Article 6, first paragraph, also places national courts under a duty to 
conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence adduced 
by the parties. Where no proper examination was carried out by the national court, 
either because it did not properly examine party evidence or because it did not use its 
investigative powers in order to determine disputed facts independently, this may lead 
the ECtHR to conclude that the national proceedings were unfair and in violation of 
Article 6, first paragraph. In addition, Article 6, first paragraph, requires the parties to 
be treated equally with regard to the admission, exclusion and evaluation of the evi-
dence. The requirements of adversariality and equality of arms are not absolute, 
though. Non-disclosure of evidentiary materials may be justified if this is strictly nec-
essary to preserve the fundamental rights of another individual or to safeguard an im-
portant public interest, such as the protection of national security. A weighing of in-
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terests then needs to be made: the interest of the particular party to have knowledge 
of the evidence must be weighed against the interest of the other party to keep this 
evidence secret, for example, in order to protect the security of certain other persons, 
sources of information or to protect national security. If a national court allows secret 
evidence into the proceedings and accepts that this evidence has not been disclosed 
to the other party, it must follow special procedures to counterbalance these difficul-
ties. This means, at least, that the national court itself examines the secret evidence, 
and that, if possible, takes additional counterbalancing measures. 
Limited instead of full jurisdiction of national courts is, exceptionally, permitted 
under Article 6, first paragraph, when certain specific conditions have been met. First, 
the particular subject matter of the proceedings is of importance. In cases where the 
subject-matter came within the classical exercise of administrative discretion, such as 
land planning, limited judicial scrutiny at national level was found permissible by the 
ECtHR. One may also think of cases in which complex technical assessments are 
made and of cases where important diplomatic issues are at stake. In those cases 
where the ECtHR found limited national court jurisdiction acceptable, other condi-
tions had also been met. For example, the national proceedings had centered on 
points of law and not facts, the preceding administrative procedure(s) had been gov-
erned by many Article 6-safeguards and the national judicial scrutiny review, although 
limited, had been, nevertheless, meaningful in the sense that it had entailed real 
scrutiny along the procedural points raised by the applicant. 
I have argued that it would seem more logical to place Article 3-cases concerning 
the expulsion of asylum seekers in the category of cases that require full judicial 
scrutiny on points of fact and points of law. The reasons are that as opposed to, for 
example, land planning cases, in asylum cases, the life and safety of the individual is at 
stake, Article 3 is a fundamental, absolute and non-derogable right, most asylum cases 
will not be of a highly technical nature, and in only a very limited number of cases 
will important diplomatic issues be at stake. Taking into account that the require-
ments of Article 6, first paragraph, reinforce those of Article 13, the requirement of 
full jurisdiction on points of fact and points of law following from the Zumtobel 
doctrine may be regarded as reinforcing the requirement from Article 13 that in 
expulsion cases an individual, case-specific, factual examination on the merits of the 
claim has to take place.  
In part 2 of this chapter, section 5.6, I looked at the assessment performed by the 
ECtHR in Article 3-cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, with the help 
of the eleven aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny. Interestingly, the ECtHR uses 
the term ‘rigorous scrutiny’ to describe the assessment it performs. As Articles 3, 13 
and 35, first paragraph ECHR require the national asylum court to perform a ‘rigor-
ous scrutiny’ as well, the conclusion must be that the ECtHR uses identical terms to 
qualify the assessment it carries out and the assessment to be performed by the 
national remedy. The investigation has demonstrated that the ECtHR has developed 
concrete principles with regard to each of the eleven aspects of evidence and judicial 
scrutiny. The standard of proof is that substantial grounds have to be shown for 
believing that upon expulsion there is a real risk of treatment contrary to Article 3. 
The level of risk required is a real, personal, foreseeable risk exceeding the mere pos-
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sibility of being subjected to proscribed ill-treatment. The risk does not need to be 
certain or highly probable. 
The burden of proof rests initially with the applicant, who has to make an argua-
ble claim. When this arguability test is met, the burden of proof shifts towards the 
State. At that moment, for national authorities, including the courts, the obligations 
summed up at the end of Part 1 come into play. These authorities have to conduct 
active investigations to establish whether the application is well-founded or ill-found-
ed. 
Relevant facts and circumstances are all possible personal circumstances, and, in 
addition to these, the general human rights situation in the country of origin is 
relevant. Many concrete examples of such circumstances were given above. The per-
sonal facts must be assessed in the light of the general situation in the country of 
origin. From the case law of the ECtHR it becomes clear that it is normally a com-
bination of facts and circumstances, and not a single fact, which establish substantial 
grounds for assuming a real Article 3-risk. 
As to the required level of individualisation, the investigation has demonstrated 
that, in general, the graver the general human rights situation in the country of origin, 
the more significant this situation becomes in assessing the risk and the less individual 
facts and circumstances, and evidence corroborating individual facts and circum-
stances, are required. In accordance with this principle, we can distinguish three cate-
gories of cases: 
-  Cases in which there is extreme general violence in the country of origin, to such 
an extent that a real risk of ill-treatment would occur simply by virtue of an indi-
vidual being exposed to such violence on return; 
-  Cases in which the applicant belongs to a group of persons systematically ex-
posed to a practice of ill-treatment. This very fact constitutes a special distin-
guishing feature, so that no further special distinguishing features are required;  
-  Cases in which there is no extreme general violence in the country of origin and 
the applicant does not belong to a specially targeted group. In such cases, the 
general situation in the country of origin does play a more or less important role, 
but there must also be special personal facts and circumstances (special distin-
guishing features) which establish that this very applicant runs a risk. 
 
When it comes to determining the facts, and, as part of this, assessing the credibility 
of the asylum claim, the ECtHR tries to strike a difficult balance. In a number of 
admissibility decisions, it has relied on the credibility assessment made by the respon-
dent State. However, in a significant number of final judgments, and in some admis-
sibility decisions the Court has made a completely independent determination of the 
facts, including an assessment of the credibility of the claimant’s statements. Three 
circumstances trigger the Court in particular to proceed to an independent determina-
tion of the facts and apply investigative powers to that end. These are: insufficient 
national proceedings (for example, evidence was overlooked or not taken seriously, 
or the assessment made at national level was insufficiently supported by relevant 
country of origin materials); new facts, circumstances and developments, including 
evidence thereof, or new information which casts doubt on the information relied on 
by the government; and disrespect for the absolute nature of Article 3, for example, a 
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weighing of national security considerations against the Article 3-risk, or an incorrect 
application of the standard of proof or another evidentiary standard, for example, a 
too strict standard of proof or a too strict standard on individualisation. 
Once the Court has decided to determine the facts fully independently, it actively 
gathers and checks information. In assessing the credibility of the claimant’s 
statements, the ECtHR evaluates the ‘general credibility’. This means that the state-
ments made by the asylum seeker may contain some incredible or not entirely credi-
ble aspects, but that the core aspects – the basic story – must be credible, that is, con-
sistent with country of origin information, consistent throughout the (national and 
international) proceedings, brought forward in a timely manner and corroborated by 
(some) evidence. 
The ECtHR, in principle, admits to the proceedings every form of evidence 
capable of proving an Article 3-risk, for example, documentary evidence from State 
organs stating that a person is being sought, or is wanted (arrest warrants, police re-
ports), medical reports corroborating statements of past-ill treatment, written or oral 
statements made by family members or other witnesses, and reports from various 
sources containing the country of origin information. It seems that four main sources 
of country of origin information used by the ECtHR can be identified: information 
compiled by agencies of the United Nations and the Council of Europe; information 
compiled by States; information from independent international human rights protec-
tion organisations and information from the media and other sources. All evidentiary 
materials, whether presented by the parties or obtained proprio motu, are considered 
materially by the Court. The Court normally requires that submitted documentary or 
other evidence has a certain direct bearing on the applicant’s personal situation. What 
generally needs to be substantiated is the core of the flight narrative, the basic story. 
The approach of the Court is strict. The general principle that account should be 
taken of the difficult evidentiary position of asylum seekers is not readily applied in 
concreto. 
The value and persuasiveness of evidence is determined by the authenticity of 
submitted documents, the specificity, comprehensiveness and consistency of the in-
formation contained in evidentiary materials or given by witnesses, the independence, 
reliability and objectiveness of the source and the authority and reputation of the 
author. In a number of cases, the ECtHR has attached considerable evidentiary 
weight to medical reports submitted by applicants to corroborate past torture or ill-
treatment. In assessing the evidentiary value of the country of origin information, the 
ECtHR gives consideration to its source, in particular its independence, reliability and 
objectivity, and the authority and reputation of the author of reports, the seriousness 
of the investigations by means of which the reports were compiled, the consistency 
of the conclusions, the corroboration by other sources, the presence and the report-
ing capacities of the author in the country in question are all taken into account. The 
precise evidentiary weight accorded to the country of origin information is also de-
termined by its specific content. The more the information contained in it is couched 
in terms of Article 3, the more value the Court attaches to it. Reports by UN agencies 
and by States are considered to be important sources, because UN agencies have di-
rect access to the authorities of the country of destination as well as the ability to car-
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ry out on-site inspections, and States have the ability to gather information through 
their diplomatic missions.  
In its proceedings, the ECtHR adheres to the principle of adversarial proceed-
ings. The relevant Rules of Procedure stipulate that, at both the admissibility stage 
and the merits stage, both parties to the case are allowed to submit their observations 
and evidence and to react to the observations and evidence lodged by the other party. 
The structure of the judgments reflects the principle of adversariality. The ECtHR 
does not have a problem with the submission of new evidence which was not 
presented in the national proceedings, which distinguishes it from the HRC and the 
ComAT, who do not allow the complainant or the respondent State to submit new 
statements and evidence which were not presented in the national proceedings. 
Statements have to be made as early as possible and their late presentation may 
cast serious doubts on credibility. To the contrary, the precise moment of presenta-
tion of evidence is not, in itself and alone, a decisive factor. Late submission of evi-
dence may, however, become problematic in combination with other problematic 
features, such as late statements, numerous inconsistencies and discrepancies, vague 
statements, escalation of a flight narrative in the different stages of the proceedings, 
or submission of forged documents. With regard to the point in time for the risk 
assessment, it was concluded that the main rule, applying in cases where the applicant 
has not yet been expelled at the moment of examination by the ECtHR, is that the 
Court assesses the existence of the alleged Article 3-risk on an ex nunc basis. The as-
sessment of the risk is made on the basis of all the information available at the 
moment of consideration of the case by the ECtHR. In cases where deportation from 
the respondent State has already been effectuated, the point in time for the considera-
tion by the Court is the moment of that deportation, but the Court may, and actually 
does, have regard to information that becomes known subsequent to the deportation. 
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Chapter 6: European Union1 asylum law 
6.1  Introduction 
6.1.1  Brief history of the EU 
In 1950, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands founded 
the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC)2 in an attempt to unite European 
countries economically and politically in order to secure lasting peace after the 
Second World War.  
In an attempt to strengthen the economic ties, the Treaty establishing the Euro-
pean Economic Community (TEC, Treaty of Rome ) and the Treaty establishing the 
European Atomic Energy Community (TEAEC) were signed in 1957.3 On 1 January 
1973, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom joined the EEC. In 1981, Greece 
became the 10th member and Spain and Portugal followed in 1986. In 1987 the Sing-
le European Act (SEA)4 was signed. This treaty provided the basis for a vast six-year 
programme aimed at creating a Single European Market of ‘four freedoms’ of move-
ment of goods, services, people and money.  
In 1992, the Member States concluded the Treaty on the European Union (TEU, 
Treaty of Maastricht).5 This treaty established the European Union (EU) that supple-
mented the Community and consisted of the same Member States. The EU was a 
new legal structure consisting of three ‘pillars’, the first pillar being the European 
Community as established by the TEC, the two other – intergovernmental – pillars 
concerning ‘security and foreign policy’ and ‘justice and home affairs’. The Treaty of 
Maastricht also added, as a new feature, a provision on citizenship of the Union and 
created a monetary union. Austria, Finland and Sweden became Member States in 
1995. On 1 May 1999, the Treaty of Amsterdam,6 signed on 2 October 1997, entered 
into force. This treaty radically changed the legal nature of EU asylum law (see sec-
tion 6.1.4 below on the genesis of EU asylum law.) It moved the area of asylum and 
immigration from the Union’s third pillar – the intergovernmental co-operation 
among the Member States in the area of justice and home affairs – to the first pillar, 
                                                        
1 For consistency and readability throughout, the terms European Union (EU) and EU law will be 
used, also when referring to provisions and judgments dating from the time when the EU was still 
the EEC or EC. There is much literature on the EU and EU law; very informative are Craig & De 
Búrca 2008; much information on the EU can also be found on the internet, for example http:// 
europa.eu/abc/history/index_en.htm, where a detailed description of the history of the EU can be 
found. Also informative is http://www.minbuza.nl/ecer, the site of the EU Expertise Centre of the 
Dutch Ministry of Foreign Affairs. It contains frequent updates on important developments in the 
field of the EU and EU law. 
2 Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (1951), see: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/ 
en/treaties/index.htm.  
3 See http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/index.htm.  
4 Single European Act (1986), OJ of the EU L 169 of 29 June 1987. 
5 Treaty on European Union (1992), OJ of the EU C 191 of 29 July 1992. 
6 Treaty of Amsterdam amending the treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing the Euro-
pean Communities and related acts, OJ of the EU C 340, 10 November 1997. 
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hence to the Treaty on European Community. As a result, EU asylum law was no 
longer intergovernmental, but instead became Union law. This made the issuing of 
binding EU legislation on asylum possible, together with judicial control asserted by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU or Court, see sections 6.1.2, 
6.1.4.4). On 1 May 2004, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, 
Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia joined the EU and Cyprus and Malta also became 
members. Bulgaria and Romania joined on 1 January 2007.  
On 13 December 2007, the 27 EU Member States signed the Treaty of Lisbon.7 
It entered into force on 1 December 2009 and amended the TEU (Treaty of Maas-
tricht, 1992) and the TEC (Treaty of Rome, 1957). The TEC was renamed the Treaty 
on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). The Treaty of Lisbon abolished 
the pillar structure and, importantly, made the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the 
EU legally binding, with the same status as the two treaties. In section 6.1.3 below 
more will be said on the EU’s Charter of Fundamental Rights.  
At the time of completion of this research, Croatia, the Former Yugoslav Re-
public of Macedonia and Turkey were candidates for future membership of the EU. 
6.1.2  EU law and its supervisory mechanisms 
Although established by a treaty, an intergovernmental instrument of international 
law, the EU presents a new legal order which is different and independent from inter-
national law.8 To distinguish EU law from common international law, it has been 
named ‘supranational’. A basic tenet of this supranational nature is that EU law has 
precedence over all national law. This is called the principle of supremacy. It means 
that EU law applies in the Member States on its own terms, not subject to conditions 
set out by national law, and that national law contrary to primary or secondary EU 
law does not apply.9 This principle of supremacy, developed in the case law of the 
CJEU, has also been laid down in the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference 
on the Treaty of Lisbon, stating:  
 
‘The Conference recalls that, in accordance with well settled case law of the CJEU, the Treaties 
and the law adopted by the Union on the basis of the Treaties have primacy over the law of 
Member States, under the conditions laid down by the said case law.’10 
 
Three main sources of EU law can be distinguished. They are presented below in 
hierarchical order: 
- Primary EU law: the TEU, the TFEU and the Charter; 
- General principles of EU law, as well as international agreements to which the 
EU is party;  
                                                        
7 Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European 
Community, signed on 13 December 2007, entry into force 1 December 2009, OJ of the EU C 306, 
17 December 2007. 
8 CJEU, Van Gend en Loos, 5 February 1963, C-26/62, paras. 1-12. 
9 CJEU, Costa ENEL, 15 juni 1964, C-6/64. 
10 Declaration 17 of the Final Act of the Intergovernmental Conference on the Treaty of Lisbon. 
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- Secondary EU law, laid down in regulations, directives and decisions.11 
General principles of EU law are of fundamental importance in the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU and serve a number of purposes. They may be invoked as an aid to inter-
pretation of EU law, as a means to challenge action by a Member State performed in 
the context of a right or obligation arising from EU law or to challenge Union action. 
Many different general principles of EU law can be identified. For this research two 
of them are of particular importance: the general principle of effective judicial 
protection and the general principle of respect for human rights.12 
Most secondary EU law has been laid down in regulations and directives. Both 
regulations and directives are binding and not addressed at specific individuals. Regu-
lations need not and may not be transposed by the Member States into national legis-
lation and have legal effect independently of any national law.13 Directives require 
transposition into national law. They are binding as to the result to be achieved, but 
leave to the Member States the choice of form and methods.14 
The EU system of judicial protection is based on the principle that all individuals 
are entitled to effective judicial protection of the rights they derive from the legal 
order of the European Union.15 Judicial protection is provided for by a system of 
supervision carried out by both the national courts of the EU Member States and the 
CJEU. Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009, the 
term ‘CJEU’ has comprised three institutions: the Court of Justice, the General 
Court, and the EU Civil Service Tribunal.16 The CJEU was set up under the ECSC 
Treaty in 1952. Its job is to make sure that ‘in the interpretation and application of 
the Treaties the law is observed’.17 On the Court’s website a useful brief description 
of the Court’s main tasks can be found. The Court is composed of one judge per 
Member State, so that all 27 of the EU’s national legal systems are represented.18 For 
the sake of efficiency, however, the Court rarely sits as the full court of 27. It usually 
sits as a ‘Grand Chamber’ of 13 judges or in chambers of five or three judges.19 The 
judges have the qualifications or competence needed for appointment to the highest 
judicial positions in their home countries. They are appointed by joint agreement 
between the governments of the EU Member States. Each is appointed for a term of 
                                                        
11 Article 288 TFEU. 
12 See for a more extensive description and analysis of the (development of the) general principles of 
EU law Bernitz & Nergelius 2000, Tridimas 2006, Steiner & Woods 2009: Chapter 6: The General 
Principles of Law. 
13 See Article 288 TFEU. 
14 See Article 288 TFEU. 
15 CJEU, Unión de Pequeños Agricultores v. Council, 25 July 2002, C-50/00 P, para. 39. 
16 Article 19, para. 1, TEU states: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall include the Court 
of Justice, the General Court and specialised courts.’ 
17 Article 19, para. 1, TEU: ‘It shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the 
law is observed.’ 
18 Article 19, para. 2, TEU stipulates that the Court shall consist of one judge from each Member State. 
19 Article 251 TFEU states: ‘The Court of Justice shall sit in chambers or in a Grand Chamber, in ac-
cordance with the rules laid down for that purpose in the Statute of the CJEU. When provided for 
in the Statute, the Court of Justice may also sit as a full Court.’ 
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six years, which may be renewed.20 The Court is assisted by eight Advocates-General 
(A-Gs). The task of these A-Gs is to make, in open court, reasoned submissions on 
cases which, in accordance with the Statute of the Court, require their involvement.21 
Article 19 TEU lists the core tasks of the Court: 
a)  Rule on actions brought by a Member State, an institution or a natural or legal 
person; 
b)  Give preliminary rulings, at the request of courts or tribunals of the Member 
States, on the interpretation of Union law or the validity of acts adopted by the 
institutions; 
(c)  Rule in other cases provided for in the Treaties.22 
 
Articles 251-281 TFEU lay down further detailed rules for the performance of these 
tasks. For the purposes of this study it suffices to describe in some detail the Court’s 
task to give preliminary rulings at the request of national courts of the Member States 
on the interpretation or validity of Union law. The national courts play a very impor-
tant role in guaranteeing judicial supervision over the application of EU law. They are 
obliged to provide the legal protection which individuals derive from the rules of EU 
law and to ensure that those rules are fully effective.23 When applying EU law, na-
tional courts in fact function as the local branches of the EU judiciary.24 In national 
judicial proceedings, questions of interpretation of EU primary or secondary asylum 
law may arise, as well as questions concerning the validity of secondary EU law. Pur-
suant to Article 267 TFEU, national lower courts may, and upper courts must, refer 
those issues for a preliminary ruling to the CJEU.25 The ruling of the CJEU is ‘pre-
liminary’, meaning that the Court does not decide in a definitive way on the case it-
self, but only answers the question of EU law posed by the national court. The refer-
                                                        
20 Article 253 TFEU states: ‘The Judges and Advocates-General of the Court of Justice shall be chosen 
from persons whose independence is beyond doubt and who possess the qualifications required for 
appointment to the highest judicial offices in their respective countries or who are jurisconsults of 
recognised competence; they shall be appointed by common accord of the governments of the 
Member States for a term of six years, after consultation of the panel provided for in Article 255.’ 
21 Article 252 TFEU. 
22 Article 19, para. 3, TEU. 
23 See, for example, CJEU, Pfeiffer and others, 5 October 2004, joined cases C-397/01 to C-403/1, para. 
111, CJEU, Impact, 15 April 2008, C-268/06, para. 42, CJEU, Kücükdeveci, 19 January 2010, C-555/07, 
para. 45, CJEU, Günter Fuss, 14 October 2010, C-243/09, para. 63. 
24 See, for example, CJEU, Köbler, 30 September 2003, C-224/01, para. 33: ‘In the light of the essential 
role played by the judiciary in the protection of the rights derived by individuals from Community 
rules (…).’ 
25 Article 267 TFEU stipulates: ‘The Court of Justice of the Euopean Union shall have jurisdiction to 
give preliminary rulings concerning: (a) the interpretation of the Treaties; (b) the validity and inter-
pretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union. Where such a question 
is raised before any court or tribunal of a Member State, that court or tribunal may, if it considers 
that a decision on the question is necessary to enable it to give judgment, request the Court to give a 
ruling thereon. Where any such question is raised in a case pending before a court or tribunal of a 
Member State against whose decisions there is no judicial remedy under national law, that court or 
tribunal shall bring the matter before the Court. If such a question is raised in a case pending before 
a court or tribunal of a Member State with regard to a person in custody, the Court of Justice of the 
European Union shall act with the minimum of delay.’ 
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ring national court subsequently has to apply the EU rule as interpreted by the CJEU 
to the case, guided by the preliminary ruling on the matter, and pass judgment. 
The CJEU’s Rules of Procedure envisage several special procedures under which 
preliminary questions are answered more rapidly. These are: 1) the simplified proce-
dure of Article 104(3) of the Rules of Procedure, applicable where the question has 
been answered earlier by the Court and also where the question has not yet been 
answered by the Court, but there is no doubt about the answer; 2) the urgent proce-
dure of Article 104b, in cases of extraordinary haste.26 The urgent procedure has al-
ready been applied by the CJEU in different cases, including a case concerning migra-
tion and the detention of illegal migrants, the case of Kadzoev (2009).27 In that case, 
the CJEU granted the national court’s request to issue a preliminary ruling under the 
urgent procedure of Article 104b in view of, mainly, the fact that Kadzoev had been 
detained.28 
6.1.3  EU human rights law  
6.1.3.1  Human rights as general principles 
Human rights have gradually obtained a more and more prominent place within the 
legal order of the EU. For the purposes of this study a brief analysis of this develop-
ment suffices; for a more comprehensive analysis I refer to Alston (2000), Jacobs 
(2001), Craig & DeBúrca (2008) and Steiner & Woods (2009). The original three 
European Community Treaties contained no provisions concerning the protection of 
human rights. As of 1969, however, the CJEU gradually developed an approach un-
der which general principles of EC law included the protection of fundamental rights. 
The first case in which this happened was Stauder v. City of Ulm (1969).29 This case was 
followed in 1970 by Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970).30 In both cases the Court 
considered that 
 
‘Respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of Community 
law protected by the Court of Justice.’31 
 
In the case of Nold (1974),32 the CJEU further clarified that international human 
rights agreements are one of the two main sources of inspiration for the general prin-
                                                        
26 The Court’s Rules of Procedure may be found at: http://curia.europa.eu/jcms/upload/docs/ap-
plication/pdf/2011-07/rp_cjue_en.pdf, last visited 21 December 2012; the original version of 19 
June 1991 may be found in the OJ of the EU L 176 of 4 July 1991, p. 7, and the OJ of the EU L 383 of 
29 December 1992 (corrigenda). A number of amendments were subsequently made to it. They are 
all mentioned on the listed site, including their publications. 
27 CJEU, Kadzoev, 30 November 2009, C-357/09 PPU. 
28 CJEU, Kadzoev, 30 November 2009, C-357/09 PPU, paras. 31-33. 
29 CJEU, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 12 November 1969, C-29/69. 
30 CJEU, Internationale Handelsgesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorrattstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 17 Decem-
ber 1970, C-11/70. 
31 CJEU, Stauder v. City of Ulm, 12 November 1969, C-29/69, para. 7, and CJEU, Internationale Handels-
gesellschaft v. Einfuhr und Vorrattstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel, 17 December 1970, C-11/70, para. 4. 
32 CJEU, Nold v. Commission, 14 May 1974, C-4/73. 
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ciples of EU law (the other main source being the common national constitutional 
traditions).33 The CJEU has consistently treated the ECHR as a special source of 
inspiration for the general principles of EU law and has often drawn on it in its case 
law.34 In a number of cases, the Court has also drawn explicitly on other human 
rights instruments, particularly the ICCPR.35 
This jurisprudence was codified in the Treaty of Maastricht (1992). The binding 
role of the human rights protected in the ECHR for EU law was now explicitly rec-
ognised in the EU Treaty itself, as the new Article F(2) stipulated that 
 
‘The Union shall respect fundamental rights as guaranteed by the ECHR and as they result 
from the constitutional traditions common to the Member States, as general principles of 
Community Law.’36 
 
The inclusion of this provision was deemed necessary as it became clearer, with the 
expansion of EU powers and tasks to areas in which fundamental rights play an im-
portant role,37 that the originally economic focus of the EU did not exclude funda-
mental human rights from being affected by EU action.38 With the Treaty of Amster-
dam (1999), a new Article 6, first paragraph, was added to the EU Treaty, which 
stated that respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms is a founding prin-
ciple for the Union and a principle common to the Member States.39 
6.1.3.2  The Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU 
In 2000, the Member States concluded the Treaty of Nice40 and proclaimed a ‘Char-
ter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union’ (the EU Charter).41 In this way 
the EU created its own set of human rights. Many other authors have commented 
                                                        
33 CJEU, Nold v. Commission, 14 May 1974, C-4/73, para. 13. 
34 Some examples of judgments in which this special position of the ECHR is stressed are: CJEU, 
Connolly v. Commission, 6 March 2001, C-274/99, para. 37 P; CJEU, Roquette Frères, 22 October 2002, 
C-94/00, para. 25; CJEU, Omega, 14 October 2004, C-36/02, para. 33. 
35 Examples of cases in which the CJEU explicitly ruled that the ICCPR is one of the international 
instruments for the protection of human rights of which the Court takes account in applying the 
general principles of Union law are: CJEU, Dzodzi, 18 October 1990, C-197/89, para. 68, and Grant, 
17 February 1998, C-249/96, para.44. In Grant, however, the CJEU did not follow the interpretation 
of the term discrimination given by the HRC for a number of reasons, one of them being that the 
HRC is not a judicial institution. See for a good example of a judgment in which the CJEU stressed 
the special character of the ECHR, but at the same time also drew on the ICCPR and the Inter-
national Convention on the Rights of the Child: CJEU, European Parliament v. Council, 27 June 2006, 
C-540/03, paras. 35-37, 54-57.  
36 Article 6(1) Treaty on European Union (1992), OJ of the EU C 191 of 29 July 1992. 
37 The Treaty of Maastricht added two pillars of intergovernmental co-operation to the EU, con-
cerning ‘security and foreign policy’ and ‘justice and home affairs’. See Barkhuysen & Bos 2011, p. 4. 
38 Barkhuysen & Bos 2011, p. 4. 
39 Article 6(1) Treaty of Amsterdam amending the treaty on European Union, the treaties establishing 
the European Communities and related acts, OJ of the EU C 340, 10 November 1997. 
40  Treaty of Nice, OJ C 80, 10 March 2001. 
41 OJ of the EU 2000, C-364/1. Certain parts of this version were amended subsequently, the version 
now in force can be found in OJ of the EU 2010, C-83/02. 
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extensively on the history, legal status, scope and content of the Charter, as well as its 
relationship to the ECHR and its added value. I refer to their works here.42 For the 
purposes of this study it will suffice to mention the main stages of the Charter’s 
history and the most important key features before shifting the focus to the signifi-
cance of the Charter for the asylum context. 
As a result of disagreement among the Member States, the Charter was not, in 
2000, given legally binding effect within the EU order. It was, subsequently, intro-
duced as a ‘bill of rights’ into the draft Constitutional Treaty, which was proposed to 
the Member States for ratification in 2004, but that treaty proposal failed to gather 
sufficient popular support in two Member States, France and the Netherlands.43 Al-
though it lacked binding legal force, the A-Gs with the CJEU, and also the Court it-
self, used the Charter as an important source for the interpretation of human rights.44 
Under the Treaty of Lisbon, the Charter has become binding primary EU law: 
Article 6, first paragraph, TEU explicitly states that the Charter will have the same 
legal value as the TEU and the TFEU.45 Many of the secondary asylum legislation in-
struments, about which more below, contain explicit references to the Charter.46 
Also, the CJEU’s post-Lisbon case law on the provisions of the Charter is growing 
steadily.47 In Alassini (2010), the CJEU ruled that the requirement laid down in na-
tional law that, before bringing an action to court, an out-of-court settlement should 
be attempted, is not contrary to the principle of effective judicial protection laid 
down in Article 47 of the Charter.48 And in DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungs-
gesellschaft mbH (2010) the Court provided a set of very concrete guidelines on how 
national courts can ascertain whether national conditions for granting legal aid con-
stitute a limitation of the right of access to courts undermining the core of the right 
to effective judicial protection enshrined in Article 47 of the Charter.49 
                                                        
42 See, for example, Peers & Ward 2004, Claes 2009, Hailbronner 2010, pp. 18-22, Morijn 2011, 
Pahladsingh & Van Roosmalen 2011, Barkhuysen & Bos 2011.  
43 Guild 2011, p.4. 
44 See, for an example of an A-G opinion: A-G Maduro, Opinion of 9 September 2008 in the case of 
Elgafaji, para. 21 (judgment 17 February 2009, C-465/07); see, for some examples of judgments: 
Parliament v. Council, 27 June 2006, C-540/03, commented on by Battjes & Vermeulen in AB 2007/ 
16 (this judgment was the first one in which the Court referred to the Charter); Der Grüne Punkt 
DSD GmbH, 16 July 2009, C-385/07, para. 179. See also Hailbronner 2010, p. 19. For an extensive 
discussion of pre-Lisbon references by the CJEU to the Charter, I refer to Mortelmans 2009 and 
Overkleeft-Verburg 2005.  
45 Article 6, para. 1, part 1, TEU reads: ‘The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set 
out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted 
at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.’ 
46 See, for example, the Asylum Procedures Directive, Preamble (8), which states: ‘This Directive re-
spects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised in particular by the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union.’ See also the Returns Directive, Preamble (24), which 
stipulates that ‘This Directive respects the fundamental rights and observes the principles recognised 
in particular by the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.’ 
47 For a more extensive discussion of post-Lisbon jurisprudence on provisions of the Charter, see 
Pahladsingh & Van Roosmalen 2011. 
48 CJEU, Alassini, 18 March 2010, C-317/08 to C-320/08. 
49 CJEU, DEB Deutsche Energiehandels- und Beratungsgesellschaft mbH, 22 December 2010, C-279/09. 
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Two EU countries, Poland and the UK, tried to create a special position in 
relation to the Charter. According to Protocol 30 to the Treaty of Lisbon relating to 
the application of the Fundamental Rights Charter in these countries,50 their national 
courts and the EU's courts are precluded from finding that national laws, regulations 
or administrative provisions, practices or action are inconsistent with the Charter.51 
However, in its judgment in the case of N.S. and Others (2011, see also Chapter 8), the 
CJEU made clear that Protocol 30 does not call into question the applicability of the 
Charter in the UK or Poland. The CJEU interpreted Article 1(1) of Protocol 30 as an 
explanation of Article 51 of the EU Charter with regard to the scope thereof, and 
ruled that Article (1) of Protocol 30 does not intend to exempt Poland or the UK 
from the obligation to comply with the provisions of the EU Charter or to prevent a 
court of one of those Member States from ensuring compliance with those provi-
sions.52 
The Charter, in fact, codifies all fundamental rights as we know them from the 
ECHR, the European Social Charter and the UN treaties like the ICCPR, and brings 
these rights together in one single document. In most cases, therefore, the rights laid 
down in the Charter are the same as those explicit and binding rights laid down in 
other treaties.53 In some cases, however, the Charter offers innovations, which are 
mostly related to on-going technological and social developments.54 For example, 
Article 8 contains, along with Article 7 on protection of family life and protection of 
private life, a separately articulated right on the protection of personal data. Another 
interesting innovation is Article 41 on the right to good administration. This includes 
the right of every person to be heard before an adverse decision is taken, the right to 
have access to the file and the obligation of the administration to give reasons for its 
decisions. 
Article 6, first paragraph, TEU and Article 52, seventh paragraph, of the Charter 
make clear that the Explanations to the Charter, drawn up as a way of providing 
guidance in the interpretation of this Charter, shall be given due regard by the courts 
of the Union and of the Member States.55 Groenendijk (2011) warns, however, 
against attaching too much weight to the Explanations as they seem to downplay the 
value of the rights and principles laid down in the Charter itself and because the 
                                                        
50 Protocol No. 30 to the Consolidated versions of the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty on 
the Functioning of the European Union, Official Journal of the EU, C 83, 30 March 2010. See for ex-
tensive comments on Protocol 30: Claes 2009. 
51 Article 1, para. 1, of Protocol No. 30. 
52 CJEU, N.S. and Others, 21 December 2011, C-411/10 and C-493/10, paras. 119, 120. 
53 Barkhuysen & Bos 2011, p. 7. 
54 Barkhuysen & Bos 2011, p. 7. 
55 Article 6, first paragraph, part 3 TEU states: ‘The rights, freedoms and principles in the Charter shall 
be interpreted in accordance with the general provisions in Title VII of the Charter governing its 
interpretation and application and with due regard to the explanations referred to in the Charter, that 
set out the sources of those provisions.’ Article 52, seventh paragraph, of the Charter states: ‘The 
explanations drawn up as a way of providing guidance in the interpretation of this Charter shall be 
given due regard by the courts of the Union and of the Member States.’ The Explanations to the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union can be found at http://www.europarl.euro-
pa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf, visited 22 December 2012. See also Morijn 2011, p. 48, 
Barkhuysen & Bos 2011, p. 6. 
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CJEU has, so far, not referred to the Explanations when interpreting provisions of 
the Charter.56 Morijn (2011) mentions many unresolved questions concerning the 
exact purpose and status of the Explanations and calls for an ‘explanation to the Ex-
planations’; he points, for example, to the inconsistency that Article 6 TEU gives the 
Explanations an important status whereas the Explanations themselves set out that 
they are not legally binding.57 
It follows from Article 51 and the Explanations to this Article that Member 
States and, therefore, national courts as State organs are only bound by the provisions 
of the Charter when they operate within the scope of Union law.58 Since the entry 
into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), asylum has fallen within the scope of 
powers of the EU.59 Since then – as will be shown in the next section – extensive sec-
ondary legislation on asylum has been adopted. Asylum cases will, therefore, almost 
always be within the scope of Union law. As a result, the Charter will apply to the im-
plementation and application of this new EU asylum law by the EU Member States.60 
A provision crucial to understanding the relationship between the Charter and 
the ECHR is Article 52, third paragraph, which stipulates that: 
 
‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope 
of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision 
shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’ 
 
This provision is evidently intended to promote harmony between the provisions of 
the ECHR and the Charter, while not preventing the EU from developing more ex-
tensive protection.61 The Explanations on Article 52 contain a list of rights ‘which 
may at the present stage, without precluding developments in the law, legislation and 
the Treaties, be regarded as corresponding both in meaning and scope to rights in the 
                                                        
56 Groenendijk 2011. 
57 Morijn 2011, pp. 50, 51. 
58 Article 51 of the Charter states: ‘The provisions of this Charter are addressed to the institutions, 
bodies, offices and agencies of the Union with due regard for the principle of subsidiarity and to the 
Member States only when they are implementing Union law.’ The Explanations on Article 51 refer 
to pre-Charter case law of the CJEU and state that ‘As regards the Member States, it follows unam-
biguously from the case-law of the Court of Justice that the requirement to respect fundamental 
rights defined in the context of the Union is only binding on the Member States when they act in the 
scope of Union law (…).’ See also Hailbronner 2010, p. 18. 
59 The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, moved the whole area of asylum and 
immigration from the former so-called third pillar (the intergovernmental co-operation among the 
Member States) to the first pillar, hence to the former Treaty on European Community. The provi-
sions on asylum and immigration were placed in Title IV of Part III of the TEC. See more exten-
sively on the communautarisation of asylum law De Jong 2000, in: Van Krieken 2000, pp. 22-25, 
Lavenex 2001, pp. 126-137, Da Lomba 2004, pp. 38-45.  
60 An example of cases which would, arguably, fall outside the scope of Union law are cases in which a 
purely national form of protection – not being refugee protection, subsidiary protection or tempo-
rary protection as defined in EU secondary asylum legislation – is invoked and applies. 
61 See on the relationship between the Charter and the ECHR Barkhuysen & Bos 2011, pp. 17-25, 
Pahladsingh & Van Roosmalen 2011, pp. 55-58. 
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ECHR’.62 As well as this list, the Explanations contain a second list of rights ‘where 
the meaning is the same as the corresponding Articles of the ECHR, but where the 
scope is wider’.63 An example of the first category of rights (corresponding in both 
meaning and scope with the ECHR-counterpart) is the EU prohibition on refoulement 
contained in Article 19, second paragraph of the Charter, which will be discussed in 
the next section on EU asylum law. An example of the second category of rights 
(with a wider scope than the ECHR-counterpart) is the right to an effective remedy 
and a fair trial contained in Article 47 of the Charter, which will be discussed in sec-
tion 6.3.  
As Barkhuysen & Bos (2011) point out, in addition to these two categories of 
rights there is a third category, consisting of new rights which do not in any way cor-
respond to the ECHR-rights. Article 41, containing the right to good administration, 
was mentioned as such an innovation. It is to be expected that the CJEU will develop 
its own jurisprudential lines with respect to these rights.64 
Compared to the treaties discussed in the previous chapters of this book, the 
Charter creates added value is many ways. First, as has been said above, it contains a 
number of rights which have a wider scope than their corresponding ECHR counter-
parts; Article 47, which is an example of this category, is discussed below in section 
6.3. Second, the Charter contains a number of new rights, such as Articles 8 and 41. 
Third, as the Charter is now primary binding EU law, human rights can be invoked 
directly before the national courts and the CJEU, and all national courts have the 
possibility of referring preliminary questions concerning the interpretation of Charter 
rights to the CJEU.65 This possibility has already been used by national courts; the 
cases are still pending in Luxembourg.66 In addition to the complaints procedures be-
fore the HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR, the system of judicial supervision of EU 
human rights law may turn out to have a complementary value. Although they are of 
great value, the complaints procedures under the ICCPR, the CAT and the ECHR 
have their weaknesses. The ECtHR, the HRC and the ComAT are overburdened and 
enter the stage only after the national proceedings (in asylum cases sometimes after 
the expulsion of the asylum seeker to his or her country of origin). The preliminary 
procedure before the CJEU offers national first instance and upper courts the pos-
sibility of referring questions to the CJEU pending the national judicial proceedings, 
which may help to prevent or redress violations of human rights at an early stage.67 
                                                        
62 Explanations on Article 52. 
63 Explanations on Article 52. 
64 Barkhuysen & Bos 2011, p. 22. 
65 Article 267 TFEU stipulates: ‘The Court of Justice of the European Union shall have jurisdiction to 
give preliminary rulings concerning:  
(a) the interpretation of the Treaties;  
(b) the validity and interpretation of acts of the institutions, bodies, offices or agencies of the Union. 
(…).’ 
Due to Article 6, para. 1, part 1, TEU, the Charter has the same legal value as the Treaties. 
66 An example is LJN: BV8942, District Court of Middelburg, the Netherlands, in which the court of 
Middelburg referred to preliminary questions concerning the interpretation of Articles 8 and 41 of 
the Charter to the CJEU in a case concerning a request from an asylum seeker to be given insight 
into the internal administrative note underpinning a negative asylum decision. 
67 Barkhuysen & Bos 2011, pp. 28-30, Callewaert 2010. 
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Fourth, the European Commission can start an infraction procedure against a Mem-
ber State if it finds that Charter provisions have been violated.68 In a statement of 
October 2010, the Commission made clear that it would seriously supervise ad-
herence to the Charter by Member States.69 
To conclude this section on the development of EU human rights law, it is worth 
mentioning that human rights have been incorporated into EU law not only via the 
now binding Charter as stipulated in Article 6, first paragraph, TEU. Human rights 
enter EU law via two more avenues as well. The second paragraph of Article 6 TEU 
stipulates that the EU shall in the future accede to the ECHR. At the time of comple-
tion of this chapter, negotiations were taking place on the conditions of accession of 
the EU to the ECHR.70 And as a result of the third paragraph of Article 6, human 
rights still constitute general principles of EU law.71 
6.1.4  EU asylum law72 
6.1.4.1  Early intergovernmental measures 
Before 1993, the Treaty on the European Economic Community (TEC) did not 
make any mention of asylum. Its main objective was the integration of the economies 
of the Member States. For this purpose, the Single Market comprising an area with-
out internal frontiers was to be created.73 This implied shifting control from the 
                                                        
68 Article 258 TFEU stipulates: ‘If the Commission considers that a Member State has failed to fulfil an 
obligation under the Treaties, it shall deliver a reasoned opinion on the matter after giving the State 
concerned the opportunity to submit its observations. If the State concerned does not comply with 
the opinion within the period laid down by the Commission, the latter may bring the matter before 
the CJEUropean Union.’ Due to Article 6, para. 1, part 1, TEU, the Charter has the same legal value 
as the treaties. 
69 COM (2010) 573, Strategy for the effective implementation of the Charter of Fundamental Rights by 
the European Union, 19 October 2010. This document is accessible at: http://ec.europa.eu/jus-
tice/news/intro/doc/com_2010_573_en.pdf, visited 30 August 2011. 
70 Barkhuysen & Bos 2011, p. 5, Callewaert 2010. 
71 Article 6, paras. 2 and 3 read:  
‘2. The Union shall accede to the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms. Such accession shall not affect the Union’s competences as defined in the 
Treaties. 
3. Fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States, shall constitute general principles of the Union’s law.’ 
The question why it was deemed necessary to create three different human rights pillars and how 
they relate to each other is a complex one, which has so far not been answered in a clear way. See, 
for example, Morijn 2011, p. 50. 
72 To trace back and understand the origins and development of EU asylum law, see Battjes 2006, 
Chapter 1.5, Boeles et al. 2009, Chapter 3.3, Guild 2000, part 1, section 1, Hailbronner 2000, Hail-
bronner 2010, Chapter 1, De Jong 2000 in: Van Krieken 2000, Chapter 1.2, Lavenex 2001, Chapter 
3, Da Lomba 2004, Chapter 1.3 and Chapter 2, Pollet 1994, Van der Klaauw 2000 in: Van Krieken 
2000, Chapter 1.1, Van Krieken 2004, Introduction; Van Krieken 2004 contains, in the introduction 
to the book, a useful chronological overview of the relevant political and legal developments in the 
field of EU asylum law. 
73 Article 7A TEEC (TEC)(old, introduced by the Single European Act of 1986, Official Journal (1987) 
L 169/1, after amendment by the Treaty of Amsterdam Article 14 TEEC (new) stipulated that ‘the 
→ 
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internal borders (borders between the Member States of the Community) to the ex-
ternal borders of the Community. Policy makers across Europe then realised that the 
creation of this Single Market would have a profound impact on national asylum 
policies. It was feared that the abolition of border controls would put incentives in 
place for asylum seekers to ‘shop’ for asylum: once inside the territory of the Euro-
pean Community, it would be possible for them to travel unchecked, to apply for asy-
lum in those Members States with the most generous systems and to apply for asylum 
in more than one Member State. It was for this reason that additional measures 
dealing with asylum seekers were deemed indispensable.74 The creation of the internal 
market was, therefore, perceived as requiring harmonisation of asylum law.75 
A number of Member States, however, were unwilling to give up control of the 
entry of third-country nationals. The Member States that did wish to achieve the abo-
lition of internal borders sought the means to do so outside the scope of Community 
law. In 1985, they concluded the Schengen Agreement.76 This Agreement offered a 
framework for adopting measures compensating for the abolition of internal border 
control.77 These measures were laid down in the Schengen Implementing Agreement 
(SIA or, as the CJEU calls it, CISA) that was concluded in 1990.78 The SIA or CISA 
contained a mechanism to determine which Member State was responsible for pro-
cessing asylum applications. Gradually, all Member States acceded to the SIA, except 
for the United Kingdom and Ireland. The chapter in the SIA on the Member States 
responsible for asylum requests was subsequently replaced by the Dublin Conven-
tion, which entered into force in 1997 in all twelve original Member States of the 
Community.79 The new Member States, Austria, Sweden and Finland had followed 
suit and had all joined the Dublin Convention by 1 January 1998. 
In addition to this development, an attempt was made in 1992 to bring asylum 
matters closer within the ambit of Community law. As was said above, in that year 
the Member States concluded the Treaty on the European Union (TEU, Treaty of 
Maastricht), establishing a Union that supplemented the Community and consisted of 
the same Member States. The European Union was a new legal structure consisting 
of three pillars. The first pillar was the European Community as established by the 
Treaty on European Community, with its own powers and its own specific legal 
order. The two other pillars concerned ‘security and foreign policy’ and ‘justice and 
home affairs’. The second and third pillars lacked the characteristics of Community 
                                                        
Community shall adopt measures with the aim of progressively establishing the internal market over 
a period expiring on 31 December 1992 (...). The internal market shall comprise an area without in-
ternal frontiers in which the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital is ensured in ac-
cordance with the provisions of this Treaty.’ 
74 Boeles 2009, p. 316 and Van der Klaauw 2000 in: Van Krieken 2000, p. 11. 
75 White paper on the Completion of the Internal Market (COM (1985) 310def), para. 11. 
76 Agreement between the Governments of the States of the Benelux Economic Union, the Federal 
Republic of Germany and the French Republic on the Gradual Abolition of Checks at their Com-
mon Borders of 14 June 1985, OJ of the EU 2000 L239/13-18. 
77 See Articles 17 and 20 of the Schengen Agreement. 
78 Convention applying the Schengen Agreement (CISA) of 14 June 1985 (the Schengen Agreement) 
of 19 June 1990, OJ of the EU 2000 L 239/19. 
79 Convention determining the State responsible for examining applications for asylum lodged in one 
of the Member States of the European Communities, OJ of the EU 1997 C/254. 
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law. According to Article K.1 Treaty of Maastricht, the objective of the third pillar – 
justice and home affairs – was to achieve the objective of the European Union, ‘in 
particular the free movement of persons’. This Article declared asylum and a number 
of other immigration matters as ‘matters of common interest’. The Council could 
adopt measures on these matters by unanimity voting. A number of ‘joint positions’, 
‘joint actions’ and ‘decisions’ were taken, but they had little binding force.80 
6.1.4.2  Intergovernmental co-operation in the field of asylum becomes Union law 
The Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) radically changed the legal nature of EU asylum 
law. This treaty moved the whole area of asylum and immigration from the Union's 
third pillar –the intergovernmental co-operation among the Member States in the 
area of justice and home affairs –to the first pillar, hence to the Treaty on European 
Community. The provisions on asylum and immigration were placed in Title IV, Part 
III TEC.81 EU asylum law was, as a result, no longer intergovernmental, but was, in-
stead, Community law. This made the issuing of binding EU legislation on asylum 
possible, together with judicial control asserted by the Court of Justice (see more on 
this below in this section). Article 63 TEC (now Article 78 TFEU) dealt explicitly 
with asylum and required the adoption of measures on a number of asylum issues 
within five years after the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam, that is, before 
1 May 2004. The United Kingdom and Ireland retained a special position: they can 
participate in asylum measures at will; and Denmark opted out: secondary EU asylum 
law does not apply at all to this country.82 As an attachment to the Treaty of Amster-
dam, a special Protocol was adopted on asylum for nationals of the EU Member 
States (the Aznar Protocol ).83 
                                                        
80 See Hailbronner 2000, p. 49 and Hailbronner 2010, p. 3. See also Van der Klaauw 2000, in: Van 
Krieken 2000, p. 11, and Boeles et al. 2009, p. 317. 
81 Articles 61-69 TEC after consolidation. See more extensively on the communautarisation of asylum 
law De Jong 2000, in: Van Krieken 2000, pp. 22-25, Lavenex 2001, pp. 126-137, Da Lomba 2004, 
pp. 38-45.  
82 For Title IV measures, Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom have secured a special position 
by means of Protocols to the Treaty of Amsterdam (Protocol on the position of the UK and Ireland 
and Protocol on the Position of Denmark). See also Article 69 TEC. The UK and Ireland have in-
dicated in the case of each relevant secondary law instrument that they would opt in. The UK has 
secured that if secondary law measures are accepted by it, these measures bind that country as inter-
national law but not as Union law.  
83 Protocol on Asylum for nationals of the Member States of the EU (Protocol 29 to the Treaty of 
Amsterdam, now Protocol 24 to the consolidated version of the TEU and TFEU). In its sole 
Article, this Protocol stipulates that, given the level of protection of fundamental rights and free-
doms by the EU Member States, Member States shall be regarded as constituting safe countries of 
origin in respect of each other for all legal and practical purposes in relation to asylum matters, and 
that, accordingly, any application for asylum made by a national of a Member State may only in spe-
cific circumstances be taken into consideration. An example of such a specific circumstance is the 
situation where a Member State takes measures derogating from the ECHR. For more on the Aznar 
Protocol, see Guild & Garlick (2010). 
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6.1.4.3  The creation of the Common European Asylum System (CEAS) 
The negotiating process on this new legislative programme for asylum and immi-
gration started with the European Council summit in Tampere in 1999. Here, for the 
first time, the ambition was expressed to create a Common European Asylum Sys-
tem, the CEAS, based on the full and inclusive application of the 1951 Refugee Con-
vention.84 According to Tampere conclusions 14 and 15, it was decided to construct 
the CEAS in two phases. During the first phase, to be completed before 1 May 2004, 
the CEAS would include a clear and workable determination of the State responsible 
for the examination of an asylum application, common minimum standards for a fair 
and efficient asylum procedure, common minimum conditions for the reception of 
asylum seekers, and the approximation of rules on the recognition and content of ref-
ugee status. It would be completed with measures on subsidiary forms of protection 
offering an appropriate status to any person in need of such protection. In this first 
CEAS stage, on the basis of (old) Article 63 TEC, now Article 78 TFEU, the fol-
lowing secondary legislation on asylum has been brought about: 
- The EU Temporary Protection Directive (2001), a measure on the possibility of 
the Council to decide on temporary protection for mass influxes of asylum seek-
ers and the rights of the beneficiaries of that status;85 
- The EU Reception Conditions Directive (2003), a measure on the question of 
which rights and conditions are applicable for asylum seekers pending the asylum 
procedure;86 
- The EU Dublin Regulation (2003) on which Member State is responsible for 
examining an asylum claim;87 
- The EU Qualification Directive (2004 and 2011), a measure on who is eligible for 
international protection;88 and 
                                                        
84 Tampere European Council 15 and 16 October 1999 – Presidency Conclusions, SN 200/99, avail-
able on http://www.europarl.eu.int/summits/tam_en.htm. 
85 Council Directive 2001/55 of 20 July 2001, on minimum standards for giving temporary protection 
in the event of a mass influx of displaced persons and on measures promoting a balance of efforts 
between Member States in receiving such persons and bearing the consequences thereof, OJ of the 
EU L 212, 7 August 2001, pp. 12-23. 
86 Council Directive 2003/9/EC of 27 January 2003, laying down minimum standards for the recep-
tion of asylum seekers, OJ of the EU L 031, 6 February 2003, pp.18-25. 
87 Regulation 2003/343/EC of 18 February 2003, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for deter-
mining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third country national, OJ of the EU L 50, 25 February 2003, pp. 1-10, last 
amended by OJ of the EU L 304, 14 November 2008, p. 83. 
88 Council Directive 2004/83/EC on minimum standards for the qualification and status of third 
country nationals or stateless persons as refugees or as persons who otherwise need international 
protection on the content of the protection granted, OJ of the EU L 304, 30 September 2004, pp. 12-
23, last amended by OJ L 204, 5 August 2005, p. 24. On 13 December 2011, the new Qualification 
Directive was adopted: Directive 2011/95/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 
December 2011 on standards for the qualification of third-country nationals or stateless persons as 
beneficiaries of international protection, for a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for 
subsidiary protection, and for the content of the protection granted, OJ of the EU L 337, 20 De-
cember 2011, pp. 9-26. The new directive must be implemented by the EU Member States by 21 
December 2013. 
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- The EU Asylum Procedures Directive (2005), a measure on the rules of proce-
dure for the examination of asylum claims.89 
 
Two EU Member States have a special position in relation to the CEAS. Ireland par-
ticipates in the application of the Dublin Regulation and the EU Qualification Direc-
tive, the EU Asylum Procedures Directive and the EU Temporary Protection Direc-
tive, but not in the EU Reception Conditions Directive. Denmark is not bound by 
the four EU Directives mentioned above.90 
During the second CEAS stage, new measures will lead to a common asylum 
procedure and a uniform status for those who are granted asylum which is valid 
throughout the Union. The second stage was set in motion in 2009, when the Euro-
pean Commission presented several proposals to revise the previously adopted meas-
ures.91 As many of these second-stage measures have yet to be decided upon by the 
Council and the European Parliament, this study focuses mainly on the first-stage in-
struments. The second EU Qualification Directive 2011/95 is included as this Direc-
tive was adopted on 13 December 2011 and must be implemented by the EU Mem-
ber States by 21 December 2013. Provisions from the EU Qualification Directive 
mentioned, quoted or referred to in this chapter are from the second EU Qualifica-
tion Directive 2011/95. 
Article 78 TFEU (old Article 63 TEC) stipulates that the secondary EU asylum 
legislation mentioned above must be in accordance with the 1951 Refugee Conven-
tion as well as other relevant treaties.92 It may safely be argued that ‘other relevant 
treaties’ include the treaties dealt with in the previous chapters of this book: the 
ECHR, the ICCPR and the CAT.  
Some provisions of EU asylum law are worded in the same, or in a very similar, 
way compared to the provisions of these international asylum instruments. In particu-
lar, the Qualification Directive is to a large extent aimed at resolving the differences 
between the EU Member States concerning the application of the existing material 
international asylum rules, including the refugee definition contained in the RC.93 In 
line with this, the secondary asylum legislation often refers to the RC. For example, 
Preamble (4) to the EU Qualification Directive stipulates that 
 
                                                        
89 Council Directive 2005/85 of 1 December 2005 on minimum standards on procedures in Member 
States for granting and withdrawing refugee status, OJ of the EU L 326, 13 December 2005, pp. 13-
34. 
90 The Directives mention this special provision. See also CJEU, N.S. and Others, 21 December 2011, 
C-411/10 and C-493/10. 
91 See, for example, the proposal for recasting the Dublin regulation 343/2003 EC (COM (2008) 820 
final; the proposal for recasting of the Reception Conditions Directive 2003 (COM (2008) 815 final; 
further proposals are foreseen for recasting the Qualification Directive 2004/83/EC and the Asylum 
Procedures Directive 2005/85/EC. Recast proposals are included in Hailbronner’s book of 2010. 
92 Article 78, first paragraph, TFEU, states: ‘The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, 
subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any 
third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle 
of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 
and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.’ 
93 See Preambles 3, 4, 5 of this Directive. 
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‘The Geneva Convention and Protocol provide the cornerstone of the international legal re-
gime for the protection of refugees.’94 
 
And Preamble (2) to the Dublin Regulation states that 
 
‘(2) The European Council, at its special meeting in Tampere on 15 and 16 October 1999, 
agreed to work towards establishing a Common European Asylum System, based on the full 
and inclusive application of the Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees of 28 
July 1951, as supplemented by the New York Protocol of 31 January 1967, thus ensuring that 
nobody is sent back to persecution, i.e. maintaining the principle of non-refoulement (…).’ 
 
As well as this secondary legislation on asylum, the Charter, which was discussed in 
more detail in the previous section, contains two provisions on asylum: Article 18 on 
the right to asylum and Article 19 on the prohibition on refoulement. Articles 18 and 19 
are discussed in more detail below in section 6.2. 
6.1.4.4  Case law of the CJEU in asylum cases95 
In the past, and for some years, the CJEU had no or only limited jurisdiction as far as 
EU asylum law was concerned. The Treaty of Maastricht (1993) excluded jurisdiction 
of the Court in this area; the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999) introduced jurisdiction, 
with a number of restrictions, in Article 68 TEC. Under this provision, the possibility 
for national courts to refer questions to the CJEU in cases concerning asylum, migra-
tion and visa was limited. National courts of first instance were denied the compe-
tence to refer questions on migration and asylum matters. Only the highest national 
courts could do so. The reason behind this restriction was the fear that the CJEU 
would not be able to cope with a deluge of questions. This denial of competence was 
lifted by the Treaty of Lisbon. Under Article 267 TFEU, the CJEU is now fully com-
petent to rule on the validity of secondary asylum law, and on the interpretation of 
primary and secondary EU asylum law, and all national courts are permitted to refer 
preliminary questions in pending asylum cases to the CJEU. 
So far, in ten cases concerning asylum, preliminary questions referred by national 
courts of EU Member States have been answered by the CJEU.96 Most of the ques-
                                                        
94 The CJEU confirmed this in its case law. See, for example, CJEU, Abdulla, 2 March 2010, C-175/08, 
C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08, paras. 52 and 53, where the Court ruled: ‘According to points 3, 
16 and 17 of the Preamble to the Directive the Geneva Convention is the cornerstone of the inter-
national legal regime for the protection of refugees (…). Therefore, the provisions of the Directive 
must be interpreted in the light of the general system and the purpose of the Directive, taking into 
account the Geneva Convention and other relevant treaties mentioned in Article 63, para. 1, sub 1, 
EC.’ 
95 See for a description and analysis of the development of the Court’s jurisdiction over immigration 
and asylum Guild & Peers 2001. See for a description of the preliminary procedure after Lisbon with 
a specific focus on migration cases the article ‘De prejudiciële procedure na Lissabon’ by S. Hubel & 
M. Stronks in: Migrantenrecht 9-10/09. See for a more general description of the impact of the Treaty 
of Lisbon on the jurisdiction of the Court ‘En wat met de rechtsbescherming? Het Verdrag van 
Lissabon en de Communautaire Rechter’, by L. Parret, in: Van Ooijk & Wessel 2009, pp. 49-59.  
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tions submitted in these cases concerned the interpretation of material provisions 
contained in the Qualification Directive concerning inclusion and exclusion from 
protection. Three cases, Brahim Samba Diouf (2011), N.S. (2011) and M.M. (2012) con-
cerned questions pertaining to judicial procedures. In Brahim Samba Diouf, the national 
court asked whether the right to an effective remedy laid down in Article 39 Pro-
cedures Directive permits national regulations to deny a right of appeal on a decision 
to channel an application for international protection into an accelerated procedure. 
The case of N.S. concerned application of the EU Dublin Regulation and the 
question of whether the referring EU Member State should test the compliance of 
asylum procedures in the intermediary EU Member State with EU asylum law (See 
Chapter 8 for more about Dublin cases and this judgment of the CJEU). The case of 
M.M. concerned the requirement of co-operation, laid down in Article 4 of the EU 
Qualification Directive, between the national authorities and the asylum seeker (see 
section 6.4.3.2 below). It is interesting to mention here that the UNHCR issued state-
ments in the context of all the cases (see also Chapter 2).97 Where relevant for the 
purposes of this research, the asylum case law of the CJEU will be discussed in more 
detail below. 
6.1.5  Further content and structure of this chapter 
The choice to describe in some detail the development of EU human rights law and 
EU asylum law was made deliberately. Some knowledge of the genesis of EU human 
                                                        
96 The judgments issued up to 31 December 2012 by the CJEU on preliminary questions in asylum 
cases are: Petrosian and others, 29 January 2009, C-19/08, Elgafaji,17 February 2009, C-465/07, Abdulla 
and others, 2 March 2010, C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08, C-179/08, Bolbol, 17 June 2010, C-31/09, 
B and D, 9 November 2010, C-57/09 and C-101/09, and Brahim Samba Diouf, 28 July 2011, C-69/10; 
N.S. and Others, 21 December 2011, C-411/10 and C-493/10; Migrationsverk Sweden v. Nurije, Valdrina 
and Valdri Kastrati, 3 May 2012, C-620/10; Bundesrepublik Deutschland v. Y. and Z., 5 September 2012, 
C-71/11 and C-99/11; M.M. v. Ireland, 22 November 2012, C-277/11. In addition, of relevance to 
the field of asylum are two other judgments, being Parliament v. Council, 6 May 2008, C-133/06, con-
cerning an application by the European Parliament for the annulment of Articles 29(1) and (2) and 
36(3) of the EU asylum Procedures Directive, concerning safe countries of origin and safe third 
countries, and European Commission v. Ireland, 7 April 2011, C-431/10, concerning an action for failure 
by Ireland to implement Procedures Directive 2005/85/EC. The CJEU ruled that Ireland had failed 
to implement the Directive. Relevant judgments are also: CJEU, Parliament v. Council, 6 May 2008, C-
133/06, concerning an application by the European Parliament for the annulment of Articles 29(1) 
and (2) and 36(3) of the Procedures Directive, concerning safe countries of origin and safe third 
countries, and, alternatively, the annulment of that Directive in its entirety; in this case the Court in-
deed annulled the mentioned provisions due to the fact, in short, that the wrong procedure for deci-
sion making had been followed; CJEU, Kadzoev, 30 November 2009, C-57/09, in which questions 
were raised concerning the detention of asylum seekers in the light of Article 15(4) to (6) of Direc-
tive 2008/115/EC of 16 December 2008 on common standards and procedures in Member States 
for returning illegally staying third-country nationals (OJ of the EU 2008 L 348, p. 98), and CJEU, 
European Commission v. Ireland, 7 April 2011, C-431/10, a case in which the Commission sought – and 
obtained – a declaration from the Court that Ireland had failed to implement the Procedures Direc-
tive. 
97 The UNHCR statements are available at RefWorld. See, for example, the statement issued in the 
context of the case of Brahim Samba Diouf at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4bf67fa12. 
html.  
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rights and EU asylum law is indispensable for understanding the position of the 
Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU in international human rights law and the 
position of the secondary asylum legislation in relation to the international treaties 
discussed in the previous chapters. This knowledge is also necessary for tackling the 
question of whether EU asylum law offers any additional principles or added value 
regarding questions of evidence and judicial scrutiny. In the remaining sections of this 
chapter, the focus will shift to the central theme of this study: evidence, proving and 
judicial scrutiny in asylum court proceedings. In section 6.2, Articles 18 and 19 of the 
Charter are analysed, followed by Article 47 of the Charter in section 6.3. Section 6.4 
addresses secondary EU asylum law provisions on evidentiary issues. In 6.5, con-
cluding remarks are made. 
This chapter deviates from the previous ones as it does not contain a section 
which meticulously describes the approach of the CJEU to all the eleven aspects of 
evidence and judicial scrutiny. Such a detailed description is currently impossible as 
the CJEU has passed judgments in only a limited number of asylum cases and has, as 
a result, not had an opportunity to express itself on all the aspects. However, in cases 
concerning other fields, such as, inter alia, migration of EU citizens, competition, mar-
keting authorisations, product classification, and taxes, the CJEU has dealt with ques-
tions regarding the intensity of national judicial scrutiny, certain questions concerning 
the admission and evaluation of evidence as well as opportunities to present evidence, 
and questions concerning time limits. It is difficult to infer from these cases very spe-
cific guidelines as to how national judges should do their work in asylum cases, as the 
subject-matter is quite different. Nevertheless, some general trends and lines can be 
discerned, and the CJEU may draw on these lines and trends when confronted with 
similar types of questions in asylum cases. It has done so before with regard to EU 
migration law in cases concerning the migration of nationals from non-EU coun-
tries.98 It is for that reason that this case law in other fields is analysed in this study. 
6.2  Issues of evidence and judicial scrutiny under Articles 18 and 19 of 
the Charter 
6.2.1  Article 18: respect for the RC, respect for the UNHCR’s positions 
Article 18 contains the right to asylum and stipulates: 
 
‘The right to asylum shall be guaranteed with due respect for the rules of the Geneva Con-
vention of 28 July 1951 and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees 
and in accordance with the Treaty establishing the European Community.’ 
 
The CJEU has not, so far, expressed itself on Article 18 of the Charter. The Court 
has mentioned Article 18 of the Charter as part of the relevant EU legislation in only 
one of the seven preliminary procedure judgments given so far in cases concerning 
                                                        
98 See, for example, CJEU, Bozkurt, 22 December 2012, C-303/08, and CJEU, Toprak and Oguz, 9 De-
cember 2010, C-300/09. 
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asylum: Abdulla and others (2010).99 This may be partly explained by the fact that the 
Charter gained the status of binding primary EU law with the entry into force of the 
Treaty of Lisbon on 1 December 2009 and two of the judgments in asylum cases 
(Petrosian and Elgafaji) were given in the pre-Lisbon period. The fact that the Court 
referred to Article 18 only in Abdulla and others, and not in the three other post-Lisbon 
judgments, may perhaps also be explained by the fact that Abdulla concerned cessa-
tion of refugee status and the corresponding secondary rights, in other words, the 
loss of an earlier gained right to asylum. The Explanations on Article 18 make clear 
that the text of Article 18 is based on Article 78 TFEU, which stipulates that the 
common EU policy on asylum must be in accordance with the Refugee Convention 
and the Refugee Protocol, and other relevant treaties.100 The right to asylum is to be 
distinguished from protection from refoulement, which is addressed separately by 
Article 19 of the Charter. The right to asylum is generally assumed to imply a right to 
durable protection (as opposed to temporary protection) and the appropriate second-
ary rights (to, for example, housing and employment) as defined in the RC.101 As op-
posed to the right to asylum, protection from refoulement does not confer secondary 
rights but only means that the individual concerned may not be expelled or otherwise 
returned to his or her country of origin. The obligation to guarantee the right to asy-
lum means that Article 18 recognises at least the refugee’s claim to asylum. Battjes 
(2006) and Hailbronner (2010) write that it does not impose an obligation to grant 
asylum.102 It may be argued, however, that Article 18 does impose an obligation to 
grant asylum when the necessary conditions have been fulfilled. Article 14 UDHR en-
visages the right to seek and to enjoy asylum,103 and not, as Article 18 does, a right to 
asylum which shall be guaranteed. Next, Article 13 EU Qualification Directive states 
that Member States shall grant refugee status to a third-country national or a stateless 
person, who qualifies as a refugee (who meets the criteria laid down in Chapters II 
and III of the Directive). An interpretation of Article 18 as an obligation to grant 
asylum where the relevant conditions have been fulfilled is in line with Article 13 EU 
Qualification Directive and would explain the stronger wording of Article 18, com-
pared to Article 14 UDHR. 
The obligation to guarantee the right to asylum is conditioned in Article 18 by the 
obligation to pay due respect to the RC. According to Battjes (2006) and Hailbronner 
(2010) the requirement of respect for the RC sets a material standard.
104
 Based on the 
conclusions drawn in Chapter 2 it may be argued that the requirement of respect for 
the RC also sets concrete procedural standards. The RC contains a number of proce-
dural provisions in Articles 16 (access to courts) and 32 (due process of law in cases 
of expulsion). In section 2.4, the UNHCR’s positions on evidence and judicial scru-
                                                        
99 CJEU, Abdulla and others, 2 March 2010, C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08, C-179/08. 
100 Explanations on Article 18 of the Charter; the Explanations to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union can be found at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf, 
last visited 30 August 2011. 
101 Battjes 2006, p. 112, Hailbronner 2010, p. 19. 
102 Battjes 2006, p. 113, Hailbronner 2010, p. 19. 
103 Article 14, first paragraph, UDHR. 
104 Battjes 2006, p. 113, Hailbronner 2010, p. 19. 
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tiny were discussed and it was demonstrated that these positions may serve as a tool 
for interpreting Articles 16 and 32 RC. By virtue of Article 18 of the Charter, national 
asylum courts will have to pay due respect to the procedural provisions of the RC, 
and to the procedural positions taken by the UNHCR, as discussed in Chapter 2. It 
may be argued that it is no longer possible to set these positions aside as non-binding, 
as that would amount to non-compliance with Article 18 of the Charter, which is 
binding primary Union law. 
6.2.2  Article 19: incorporation into EU law of the ECtHR’s standards 
Article 19, second paragraph, contains an explicit prohibition on refoulement. It stipu-
lates:  
 
‘No one may be removed, expelled, or extradited to a State where there is a serious risk that he 
or she would be subjected to the death penalty, torture or other inhuman or degrading treat-
ment or punishment.’ 
 
The Explanations on Article 52, third paragraph, state that ‘Article 19(2) corresponds 
to Article 3 of the ECHR as interpreted by the European Court of Human Rights.’ 
And the Explanations on Article 19 state that ‘paragraph 2 incorporates case law 
from the European Court of Human Rights regarding Article 3 of the ECHR’.105 In 
other words, this provision incorporates the ECtHR’s case law under Article 3 in 
expulsion cases.106 
Battjes (2006) points out the discrepancy between the aim of Article 19 to incor-
porate the relevant case law of the ECtHR and the wording of Article 19, second 
paragraph, which suggests a different scope in a number of ways.107 The most re-
markable and for this study most relevant difference is that the ECtHR requires a 
‘real risk’ whereas Article 19, second paragraph, requires a ‘serious risk’, which seems 
to be a stricter standard, as it seems to require a higher degree of foreseeability. 
Battjes also points out, however, that it would be wrong to conclude that Article 19, 
second paragraph, is indeed different in scope and risk criteria for two reasons.108 
First, Article 52, third paragraph, states that the scope and meaning are the same as 
the corresponding right under Article 3 ECHR. Second, any person who falls outside 
the scope of Article 19, second paragraph, will be able to invoke Article 4 of the 
Charter which states: 
 
‘No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.’ 
 
                                                        
105 Explanations on Article 52, paragraph 3, of the Charter and Explanations on Article 19, paragraph 2, 
of the Charter; the Explanations to the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union can 
be found at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf, last visited 30 August 2011. 
106 Battjes 2006, pp. 114, 115; Hailbronner 2010, p. 20. 
107 Battjes 2006, p. 115. 
108 Battjes 2006, p. 116. 
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Scope and meaning of this provision are, according to the Explanations, the same as 
those of Article 3 ECHR, as interpreted by the ECtHR. Articles 4 and 19 thus over-
lap.109 
It follows from the foregoing that Article 19, second paragraph, incorporates into 
EU asylum law the standards, principles and approaches developed by the ECtHR 
under Article 3 ECHR in expulsion cases, including the procedural and evidentiary 
standards set out in Chapter 5. This incorporation has transformed the legal nature of 
these standards. They have been transformed from intergovernmental international 
law, which enters national legal orders and works in them via the constitutions of 
states, into binding primary EU law, which works on its own terms in national legal 
orders, not subject to conditions set out by national law, and takes precedence over 
all national law. 
Neither the text of Article 19 nor the Explanations refer explicitly to the ICCPR 
and the CAT. There are, however, three reasons for assuming that Articles 7 ICCPR 
and 3 CAT, and the corresponding case law of the HRC and the ComAT, must be 
taken into consideration when applying Article 19 of the Charter. First, the Preamble 
to the Charter states that  
 
‘This Charter reaffirms (…) the rights as they result, in particular, from the constitutional tradi-
tions and international obligations common to the Member States, the European Convention 
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the Social Charters adopted 
by the Union and by the Council of Europe and the case-law of the European Union and of 
the European Court of Human Rights.’ 
 
As all the EU Member States are party to both the ICCPR and the CAT (see Chap-
ters 3 and 4), Articles 7 ICCPR and 3 CAT can be qualified as ‘international obliga-
tions common to the Member States’. Second, Article 78 TFEU requires secondary 
EU asylum law to be in accordance with the RC and ‘other relevant treaties’, which 
must be assumed to include the ECHR, the ICCPR and the CAT. It would be diffi-
cult to imagine that it would be acceptable for secondary asylum law to be in con-
formity with the ‘other relevant treaties’, whereas primary law, more in particular 
Article 19 of the Charter, would be at variance with them. In other words, the re-
quirement that secondary Union law is in accordance with international treaties pre-
supposes that primary Union law is also in accordance with these instruments. 
Third, Article 53 of the Charter states: 
 
‘Nothing in this Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as recognised, in their respective fields of application, by Union law 
and international law and by international agreements to which the Union or all the Member 
States are party, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and 
Fundamental Freedoms, and by the Member States' constitutions.’ 
                                                        
109 The Explanations on Article 4 of the Charter state: ‘The right in Article 4 is the right guaranteed by 
Article 3 of the ECHR, which has the same wording (…).’ By virtue of Article 52(3) of the Charter, 
it therefore has the same meaning and the same scope as the ECHR Article. 
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Taking all this into account, and bearing in mind that human rights form one of the 
two main sources of inspiration for the general principles of Union law (see section 
6.1.3.1 above), it may safely be assumed that Articles 3 CAT and 7 ICCPR form 
important additional sources of inspiration for the interpretation of Article 19 of the 
Charter.110 
As was demonstrated in Chapters 3 and 4, the Human Rights Committee and the 
Committee against Torture have developed a number of procedural and evidentiary 
standards. It follows from the foregoing that these standards must be taken into 
consideration when applying Article 19, second paragraph, of the Charter. 
6.3  Issues of evidence and judicial scrutiny under Article 47 of the 
Charter 
Article 47 of the Charter stipulates: 
 
‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms guaranteed by the law of the Union are violated has the 
right to an effective remedy before a tribunal in compliance with the conditions laid down in 
this Article. 
Everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a reasonable time by an independent 
and impartial tribunal previously established by law. Everyone shall have the possibility of be-
ing advised, defended and represented. 
(…)’ 
6.3.1  Article 47: the EU law counterpart of Articles 6 and 13 ECHR 
The text of Article 47 of the Charter and the Explanations on Article 47111 make clear 
that Article 47 is inspired by Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. In a number of pre-Lisbon 
judgments, the CJEU explicitly stated that Articles 6 and 13 ECHR apply in Union 
law as general principles and have been reaffirmed by Article 47 of the Charter.112 
The first paragraph of Article 47 is clearly inspired by Article 13 ECHR.113 The Ex-
planations make clear, however, that this provision differs in two ways from Article 
13 ECHR. First, in EU law the effective remedy requirement is stricter since it guar-
antees the right to an effective remedy before a genuine judicial body: a court or tri-
bunal, and not an administrative body. Under Article 13 ECHR, the authority before 
which an effective remedy must be available need not per se be a judicial authority. 
                                                        
110 See, for the same conclusion, Battjes 2006, p. 116. 
111  Explanations on Article 47 of the Charter; the Explanations to the Charter of Fundamental Rights 
of the European Union can be found at http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/pdf/04473_en.pdf. 
112 See, for example, CJEU, Johnston, 15 May 1986, C-222/84, paras. 18 and 19; CJEU; Heylens and others, 
15 October 1987, C-222/86, para. 14; CJEU, Eribrand, 19 June 2003, C-467/01, para. 61; CJEU, 
Unibet, 13 March 2007, C-432/05, para. 37; CJEU, Productores de Música de España, 29 January 2008, C-
275/06, para. 62; CJEU, Der Grüne Punkt DSD GmbH, 16 July 2009, C-385/07, para. 179. 
113 Article 13 ECHR reads: ‘Everyone whose rights and freedoms as set forth in the Convention are 
violated shall have an effective remedy before a national authority notwithstanding that the violation 
has been committed by persons acting in an official capacity.’ 
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Second, unlike Article 13 ECHR, Article 47, first paragraph, does not impose the 
requirement for an arguable claim, and, therefore, offers wider protection. The only 
requirement for applicability is that a case is within the scope of EU law.114 Thus, the 
EU right to an effective remedy implies the right to effective judicial scrutiny of the 
decisions of the EU institutions or national authorities taken pursuant to the 
applicable provisions of EU law.115 
The second paragraph of Article 47 is clearly inspired by Article 6, first para-
graph, ECHR.116 Importantly, Article 47 of the Charter offers more extensive pro-
tection. The Explanations on Article 47, second paragraph, state explicitly that in EU 
law, the right to a fair hearing is not confined to disputes relating to civil law rights 
and obligations and criminal charges, but instead applies to all cases which are within 
the scope of EU law, that is, cases in which an EU right or freedom is at stake.117 
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam (1999), asylum has fallen with-
in the scope of powers of the EU.118 Since then (as was shown above) extensive sec-
ondary EU legislation on asylum has also been adopted. For these reasons, asylum 
cases will almost always be within the scope of Union law. Article 47 of the Charter 
will, therefore, normally apply to asylum cases.  
The Explanations on Article 47 make clear that, in all respects other than their 
scope, the guarantees afforded by the ECHR under Article 6, first paragraph, and 
Article 13 ECHR apply under Article 47 of the Charter.119 This also follows logically 
from Article 52, third paragraph, of the Charter, which stipulates that: 
                                                        
114 The Explanations on Article 47, first paragraph, of the Charter state: ‘However, in Union law the 
protection is more extensive since it guarantees the right to an effective remedy before a court. The 
Court of Justice enshrined that right in its judgment of 15 May 1986 as a general principle of Union 
law (Case 222/84, CJEU, Johnston [1986] ECR 1651; see also judgment of 15 October 1987, Case 
222/86, CJEU, Heylens [1987] ECR 4097 and judgment of 3 December 1992, Case C-97/91, CJEU, 
Borelli [1992] ECR I-6313). According to the Court, that general principle of Union law also applies 
to the Member States when they are implementing Union law.’ 
115  Reneman 2012, p. 92. 
116 Article 6, first paragraph, ECHR stipulates: ‘In the determination of his civil rights and obligations 
or of any criminal charge against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public hearing within a rea-
sonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal established by law. Judgement shall be pro-
nounced publicly but the press and public may be excluded from all or part of the trial in the interest 
of morals, public order or national security in a democratic society, where the interests of juveniles 
or the protection of the private life of the parties so require, or to the extent strictly necessary in the 
opinion of the court in special circumstances where publicity would prejudice the interests of 
justice.’ 
117  The Explanations on Article 47, second paragraph, state: ‘In Union law, the right to a fair hearing is 
not confined to disputes relating to civil law rights and obligations. That is one of the consequences 
of the fact that the Union is a community based on the rule of law as stated by the Court in Case 
294/83, ‘Les Verts’ v. European Parliament (judgment of 23 April 1986, [1986] ECR 1339).(…).’ 
118 The Treaty of Amsterdam, which entered into force in 1999, moved the whole area of asylum and 
immigration from the former so-called third pillar (the intergovernmental co-operation among the 
Member States) to the first pillar, hence to the former Treaty on European Community. The provi-
sions on asylum and immigration were placed in Title IV of Part III TEC. See more extensively on 
the communautarisation of asylum law De Jong 2000, in: Van Krieken 2000, pp. 22-25, Lavenex 
2001, pp. 126-137, Da Lomba 2004, pp. 38-45.  
119 The Explanations on Article 47, second paragraph, state: ‘(…). Nevertheless, in all respects other 
than their scope, the guarantees afforded by the ECHR apply in a similar way to the Union.’ 
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‘In so far as this Charter contains rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope 
of those rights shall be the same as those laid down by the said Convention. This provision 
shall not prevent Union law providing more extensive protection.’ 
 
Article 47 of the Charter, thus, incorporates all the procedural safeguards afforded by 
Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, set out in Chapter 5.120 This incorporation into EU law has 
two important consequences. First, national courts can no longer maintain, with ref-
erence to constant case law of the ECtHR, that the safeguards developed under 
Article 6 ECHR do not apply in asylum cases and that those developed under Article 
13 apply only in cases of an arguable asylum claim. Union law has, thus, caused the 
effect that the procedural safeguards flowing from Articles 6 and 13 will almost al-
ways apply in asylum cases. Second, the incorporation means that the procedural 
safeguards of Articles 6 and 13 ECHR now enter the national legal orders of EU 
Member States not only as ‘intergovernmental’ international law, subject to the con-
stitutional conditions set out by national law, but also in their capacity as primary 
binding Union law which has precedence over all national law and applies in the 
Member States on its own terms, not subject to conditions set out by national law.121 
Neither Article 47 nor the Explanations refer explicitly to the ICCPR, the CAT 
and the RC. For the reasons mentioned above in section 6.2.2, it may be assumed 
that Articles 2, third paragraph, and 14 ICCPR, Articles 12 and 13 CAT, including the 
corresponding case law of the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against 
Torture, and Article 16 RC, must be taken into consideration when applying Article 
47 of the Charter. The mentioned provisions on proceedings of the ICCPR, the CAT 
and the RC thus form important sources for the interpretation of Article 47 of the 
Charter, along with Articles 6 and 13 ECHR.122 
6.3.2  Article 47 Charter: codification of the principle of effective judicial 
protection 
6.3.2.1  The principle of effective judicial protection: introduction 
Article 47 is not only the mirror of Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. It also constitutes the 
codification of the Union law principle of effective judicial protection. In Samba Diouf 
(2011), the Court stated that the principle of effective judicial protection:  
                                                        
120 See in the same vein Battjes 2006, pp. 325-327, Tridimas 2006, pp. 455-456, and Widdershoven in 
his comment on CJEU, Der Grüne Punkt DSD GmbH, 16 July 2009, C-385/07, in AB 2010, 119. 
121 Mr Ben Smulders, director at the legal department of the European Commission, expressed the 
same opinion at the conference for the Dutch judiciary on the Treaty of Lisbon and the Charter, or-
ganised by the Training Institute for the Judiciary SSR on 9 June 2010 in Utrecht, the Netherlands. 
He stated in his presentation that the principles as to how national courts should perform their 
work, developed by the ECtHR under Articles 6 and 13 ECHR, in fact now form primary EU law as 
these principles have been incorporated into EU law via Article 47 read in conjunction with Article 
52, para. 3, which Articles are primary EU law provisions.  
122 The specific obligations flowing from the provisions on national proceedings contained in the RC, 
ICCPR and the CAT were dealt with in Chapters 2, 3 and 4.  
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‘Is a general principle of EU law to which expression is now given by Article 47 of the Charter 
of Fundamental Rights of the European Union.’123 
 
The leading case in which the CJEU for the first time ruled explicitly that national 
courts are under a duty to provide effective judicial protection of EU rights is Johnston 
v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary (1986).124 This case concerned a female 
police officer in Northern Ireland who was refused renewal of her contract pursuant 
to a policy decision that, due to the situation of growing violence, the contracts of 
female officers would not be renewed. Johnston argued that this policy decision was 
at variance with the EC Sex Discrimination Directive.125 The CJEU, referring to 
Article 6 of the Directive, ruled that  
 
‘The requirement of judicial control stipulated in that provision reflects general principle of law 
which underlies the constitutional traditions common to the Member States. That principle is 
also laid down in Articles 6 and 13 of the ECHR. By virtue of Article 6 of Directive No. 
76/207, interpreted in the light of the general principle stated above, all persons have the rights 
to obtain an effective remedy in a competent court against measures which they consider to be 
contrary to the principle of equal treatment of men and women laid down in the Directive.’126 
 
The importance of providing effective judicial protection of rights conferred by EU 
law was subsequently stressed in many other cases.127 
The principle of effective judicial protection can be further divided into a number 
of sub-principles. In literature, different stances are taken on how this sub-division 
can best be made. For example, Jans, De Lange, Prechal & Widdershoven (2007) 
seem to make a distinction between, on the one hand, the principles of equivalence 
and effectiveness, and on the other hand, the principle of effective judicial protection; 
they do not see the first two principles as being part of the latter principle.128 By 
contrast, Battjes (2006) discusses in his chapter on judicial supervision a number of 
                                                        
123 CJEU, Samba Diouf, 28 July 2011, C-69/10, paras. 48-49. See also the judgments in CJEU, Unibet, 13 
March 2007, C-432/05, para. 37; CJEU, Der Grüne Punkt DSD GmbH, 16 July 2009, C-385/07 P, 
paras. 177-179; CJEU, Alassini, 18 March 2010, C-317/08 to C-320/08. 
124 CJEU, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 15 May 1986, C-222/84. 
125 Council Directive No. 76/207 of 9 February 1976, Official Journal of the EU 39 of 14 February 1976, 
pp. 40-42. 
126 CJEU, Johnston v. Chief Constable of the Royal Ulster Constabulary 15 May 1986, C-222/84, paras. 18, 19. 
127 See, for example, CJEU, Les Verts v. European Parliament, 23 April 1986, C-294/83, para. 23; CJEU, 
Heylens, 15 October 1987,C-222/86, paras. 2, 14-17; CJEU, Oleificio Borelli SpA v. Commission of the 
EC, 3 December 1992, C-97/91, para. 14; CJEU, Van Schijndel 14 December 1995, C-430/93, para. 
19; CJEU, Siples, 11 January 2001, C-226-99, paras. 17-19; CJEU, Union de Pequenos Agricultores v. 
Council, 25 July 2002, C-50/00 P, para. 39; CJEU, Jégo-Quéré et Cie SA v Commission of the European 
Communities, 3 May 2002, T-177/01, paras. 41-42; CJEU, Safalero, 11 September 2003, C-13/01, para. 
50; CJEU, Ahmed Ali Yusuf, 21 September 2005, T-306/01, para. 326-327; CJEU, Unibet, 13 March 
2007, C-432/05, para. 44; CJEU, PKK and KNK, 18 January 2007, C-229/05, paras. 109, 110; CJEU, 
Kadi & Al Barakaat v. Council of the EU, 3 September 2008, C-402/05, para. 335; CJEU, People’s 
Modjahedin Organization of Iran, 4 December 2008, T-284/08, particularly para. 55; CJEU, Kücükdeveci, 
19 January 2010, C-555/07, para. 45. 
128 Jans, De Lange, Prechal & Widdershoven 2007, pp. 40-56. See also Widdershoven’s comment to 
CJEU, Pontin (2009), C-63/08, in: AB 2010. 
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sub-principles, including equivalence, effectiveness, conciliatory interpretation and 
disapplication of national law contrary to EU provisions having direct effect.129 
Arnull (2011) treats the principles of equivalence and effectiveness as sub-principles 
of the broader principle of effective judicial protection.130 This approach is also 
found in the case law of the CJEU.131 For the purposes of this study, the principle of 
effective judicial protection is broken down into four sub-principles132 and, in addi-
tion, into guidelines regarding the required intensity of judicial scrutiny. Below, I will 
first briefly discuss four sub-principles of the principle of effective judicial protection. 
These are equivalence, effectiveness, conciliatory interpretation and disapplication of 
national law contrary to EU law with direct effect. Some knowledge of these sub-
principles is needed before addressing the question of the implications of the prin-
ciple of effective judicial protection for judicial scrutiny in asylum cases. After that, I 
will discuss case law in which the CJEU – within the framework of the question of 
whether national procedural rules were compliant with the principle of effective 
judicial protection – dealt with questions regarding the intensity of judicial scrutiny 
required by EU law. The CJEU may draw upon this case law when confronted, in the 
future, with questions regarding the required intensity of judicial scrutiny in asylum 
cases. 
6.3.2.2  Effective judicial protection: equivalence and effectiveness 
In the absence of EU (harmonisation) rules on legal procedures, it is for the national 
legal system of each Member State to lay down the detailed procedural rules gov-
erning actions at law for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from EU law. 
This is called the principle of national procedural autonomy. The underlying idea of 
this principle is that it recognises that national procedural rules may reflect deep-
seated cultural and ethical values and should, therefore, not be lightly set aside.133 
There are two limitations to national procedural autonomy. First, national procedural 
rules applied in cases under EU law must be no less favourable than those governing 
similar national actions. This is called the principle of equivalence. Second, national 
procedural rules must not, in practice, make it impossible or excessively difficult to 
exercise rights conferred by EU law. This is called the principle of effectiveness. The 
CJEU has reiterated and applied this doctrine of national procedural autonomy con-
ditioned by the requirements of equivalence and effectiveness in many different judg-
ments.134 
                                                        
129 Battjes 2006, Chapter 9: Effective judicial protection, pp. 534-542. A number of other authors make 
a similar sub-division, see, for example, Craig & De Búrca 2008, Chapter 9, Tridimas 2006, Chapter 
9, section 9.7; Steiner & Woods 2009, Chapter 8. 
130 Arnull 2011, p. 51, 52. 
131 See, for a fairly recent example, CJEU, Pontin, 29 October 2009, C-63/08, paras. 43, 44. 
132 In making this sub-division, I was inspired by the CJEU, Battjes, and Arnull. It seemed the most 
appropriate for the purposes of this research.  
133 Arnull 2011, p. 52. 
134 The first and central judgment in which the CJEU developed this doctrine of national procedural 
autonomy conditioned by the requirements of equivalence and effectiveness is CJEU, Rewe, 16 De-
cember 1976, C-33/76, para. 5 and further. Since then the doctrine has been reiterated and applied 
→ 
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Craig & De Búrca (2008), Steiner&Woods (2009), Engström (2010) and Arnull 
(2011) distinguish different stages in the case law of the CJEU.135 The first stage, 
from 1958 to the mid-eighties, was dominated by great deference to national proce-
dural autonomy. In this period, the Court was unwilling to rule that national proce-
dural rules were not in conformity with the principle of effective judicial protection. 
Instead, it urged the Union legislature to take action to harmonise national procedural 
rules. The second stage, from the mid-eighties to the mid-nineties, was characterised 
by cases intervening in procedural autonomy. The emphasis yielded a stronger insis-
tence on the effectiveness of EU law and on effective judicial protection as a funda-
mental right. Examples of judgments where the CJEU adopted a more robust ap-
proach after a period of deference to national procedural autonomy are Factortame 
(1990),136 and Francovich (1991).137 In Factortame, the Court ruled, in short, that any 
provision of a national legal system and any legislative, administrative or judicial prac-
tice which might impair the effectiveness of Union law by withholding from the na-
tional court the power to do everything necessary to set aside national legislative pro-
visions which might prevent, even temporarily, Union rules from having full force 
and effect were incompatible with the requirements inherent in the very nature of 
Union law. The full effectiveness of Union law would be just as much impaired if a 
rule of national law could prevent a national court seized of a dispute governed by 
Union law from granting interim relief in order to ensure the full effectiveness of the 
judgment to be given on the existence of the rights claimed under Union law.138 In 
Francovich, the Court ruled, in short, that it was inherent in the system of EU law that 
a State must be liable for loss and damage caused to individuals by breaches of Union 
law for which the State could be held responsible.139 
In the third stage, from the mid-nineties up until the present, the case law has 
been characterised by a careful balancing of interests. The determination of the com-
patibility of a national procedural rule with the EU requirement of effective judicial 
protection depends on the character of the specific EU right at stake, the role and 
purpose of the national procedural rule, and the precise circumstances of each case.140 
In order to answer the question of compatibility, the national court must perform a 
test consisting of two steps. In the first step, it must look at the question of equiva-
lence: is the specific national procedural rule governing the action involving EU law 
no less favourable than procedural rules governing similar actions under national law? 
                                                        
in numerous other judgments. An example is CJEU, Alassini, 18 March 2010, C-317/08 to C-320/ 
08, para. 48.In literature, this jurisprudential line or doctrine is referred to as the Rewe/Comet juris-
prudence; see, for example, Barkhuijsen & Bos 2011, p. 11, Steiner & Woods 2009, 8.2, Arnull 2011, 
p. 52. 
135 Craig & De Búrca 2008, pp. 305, p. 328; the Principle of Effective Judicial Protection in EU law, 
presentation by Johanna Engström, ERA conference on national judicial protection in EU law, 
Paris, 15 and 16 February 2010; Steiner & Woods 2009, 8.3. and8.3.2; Arnull 2011, p. 52. 
136 CJEU, Factortame, 19 June 1990, C-213/89. 
137 CJEU, Francovich, 19 November 1991, C-690 and C-9/90. 
138 CJEU, Factortame, 19 June 1990, C-213/89, paras. 20 and 21. 
139 CJEU, Francovich, 19 November 1991, C-690 and C-9/90, paras. 39-41. 
140 Craig & De Búrca 2008. p. 322, Battjes 2006, pp. 535-537, Woods & Steiner 2009, 8.2, Arnull 2011, 
pp. 53-60.  
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This part of the test can be broken down into two sub-questions: first, are the EU 
claim and the national claim similar? Regard may be had here to the distinction be-
tween public and private law, to the substantive right at stake, and the purpose of the 
proceedings. Second, is the national procedural rule applicable to the EU law claim 
less or no less favourable than procedural rules applicable to similar claims based on 
national law? 
In the second step, the national judge must apply a ‘procedural rule of reason’.141 
The question of this second step is whether the national procedural rule renders ap-
plication of EU law impossible or excessively difficult. This question must be answer-
ed  
 
‘By reference to the role of the procedural rule in the domestic procedure, its progress and its 
special features, viewed as a whole, before the various national instances. In the light of that 
analysis, the basic principles of the domestic judicial system, such as the protection of the 
rights of the defence, the principle of legal certainty and the proper conduct of procedure 
must, where appropriate, be taken into consideration’.142 
 
The second step is in fact a proportionality test, in which the national court weighs 
the importance of the EU right at stake against the scope and purpose of the national 
procedural rule – for example, legal certainty, rights of the defence, judicial efficiency 
and party autonomy – taking into account the specific factual circumstances of the 
case. Literature points out that there is persistent tension in the case law: in some 
cases, the CJEU relies heavily on the notion that Union law should be effective, 
whereas in other cases the procedural autonomy of the Member States is stressed. 
The balancing approach, and the significance of the specific facts of the case, in-
troduce a large amount of uncertainty and refer the assessment of all the facts back to 
the national courts.143 
6.3.2.3  Effective judicial protection: conciliatory interpretation 
It is settled case law that national courts are required to interpret national law as 
much as possible in conformity with EU law. This is inherent in the system of Union 
law as it permits the national court to ensure the full effectiveness of EU law when it 
determines the dispute before it.144 Conciliatory interpretation is not restricted to a 
specific type of rule of EU law: it applies to directives, but also to EU primary legis-
lation, to provisions having direct effect and provisions having indirect effect.145 A 
                                                        
141 Presentation by Dr. Johanna Engström, ERA conference on domestic judicial protection in EU law, 
Paris, 15 and 16 February 2010. 
142 See, for example, CJEU, Van Schijndel (1995), C-430/93, para. 19. 
143 See, for example, Battjes 2006, pp. 535-537; Craig & De Búrca 2008, pp. 322, 328, Steiner & Woods 
2009, Chapter 8: Remedies in national courts, 8.2, 8.3.2, these authors call the case law on this matter 
‘uncertain’. See also Arnull 2011, p. 58. 
144 See, for example, CJEU, Santex SpA, 27 February 2003, C-327/00, CJEU, Kücükdeveci, 19 January 
2010, C-555/07, para. 48.  
145 CJEU, Von Colson und Kamann, 10 April 1984, C-14/83, paras. 24-28; see Battjes 2006, p. 538, with 
references. 
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good example to mention here is the CJEU’s judgment in the asylum case of Elgafaji 
(2009),146 in which the Dutch Council of State referred questions to the CJEU 
concerning the interpretation of Article 15(C) of the Qualification Directive. Lower 
national courts and the Council of State had been wrestling with the question of 
whether this provision should be seen as offering a new type of international protec-
tion or whether it could be seen as the EU asylum law counterpart of the national 
Dutch Aliens Act Articles 29(1) (b) (corresponding to Article 3 ECHR) or 29(1)(d) 
(offering temporary national protection to asylum seekers coming from countries 
where extreme violence prevails). The CJEU stressed in its judgments that national 
courts were obliged to try to reconcile national law provisions with provisions con-
tained in directives: 
 
‘In the case of the main proceedings it should be borne in mind that, although Article 15(C) of 
the Directive was expressly transposed into Netherlands law only after the facts giving rise to 
the dispute before the referring court, it is for that court to seek to carry out an interpretation 
of national law, in particular of Article 29(1) (b) and (d) of the national Aliens Act which is 
consistent with the Directive.  
According to settled case law, in applying national law, whether the provisions in question 
were adopted before or after the directive, the national court called upon to interpret it is re-
quired to do so, as far as possible, in the light of the wording and the purpose of the directive 
in order to achieve the result pursued by the latter and thereby comply with the third para-
graph of Article 249 EC (…).’147 
6.3.2.4 Effective judicial protection: disapplication of national law contrary to EU law with 
direct effect 
A rule of EU law has direct effect if it is sufficiently precise, meaning that the wordi-
ng is unequivocal, and unconditional, meaning that no reservations leaving discretion 
have been made for implementation. This is also referred to as the ‘precision and un-
conditionality test’.148 The question of whether a rule of EU law has direct effect de-
pends to a large extent on the type of instrument involved. Provisions of regulations, 
in principle, have direct effect. Provisions of directives can have direct effect when 
the transposition term has expired and the provision has not been implemented or 
has been implemented incorrectly, provided that the provision meets the conditions 
of being sufficiently precise and unconditional.149 If the EU rule with direct effect 
conflicts with a rule of national law, the EU rule has precedence in accordance with 
the principle of the supremacy of EU law and the national rule cannot apply. The 
CJEU has ruled in numerous cases that 
 
                                                        
146 CJEU, Elgafaji, 17 February 2009, C-465/07. 
147 CJEU, Elgafaji, 17 February 2009, C-465/07, paras. 41 and 42. 
148 See, for example, CJEU, Becker, 19 January 1982, C-8/81, para. 25. 
149 See, again, CJEU, Becker, 19 January 1982, C-8/81, para. 25; see also Battjes 2006, pp. 539-542, with 
references. 
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‘Where application in accordance with the requirements of Community law is not possible, the 
national court must fully apply Community law and protect the rights conferred thereunder on 
individuals, if necessary disapplying any provision in so far as its application would, in the cir-
cumstances of the case, lead to a result contrary to Community law.’150 
6.3.2.5  Effective judicial protection: required intensity of judicial scrutiny 
As will be shown in more detail below, the intensity of judicial scrutiny applied by the 
CJEU and the required intensity of judicial scrutiny to be offered by national courts 
in cases within the scope of EU law, depend on the nature of the right at stake, the 
discretion of the decision making authority, and the further circumstances of the case. 
In literature, criticism has been voiced that the CJEU has neither announced nor ap-
plied in a consistent way a clear standard of judicial scrutiny even when dealing with 
similar questions, and that explicit indications of a limited review have been followed 
by what has seemed to be a comprehensive review, whereas in other cases a limited 
review has been undertaken without justifying it.151 Certain lines regarding the inten-
sity of judicial scrutiny can be discerned in the Court’s jurisprudence, though.  
It is important to note that – just like the ECtHR has ruled in its Zumtobel 
doctrine (full jurisdiction doctrine, see Chapter 5, section 5.4.1) – the CJEU has made 
clear that  
 
‘for a tribunal to be able to determine a dispute concerning rights and obligations arising under 
EU law in accordance with Article 47 of the Charter, that tribunal must have power to con-
sider all the questions of fact and law that are relevant to the case before it’.152 
 
This basic consideration makes clear that a court must be able to look at the relevant 
facts and the relevant legal rules. It does not, however, specify any further how thor-
ough the factual judicial investigation must be. Below I will describe five main 
categories of cases for which the CJEU has developed different standards of factual 
judicial scrutiny. Given the specific asylum focus of this study, the description of 
these categories is not intended to be comprehensive. The aim is only to give certain 
insight into the notions the CJEU has developed with regard to the intensity of ju-
dicial review in relation to different areas of law. With this insight in mind, I will next 
raise and try to answer the question of what standard of judicial scrutiny the CJEU is 
most likely to apply in asylum cases. 
6.3.2.5.a Category 1: complex economic assessments 
Illustrative examples of this category are Commission decisions determining the com-
patibility of certain State aid regimes with the common market according to Article 
107, third paragraph, TFEU, a provision which allows the Commission to declare 
otherwise forbidden State aid compatible with the common market in order to 
                                                        
150 See, for example, CJEU, Solred, 5 March 1998, C-347/96, para. 30; CJEU, Engelbrecht, 26 September 
2000, C-262/97, para. 40; CJEU, Santex SpA, 27 February 2003, C-327/00, para. 64. 
151 Tridimas 2006, p. 447, Fritzsche 2010, p. 380.  
152  CJEU, EU v. Otis and Others, 6 November 2012, C-199/11, para. 49. 
EU law 
 
 
 
317 
achieve other Union interests. The Commission has to weigh the interests of undis-
torted competition in the common market against those interests and to determine 
whether State aid is necessary to achieve them.  
In older case law on the compatibility of State aid with the common market, we 
find considerations of the Court indicating that the review standard was whether the 
Commission ‘misused its powers or committed a manifest error’, which means a very 
superficial judicial touch. For example, in Exécutif Régional Wallon and SA Glaverbel v. 
Commission (1988), the Court considered as follows: 
 
‘It should be borne in mind that the Commission enjoys a power of appraisal in applying 
Article 92(3) (C) as well as in applying Article 92(3) (B). It is, in particular, for the Commission 
to determine whether trading conditions between the Member States are affected by aid to an 
extent contrary to the common interest. The applicants have supplied no evidence to suggest 
that in making that assessment the Commission misused its powers or committed a manifest 
error.’153 
 
In later jurisprudence, however, we find considerations indicating a standard of ju-
dicial review which encompasses much more than just the misuse of powers or 
manifest error test. Under this standard, the CJEU also tests compliance with proce-
dural rules, the duty to state reasons, the accuracy of the facts relied on and whether 
factual assessments show no manifest error. In Italy v. Commission (2004), the Court 
considered as follows: 
 
‘In the application of Article 92(3) of the Treaty (now: Article 107, paragraph 3, TFEU), the 
Commission has a wide discretion the exercise of which involves economic and social assess-
ments which must be made in a Community context (…). Judicial review of the manner in 
which that discretion is exercised is confined to establishing that the rules of procedure and the 
rules relating to the duty to give reasons have been complied with and to verifying the accuracy 
of the facts relied on and that there has been no error of law, manifest error of assessment in 
regard to the facts or misuse of powers (…).’154 
 
The same consideration on the standard of judicial review is found in other judg-
ments as well. A few examples are Schmitz-Gotha Fahrzeugwerke GmbH v. Commission 
(2006)155 and Société Régie Networks v. Direction de contrôle fiscal Rhône-Alpes Bourgogne 
(2008).156 In these examples, the Court not only proclaimed a more intense scrutiny 
standard but also really demonstrated a much greater willingness to go into the fac-
tual details of the cases.157 The manifest error of appraisal standard, therefore, seems 
                                                        
153 CJEU, Exécutif Régional Wallon and SA Glaverbel v. Commission, 8 March 1988, Joined cases 62/87 and 
72/87, para. 34. 
154 CJEU, Italy v. Commission, 29 April 2004, C-372/97, para. 83. 
155 CJEU, Schmitz-Gotha Fahrzeugwerke GmbH v. Commission, 6 April 2006, T-17/03, para. 41. 
156 CJEU, Société Régie Networks v. Direction de contrôle fiscal Rhône-Alpes Bourgogne, 22 December 2008, C-
333/07, para. 78. 
157 See for the same conclusion Fritzsche 2010, p. 378, with references to other authors. 
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to have evolved over time towards a standard under which a fuller judicial scrutiny 
takes place. 
This is also what Advocate-General Cosmas observed in his Opinion to French 
Republic v. Ladbroke Racing Ltd. (2000),158 where he stated: 
 
‘A tendency may be observed in the case law of the Court of Justice towards a dynamic broad-
ening of judicial review and a strengthening of jurisdiction even in instances where it is neces-
sary to solve complex legal problems.’159 
 
Cases concerning mergers and (possible) cartels form another example of this first 
category of cases. These cases involve a prospective analysis: a prediction of the 
effect a planned merger or a cartel will have on the market. Here, too, a standard of 
judicial scrutiny has evolved which indicates that the CJEU looks closely at the facts 
and the evidence. Tetra Laval (2005) was a case in which the Commission had de-
clared the merger of Tetra Laval with another company incompatible with the com-
mon market. The CJEU stressed in that case that in cases of a prospective economic 
analysis of a complex nature, a rigorous judicial scrutiny of the factual accuracy, the 
reliability and the consistency of the evidence must take place. The Court also had to 
test whether the evidence was comprehensive and whether it supported the Com-
mission’s conclusions.160 The same considerations can be found in other cases in-
volving complex prospective analyses of an economic nature, for example, Alrosa 
Company Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities (a case concerning the question 
of whether the Alrosa Company had abused a dominant market position, 2007)161 
and Qualcomm Wireless Business Solutions Europe BV v. Commission of the European Com-
munities (a case concerning market concentrations and competition, 2009).162  
The case of EU v. Otis and others (2012) concerned a possible cartel between well-
known producers of elevators. It is worthwhile quoting the relevant considerations in 
this judgment as the CJEU was particularly clear about the intensity of its scrutiny in 
this type of cases. The CJEU considered as follows: 
 
‘The defendants maintain, however, that the review of legality carried out by the EU Courts 
under Article 263 TFEU in the sphere of competition law is insufficient because of, inter alia, 
the margin of discretion which those Courts allow the Commission in economic matters. The 
Court of Justice has stated in this connection that, whilst, in areas giving rise to complex eco-
nomic assessments, the Commission has a margin of discretion with regard to economic mat-
ters, that does not mean that the EU Courts must refrain from reviewing the Commission’s in-
terpretation of information of an economic nature. Those Courts must, among other things, 
                                                        
158 CJEU, French Republic v. Ladbroke Racing Ltd, 16 May 2000, C-83/98. 
159 Opinion of A-G Cosmas of 13 November 1999 to French Republic v. Ladbroke Racing Ltd, 16 May 
2000, C-83/98. 
160 CJEU, Tetra Laval 15 February 2005, C-12/03, paras. 39-43. 
161 CJEU, Alrosa Company Ltd v. Commission of the European Communities, 11 July 2007, T-170/06, paras. 
108, 109.  
162 CJEU, Qualcomm Wireless Business Solutions Europe BV v. Commission of the European Communities, 19 June 
2009, a case concerning market concentrations and competition, T-48/04. 
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not only establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and consistent 
but also ascertain whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken into 
account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the 
conclusions drawn from it. The EU Courts must also establish of their own motion that the 
Commission has stated reasons for its decision and, among other things, that it has explained 
the weighting and assessment of the factors taken into account. The EU Courts must also 
carry out the review of legality incumbent upon them on the basis of the evidence adduced by 
the applicant in support of the pleas in law put forward. In carrying out such a review, the 
Courts cannot use the Commission’s margin of discretion – either as regards the choice of fac-
tors taken into account in the application of the criteria mentioned in the Commission notice 
entitled ‘Guidelines on the method of setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of 
Regulation (EC) No 1/2003’ (OJ 2006 C 210, p. 2) or as regards the assessment of those fac-
tors – as a basis for dispensing with the conduct of an in-depth review of the law and of the 
facts. Finally, the review of legality is supplemented by the unlimited jurisdiction which the EU 
Courts were afforded (…) which is now recognised by Article 31 of Regulation No 1/2003, in 
accordance with Article 261 TFEU. That jurisdiction empowers the Courts, in addition to 
carrying out a mere review of the lawfulness of the penalty, to substitute their own appraisal 
for the Commission’s and, consequently, to cancel, reduce or increase the fine or penalty pay-
ment imposed.’163 
  
In sum, the CJEU made clear in EU v. Otis that the scrutiny provided for by the EU 
Courts in cases concerning complex economic assessments, involve the law and the 
facts, and means that the EU Courts have the power to thoroughly assess the evi-
dence, to annul the contested decision and to alter the amount of a fine. 
6.3.2.5.b Category 2: cases requiring expert medical or technical knowledge 
A first group of cases within this category consists of cases where difficult medical 
questions play an important role. The case of Upjohn (1999)164 is described here as it is 
illustrative and because the CJEU drew an explicit link between the standard of 
judicial scrutiny applied by it and the standard of judicial scrutiny required from 
national courts.  
Upjohn concerned the revocation by the national licensing authority of a market-
ing authorisation for a medicine called Triazolam for the treatment of insomnia. This 
revocation took place after a woman had killed her mother whilst under the influence 
of this drug. The national licensing authority based the revocation on an expert medi-
cal opinion. In the ensuing proceedings before the High Court and the Court of Ap-
peal of England and Wales, Upjohn pleaded that Directive 65/65165 and, more gener-
ally, Union law, required the Member States to establish a procedure for judicial re-
view of decisions taken by the national authorities responsible for marketing authori-
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sations, empowering national courts to verify, on the basis of a completely fresh, 
comprehensive assessment of the issues of fact and of law, whether the decision 
taken had been correct. The CJEU disagreed with Upjohn. The Court first referred to 
its doctrine of national procedural autonomy subject to equivalence and effectiveness: 
 
‘It is settled case-law that in the absence of Community rules governing the matter it is for the 
domestic legal system of each Member State to (…) lay down the detailed procedural rules 
governing actions for safeguarding rights which individuals derive from Community law, pro-
vided, however, that such rules are not less favourable than those governing similar domestic 
actions (the principle of equivalence) and do not render virtually impossible or excessively dif-
ficult the exercise of rights conferred by Community law (the principle of effectiveness)’.166 
 
The CJEU then continued: 
 
‘As regards decisions revoking marketing authorisations taken by the competent national au-
thorities following complex assessments in the medico-pharmacological field, it does not ap-
pear that the only appropriate means of preventing the exercise of rights conferred by Com-
munity law from being rendered virtually impossible or excessively difficult would be a proce-
dure for judicial review of national decisions revoking marketing authorisations, empowering 
the competent national courts and tribunals to substitute their assessment of the facts and, in 
particular, of the scientific evidence relied on in support of the revocation decision for the as-
sessment made by the national authorities competent to revoke such authorisations.’167 
 
Importantly, the Court then drew a parallel with the intensity of its own judicial 
review in situations where an EU authority had made a complex assessment, and 
concluded that national courts were not obliged under EU law to perform a more 
extensive review: 
 
‘According to the Court’s case-law, where a Community authority is called upon, in the per-
formance of its duties, to make complex assessments, it enjoys a wide measure of discretion, 
the exercise of which is subject to a limited judicial review in the course of which the Commu-
nity judicature may not substitute its assessment of the facts for the assessment made by the 
authority concerned. Thus, in such cases, the Community judicature must restrict itself to ex-
amining the accuracy of the findings of fact and law made by the authority concerned and to 
verifying, in particular, that the action taken by that authority is not vitiated by a manifest error 
or a misuse of powers and that it did not clearly exceed the bounds of its discretion. (…) 
Consequently, Community law does not require the Member States to establish a procedure 
for judicial review of national decisions revoking marketing authorisations, taken pursuant to 
Directive 65/65 and in the exercise of complex assessments, which involves a more extensive 
review than that carried out by the Court in similar cases.’168 
 
                                                        
166 CJEU, Upjohn Ltd v. The Licensing Authority established by the Medicines Act 1968 and Others, 21 January 
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Finally, and importantly, the CJEU ruled in Upjohn that EU law did not require a 
national court seized of an application for annulment of a decision revoking a mar-
keting authorisation for a medicinal product to take into account any relevant scien-
tific information coming to light after the adoption of the administrative decision. In 
other words, the national court was not required to perform an ex nunc review.169 In 
reaching this conclusion, the CJEU took into account the fact that in the event of 
new material coming to light, the company concerned would still be able to make a 
fresh application for a new marketing authorisation.170 
The standard of judicial scrutiny mentioned in Upjohn – an ex tunc test of accuracy 
of findings of fact and law, absence of manifest error and misuse of powers – re-
sembles the standard formulated in State aid cases (see above 6.3.2.5.a) which en-
compasses the same elements. In the State aid cases, however, two more elements 
were explicitly mentioned as being part of the judicial test: whether rules of procedure 
had been adhered to by the administrative authority and whether the administrative 
authority had adhered to its duty to give reasons for its decision.  
The importance of a judicial test on compliance with procedural rules is stressed 
in a second group of cases coming within the category of ‘technical knowledge cases’, 
being customs duty exemption cases. In the case of Technische Universität München 
(1991),171 the national court asked for a preliminary ruling on the legality of a Com-
mission decision denying customs duty exemption for an electron microscope the 
university had imported from a third country, on the basis that there were appara-
tuses of equivalent scientific value in the Union. The national court expressed its 
doubt as to whether the limited judicial review the Union judicature normally adopted 
in such cases would be in line with the general principle of effective judicial pro-
tection. The CJEU held:  
 
‘It must be stated first of all that, since an administrative procedure entailing complex technical 
evaluations is involved, the Commission must have a power of appraisal in order to be able to 
fulfill its tasks. However, where the Community institutions have such a power of appraisal, 
respect for the rights guaranteed by the Community legal order in administrative procedures is 
of even more fundamental importance. Those guarantees include, in particular, the duty of the 
competent institution to examine carefully and impartially all the relevant aspects of the indi-
vidual case, the right of the person concerned to make his views known and to have an ade-
quately reasoned decision. Only in this way can the Court verify whether the factual and legal 
elements upon which the exercise of the power of appraisal depends were present.’172 
6.3.2.5.c Category 3: complex value judgments in staff matters 
In staff cases, the CJEU has demonstrated reluctance to examine in detail the factual 
findings in reports by superiors on the professional performance of staff members. 
With regard to the intensity of judicial review the Court has, in a number of judg-
ments, formulated the standard as follows:  
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‘The Court considers that, according to settled case-law, it does not have the function of deter-
mining whether the assessment by the administration of the occupational ability of an official 
is well founded when such an assessment involves complex value judgments which, by their 
very nature, are not capable of objective proof. However, those cases concern only value judg-
ments and the Court is required to carry out a review concerning any irregularities of form or 
procedure, manifest errors of fact vitiating the assessments made by the administration and any 
misuse of power.’173 
 
In other words, if the assessment of the occupational ability of an official involves a 
complex value judgment, which will often be so in staff cases, the Court does not see 
it as its task to examine the facts underpinning this assessment and to examine the 
question of whether these facts form sufficient basis for the decision. The Court 
does, however, verify whether the procedural rights guarding the decision-making 
process were upheld. 
6.3.2.5.d Category 4: protection of consumer rights174 
The leading case here is Océano Grupo Editorial and Salvat Editores (2000)175 concerning 
the interpretation of Directive 93/13 on unfair terms in consumer contracts.176 The 
referring national court asked the CJEU whether the system of protection which this 
Directive guaranteed to consumers implied that a national court, in deciding a case 
concerning alleged non-performance of a contract concluded between a seller or sup-
plier and a consumer, must be able to determine, of its own motion, whether a term 
inserted into that contract was unfair. The CJEU answered this question in the af-
firmative, emphasizing the weak position of the consumer vis-à-vis the seller or sup-
plier in the context of the conclusion of consumer contracts as well as in the context 
of possible legal disputes concerning the performance of those contracts, and the en-
suing need to correct this imbalance by positive action. The Court phrased it as fol-
lows:  
 
‘As to the question of whether a court seized of a dispute concerning a contract between a 
seller or supplier and a consumer may determine of its own motion whether a term of the con-
tract is unfair, it should be noted that the system of protection introduced by the Directive is 
based on the idea that the consumer is in a weak position vis-à-vis the seller or supplier, as 
regards both his bargaining power and his level of knowledge. This leads to the consumer 
agreeing to terms drawn up in advance by the seller or supplier without being able to influence 
the content of the terms. The aim of Article 6 of the Directive, which requires Member States 
to lay down that unfair terms are not binding on the consumer, would not be achieved if the 
consumer were himself obliged to raise the unfair nature of such terms. In disputes where the 
                                                        
173 See, for example, CJEU, Calvin Williams v. the Court of Auditors of the European Communities, 10 Decem-
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amounts involved are often limited, the lawyers' fees may be higher than the amount at stake, 
which may deter the consumer from contesting the application of an unfair term. While it is 
the cases that, in a number of Member States, procedural rules enable individuals to defend 
themselves in such proceedings, there is a real risk that the consumer, particularly because of 
ignorance of the law, will not challenge the term pleaded against him on the grounds that it is 
unfair. It follows that effective protection of the consumer may be attained only if the national 
court acknowledges that it has power to evaluate terms of this kind of its own motion. 
Moreover (…) the system of protection laid down by the Directive is based on the notion that 
the imbalance between the consumer and the seller or supplier may only be corrected by posi-
tive action unconnected with the actual parties to the contract. (…).’177 
 
In its case law regarding Directive 93/13, the CJEU has not only ruled that national 
courts must have the power and are obliged to examine, of their own motion, 
whether a term of a consumer contract is to be regarded as unfair within the meaning 
of Article 3 of that Directive, which power may not be subjected to a specific limita-
tion period after which the power would become time-barred.178 National courts 
seized of an action for annulment of an arbitration award delivered on the basis of an 
arbitration agreement in a consumer contract must also have the power to determine 
whether this arbitration agreement must be regarded as unfair under Directive 93/13, 
and, in the affirmative, to declare the arbitration agreement void and annul the ar-
bitration award, even though the consumer has omitted to plead that invalidity in the 
course of the arbitration proceedings.179 
The CJEU has expanded this line of reasoning to other consumer protection 
directives as well. As a result of this case law, national courts must have the power to 
apply, of their own motion, the national law provisions transposing Article 11, 
paragraph 2, of Directive 87/102 concerning the right of the consumer to pursue 
remedies against the grantor of credit.180 The same is true with regard to Article 4 of 
Directive 85/577 concerning the duty of the trader to give notice of the consumer’s 
right of cancellation of a contract negotiated away from business premises, so that, in 
the event that the consumer has not been duly informed of this right of cancellation, 
the national court may then raise, of its own motion, an infringement of this duty of 
the trader.181 
In this case law, the CJEU has not fundamentally called into question the prin-
ciple of procedural autonomy of the Member States, but has resorted to a consumer-
oriented interpretation of this principle and raised the effectiveness threshold which 
national procedural rules for the enforcement of the rights under the consumer 
protection directives must meet.182 The CJEU has justified the active role of national 
courts by referring to the aim of strengthening consumer protection, a measure which 
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is essential to the accomplishment of the tasks entrusted to the EU, and to raising the 
standard of living and the quality of life in its territory.183 In short, the weak position 
of the consumer vis-à-vis the seller or supplier and the importance of the public 
interest underlying consumer protection justifies a firm and active role for national 
courts.184 
6.3.2.5.e Category 5: restrictions of fundamental freedoms of EU citizens 
The CJEU has dealt with numerous cases concerning the entry of, refusal of a resi-
dence permit to, or (planned) expulsion of migrated EU citizens for reasons of public 
order or public security. In these cases it has gradually developed a specific standard 
of judicial scrutiny to be applied by national courts. Until April 2006, the Directive 
regulating the entry of, refusal of a residence permit to, or (planned) expulsion of 
migrated EU citizens for reasons of public order or public security was Directive 
64/221/EC.185 Article 8 of this Directive provided that the person concerned should 
have the same legal remedies in respect of any decision concerning entry or refusal of 
the renewal of a residence permit or expulsion from the territory as were available to 
nationals of the State concerned in respect of acts of the administration. Article 9 
stipulated, in short, that where the national legal system did not provide for a right of 
appeal to a court or where such appeal would only extend to the legal validity (no 
appeal on the facts, but only on points of law), the administrative authority had to 
obtain, prior to the decision, an opinion from an independent competent authority. 
In a number of judgments the CJEU further explained that, where the national right 
of appeal was limited only to the legal validity (not factual validity) of the adminis-
trative decision, the purpose of the intervention of the authority referred to in Article 
9 was to enable an 
 
‘Exhaustive examination of all the facts and circumstances, including the expediency of the 
proposed measure, to be carried out before the decision is finally taken.’186 
 
In other words, where national law allowed for a judicial review on points of law 
only, Article 9 of the Directive required an additional national legal remedy allowing 
for a full review on all the relevant points of law and fact. In the words of the CJEU, 
the Article 9-procedure was aimed at ‘mitigating the effect of deficiencies in the 
available national legal remedies’.187 From this qualification – deficiency – it may be 
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inferred that, in cases concerning restrictions on the right of free movement of Union 
citizens, the CJEU regards a national judicial review on only points of law as deficient 
and, therefore, inappropriate. In other words, full judicial review on points of fact 
and points of law is the standard in these cases.188 
In Olazabal (2002), a case which concerned the legality of measures limiting the 
Spanish citizen Olazabal’s rights of residence in France to only a part of French 
territory, the CJEU clarified that this standard of judicial scrutiny also meant that the 
national court had to determine whether the measure restricting the right to free 
movement complied with the principle of proportionality. The proportionality test to 
be performed by the national court was whether the measure did in fact relate to 
individual conduct which constituted a genuine and sufficiently serious threat to 
public order or public security.189 In Olazabal, the Court also shed light on the reason 
behind this standard of full judicial scrutiny on facts, law and proportionality. The 
reason why such judicial scrutiny was required was that one of the fundamental free-
doms guaranteed by EU law – the freedom of movement of EU citizens – was at 
stake.190 
Two years after Olazabal, the Court explained in the case of Orfanopoulos and 
Oliveiri (2004)191 that the standard of full judicial scrutiny on facts, law and propor-
tionality also meant that national courts must take into consideration factual matters 
which had occurred after the final decision of the administrative authority and which 
might have pointed to the cessation or substantial diminution of the threat which the 
conduct of the person constituted to public policy. In other words, ex nunc judicial 
scrutiny was required.192 In Orfanopoulos, a case concerning the expulsion from Ger-
many of a Greek and Italian citizen on grounds of public order, the national court 
asked whether Article 3 of Directive 64/221 precluded a national practice whereby 
the courts of a Member State could not take into consideration, in reviewing the 
lawfulness of the expulsion of a national of another Member State, factual matters 
and a positive development in that person which had occurred after the final decision 
of the competent authorities. Under the national German system, the courts could 
base their decisions on evidence which had become available after the final decision 
had been taken by the administration only where such evidence would support the 
administrative decision. Both Orfanopoulos and Oliveri invoked, at the national judi-
cial stage, new facts and circumstances (facts that came up after the administrative de-
cision). Oliveri referred to the fact that he was HIV-infected.  
The CJEU first reiterated its standard consideration on national procedural au-
tonomy limited by equality and effectiveness.193 It then moved on to rule as follows 
with regard to German judicial practice: 
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‘A national practice such as that described in the order for reference is liable to adversely affect 
the right to freedom of movement to which nationals of the Member States are entitled and 
particularly their right not to be subjected to expulsion measures save in the extreme cases pro-
vided for by Directive 64/221. That is especially so if a lengthy period has elapsed between the 
date of the decision to expel the person concerned and that of the review of that decision by 
the competent court.  
In the light of the foregoing, the reply to the second question must be that Article 3 of Direc-
tive 64/221 precludes a national practice whereby the national courts may not take into consid-
eration, in reviewing the lawfulness of the expulsion of a national of another Member State, 
factual matters which occurred after the final decision of the competent authorities which may 
point to the cessation or the substantial diminution of the present threat which the conduct of 
the person concerned constitutes to the requirements of public policy. That is so, above all, if a 
lengthy period has elapsed between the date of the expulsion order and that of the review of 
that decision by the competent court.’194 
 
For EU citizens and their family members migrating with them, the standard of full 
judicial scrutiny on facts, law and proportionality has now been codified in Article 31, 
paragraph 3 of Directive 2004/38, which reads:  
 
‘The redress procedures shall allow for an examination of the legality of the decision, as well as 
of the facts and circumstances on which the proposed measure is based. They shall ensure that 
the decision is not disproportionate, particularly in view of the requirements laid down in Ar-
ticle 28.’195 
 
The CJEU has subsequently extended this standard of full and ex nunc judicial 
scrutiny on facts, law and proportionality to Turkish workers and their family mem-
bers who enjoy the rights of Decision 1/80 of the Association Council of 19 Septem-
ber 1980 on the development of the Association between the EU and Turkey (Deci-
sion 1/80) or the rights or freedoms under the Agreement Creating An Association 
Between The Republic of Turkey and the European Economic Community of 1963 
(The Association Agreement).196 
6.3.2.5.f  Expected standard of judicial scrutiny in asylum cases 
The CJEU has so far not had an occasion to express itself extensively on issues 
relating to the intensity of national judicial review in asylum cases. At this moment in 
time, I can, therefore, only make a preliminary estimation as to whether it will follow 
one (or more) of the jurisprudential lines described above and declare one (or more) 
of the standards described above regarding the intensity of judicial scrutiny applicable 
to asylum cases. Interestingly, asylum cases are characterised by features which create 
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a parallel with each of the categories of cases described above. It is, therefore, not 
only possible, but also feasible and useful to make such estimation. 
First, asylum cases feature a parallel with category 1 cases in which a complex 
retro-prospective appraisal is made. In asylum cases, too, a complex retro-prospective 
analysis is made. Based on the flight narrative concerning past events and based on a 
taxation of the current situation the central question to be answered is whether the 
asylum seeker runs a risk of persecution or torture or inhuman or degrading treat-
ment upon expulsion to the country of origin. Given this parallel, it would not be sur-
prising if the CJEU drew on the standard that it 
 
‘must not only (…) establish whether the evidence relied on is factually accurate, reliable and 
consistent but also whether that evidence contains all the information which must be taken in-
to account in order to assess a complex situation and whether it is capable of substantiating the 
conclusions drawn from it. Such a review is all the more necessary in the case of a prospective 
analysis required (…). Thus, the Court (…) was right to find (…) that the [administrative au-
thority’s] analysis (…) calls for a close examination of the circumstances which are relevant 
(…). A prospective analysis (…) must be carried out with great care since it does not entail the 
examination of past events – for which often many items of evidence are available which make 
it possible to understand the causes – or of current events, but rather a prediction of events 
which are more or less likely to occur in future (…).’197 
 
And that it is also the CJEU’s task  
 
‘to establish that the rules of procedure and the rules relating to the duty to give reasons have 
been complied with and to verifying the accuracy of the facts relied on and that there has been 
no error of law, manifest error of assessment in regard to the facts or misuse of powers 
(…).’198 
 
This would mean an intense scrutiny of the evidence relied on by both parties, the 
conclusions parties draw from this evidence, the rules of procedure, possible error of 
law, manifest error of factual assessment and, finally, misuse of powers. 
A second parallel can be drawn between asylum cases and category 4 cases con-
cerning consumer rights. In these cases, the CJEU has found that the weak position 
of the consumer vis-à-vis the seller or supplier and the importance of the public 
interest underlying consumer protection justify a firm and active role for national 
courts.199 It may be argued that asylum seekers are often in a similarly weak position 
vis-à-vis the administrative decision maker for different reasons. First, because of the 
difficult evidentiary position in which asylum seekers will often find themselves: it 
will often be difficult to substantiate asylum claims with direct documentary evidence 
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and to do this within a short time frame.200 Second, because asylum seekers are vul-
nerable: they are foreigners who do not normally speak the language of the country 
of refuge, who have only recently arrived in that country, who are very much de-
pendent on legal assistance for bringing an asylum claim and who are often also 
vulnerable in other respects. Given this imbalance between the parties (which is per-
haps even greater than the imbalance between consumer and seller or supplier), the 
CJEU may probably require national courts to take an active role when it comes to 
fact finding and evidence gathering. It will probably also be inspired by the active role 
in the gathering and verification of facts played by the ECtHR in a number of asylum 
cases.201 
A third parallel can be drawn with category 3-cases concerning complex value 
judgments in staff matters. It may be argued that especially assessment of the credi-
bility of the statements of asylum seekers in fact involves a complex value judgment 
with a strong subjective component. The words used by Judge Thomassen in her 
concurring opinion to the judgment in Said v. the Netherlands (2005) spring to mind:  
 
‘What complicates the examination of the present and similar cases, however, is that the facts – 
as related by the person concerned – can often not, or can only partially, be established. This 
cannot always be held against that individual, because one can readily understand that adducing 
proof of the facts is often a difficult task. At the same time, it is important to recognise that 
persons who have fabricated the reasons for their flight should not be able to benefit from asy-
lum laws, because this could discredit the very important humanitarian right to asylum. Insuf-
ficient facts will often result in the judge having to assess the reliability of the account given by 
the person concerned. Bearing in mind the subjective elements which are inherent in making 
such an assessment, judges will to a certain extent, in an area where the most fundamental hu-
man rights are at stake, find themselves on thin ice.’202 
 
Drawing on this parallel, the CJEU may probably see reasons to rule that it is not the 
task of the Court itself, and not the task of national courts, to examine the facts 
underpinning the assessment of credibility and to examine the question of whether 
these facts form sufficient basis for the decision. 
There is a fourth parallel between asylum cases and category 5-cases concerning 
restrictions of fundamental freedoms of EU citizens. In these category 5-cases, the 
CJEU has developed the intense standard of full and ex nunc judicial scrutiny on facts, 
law and proportionality by national courts because the EU right at stake in such cases 
– the freedom of movement of EU citizens – constitutes a ‘fundamental freedom of 
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EU law’.203 Similarly, the right to asylum laid down in Article 18 of the Charter is a 
fundamental right; in its judgment in Abdulla (2010),204 the CJEU made clear that in 
asylum cases  
 
‘The integrity of human beings and individual freedoms, matters belonging to the fundamental 
values of the Union (italics author) are at stake’.205 
 
The similar terminology used – the term ‘fundamental freedom’ in EU citizen migra-
tion cases and the term ‘fundamental value’ in asylum cases – makes clear that, al-
though the right of free movement of EU citizens and the right to asylum are of a 
different nature, the CJEU regards both as very important EU rights. Given the 
fundamental nature of the right at stake, it would not be surprising if the CJEU ex-
tended the standard of full and ex nunc national judicial scrutiny to asylum cases. 
There is yet another reason why it seems likely that the CJEU will extend the stan-
dard of full and ex nunc judicial scrutiny on facts, law and proportionality to asylum 
cases. This standard comes close to the requirement for full jurisdiction flowing from 
Article 6, first paragraph, ECHR and the requirement for rigorous scrutiny flowing 
from Articles 3 and 13 ECHR. As was explained above, the scrutiny performed by 
the ECtHR under Article 3 has been incorporated into EU asylum law via Article 19, 
second paragraph, in conjunction with Article 52, third paragraph, of the Charter, and 
the full jurisdiction and rigorous scrutiny requirements flowing from Articles 6 and 13 
ECHR have been incorporated into Union law via Article 47 in conjunction with 
Article 52, third paragraph, of the Charter.206 Article 52, third paragraph, stipulates, in 
short, that Charter rights corresponding to ECHR rights are in meaning and scope 
the same as their ECHR counterparts, but that Charter rights may provide more ex-
tensive protection. It follows that judicial protection offered under EU law may not 
fall below the standards of judicial protection offered by the ECtHR. A first con-
firmation for this line of reasoning may be found in the recent judgment, Samba Diouf 
(2011), in which the CJEU ruled that the final decision on an asylum claim must be 
the subject of a thorough review on the merits of the claim by the national court.207 It 
is also interesting to note that in the recast proposal for the new Procedures Directive 
Article 41, third paragraph, stipulates the following:  
 
‘Member States shall ensure that the effective remedy referred to in paragraph 1 provides for a 
full examination of both facts and points of law, including an ex nunc examination of the inter-
                                                        
203 See CJEU, Olazabal, 26 November 2002, C-100/01, para. 43. 
204 CJEU, Abdulla, 2 March 2010, C-175/08, C-176/08, C-178/08 and C-179/08. 
205 Ibidem, para. 90. 
206 See for the same conclusion CJEU, Elgafaji, 17 February 2009, C-465/07, para. 28: ‘(...) the funda-
mental right guaranteed under Article 3 of the ECHR forms part of the general principles of Com-
munity law, observance of which is ensured by the Court, and (...) the case law of the European 
Court of Human Rights is taken into consideration in interpreting the scope of that right in the 
Community legal order (...).’ 
207 CJEU, Samba Diouf, 28 July 2011, C-69/10, paras. 56, 61. 
Chapter 6 
 
 
 
330 
national protection needs (…), at least in appeal procedures before a court or tribunal of first 
instance.’208 
 
This recast proposal was, at the time of completion of this chapter, still the subject of 
negotiations and it is so far unknown whether this text will be included in the new 
Procedures Directive. The proposed text does, however, indicate that the drafters 
sought inspiration from both the case law of the ECtHR and the case law of the 
CJEU in cases concerning the migration of EU and Turkish citizens and deemed it 
necessary to transpose the standard of judicial scrutiny developed in that case law into 
the asylum context. 
Finally, a small category of asylum cases feature a certain parallel with category 2-
cases requiring expert medical and/or technical knowledge. We may think, for ex-
ample, of cases in which an asylum request has been refused because of doubt as to 
the asylum seeker’s stated minority (age under 18) and in which a medical age test has 
been performed on the instigation of the administrative decision maker. Another 
example would be the so-called medical asylum cases – cases in which seriously ill in-
dividuals claim asylum abroad because they fear death due to the absence of medical 
care facilities in their home countries. In such cases, the administrative decision 
maker often orders medical examinations to be carried out. It is possible that in such 
special asylum cases the CJEU will resort to the standard developed in category 2 and 
will regard as appropriate a somewhat more limited factual judicial scrutiny, coupled 
with close judicial scrutiny of compliance with procedural rules. 
6.3.2.5.g  Provisions on judicial scrutiny in secondary EU asylum law 
Secondary EU asylum law contains different provisions on national legal remedies. 
Three different types of clauses can be distinguished: 
- Provisions granting a ‘right to mount a legal challenge’, for example, Article 29 of 
the Temporary Protection Directive;209 
- Provisions granting a ‘right to appeal against decisions’, for example, Article 21, 
first paragraph, of the Reception Conditions Directive,210 and Article 19, second 
paragraph, of the Dublin Regulation;211 
                                                        
208 COM (2009) 554 final 21 October 2009, 2009/0165 (COD). The recast proposal can be found inte-
grally in Hailbronner 2010, p. 1311-1350. It can also be found in the EUR-lex database: http://eur-
lex.europa.eu, under Preparatory documents, COM documents. 
209 Article 29 of Directive 2001/55/EC on Minimum Standards for Temporary Protection stipulates: 
‘Persons who have been excluded from the benefit of temporary protection by a Member State have 
the right to mount a legal challenge in this Member State.’ 
210 Article 21, para. 1, of Directive 2003/9/EC on Minimum Standards for the Reception of Asylum 
Seekers stipulates: ‘Negative decisions relating to the granting of benefits under this Directive or de-
cisions taken under Article 7 (decisions with regard to their residence and freedom of movement) 
which affect asylum seekers individually may be the subject of an appeal within the procedures laid 
down in the national law. The Member States must at least in the last instance grant the asylum seek-
er the right of appeal or review before a judicial body.’ 
211 Article 19, para. 2, of Regulation 343/2003/EC (Dublin II) stipulates: ‘This decision (the decision 
not to examine an asylum application) may be subject to an appeal or a review. Appeal or review 
concerning this decision shall not suspend the implementation of the transfer unless the courts or 
competent bodies so decide on a case by case basis if national legislation allows for this.’ 
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- Provisions granting a ‘right to an effective remedy before a court or tribunal’, for 
example, Article 39 of the Procedures Directive.212 
 
The directives on migration (regular migration, not asylum) also contain differently 
worded provisions on national legal protection. The ‘right to mount a legal challenge’ 
can be found in Article 18 of Directive 2003/86/EC on the right to family reunifica-
tion. The ‘right to appeal against decisions’ can be found in Article 13, third para-
graph, of Regulation 562/2006, also known as the Schengen Borders Code. The third 
type found in the asylum instruments – the ‘right to an effective remedy’ – is not 
present in the migration instruments. Instead, we see a different kind of provision in 
Directive 2004/38 on the right of citizens of the Union and their family members to 
move and reside freely within the territory of the Member States. Article 31 of this 
Directive contains a right of access to judicial and administrative redress procedures, 
which allow for an examination of the legality of the decision, as well as of the facts 
and circumstances on which the proposed measure is based, and which ensure that 
the decision is not disproportionate. That standard is the codification of the principle 
of full judicial scrutiny on facts, law and proportionality discussed above in section 
6.3.2.5.e, developed in the case law concerning the migration of EU citizens, their co-
migrating third-country family members, and Turkish migrants who enjoy the rights 
of Decision 1/80 of the EEC-Turkey Association Council. 
The legislative history of the provisions on legal remedies in secondary EU asy-
lum law demonstrates that, in the negotiations following the original text proposals, 
serious attempts were made by representatives of the EU Member States to keep 
national courts away from negative asylum decisions or to water down the intensity 
of judicial scrutiny of negative asylum decisions. The original text of Article 29 of the 
Temporary Protection Directive stated that persons excluded from the benefit of 
temporary protection were ‘entitled to seek redress in the courts’ of the Member State 
concerned.213 The amended text – persons excluded from temporary protection ‘shall 
be entitled to legal challenge’ instead of ‘shall be entitled to seek redress in the courts’ 
– occurred for the first time in the Introductory Note from the Council Secretariat to 
the Permanent Representatives Committee of 18 April 2001, unfortunately without 
any footnotes explaining the amendment.214 This Note, however, mentioned that, in 
between the Council sessions, the Permanent Representatives Committee 
(COREPER)215 had been working on the text of the provisions, in order to obtain an 
                                                        
212 Article 39, paras. 1 and 2 of Directive 2005/85/EC on Minimum Standards for Asylum Procedures 
stipulate: ‘Member States shall ensure that applicants for asylum have the right to an effective 
remedy before a court or tribunal, against the following (…) (author: follows a list of all negative de-
cisions on an asylum application). Member States shall provide for time-limits and other necessary 
rules for the applicant to exercise his/her right to an effective remedy pursuant to paragraph 1.’ 
213 COM(2000)0303. 
214 In many of these reports, text amendments are indicated in bold and explanations are provided in 
footnotes. Unfortunately, not all amendments are made explicit and explained in this way.  
215 Article 240 TFEU lays down the legal basis of COREPER, the Committee of Permanent Repre-
sentatives in the EU, made up of the head or deputy head of missions from the EU member states 
in Brussels. The functioning of COREPER is very well explained at http://www.europa-nu.nl/id/ 
vga3ex9vr2z9/comite_van_permanente_vertegenwoordigers. 
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agreement. This leads to the conclusion that the amendment was brought about by 
the Permanent Representatives of the Member States, obviously in an attempt to 
maintain the option of remedies other than judicial control, as a ‘legal challenge’ in-
cludes both administrative and judicial remedies.216 It is interesting to mention here 
that a similar development occurred in the history of the provisions granting a ‘right 
to mount a legal challenge’ in the migration directives. Article 18 of Directive 2003/ 
86/EC on the right to family reunification, which, just like Article 29 of the Tem-
porary Protection Directive, contains the ‘right to mount a legal challenge’ (against a 
decision rejecting family reunification), has a similar drafting history. The first two 
proposals granted a ‘right to apply to the courts of the Member State concerned’217 
and the third proposal even granted a ‘de facto and de jure right to apply to the 
courts’.218 Here, too, the text was amended in the course of the negotiations. It was 
obviously thought that a ‘right to mount a legal challenge’ would make it allowable to 
have (only) administrative remedies and keep national courts away from refusals of 
family reunification. Guèvremont (2009) makes clear in her dissertation that in the 
process of negotiations on the Family Reunification Directive it became clear that in 
Austria, Ireland and Sweden no judicial remedies existed against refusals of family 
reunification.219 By amending the text to the vague ‘right to mount a legal challenge’, 
the negotiators clearly attempted to restrict the impact of the Directive on existing 
national remedies. 
The legislative history of Article 19, second paragraph, of the Dublin Regulation 
demonstrates the same transformation. The initial text in the initial legislative pro-
posal from the Commission was different and stipulated that ‘appeal from the 
decision shall lie to the courts’.220 The amended text ‘the decision may be subject to 
an appeal or a review’ instead of ‘appeal from the decision shall lie at the courts’ ap-
peared for the first time in the Report on the outcome of the proceedings of the Asy-
lum Working Party221 of 8, 9 and 17 May 2002.222 The Report contained no clarifica-
tions explaining the amendment.223 The amendment had obviously been brought 
about by the members of the Asylum Working Party of the Council of the EU in an 
attempt to maintain the option of remedies other than judicial control. As Asylum 
                                                        
216 Hailbronner 2010, p. 868. 
217 COM (1999) 638 final, Article 16; COM (2000) 624 final, Article 16. 
218 COM (2002) 225 final, Article 18. 
219 Guèvremont 2009, pp. 231-235. 
220 COM(2001)0447, Article 20(2), the legislative observatory. 
221 The Asylum Working Party of the Council of the EU deals with the proposed legal instruments 
aimed at creating a common European system of asylum. The Working Party prepares all asylum is-
sues before they go to COREPER and then on to ministerial level. The Working Party comprises 
senior officials, either from the Member States’ permanent representations in Brussels or from na-
tional ministries.  
See: http://www.europa-nu.nl/id/vga3ex9vr2z9/comite_van_permanente_vertegenwoordigers. 
222 Outcome of proceedings of the Asylum Working Party, Report of 8, 9 and 17 May 2002, No. 
8752/02. This report was found in the following way on the internet: Radboud Universiteit Nijme-
gen, European Documentation Centre, Institutions, Council of the EU, Documents, Advanced 
Search, interinstitutional number CNS 2001/0182. 
223 In many of these reports, text amendments are indicated in bold and explanations are provided in 
footnotes. Unfortunately, not all amendments are made explicit and explained in this way. 
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Working Party deliberations and reports thereof are not open to the public, it cannot 
be traced any further whether there were any other or additional reasons behind the 
amendment. 
In contrast to the Temporary Protection Directive and the Dublin Regulation, 
where amendments were made to provisions on national legal remedies in an attempt 
to maintain the option of remedies other than judicial control, the text of Article 39, 
first paragraph, of the Asylum Procedures Directive was not amended in the same 
way. What did occur, however, was a different type of amendment. The initial 
Commission proposal was based on the notion of a two-tier review/judicial appeal 
system. The first paragraph of Article 38 stated that ‘Member States shall ensure that 
in all cases applicants for asylum have a right to further appeal to the Appellate 
Court’. It stipulated, in Article 38, second paragraph, that ‘if the reviewing body is an 
administrative or quasi-judicial body, Member States shall ensure that the Appellate 
Court has the power to examine decisions on both facts and points of law. If the re-
viewing body is a judicial body, Member States may decide that the Appellate Court 
has to limit its examination of decisions to points of law’. According to the explana-
tion by the Commission, the idea behind this text was that there should be at least 
one judicial examination on both facts and points of law.224 The first legislative stage 
after this modified proposal by the Commission in which the addition ‘examination 
on both facts and points of law’ no longer formed part of the text was the so-called 
Council Re-consultation, the result of which was laid down in a report of 9 Novem-
ber 2004.225 In this report, the text of Article 38 spoke of the right to an effective 
remedy before a court, without specifying that the judicial scrutiny should encompass 
both points of fact and points of law. The report did not explain the reasons behind 
the amendment but it follows that the intention of the amendment must have been to 
create room for forms of judicial scrutiny not encompassing review of the facts.  
It may be argued that the described attempts to keep national courts away from 
negative asylum decisions or to water down the intensity of judicial scrutiny over 
negative asylum decisions were made in vain.226 Secondary EU law provisions have to 
be interpreted in accordance with higher ranking EU law provisions.227 Article 47 of 
the Charter is such a higher ranking EU law provision as since the entry into force of 
the Treaty of Lisbon the Charter has been binding primary Union law.228 As was ex-
plained above in section 6.1.3.2, the legal status of the Charter was very different at 
                                                        
224 COM 2000/0578. 
225 Council Re-consultation No. 14203/2004. 
226 See for the same conclusion Brouwer 2007. 
227 See, for example, CJEU, Deticek, 23 December 2009, C-403/09, paras. 53-55. The reference for a 
preliminary ruling in this case concerned the interpretation of Article 20 of Council Regulation (EC) 
No 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation 
(EC) No. 1347/2000 (OJ 2003 L 338, p. 1). The CJEU ruled, in paras. 53-55, that Article 20 of 
Regulation No. 2201/2003 must be interpreted in such a way that respect is paid to the fundamental 
right of the child set out in Article 24(3) of the Charter, to maintain on a regular basis a personal re-
lationship and direct contact with both parents. 
228 Article 6, para. 1, part 1, TEU reads: ‘The Union recognises the rights, freedoms and principles set 
out in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union of 7 December 2000, as adapted 
at Strasbourg, on 12 December 2007, which shall have the same legal value as the Treaties.’ 
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the time of the negotiations on the secondary asylum instruments. In that period the 
Charter was no more than a non-binding solemn declaration of principles. Obviously, 
at that time, the negotiators who drafted the texts of the secondary EU law asylum 
instruments did not foresee that the Charter’s legal status would change so drastically 
in the near future. Article 47 of the Charter guarantees the right to an effective reme-
dy before a judicial body: a court or tribunal, and not an administrative body, and re-
quires an intense form of judicial scrutiny when fundamental rights are at stake. 
When interpreting secondary law provisions, it must also be ensured that there is har-
mony with the higher ranking general principle of effective judicial protection, which 
principle is now codified in Article 47 of the Charter.229 
6.4 Provisions on evidentiary issues in secondary EU asylum law 
6.4.1  Preliminary remarks 
When interpreting secondary Union law provisions on evidentiary issues, the stan-
dards and principles developed by the UNHCR, the HRC, the ComAT and the 
ECtHR must constantly be kept in mind for two reasons. First, EU secondary law 
must be interpreted in such a way that there is harmony with the relevant primary law 
provisions, being Articles 18, 19 and 47 of the Charter.230 Above it has been explain-
ed that Articles 18, 19 and 47 of the Charter encompass the standards on judicial 
scrutiny and evidence developed by the UNHCR, the HRC, the ComAT and the 
ECtHR.  
Second, Article 78 TFEU (old Article 63 TEC) stipulates that the secondary EU 
asylum legislation mentioned above must be in accordance with the RC as well as the 
other relevant treaties, including the ECHR, the ICCPR and the CAT.231 It must also 
be kept in mind that EU secondary asylum law does not provide an exhaustive regu-
lation for all possible issues of evidence. It does not regulate, for example, the appre-
ciation and evaluation of evidence.232 Also unregulated is the point in time for the as-
sessment of the risk. With regard to the issues that are not regulated, national courts, 
and the CJEU as well, will have to fall back on the standards and principles de-
                                                        
229 CJEU, Siples Srl, in liquidation, 11 January 2001, C-226/99, paras. 16-20. 
230 See, for example, CJEU, Deticek, 23 December 2009, C-403/09, paras. 53-55. The reference for a 
preliminary ruling in this case concerned the interpretation of Article 20 of Council Regulation (EC) 
No. 2201/2003 of 27 November 2003 concerning jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement 
of judgments in matrimonial matters and the matters of parental responsibility, repealing Regulation 
(EC) No. 1347/2000 (OJ 2003 L 338, p. 1). The CJEU ruled, in paras. 53-55, that Article 20 of Reg-
ulation No. 2201/2003 must be interpreted in such a way that respect is paid to the fundamental 
right of the child set out in Article 24(3) of the Charter, to maintain on a regular basis a personal re-
lationship and direct contact with both parents. 
231 Article 78, first paragraph, TFEU, states: ‘The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, 
subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any 
third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle 
of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 
and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.’ 
232 See for the same conclusion Noll 2005. 
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veloped under the RC, the ICCPR, the CAT and the ECHR, and, in addition, may 
draw inspiration from the CJEU’s case law in other areas, as long as no asylum case 
law is available on such issues. The relevant secondary EU law provisions are ana-
lysed below, with the aid of the aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny introduced in 
Chapter 1. Where possible, the jurisprudence of the CJEU in both asylum cases and 
other areas is used as a source of interpretation. 
6.4.2  Standard of proof 
Article 2, sub paragraph d, of the EU Qualification Directive defines a refugee as a 
third-country national who, owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership of a particular 
social group, is outside the country of nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, 
unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of that country, or a stateless 
person, who, being outside of the country of former habitual residence for the same 
reasons, is unable or, owing to such fear, unwilling to return to it.233 The term ‘well-
founded fear’ in the definition corresponds to the wording of the refugee definition 
in the RC. 
Article 2, sub paragraph f, of the EU Qualification Directive qualifies a person 
eligible for subsidiary protection as an individual in respect of whom substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the person concerned would face a real 
risk of suffering serious harm.234 This phrase is taken from the ECtHR’s constant 
case law under Article 3, in which that Court developed the standard that ‘substantial 
grounds have been shown for believing that the individual concerned, if expelled, 
faces a real risk of being subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’.235 
In the Commission Proposal the standard of proof was further elaborated: the 
necessary level of risk was defined as a ‘reasonable possibility’. The applicant’s fear of 
being persecuted or exposed to serious harm had to be objectively established by 
determining whether there was a ‘reasonable possibility’ that he or she would be per-
secuted or otherwise subjected to serious harm if returned to the country of origin. 
However, this standard was deleted during the negotiation process as Member States 
could not agree on it. For this reason, the Directive does not further elaborate on the 
standard ‘well-founded fear’, or on the standard of ‘real risk’.236 
Article 78 TFEU (old Article 63 TEC) stipulates that the secondary EU asylum 
legislation mentioned above must be in accordance with the RC as well as other rele-
vant treaties (ECHR, ICCPR, CAT).237 This implies that the standards of proof laid 
                                                        
233 Article 2, sub d, of the Qualification Directive (Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011). 
234 Article 2, sub f, of the Qualification Directive (Directive 2011/95/EU of 13 December 2011). 
235 We find this standard of proof in all the judgments of the ECtHR concerning the expulsion of asy-
lum seekers, from the first case of ECtHR, Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/ 
89, para. 69, up to later judgments such as ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/ 
07, para. 48. This standard also explicitly features in many admissibility decisions. 
236 Council doc. No. 12199/02, p. 8. See also Battjes 2006, pp. 224, 225, and Hailbronner 2010, p. 1026. 
237 Article 78, first paragraph, TFEU, states: ‘The Union shall develop a common policy on asylum, 
subsidiary protection and temporary protection with a view to offering appropriate status to any 
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down in Article 2, sub d and sub f, must be interpreted in such a way that they do not 
fall below the standards developed under these treaties, while EU law may offer more 
protection by creating a lower threshold. As was made clear in Chapter 2, the stan-
dard of proof under the RC as developed by the UNHCR is that it must be estab-
lished, to a reasonable degree that, upon expulsion, the claimant’s life or freedom would 
be threatened.238 In its Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims,239 
the UNHCR has made clear that the determination of refugee status does not pur-
port to identify refugees as a matter of certainty, but as a matter of likelihood. It is 
not required to prove well-foundedness conclusively beyond doubt, or even that 
persecution is more probable than not. To establish ‘well-foundedness’, persecution 
must be proved to be reasonably possible.240 It was exactly this standard of proof – rea-
sonably possible – that was deleted from the Commission Proposal text in the pro-
cess of the negotiations on the Qualification Directive. The negotiators obviously did 
not realise, at the time of deleting the ‘reasonably possible standard’, that this very 
standard would enter EU asylum law anyway via Article 78 TFEU in conjunction 
with the standard developed by the UNHCR under the RC. 
As the standard in Article 2, sub paragraph f, is taken literally from the ECtHR’s 
case law under Article 3, it is only logical, in the light of Article 78 TFEU, to resort to 
the standard of proof developed by the ECtHR. That standard is that the risk is real 
and not fictional, that it is personal (relates to the individual), and that it is foresee-
able. The risk does not need to be certain or highly probable,241 but it must exceed 
the mere possibility of being subjected to proscribed ill-treatment.242 
6.4.3  Burden of proof 
Article 4 of the EU Qualification Directive contains a number of paragraphs on the 
burden of proof. These paragraphs read as follows: 
 
‘1. Member States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all 
elements needed to substantiate the application for international protection. In co-operation 
with the applicant it is the duty of the Member State to assess the relevant elements of the ap-
plication.’ 
 
                                                        
third-country national requiring international protection and ensuring compliance with the principle 
of non-refoulement. This policy must be in accordance with the Geneva Convention of 28 July 1951 
and the Protocol of 31 January 1967 relating to the status of refugees, and other relevant treaties.’ 
238 UNHCR Handbook paras. 42 and 51. Wouters 2009, p. 93, p. 549: there must be a ‘serious possi-
bility’ that the claimant’s life or freedom would be threatened because of one of the persecution 
grounds. 
239 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims of 16 December 1998, available at: 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/3ae6b3338.html, visited on 23 August 2011. 
240 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims of 16 December 1998, paras. 2 and 17. 
241 Wouters 2009, p. 247. 
242 ECtHR, Vilvarajah v. the United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, Appl. Nos.13163/87, 13164/87, 
13165/87, 13447/87 and 13448/87, paras. 108 and 111. 
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‘3. The assessment of an application for international protection is to be carried out on an in-
dividual basis and includes taking into account: (…).’ 
 
‘4. The fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm or to di-
rect threats of such persecution or such harm, is a serious indication of the applicant’s well-
founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good rea-
sons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.’ 
 
‘5. Where Member States apply the principle according to which it is the duty of the applicant 
to substantiate the application for international protection and where aspects of the applicant’s 
statements are not supported by documentary or other evidence, those aspects shall not need 
confirmation, when the following conditions are met: 
(a) The applicant has made a genuine effort to substantiate his application; 
(b) All relevant elements, at the applicant’s disposal, have been submitted, and a satisfactory 
explanation has been given regarding any lack of other relevant elements; 
(c) The applicant's statements are found to be coherent and plausible and do not run counter 
to available specific and general information relevant to the applicant's case; 
(d) The applicant has applied for international protection at the earliest possible time, unless 
the applicant can demonstrate good reason for not having done so; and 
(e) The general credibility of the applicant has been established.’ 
6.4.3.1  Burden of assertion on the applicant 
Under Article 4 of the Qualification Directive, the applicant is enjoined with a burden 
of assertion.243 This means that he or she needs to provide elements to substantiate 
his or her claim for international protection. These elements consist of: a) statements; 
and b) corroborating documentation at the applicant’s disposal. The burden of asser-
tion comprises the issues listed in the second paragraph (see 6.4.4 below on the 
relevant facts and circumstances). The burden on the applicant in paragraph 1 is 
facultative: ‘Member States may (italics author) consider it the duty of the applicant 
…’. The facultative nature is further emphasised by paragraph 5: ‘Where Member 
States apply the principle according to which it is the duty of the applicant to sub-
stantiate the application for international protection.’ Hence, the burden of assertion 
is placed on the applicant when the Member State chooses to do so.244 The faculta-
tive formulation in the first and fifth paragraphs makes clear that it would be allow-
able under the Qualification Directive to operate a system in which the authorities 
alone bear the information burden and the investigative burden.245 As far as I have 
been able to establish, no such system exists in the EU.246 
                                                        
243 Noll 2005, pp. 3, 5. 
244 Noll 2005, p. 6, Hailbronner 2010, p. 1028. See on this also Battjes 2006, p. 226, who reads this 
facultative formulation in a different way: according to him, the terms ‘may consider’ give the Mem-
ber State discretion not as to the burden of proof, but rather as to the duty to submit grounds ‘as 
soon as possible’. That reading seems less convincing as it does not take account of paragraph 5. 
245 Noll 2005, p. 6. 
246 A questionnaire to my colleagues in other EU Member States, judge-members of the International 
Association of Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ) to respond to the question of who carries the initial 
→ 
Chapter 6 
 
 
 
338 
The burden of assertion on the applicant seems to be a rather low threshold. It 
does not embrace the formulation of a legal claim and the identification of its basis in 
law. This rather low threshold follows from the fact that the elements listed in the 
second paragraph are limited to identity data, such as age, nationality, previous places 
of residence, travel route, background, possible previous asylum applications, and the 
flight reasons (see below 6.4.4 on the relevant facts and circumstances). The low 
threshold also follows from the formulation that the applicant needs to state ‘the rea-
sons for applying for international protection’ and not ‘the reasons for being granted 
international protection’.247 It, finally, also follows from paragraph 5, which makes 
clear that not all the aspects of the applicant’s account need to be corroborated by 
evidence other than statements, provided that the claim was made as early as possible 
and is, in short, coherent, plausible, generally credible and the applicant has made a 
genuine effort to substantiate his or her claim.248 What is required from the applicant 
is that he or she submits the statements and the documentary evidence at his or her 
disposal, in other words, discloses all relevant facts and provides all the relevant 
documentation at his or her disposal, so that the authorities are able to assess the 
claim for protection in co-operation with the applicant.249 This strongly resembles the 
burden of proof on the applicant developed by the ECtHR:  
 
‘it is incumbent on persons who allege that their expulsion would amount to a breach of Ar-
ticle 3 to adduce, to the greatest extent practically possible, material and information allowing 
the authorities of the Contracting State concerned, as well as the Court, to assess the risk a re-
moval may entail’.250 
 
The fourth paragraph of Article 4 of the Qualification Directive envisages an alle-
viated burden of proof for cases of earlier persecution. Persecution, serious harm or 
direct threats thereof in the past are a serious indication of the applicant’s well-
founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm. In other words: 
previous persecution or serious harm or threats give rise to a refutable presumption 
that the applicant qualifies for refugee or subsidiary protection.251 The alleviation of 
the burden of proof echoes paragraph 8, sub b and sub c, of General Comment No. 
1 of the Committee against Torture, which indicates that pertinent information to be 
taken into account is the fact that the claimant has been tortured or maltreated in the 
(recent) past, as well as evidence of such (recent) torture or maltreatment.252 The rule 
                                                        
burden of assertion and proof in national asylum proceedings and how such proceedings are ini-
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also reflects the principle laid down in paragraph 45 of the UNHCR Handbook on 
procedures and criteria for determining refugee status, which states that  
 
‘It may be assumed that a person has well-founded fear of being persecuted if he has already 
been the victim of persecution for one of the reasons enumerated in the 1951 Convention.’253 
 
There is an exception where there are ‘good reasons’ for assuming non-repetition of 
persecution or serious harm or threats. The onus for these ‘good reasons’ lies with 
the authorities of the Member State; they must show, on an individual basis, why past 
persecution or harm will not entail renewed persecution or harm.254 The original text 
in the Commission Proposal read: ‘unless a radical change of conditions has taken 
place since then in the applicant’s country of origin or in his or her relation with this 
country’.255 A good reason to assume non-repetition of persecution, serious harm or 
threats may, thus, be a regime change leading to a less oppressive regime. In its judg-
ment in the case of Abdulla and others (2010), the CJEU made clear that, for the lower 
burden of proof to be activated, the earlier acts of persecution, serious harm or 
threats needed to be connected with the reason for persecution relied on by the appli-
cant.256 
6.4.3.2  Investigative burden on the authorities, the co-operation requirement 
Where the elements have been submitted by the applicant, the authorities need to 
perform an assessment of them. The authorities have an investigative burden with 
regard to the issues mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 4 of the Qualification 
Directive, in short: the situation in the country of origin, the relevant statements and 
documentation presented by the applicant, the individual position and personal cir-
cumstances of the applicant, possible sur place activities of the applicant and possible 
protection of another country where the applicant could assert citizenship (see below 
6.4.4 on the relevant facts and circumstances). It follows from the wording of para-
graph 3 – ‘the assessment includes taking into account’ – that the list is not exhaus-
tive.257 
It follows from the second sentence of Article 4, first paragraph that the assess-
ment of the elements needs to be done in co-operation with the applicant. The re-
quirement of co-operation is new compared to the instruments studied in the pre-
vious chapters, although it may be assumed that there is a certain link with the notion 
of the shared burden of proof developed under Articles 3 ECHR, 7 ICCPR, 3 CAT, 
and paragraphs 195-196 and 192, sub ii, of the UNHCR Handbook.258 Because of the 
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explicit use of the term co-operation, Article 4 of the Qualification Directive seems to 
be attempting to bring out more clearly that the applicant and the authorities need to 
work together in assessing the elements of the international protection claim. In the 
case of M.M. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland (2012)259 the CJEU 
has explained in a detailed way what the requirement of co-operation entails. The 
reference for a preliminary ruling in that case was made by the High Court of Ireland 
in proceedings between M. and the Minister concerning the lawfulness of the proce-
dure followed in processing an application for subsidiary protection which Mr M. had 
lodged following rejection of his application for refugee status. In Ireland an appli-
cation for asylum and an application for subsidiary protection are dealt with in dis-
tinct procedures, with one procedure following the other.260 Mr M. submitted an ap-
plication for subsidiary protection following rejection of his application for refugee 
status which was upheld by the Refugee Appeals Tribunal. His application for subsi-
diary protection was also rejected and Mr M. brought proceedings before the High 
Court seeking annulment of this refusal. In those proceedings he disputed the legality 
of the rejection on the ground that the procedure did not comply with EU law. Mr 
M. submitted, inter alia, that the co-operation requirement laid down in Article 4 of 
the Qualification Directive means that the Minister is obliged to supply the applicant 
for asylum with the results of his assessment before taking a final decision. This 
would enable the applicant to address those matters which suggest a negative result 
by putting forward all documents which are then available or any argument capable 
of challenging the position of the competent national authority. It would also enable 
him to draw the authority’s attention to any relevant matters of which due account 
has not, in the applicant’s view, been taken. Mr M. also submitted that he was at no 
time heard in the course of the examination of his application for subsidiary protec-
tion. Furthermore, at no point in time was he informed of the matters which the 
Minister regarded as relevant to the decision to refuse him subsidiary protection.261 
Referring to the procedure in the Netherlands where the intention to reject an 
asylum application is communicated with the applicant before a decision is taken, the 
High Court of Ireland referred to the CJEU the question whether the requirement to 
co-operate requires the administrative authorities to supply to the applicant the re-
sults of the assessment before a decision is finally made, as to enable him or her to 
address those aspects of the proposed decision which suggest a negative result.262 The 
CJEU did not follow the applicant in his proposition that the co-operation require-
ment requires the national authority to supply the applicant, before adoption of a 
negative decision on the application for subsidiary protection after refusal of an 
asylum application, with the elements on which it intends to base its decision and to 
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seek the applicant’s observations in that regard.263 In addition to this, the CJEU gave 
the following interpretation of the requirement of co-operation: 
 
‘As is clear from its title, Article 4 of Directive 2004/83 relates to the ‘assessment of facts and 
circumstances’. In actual fact, that ‘assessment’ takes place in two separate stages. The first 
stage concerns the establishment of factual circumstances which may constitute evidence that 
supports the application, while the second stage relates to the legal appraisal of that evidence, 
which entails deciding whether, in the light of the specific facts of a given case, the substantive 
conditions laid down by Articles 9 and 10 or Article 15 of Directive 2004/83 for the grant of 
international protection are met. Under Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/83, although it is gener-
ally for the applicant to submit all elements needed to substantiate the application, the fact 
remains that it is the duty of the Member State to cooperate with the applicant at the stage of 
determining the relevant elements of that application. This requirement that the Member State 
cooperate therefore means, in practical terms, that if, for any reason whatsoever, the elements 
provided by an applicant for international protection are not complete, up to date or relevant, 
it is necessary for the Member State concerned to cooperate actively with the applicant, at that 
stage of the procedure, so that all the elements needed to substantiate the application may be 
assembled. A Member State may also be better placed than an applicant to gain access to cer-
tain types of documents. Moreover, the interpretation set out in the previous paragraph finds 
support in Article 8(2)(b) of Directive 2005/85, pursuant to which Member States are to en-
sure that precise and up-to-date information is obtained on the general situation prevailing in 
the countries of origin of applicants for asylum and, where necessary, in countries through 
which they have transited. It is thus clear that Article 4(1) of Directive 2004/83 relates only to 
the first stage mentioned in paragraph 64 of this judgment, concerning the determination of 
the facts and circumstances qua evidence which may substantiate the asylum application.’264 
 
The CJEU has so far not explained any further what is meant by ‘active co-operation 
with the applicant so that all the elements needed to substantiate the application may 
be assembled.’ One may probably think here of situations in which the applicant 
informs the authority that he or she is trying to obtain certain documentation from 
the country of origin and the authority offers him or her a certain (additional) period 
for submitting this documentation. Also coming to mind are situations in which the 
applicant proposes that the authority hear certain witnesses and the authority in re-
sponse to that arranges hearing sessions, or situations in which the applicant submits 
certain documents and the national administrative or judicial authority orders an ex-
pert authenticity examination, etc.  
What is clear from the judgment in M.M. is that, in principle, the applicant 
remains responsible for submitting the elements substantiating his or her claim: the 
CJEU states clearly that ‘it is generally for the applicant to submit all elements needed 
to substantiate the application’. At the same time, the CJEU has made clear that if the 
elements provided by an applicant are not complete, up to date or relevant, it is 
necessary for the national authorities to cooperate actively with the applicant so that 
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all the elements needed to substantiate the application may be assembled. Moreover, 
the CJEU has made clear that there may be specific circumstances in which the 
administrative or judicial authority is better placed than the applicant to get hold of 
certain types of documents. This consideration of the CJEU strongly mirrors the 
ECtHR’s consideration in the case of Iskandarov v. Russia (2010) that 
 
‘The Court has also recognized that Convention proceedings do not in all cases lend them-
selves to a rigorous application of the principle affirmanti incumbit probatio (he who alleges some-
thing must prove that allegation). In certain circumstances, where the events in issue lie wholly, 
or in large part, within the exclusive knowledge of the authorities, the burden of proof may be 
regarded as resting on the authorities to provide a satisfactory and convincing explanation 
(…).’265 
 
It seems safe to conclude, with Noll (2005), that the requirement of co-operation 
entails at least two things: communication by both parties as regards the elements 
relevant to the claim and guidance from the Member State to the applicant on exactly 
what is needed to corroborate the claim.266 In addition to that, there may be situa-
tions in which it is up to the administrative or judicial authority to attempt to obtain 
certain evidence. An example would probably be the situation in which the applicant 
asserts and substantiates that he himself or herself tried to obtain certain documents 
from the authorities of his country of origin, but was refused access to these docu-
ments. In such a situation it would then be up to the administration or the judiciary 
to make a request to obtain such documents.  
6.4.3.3  Certain substantiation of the claim is also required in other areas 
Abdulla and others (2010) has so far been the only case in which the CJEU has shed 
some light on a question concerning the burden of proof in asylum cases.267 The 
CJEU has, however, dealt with burden of proof issues in other fields. As the CJEU is 
likely to draw on this jurisprudence – next to the positions of the UNHCR and the 
case law of the ECtHR, the HRC and the ComAT – it is interesting to take a brief 
look at a leading case. 
The case of Nölle (1990)268 concerned anti-dumping duties imposed on Nölle’s 
imports of paintbrushes from China. The qualification of the import as ‘dumping’ 
had resulted from a comparison of the value of these Chinese paintbrushes with the 
value of a similar product from Sri Lanka. Nölle claimed that the normal value had 
not been determined in an appropriate manner since Sri Lanka, the country chosen as 
the reference country, satisfied none of the conditions of which the Commission had 
always taken account, namely the existence in the country concerned of a like product 
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of like volume and production methods, of conditions of access to raw materials 
comparable to those of the exporting country concerned and of prices resulting from 
the operation of the rules of the market economy.269 Based on the available material, 
the CJEU could not answer the question of whether or not the Chinese and Sri 
Lankan brushes were similar.270 
The Commission was of the opinion that production methods of this product in 
China and Sri Lanka were similar as in both these countries the firms were small or 
medium-sized with labour-intensive production in small-scale units with low wage 
rates. Nölle contested this by stating that in Sri Lanka there were only two major 
producers, one of whom manufactured practically none of the products in question, 
whereas in China there were at least 150 small and medium-sized businesses and the 
production volume there was, accordingly, at least 200 times greater than that in Sri 
Lanka.271 The CJEU did not follow the Commission in its opinion that production 
methods in both countries were similar, because the Commission had not substan-
tiated its statements in any way:  
 
‘It must also be noted that the Commission and the Council did not produce during either the 
written or the oral procedure any figures or details capable of showing that, as they stated, pro-
duction methods in Sri Lanka consisted in labour-intensive production in small-scale units with 
low wage rates, so that they were comparable to production methods in China.’272 
 
Nölle claimed finally that the prices charged in Sri Lanka were not the result of the 
rules of a market economy since there was no natural competition there. In support 
of this statement, Nölle produced two documents from the Sri Lankan firms in ques-
tion, showing that they could supply the Union only to a very limited extent as the 
production of brushes adapted to the needs of the domestic market and that there 
was no price advantage in comparison with the prices which the parent company was 
able to offer in Europe.273 The Court found that Nölle in this way sufficiently sub-
stantiated the statement: 
 
‘It appears from the foregoing that Nölle has produced sufficient factors, already known to the 
Commission and the Council during the anti-dumping proceeding, to raise doubts as to wheth-
er the choice of Sri Lanka as a reference country was appropriate and not unreasonable.’274 
 
Finally, as to the question of why Taiwan had not been considered as a possible refer-
ence country by the Commission while the relevant rules had considered Taiwan as a 
possibility, the Court ruled that the Commission had not corroborated in any way its 
statement that the physical characteristics and the production costs of the products 
were different and that the Taiwanese producers who had been approached refused 
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to co-operate.275 It follows from the case of Nölle that claims and statements must 
normally be supported by some substantiation, in the form of certain substantiating 
facts, details or figures, laid down in documentation. 
6.4.4  Relevant facts and circumstances 
Article 4, second paragraph, of the EU Qualification Directive stipulates: 
 
‘2. The elements referred to in paragraph 1 consist of the applicant's statements and all docu-
mentation at the applicants disposal regarding the applicant's age, background, including that 
of relevant relatives, identity, nationality(ies), country(ies) and place(s) of previous residence, 
previous asylum applications, travel routes, identity and travel documents and the reasons for 
applying for international protection.’ 
 
Article 4, third paragraph, of the EU Qualification Directive stipulates:  
 
‘3. The assessment of an application for international protection is to be carried out on an 
individual basis and includes taking into account: (…)  
(a) all relevant facts as they relate to the country of origin at the time of taking a decision on 
the application; including laws and regulations of the country of origin and the manner in 
which they are applied; 
(b) The relevant statements and documentation presented by the applicant including informa-
tion on whether the applicant has been or may be subject to persecution or serious harm; 
(c) the individual position and personal circumstances of the applicant, including factors such 
as background, gender and age, so as to assess whether, on the basis of the applicant's personal 
circumstances, the acts to which the applicant has been or could be exposed would amount to 
persecution or serious harm; 
(d) whether the applicant's activities since leaving the country of origin were engaged in for the 
sole or main purpose of creating the necessary conditions for applying for international protec-
tion, so as to assess whether these activities will expose the applicant to persecution or serious 
harm if returned to that country; 
(e) Whether the applicant could reasonably be expected to avail himself of the protection of 
another country where he could assert citizenship.’ 
 
And Article 4, fourth paragraph, of the EU Qualification Directive stipulates:  
 
‘4. The fact that an applicant has already been subject to persecution or serious harm or to di-
rect threats of such persecution or such harm, is a serious indication of the applicant's well-
founded fear of persecution or real risk of suffering serious harm, unless there are good rea-
sons to consider that such persecution or serious harm will not be repeated.’ 
 
It becomes clear from these provisions that, just as under the international instru-
ments discussed in the previous chapters, the relevant facts and circumstances can be 
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divided into two categories: a) personal circumstances such as background, gender, 
ethnicity, age, sexual orientation, beliefs, activities, personal profile, personal expe-
riences and experiences of relatives; and b) facts and circumstances relating to the 
situation in the country of origin. 
Article 4, fourth paragraph, makes clear that, within the category of personal cir-
cumstances, past persecution, past serious harm or threats thereof are highly relevant 
facts. As was said above in the section on the burden of proof, previous persecution 
or serious harm or threats thereof give rise to a refutable presumption that the appli-
cant qualifies for refugee or subsidiary protection.276 
The lists of facts and circumstances provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 4 
are not exhaustive. In the light of Article 78 TFEU,277 we may safely assume that all 
the facts and circumstances mentioned in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 are also relevant 
under Article 4 of the Qualification Directive. 
The investigation of the situation in the country of origin must include its laws 
and regulations and the manner in which they are applied. Laws and regulations may 
be of particular importance when they authorise or condone the persecution of the 
applicant or the infliction upon him or her of serious harm.278 The requirement for 
the authorities to investigate the situation in the country of origin is reaffirmed in 
Article 8, second paragraph, of the Procedures Directive, which stipulates that Mem-
ber States shall ensure that precise and up-to-date information is obtained from va-
rious sources, such as the UNHCR, as to the general situation prevailing in the coun-
tries of origin of applicants for asylum, and, where necessary, in countries through 
which they have transited, and that such information is made available to the per-
sonnel responsible for examining applications and taking decisions.279 For national 
courts it is important that Article 8, third paragraph, stipulates that courts shall have 
access to this country of origin information through the administrative decision 
maker or via the applicant or otherwise.280 The obligations on the national authorities 
flowing from Article 8, second and third paragraph, of the Procedures Directive 
mirror the notion developed under the ICCPR, the CAT and the ECHR that parti-
cular responsibility for shaping clarity on the general human rights situation in the 
country of origin lies with the administrative and judicial authorities of the State (see 
Chapter 3, section 3.5.6, Chapter 4, section 4.5.6, and Chapter 5, section 5.6.6). 
When assessing sur place activities under Article 4, third paragraph, sub d, it must 
be borne in mind that the RC does not deny protection to persons whose reasons for 
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flight have resulted from sur place activities, irrespective of intent.281 In line with this, 
Hailbronner (2010) makes clear that Article 4, third paragraph, sub d does not auto-
matically exclude recognition in cases of post-flight activities engaged in an abusive 
way, but that the element of abuse has to be taken into consideration in assessing 
whether these activities will expose the applicant to persecution or serious harm, in 
other words, whether the activities will be taken seriously by the country of origin 
and may, therefore, create a risk.282 
As regards the possible protection of another country where the applicant could 
assert citizenship (Article 4, third paragraph, sub e), it has been pointed out by the 
UNHCR that this element does not reflect the requirements emanating from the RC. 
In its comments on the Qualification Directive, the UNHCR stated: 
 
‘The factor outlined in Paragraph (3)(e) should not form part of the refugee status determina-
tion assessment. There is no obligation on the part of an applicant under international law to 
avail him- or herself of the protection of another country where s/he could “assert” national-
ity. The issue was explicitly discussed by the drafters of the Convention. It is regulated in Ar-
ticle 1A(2) (last sentence), which deals with applicants of dual nationality, and in Article 1E of 
the 1951 Convention. There is no margin beyond the limits of these provisions. For Article 1E 
to apply, a person otherwise included in the refugee definition would need to fulfil the require-
ment of having taken residence in the country and having been recognized by the competent 
authorities in that country “as having the rights and obligations which are attached to the pos-
session of the nationality of that country”. Since Article 1E is already reflected in Article 
12(1)(b) of the Directive, Article 4 (3)(e) should not be incorporated into national legislation 
and practice if full compatibility with Article 1 of the 1951 Convention is to be ensured.’283 
 
It is problematic that Article 4, third paragraph, sub e, of the Qualification Directive 
has no predecessor in international asylum law and contains two factors of uncer-
tainty: availability of protection in the other country and assertion of citizenship of 
that other country.284 However, based upon the rationale of the provision– no need 
for international protection when protection can be offered by a State –it may be 
interpreted to mean that an applicant who is entitled to citizenship in another country 
is not in need of international protection.285 
6.4.5  Required degree of individual risk 
Article 2, sub f, of the EU Qualification Directive qualifies a person eligible for sub-
sidiary protection as an individual in respect of whom substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the person concerned would face a real risk of suffering se-
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rious harm.286 This phrase is taken from the ECtHR’s constant case law under Article 
3, in which that Court developed the standard that ‘substantial grounds have been 
shown for believing that the individual concerned, if expelled, faces a real risk of be-
ing subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment’.287 
Under the heading ‘Serious harm’, Article 15 of the Qualification Directive stipulates 
that serious harm consists of: 
a) Death penalty or execution; or 
b)  Torture or inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment of an applicant in the 
country of origin; or 
c)  Serious and individual threat to a civilian’s life or person by reason of indiscrimi-
nate violence in situations of international or internal armed conflict.’288 
 
In Chapter 5 it was demonstrated that in the ECtHR’s case law concerning the 
expulsion of asylum seekers three different types of situations can be distinguished: 
- Situations of extreme general violence; in those cases no individual risk is re-
quired as everyone returned to such a situation automatically runs an Article 3-
risk; 
- Situations of violence against a particular group; in these cases membership of 
that group forms sufficient individual Article 3-risk; and 
- Other cases; in these cases special personal facts and circumstances indicating 
that this very applicant runs an Article 3-risk must be established. 
 
Based on the judgment of the CJEU in the case of Elgafaji (2009),289 it may be argued 
that this distinction is also workable for subsidiary protection under Union asylum 
law. The CJEU made clear in its judgment that Article 15(b) of the Directive cor-
responds to Article 3 ECHR and that, by contrast, the content of Article 15(c) is dif-
ferent from that of Article 3 ECHR and must, therefore, be interpreted independent-
ly, although with due regard for fundamental rights, as they are guaranteed by Article 
3 ECHR.290 Second, the Court clarified that Article 15(c) does not require that an 
applicant is specifically targeted or singled out. Referring to the fact that in Article 
15(c) the term ‘threat’ is used instead of specific acts of violence, such as mentioned 
in Articles 15(a) and 15(b), the fact that the threat is inherent in a general situation of 
international or internal armed conflict, and, finally, the fact that the violence is de-
scribed as indiscriminate, the Court ruled that, to assume the existence of an Article 
15(c)threat, it is not necessary that the applicant adduces evidence that he or she has 
been specifically targeted or singled out by reason of factors particular to his or her 
personal circumstances.291 The Court also made clear that it would only be in excep-
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tional situations that the existence of such an Article 15(c)-threat could be considered 
to have been established. These were situations where the degree of indiscriminate 
violence characterising the armed conflict taking place reached such a high level that 
any person returned to the relevant country or region, would, solely on account of his 
or her presence there, faced a real risk of being subjected to that threat.292 The typical 
Article 15(c) situation as defined by the CJEU thus strongly resembles the situation 
described by the ECtHR as the exceptional situation of extreme general violence, 
where no individual risk is required as everyone returned to such a situation would 
automatically run an Article 3 ECHR-risk.293 The CJEU has acknowledged this by 
stating explicitly that the given interpretation of Article 15(c) is ‘fully compatible’ with 
Article 3 ECHR.294 As the Court also made clear in Elgafaji that Article 15(b) of the 
Qualification Directive corresponds in essence to Article 3 ECHR, it must be as-
sumed that Article 15(b) covers the other two categories of cases mentioned above – 
the category of group violence, where belonging to the targeted group forms suffi-
cient singling out, and the rest (third) category where the individual needs to demon-
strate that he or she as a person has been specifically targeted or singled out. Finally, 
the CJEU’s finding in paragraph 39 of the Elgafaji judgment is important for assessing 
the required degree of individual risk in subsidiary protection cases:  
 
‘the more the applicant is able to show that he is specifically affected by reason of factors par-
ticular to his personal circumstances, the lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for 
him to be eligible for subsidiary protection.’295 
 
This approach echoes the notion of the gradual scale developed in the case law of the 
ECtHR and (less explicitly) the Committee against Torture that, the graver the 
general human rights situation in the country of origin, the less individual facts and 
circumstances, including evidence corroborating these individual facts and circum-
stances, are required.296 
The CJEU has so far not dealt with the question of what the required degree of 
individual risk is in cases concerning refugee protection (not subsidiary protection). 
Given that Article 2, sub paragrah d, of the Qualification Directive defines the refu-
gee in the same way as the RC, and that Article 78 TFEU requires an interpretation 
harmonising with the RC, it is likely that the Court will look at the guidelines de-
veloped by the UNHCR on this aspect. In Chapter 2 it was made clear, in short, that 
the RC does not impose a requirement of being singled out. 
                                                        
292 Ibidem, paras. 35, 37, 38, 43. 
293 See, for example, ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 June 2011, Appl. No. 8319/07, 11449/07, 
paras. 241-250. 
294 CJEU, Elgafaji, 17 February 2009, C-465/07, para. 44. 
295 Ibidem, para. 39. 
296 See Chapter 4 on the CAT, section 4.5.4, and Chapter 5 on the ECHR, section 5.6.4. 
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6.4.6  Admission of evidence, appreciation of evidence 
6.4.6.1  Admission of evidence, possible types and sources of evidence 
Article 4, first paragraph, of the Qualification Directive uses the terms ‘all elements 
needed to substantiate the application for international protection’. The neutrality of 
the terms ‘element’ and ‘substantiate’ indicates that, in principle, every form of evi-
dence capable of proving the risk can be admitted to the procedure, whether oral or 
written or evidence in another form.  
The first paragraph specifically mentions documentation corroborating the ap-
plicant’s identity (including age, nationality, name, country and place of former resi-
dence), travel documents and documents regarding travel routes, documentation con-
cerning previous asylum applications, and, finally, documents corroborating the rea-
sons for applying for international protection. Examples of documents corroborating 
the material claim are arrest warrants, police reports, medical reports corroborating 
statements on past ill-treatment, written or oral statements made by family members 
or other witnesses relating to harm inflicted upon the applicant or threats of such 
harm. Reports containing country of origin information from various organisations 
are an important source of evidence, as follows from the second paragraph of Article 
4 of the Qualification Directive, which mentions all relevant facts as they relate to the 
country of origin, and Article 8, second paragraph, of the Procedures Directive, 
which stipulates that Member States shall ensure that precise and up-to-date infor-
mation is obtained from various sources, such as the UNHCR, as to the general situa-
tion prevailing in the countries of origin of the applicants for asylum.  
6.4.6.2 Minimum quantity and quality of evidence 
Secondary EU asylum law does not contain provisions making clear exactly how 
much evidence is required to sufficiently corroborate a claim for international protec-
tion, and of what quality that evidence should be. Nor does it contain any provisions 
regarding the evaluation of evidence. The fifth paragraph of Article 4 of the Qualifi-
cation Directive gives some guidance on the required quantity of evidence, as it 
makes clear that in the case of a timely claim (a claim made as early as possible) which 
is, in short, coherent, plausible, and generally credible, and provided that the appli-
cant has made a genuine effort to substantiate this claim, not all the aspects of the 
applicant’s account need to be corroborated by evidence other than statements. This 
echoes the approach of the ECtHR and the ComAT that not all the aspects of the 
claim need corroboration as long as the very core of the flight narrative is corrobo-
rated with specific evidence relating personally to the applicant. 
6.4.7  Opportunities for presenting evidence and reacting to evidence; 
secret evidence 
It follows from Article 4, first paragraph, of the EU Qualification Directive, that asy-
lum applicants must be given the opportunity to present and submit all the elements 
substantiating the claim. Elements consist of statements and evidence, so there must 
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always be an opportunity for asylum applicants to hand over to the authorities the 
evidence in their possession. The duty to co-operate in the assessment of the relevant 
elements of the asylum claim flowing from Article 4, first paragraph, of the EU Qual-
ification Directive, implies that the applicant must be given access to information and 
assessments the authorities have considered relevant in the case. It may be argued 
that this implies that secret investigative material which cannot be shared with the 
applicant must be excluded from the basis for a decision, otherwise he or she would 
not be part of the assessment process, which would arguably conflict with the re-
quirement of co-operation laid down in Article 4, paragraph 1.297 In other words: it 
may be argued that Article 4, first paragraph, of the Qualification Directive contains a 
prohibition on the use of secret information. Such a prohibition would go much fur-
ther than the principle flowing from the RC – information and its sources may only 
be withheld where disclosure of sources would seriously jeopardize national security 
or the security of the organizations or persons providing information.298 It also goes 
much further than the principle developed by the ECtHR that non-disclosure of 
evidence may be justified if this is strictly necessary to preserve the fundamental 
rights of another individual or to safeguard an important public interest, such as the 
protection of national security,299 and that non-disclosure of evidence to one of the 
parties must be counterbalanced in the judicial proceedings, at least by disclosure of 
the evidence to the national court.300 A prohibition on the use of secret information 
would, however, echo the prohibition on the use of secret evidence in expulsion 
proceedings formulated by the HRC in the case of Mansour Ahani (2004)301 and the 
ComAT in the case of Sogi (2007).302 Both the HRC and the ComAT concluded that 
there had been unfairness in national expulsion proceedings because of non-disclo-
sure to the applicants of secret evidence underpinning the decisions on expulsion 
based on national security considerations. From Sogi v. Canada (2007), it follows expli-
citly that the secret evidence was disclosed to the national court, but that the ComAT 
did not see this as a sufficient counterbalance for the non-disclosure of evidence to 
the claimant.303 
At this point in time we cannot be entirely sure whether the co-operation require-
ment laid down in Article 4, first paragraph, of the Qualification Directive indeed 
carries an absolute prohibition on the use of secret evidence. When confronted with 
this question, it is likely that the CJEU will look at Article 16 of the Procedures Di-
rective as well, which stipulates that the legal adviser to the applicant shall enjoy ac-
cess to such information in the applicant’s file as is liable to be examined by the judi-
cial authorities, but that an exception may be made where disclosure of information 
                                                        
297 Noll 2005, p. 7. 
298 Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures: A Non-Exhaustive Overview of Applicable International 
Standards, 2 September 2005, available at: www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/432ae9204.html, p. 5 
and 6. 
299 See ECtHR, Edwards and Lewis, 27 October 2004, para. 46. 
300 ECtHR, Al-Nashif v. Bulgaria, 20 June 2002, Appl. No. 50963/99, paras. 123-128; ECtHR, Lupsa v. 
Romania, 8 June 2006, Appl. No. 50963/99, paras. 38-42. 
301 HRC, Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 15 June 2004, Communication No. 1051/2002. 
302 ComAT, Sogi v. Canada, 16 November 2007, No. 297/2006. 
303 Ibidem, para. 2.6. 
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or sources would jeopardise national security, the security of organisations or per-
son(s) providing the information or the security of the person(s) to whom the infor-
mation relates, or where the investigative interests relating to the examination of ap-
plications for asylum by the competent authorities of the Member States or the in-
ternational relations of the Member States would be compromised. In such cases, the 
judicial authorities need to be given access to such information or sources, except 
where such access is precluded in cases of national security.304 
When confronted with questions concerning the equality of arms, adversarial 
proceedings and the use of secret evidence, the CJEU is also likely to draw on its case 
law in other areas, such as food control and competition. It is, therefore, worthwhile 
taking a brief look at the CJEU’s case law in other fields.  
 
Secret evidence305  
The CJEU has not yet ruled on the use of secret evidence in asylum cases. It has 
addressed the legality of the non-disclosure of evidence in in cases concerning other 
fields of EU law, for example competition law and EU anti-terrorism measures such 
as freezing of funds of suspected terrorists. In competition cases the EU Commis-
sion’s decision to impose a fine on one or more companies is often based on evi-
dence provided by other companies which is considered business secret. In cases 
concerning anti-terrorism measures evidence is often withheld to the party concerned 
for national security reasons.  
The general principles developed by the CJEU to answer the question of legality 
of non-disclosure of evidence strongly resemble the principles developed by the 
ECtHR, discussed in Chapter 5, section 5.5.4. These general principles include the 
following notions:  
- The use of secret evidence is permitted provided that it has a legitimate aim and 
that it is necessary;306 
- The interest of the State to keep the evidence secret must be balanced against the 
individual’s right to have knowledge of this evidence and his procedural rights of 
adversarial proceedings and equality of arms;307 
- The court examining the appeal should be able to effectively review the confiden-
tial evidence on which the impugned decision is based;308 
- Limitations to a party’s procedural rights as a consequence of the use of secret 
evidence should be compensated by taking counterbalancing measures (compen-
sation techniques).309  
                                                        
304 See Article 16, first paragraph, of the Procedures Directive (Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 De-
cember 2005). 
305  See for a more extensive analysis of the use of secret information in asylum cases and the principles 
on this use developed in international and EU asylum law Reneman 2012, pp. 303-377. 
306  See, for example, CJEU, Aalborg Portland and others v. Commission, 7 January 2004, Joined Cases C-
204/00 P etc, para 68; CJEU, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission, 3 September 2008, 
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, para. 342. 
307  See, for example, CJEU, Varec, 2008, C-450/06, para 51; CJEU, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and 
Commission, 3 September 2008, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, para. 344.  
308  See, for example, CJEU, Mobistar, 13 July 2006, C-438/04, para 40; CJEU, Organisation des Modja-
hedines du peuple d’Iran v. Council, 12 December 2006, T-228/02, para. 155. 
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It seems that the CJEU has set stricter requirements for the use of confidential evi-
dence in competition cases than in anti-terrorism cases. In a number of competition 
cases the CJEU has stressed that, for the adversarial process to work effectively and 
fairly, it is important that relevant material is available to both parties and that a 
company charged with infringing competition rules needs to have full access to the 
file prepared by the Commission so that it is familiar with all the evidence and may 
produce counter-evidence.310 In competition cases the CJEU seems to distinguish 
between ‘relevant evidence’ and ‘irrelevant evidence’, the latter category comprising 
evidence which is not relied on, that is, evidence which does not form part of the ma-
terial underpinning the impugned decision. The CJEU has ruled in a number of cases 
that there is no need to disclose documents which are not relevant for the decision.311 
Unlike in competition cases, in cases concerning anti-terrorism measures the 
CJEU seems to place somewhat less emphasis on the right to adversarial proceedings 
and equality of arms. An important aspect of proceedings concerning anti-terrorism 
measures is that the right to be heard and the right to be notified of the evidence do 
not need to be complied with during the administrative procedure; these rights may 
be exercised only during the appeal procedure before the EU Courts. The reason for 
this is that the party concerned can take advantage of the time period allowed to it to 
submit its comments to transfer funds out of the Union.312 However, in order for the 
parties concerned to be able to defend their rights effectively, particularly in legal 
proceedings which might be brought before the CJEU, it is necessary that the evi-
dence adduced against them be notified to them, in so far as reasonably possible, either 
concomitantly with or as soon as possible after the adoption of the initial decision to 
freeze funds.313 
The differences have so far not been explained explicitly by the CJEU in its judg-
ments. They may probably be explained by the nature of the interests involved; prob-
ably the CJEU considers the national security of the EU and its Member States and 
their relations with third countries worthy of more protection than the interests of 
businesses in protecting their secrets. 
 
National courts as the guardians of adversariality and equality of arms 
The case of Steffensen (2003)314 is interesting to discuss in some more detail here as 
it makes clear that the CJEU gives the national court an active role as guardian of the 
principles of adversariality and equality of arms. Steffensen concerned food control 
by the German administrative authorities at the Böklunder Plumrose Company, a 
                                                        
309  See, for example, CJEU, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission, 3 September 2008, Joined 
Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, para. 344. 
310 See, for example, CJEU, Cimenteries CBR, 18 December 1992, joined cases T-10/92 to T-12/92 and 
T-15/92, para. 38; CJEU, Imperial Chemical Industries, 29 June 1995, T-37/91, para. 49; CJEU, Solvay, 
29 June 1995, T-30/91, para. 59.  
311 See, for example, CJEU, Knauf Gips v. Commission, 1 July 2010, C-407/08 P, paras. 13, 23; CJEU, 
Aalborg Portland and Others v. Commission, Joined Cases C-204/00 P etc, 7 January 2004, paras. 71-73. 
312  CJEU, Organisation des Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v. Council, 12 December 2006, T-228/02, para. 128. 
313  Ibidem, para. 129. 
314 CJEU, Steffensen, 10 April 2003, C-276/01. 
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manufacturer of sausages. The administrative authorities took retail outlet samples 
and, based on the results of an analysis of the samples, imposed a fine on the com-
pany for marketing products without adequate labelling. The company lodged an ap-
peal against this decision before the national court. Article 7(1) of the applicable 
Council Directive 89/397EEC315 stipulated that Member States should take the nec-
essary steps to ensure that those subject to inspection might apply for a second opin-
ion. In this case, no second opinion was forthcoming – the only evidence available 
before the national court was the analysis of the samples taken by the administrative 
authorities. The reasons behind the absence of a second opinion remain unclear: the 
CJEU mentioned explicitly that 
 
‘the national court states that it does not know whether the retail traders concerned informed 
Plumrose or Mr Steffensen that samples had been taken and that it has not been possible to 
ascertain whether the results of the analyses of those samples were in each case notified to Mr 
Steffensen or Plumrose in time to enable them to apply for a second opinion’.316 
 
However, the national court obviously assumed the ‘worst case scenario’ – a situation 
in which the company had not been informed and had, therefore, not been able to 
produce counter evidence in the form of a second opinion. It referred to Luxem-
bourg the question of whether a national court is prohibited from using the results of 
the analysis of samples of a manufacturer’s products as evidence that the manufac-
turer has infringed the national rules of a Member State on foodstuffs where the 
manufacturer has been unable to exercise his or her right of a second opinion under 
Article 7(1) of the Directive. In the procedure before the CJEU, the German Gov-
ernment made clear that national German administrative procedural law did not im-
pose a general prohibition on the admission of evidence obtained in an improper ad-
ministrative procedure. The CJEU ruled as follows:  
 
‘It is for the national court to assess whether, in the light of all the factual and legal evidence 
available to it, the admission as evidence of the results of the analyses at issue in the main pro-
ceedings entails a risk of an infringement of the adversarial principle and, thus, of the right to a 
fair hearing. In the context of that assessment, the national court will have to examine, more 
specifically, whether the evidence at issue in the main proceedings pertains to a technical field 
of which the judges have no knowledge and is likely to have a preponderant influence on its 
assessment of the facts and, should this be the case, whether Mr Steffensen still has a real op-
portunity to comment effectively on that evidence. If the national court decides that the admis-
sion as evidence of the results of the analyses at issue in the main proceedings is likely to give 
rise to an infringement of the adversarial principle and, thus, of the right to a fair hearing, it 
must exclude those results as evidence in order to avoid such an infringement.’317 
 
                                                        
315 Council Directive 89/397EEC of 14 June 1989 on the official control of foodstuffs, Official Journal of 
the EU 1989 L 186, p. 23. 
316 CJEU, Steffensen, 10 April 2003, C-276/01, para. 18. 
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It may be inferred from Steffensen that, in a situation where a company, during the ad-
ministrative procedure, has not had a real opportunity to obtain a second opinion, the 
national court should arrange a real opportunity for the company to comment effec-
tively on the evidence relied on by the administration, for example, in the form of 
staying the court proceedings so that a second opinion can still be obtained. 
6.4.8  Time limits for the presentation of statements and evidence 
It follows from Article 4, first paragraph, of the EU Qualification Directive that it is 
the applicant’s duty to submit all elements as soon as possible.318 The Qualification 
Directive does not further specify what is meant by this. The terms ‘as soon as pos-
sible’ must be read in conjunction with Article 8, first paragraph, of the Procedures 
Directive, which stipulates that Member States shall ensure that applications for 
asylum are neither rejected nor excluded from examination on the sole ground that 
they have not been made as soon as possible.319 They must also be read in accord-
ance with Article 4, fifth paragraph, sub paragraph d, of the Qualification Directive, 
which states – as a condition that aspects of the applicant’s claim do not need con-
firmation – that the applicant ‘has applied (…) at the earliest possible time, unless he 
can demonstrate good reasons for not having done so’.320 
Both Noll (2005) and Hailbronner (2010) infer from the fact that the assessment 
needs to take place in co-operation with the applicant, that the expression ‘as soon as 
possible’ must be understood to mean that the applicant is required to present infor-
mation as soon as the need for this information has been established, which can hap-
pen at any time during the process.321 
There is extensive CJEU case law in other areas on the compatibility with Union 
law of national limitation periods and time limits. To answer the question of whether 
national time limits and limitation periods are compatible with EU law, the CJEU 
generally applies the principle of national procedural autonomy, provided that the re-
quirements of equality and effectiveness have been met (see above section 6.3.2.2).322 
The general rule is that reasonable national time limits are compatible with EU law, as 
they are an application of the fundamental principle of legal certainty.323 As time 
limits and limitation periods may vary greatly among the EU Member States, the 
Court generally grants considerable latitude in determining what is reasonable.324 
                                                        
318 Article 4, first paragraph, of the EU Qualification Directive 2011/95 stipulates, inter alia: ‘Member 
States may consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all elements needed to 
substantiate the application for international protection.’ 
319 Article 8, first paragraph, of the Procedures Directive (Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 De-
cember 2005). 
320 Article 4, fifth paragraph, sub d, of the EU Qualification Directive 2011/95. 
321 Noll 2005, p. 6; Hailbronner 2010, p. 1028.  
322 See, for example, CJEU, Fisscher, 28 September 1994, C-128/93, paras. 39-40; CJEU, Santex, 27 Feb-
ruary 2003, C-327/00, paras. 51, 52; CJEU, Manfredi, 13 July 2006, Joined Cases C-295/04 to C-
298/04, para. 77; CJEU, Pontin, 29 October 2009, C-63/08, paras. 43-49. 
323 See, for example, CJEU, Universale Bau, 12 December 2002, C-470/99, para. 76 ; CJEU, Santex, 27 
February 2003, C-327/00, para. 52. 
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The principle of national procedural autonomy is reflected in Article 39, second 
paragraph, of the Procedures Directive, which states, inter alia, that the Member States 
shall provide for time-limits for the applicant to exercise his or her right to an ef-
fective remedy.325 The text of the Recast Proposal of the Procedures Directive adds 
that national time limits must be reasonable: Article 41, fourth paragraph, stipulates 
that Member States shall provide for reasonable time-limits for the applicant to exer-
cise his or her right to an effective remedy.326 
The CJEU often leaves the determination of the question of whether a national 
time limit or limitation period is (in)compatible with the principle of effective judicial 
protection to the national courts. The Court does, however, provide the national 
courts with tools to answer this question. In a number of cases, tools have been pro-
vided in the form of imagined situations in which, due to particular circumstances, 
the effect of the national time limit at issue is particularly harmful for one of the 
parties. A clear example of this approach is Manfredi and others v. Lloyd Adriatico Assicu-
razioni SpA and Others (2006).327 This case concerned a dispute between a number of 
individuals and a number of insurance companies. The judicial proceedings before 
the domestic Italian court were based on Article 81 of the former EC Treaty (current-
ly Article 101 TFEU on the prohibition on contracts which negatively affect trade 
and competition within the single market) and were aimed at obtaining damages 
against insurance companies related to the increase in the cost of premiums paid 
under an agreement declared unlawful by the national Italian competition authority 
(AGCM). In the national proceedings, the insurance companies pleaded that the right 
to compensation in damages was out of time; according to them, the limitation 
period for bringing proceedings started to run from the day on which the agreement, 
which was subsequently declared unlawful, had been adopted. The national judge 
referred to the CJEU the question of whether Article 81 EC precludes a national rule 
which provides that the limitation period for seeking compensation for harm caused 
by an agreement or practice prohibited under Article 81 EC begins to run from the 
day on which that prohibited agreement or practice had been adopted. The CJEU did 
not find this national rule problematic. The Court did, however, indicate that, in com-
bination with a short appeal limitation period (for example, fourteen days), and in 
combination with the absence of a possibility of suspension, the national rule in ques-
tion might become problematic. The Court considered that it was for the national 
court to determine whether a national rule which provided that the limitation period 
for seeking compensation for harm caused by an agreement or practice prohibited 
under Article 81 EC began to run from the day on which that prohibited agreement 
or practice had been adopted, particularly where it also imposed a short limitation 
                                                        
325 Article 39, second paragraph, of the Procedures Directive (Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 De-
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326 COM (2009) 554 final 21 October 2009, 2009/0165 (COD). The recast proposal can be found inte-
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period that could not be suspended, rendered it practically impossible or excessively 
difficult to exercise the right to seek compensation for the harm suffered.328 
In Pontin (2009),329 the CJEU clearly found the national time limit problematic. 
Pontin was dismissed by her employer with immediate effect on grounds of unauthor-
ised absence. The day following her dismissal, Pontin informed her employer that she 
was pregnant and that her dismissal was null and void by virtue of the legal protec-
tion enjoyed by pregnant workers. Her employers did not respond. She then brought 
proceedings before the Employment Tribunal of Esch-sur-Alzette, Luxembourg. The 
problem was that the Luxembourg Labour Code stipulated that the dismissed female 
employee might, within 15 days of the termination of the contract, request the presi-
dent of the court exercising jurisdiction in employment matters, to declare the dis-
missal null and void and order her continued employment. Ms Pontin had waited for 
three months before initiating proceedings. She had also addressed the wrong in-
stance: the court and not the president of the court. The Employment Tribunal asked 
the CJEU, inter alia, whether EU law precludes national legislation which makes legal 
action brought by a pregnant employee who has been dismissed during her pregnancy 
subject to a 15-day time limit.  
In its judgment, the CJEU noted that short time limits for actions of this type 
were, in principle, legitimate in the interests of legal certainty. The Court then con-
sidered that the 15-day time limit in this case was particularly short in view, inter alia, 
of the situation in which a pregnant woman found herself at the start of her preg-
nancy, and for obtaining proper advice. The Court took into account that some of 
the days included in that period might have expired before the pregnant woman re-
ceived the letter notifying her of the dismissal, since it would seem that this period 
began to run, according to the case law of the CJEU, from the time the letter of dis-
missal was posted and not from the time it was received. The Court concluded that 
the combination of the short time limit and the requirement to address specifically 
the president of the court, appeared to give rise to procedural problems and, there-
fore, made the exercise of the rights that pregnant women derived from Article 10 
excessively difficult. This seemed to be non-compliant with the principle of effective-
ness, although this was for the national court to determine.330 
In its judgment in Samba Diouf (2011),331 a case concerning asylum, the CJEU 
ruled that a national time limit of 15 days for bringing an appeal against rejection of 
an application for asylum did not generally seem to be insufficient, but that particular 
circumstances might give rise to decide otherwise, and that it was up to the national 
court to do so in such circumstances:  
 
‘As regards the fact that the time-limit for bringing an action is 15 days in the case of an ac-
celerated procedure, whilst it is 1 month in the case of a decision adopted under the ordinary 
procedure, the important point, as the Advocate General has stated in point 63 of his Opinion, 
                                                        
328 Ibidem, paras. 73-82. 
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is that the period prescribed must be sufficient in practical terms to enable the applicant to pre-
pare and bring an effective action. With regard to abbreviated procedures, a 15-day time limit 
for bringing an action does not seem, generally, to be insufficient in practical terms to prepare 
and bring an effective action and appears reasonable and proportionate in relation to the rights 
and interests involved. It is, however, for the national court to determine – should that 
time-limit prove, in a given situation, to be insufficient in view of the circumstances – whether 
that element is such as to justify, on its own, upholding the action brought indirectly against 
the decision to examine the application for asylum under an accelerated procedure, so that, in 
upholding the action, the national court would order that the application be examined under 
the ordinary procedure.’332 
 
So far, the CJEU has not been able to express itself on national time limits for sub-
mitting statements and presenting evidence in asylum cases. However, there have 
been cases concerning other areas of law in which the Court did rule on questions 
concerning time limits for submitting evidence. An example is the case of Laub 
(2007),333 which concerned the recovery of export refunds unduly paid by national 
authorities. The CJEU ruled in this case that the time limit for submitting evidence 
must be reasonable: 
 
‘As there are no specific Community law rules prescribing the time-limits for the presentation 
of supplementary evidence in the context of a recovery procedure, it is a matter for the com-
petent national authorities, in accordance with national law, and subject to the limits imposed 
by Community law, to grant a supplementary period on the basis of the specific circumstances 
of each case. The period allowed must be reasonable in order to allow the exporter to obtain 
and produce the required documentation and must take account of, in particular, any effect of 
the actions of the competent authority on the exporter.’334 
 
When confronted with issues regarding time limits for presenting statements and 
evidence in asylum cases, it is likely that the CJEU will draw on this case law and will 
rule that reasonable national time limits are in conformity with EU law, provided that 
the principles of equivalence and effectiveness are met and that the party invoking 
the EU right is not affected in a particularly adverse way by the time limit in question, 
due to additional circumstances. It may also be expected that the CJEU will draw 
upon the principles concerning time limits developed by the ECtHR.335 It will 
possibly also look at the principles developed by the HRC and the ComAT.336 In 
sum, reasonable national time limits will normally not be problematic, but there must 
be room for national courts to be flexible when the circumstances of the case so re-
quire. 
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6.5  Final concluding remarks 
Since the Treaty of Lisbon (1 December 2009), the EU has had its own legally bind-
ing bill of human rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, with the 
status of primary binding EU law. Asylum cases will almost always be within the 
scope of Union law, so the Charter will normally apply to asylum cases. The Treaty of 
Lisbon has made the CJEU fully competent to rule on the validity of secondary asy-
lum law, and on the interpretation of primary and secondary EU asylum law. All na-
tional courts are permitted to refer preliminary questions in pending asylum cases to 
the CJEU. It has so far issued only a limited number of judgments concerning asy-
lum, so that at this point in time we can only describe this Court’s position on a limit-
ed number of aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny and not on all the eleven as-
pects. 
Article 18 of the Charter stipulates that the right to asylum shall be guaranteed 
with due respect for the rules of the RC. By virtue of this provision, national asylum 
courts will have to pay due respect to the procedural provisions of the RC, and to the 
procedural positions taken by the UNHCR, discussed in Chapter 2. It may be argued 
that it is no longer possible to set these positions aside as non-binding as this would 
amount to non-compliance with Article 18 of the Charter, which is binding primary 
Union law. 
The standards and principles on proceedings, evidence and judicial scrutiny 
flowing from the ECHR (discussed in Chapter 5) are incorporated into EU law via 
Articles 19, 47 and 52, third paragraph, of the Charter. They transform from inter-
governmental international law into supranational EU law, which takes precedence 
over all national law. Finally, by virtue of the Charter Preamble, Article 78 TFEU and 
Article 53 of the Charter, the standards and principles on proceedings, evidence and 
judicial scrutiny flowing from the ICCPR and the CAT (discussed in Chapters 3 and 
4) form important additional sources of interpretation of Articles 19, second para-
graph, and 47 of the Charter. 
Article 47 of the Charter is – as well as the mirror of Articles 6 and 13 ECHR – 
also the codification of the Union law principle of effective judicial protection. 
Within the framework of the principle of effective judicial protection, five different 
standards of intensity of judicial scrutiny for different categories of cases have been 
developed, varying from a very light judicial touch with no factual review (cases about 
staff matters) to an intense full and ex nunc judicial scrutiny on facts, law and propor-
tionality (cases concerning restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of EU citizens, 
their third-country national family members and Turkish workers and their family 
members who enjoy the rights of Decision 1/80 or under the Association Agree-
ment).It has been estimated that the CJEU will apply the most intense standard of 
judicial scrutiny in asylum cases. First, due to the strong parallel between asylum cases 
and cases concerning restrictions on the fundamental freedoms of EU citizens, which 
are both about fundamental freedoms or rights. Second, because that standard comes 
very close to the type of judicial scrutiny performed by the ECtHR under Article 3 
ECHR in a significant number of asylum cases, and to the full jurisdiction require-
ment and the rigorous scrutiny requirement flowing from, respectively, Articles 6 and 
13 ECHR. The judgment in the case of Samba Diouf (2011), in which the CJEU ruled 
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that the final decision on an asylum claim must be the subject of a thorough review on 
the merits by the national court, shows that this expectation is not imaginary. 
The provisions regarding judicial review in secondary EU asylum law must be 
interpreted in accordance with the higher ranking Article 47 of the Charter and the 
higher ranking general principle of effective judicial protection. The attempts to keep 
national courts away from asylum refusals or to water down the intensity of judicial 
scrutiny over such decisions, which are reflected in the texts of these provisions, 
have, therefore, been made in vain. 
The standard of proof laid down in Article 2, sub d, of the EU Qualification 
Directive 2011/95 is that it must be established, to a reasonable degree that, upon expul-
sion, the claimant’s life or freedom would be threatened. The standard in Article 2, 
sub f, is taken literally from the ECtHR’s case law under Article 3 ECHR and is that 
the risk is real and not fictional, that it is personal (relates to the individual), and that 
it is foreseeable. The risk does not need to be certain or highly probable, but must ex-
ceed the mere possibility of the claimant being subjected to proscribed ill-treatment. 
As to the burden of proof, under the first and second paragraphs of Article 4 of the 
Qualification Directive, the applicant is enjoined with a burden of assertion, which 
seems to be a rather low threshold. It entails that he or she submit the statements and 
the documentary evidence at his or her disposal. The authorities have an investigative 
burden with regard to the issues mentioned in the third paragraph of Article 4 of the 
Qualification Directive in particular the situation in the country of origin. In its judg-
ment in M.M. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland (2012) the CJEU 
has ruled that this requirement of co-operation contained in Article 4 of the Qualifi-
cation Directive means that if, for any reason whatsoever, the elements provided by 
an applicant for international protection are not complete, up to date or relevant, it is 
necessary for the Member State concerned to cooperate actively with the applicant, at 
that stage of the procedure, so that all the elements needed to substantiate the appli-
cation may be assembled. A Member State may also be better placed than an appli-
cant to gain access to certain types of documents. The CJEU has so far not explained 
any further what is meant by ‘active co-operation with the applicant so that all the 
elements needed to substantiate the application may be assembled.’ One may prob-
ably think of situations in which the authority offers the applicant a certain (addi-
tional) period for submitting new relevant documentation, of situations in which the 
applicant proposes that the authority hears witnesses and the authority in response to 
that arranges hearing sessions, and situations in which the applicant submits certain 
documents and the national administrative or judicial authority orders an expert 
authenticity examination. Like the ECtHR did in 2010 in Iskandarov v. Russia, the 
CJEU makes clear in M.M. that there may be specific circumstances in which the 
administrative or judicial authority is better placed than the applicant to get hold of 
certain types of documents. 
Under Article 4 of the Qualification Directive the relevant facts and circum-
stances can be divided into two categories: a) personal circumstances, and b) facts 
and circumstances relating to the situation in the country of origin. Article 4, fourth 
paragraph, makes clear that past persecution, past serious harm or threats thereof are 
highly relevant facts which give rise to a refutable presumption that the applicant 
qualifies for refugee or subsidiary protection. The lists of facts and circumstances 
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provided in paragraphs 2 and 3 of Article 4 are not exhaustive. In the light of Article 
78 TFEU, we may safely assume that all the facts and circumstances mentioned in the 
previous chapters are equally relevant under Article 4 of the Qualification Directive. 
As to the required degree of individual risk, it was concluded, with reference to 
the Elgafaji judgment (2009) that the division into three types of situations developed 
in the ECtHR’s case law is also workable for subsidiary protection under Union asy-
lum law. The three categories are: situations of extreme general violence, situations of 
group violence and other cases. In situations of extreme general violence no individ-
ual risk is required; in situations of group violence membership of that group forms 
sufficient individual Article 3-risk and in all other cases special personal facts and cir-
cumstances are required to establish that this very applicant runs a risk. In paragraph 
39 of Elgafaji, the CJEU ruled that ‘the more the applicant is able to show that he is 
specifically affected by reason of factors particular to his personal circumstances, the 
lower the level of indiscriminate violence required for him to be eligible for subsidiary 
protection.’ This is the mirror of the gradual scale notion emerging from the case law 
of the ECtHR and the ComAT that, the graver the general human rights situation in 
the country of origin, the less individual facts and circumstances, including evidence 
corroborating these individual facts and circumstances, are required. Finally, it was 
concluded that, for refugee protection under EU asylum law, no requirement of be-
ing singled out may be imposed. 
The neutrality of the terms ‘element’ and ‘substantiate’ in Article 4, first para-
graph, of the Qualification Directive indicates that, in principle, every form of evi-
dence capable of proving the risk can be admitted to the procedure, whether oral or 
written or evidence in another form. Secondary EU asylum law does not contain pro-
visions making clear exactly how much evidence is required to sufficiently corrobo-
rate a claim for international protection, and of what quality that evidence should be. 
Nor does it contain any provisions regarding the evaluation of the evidence.  
Secondary EU asylum law does not address in a detailed way the aspect of oppor-
tunities for presenting evidence and reacting to evidence and the CJEU has so far not 
been able to express itself on this aspect in asylum cases. There is much case law on 
the right to inter partes or adversarial judicial proceedings in other areas, such as mar-
keting and competition. It appears from this jurisprudence that adversariality and 
equality of arms are considered to be important safeguards. The general principles de-
veloped by the CJEU concerning the use of secret evidence strongly resemble those 
developed by the ECtHR (see 5.5.4). These general principles include the notions that 
the use of secret evidence is permitted provided that it has a legitimate aim and that it 
is necessary; that the interest of the State to keep the evidence secret must be bal-
anced against the individual’s right to have knowledge of this evidence and his proce-
dural rights of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms; that the court examining 
the appeal should be able to effectively review the confidential evidence on which the 
impugned decision is based and that limitations to a party’s procedural rights as a 
consequence of the use of secret evidence should be compensated by taking counter-
balancing measures (compensation techniques).  
The case of Steffensen (2003) clearly demonstrates that the CJEU regards national 
courts as guardians of the safeguards of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms. 
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Article 4, first paragraph, of the EU Qualification Directive 2011/95 requires the 
applicant to submit as soon as possible all elements underpinning his or her claim for 
international protection. The general rule established in the constant case law of the 
CJEU is that reasonable national time limits are compatible with EU law. In Samba 
Diouf (2011), an asylum case, the CJEU reiterated the rule that reasonable national 
time limits are compatible with EU law. In this judgment, the Court also made clear 
that national courts must have room for flexibility when the circumstances of the 
case require this. 
It may be concluded that EU law offers added value in three ways. First, it causes 
a transformation in the legal status of existing standards on evidence and judicial 
scrutiny contained in or flowing from international asylum law. These existing stan-
dards transform from non-binding principles into more important rules which must 
be respected (the standards developed by the UNHRC via Article 18 of the Charter), 
from intergovernmental international law into binding primary supranational EU law 
(the standards developed by the ECtHR via Articles 19 and 47 of the Charter) and 
from intergovernmental international law into important sources of inspiration for 
binding EU law (the standards and principles developed by the HRC and the ComAT 
via Articles 19 and 47 of the Charter). This incorporation into EU law makes the 
obligations and standards from the ECHR, the ICCPR and the CAT more important. 
The reason for this is that not only the treaties themselves, but also primary binding 
supranational EU law requires that the obligations and standards from the treaties are 
taken into account, with the CJEU as the international monitoring court. 
Second, the standards and principles developed under Article 6 ECHR are now 
applicable to asylum cases, as they form part of Article 47 of the EU Charter.  
Third, the system of judicial supervision over EU asylum law has a strong com-
plementary value. The preliminary procedure before the CJEU offers national courts 
the possibility to refer questions to the CJEU pending the national judicial proceed-
ings. In this way, violations of human rights may be prevented or redressed at a much 
earlier stage. 
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Chapter 7: National courts and the independent and 
rigorous scrutiny 
7.1 Towards a coherent set of standards for use by national courts 
The previous chapters were aimed at discovering standards on judicial scrutiny and 
evidence in international and European asylum law. To find such standards, treaty 
and EU law provisions on or relevant to national (judicial) proceedings were ana-
lysed. In addition, the assessment in expulsion cases as performed by the HRC, the 
ComAT and the ECtHR was analysed in order to discover the standards on judicial 
scrutiny and evidence applied by these international treaty monitoring bodies and 
court. 
From the discovered standards on national judicial scrutiny, a common denomi-
nator appeared. A national judicial remedy in cases concerning the expulsion of 
asylum seekers is ECHR-compliant if it performs an ‘independent and rigorous 
scrutiny’ of the protection claim.1 It is ICCPR-compliant if it considers the claim for 
protection ‘thoroughly and fairly’.2 CAT-compliance is ensured when a national ju-
dicial remedy offers an ‘effective, independent and impartial review’ of the decision 
on expulsion.3 On many occasions the UNHCR has expressed its opinion that na-
tional judges dealing with asylum cases should be able to ‘obtain a personal impres-
sion of the applicant’ and that ‘appeal or review proceedings should involve points of 
fact, including credibility, and points of law’.4 Finally, in Samba Diouf (2011), the 
CJEU ruled that the final decision on an asylum claim must be the subject of a ‘thor-
ough review on the merits of the claim’ by the national court.5 Thus, the common 
denominator following from international and EU asylum law is that national courts 
are required to offer an independent and rigorous (thorough) scrutiny of the asylum 
refusal.  
 
The central question in this chapter is how national asylum courts can live up to this 
requirement. In order to find an answer to this question, the results of the analysis 
conducted in the previous chapters are now brought together with the aim of de-
fining more exactly what a ‘rigorous and independent national judicial scrutiny’ is 
about. 
The first question looked at in this chapter, in section 7.2, is how the treaties 
studied in this book and EU asylum law relate to each other. This question is address-
                                                        
1 See, for some recent examples, ECtHR, Muminov v. Russia, 11 December 2008, Appl. No. 42502/06, 
para. 101; Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 2009, Appl. No. 30471/08, para. 108; 
ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and others v. Italy, 23 February 2012, Appl. No. 27765/09, para. 198. 
2 See, for example, HRC, Dawood Khan v. Canada, 10 August 2006, No. 1302/2004, para. 5.3. 
3 See, for example, ComAT, Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, No. 233/2003, paras. 13.6 and 13.7. 
4 See, for example, submission of the UNHCR in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands. Appl. No. 
31252/03, May 2005, www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/454f5e484.html, last visited 23 December 
2012, paras. 31-42. 
5 CJEU, Samba Diouf, 28 July 2011, C-69/10, paras. 56, 61. 
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ed in order to make clear how national asylum courts are bound by the procedural 
obligations flowing from the treaties and EU asylum law. 
After that, in sections 7.3 and 7.4, an attempt is made to integrate into a coherent 
whole the standards on judicial scrutiny and evidence flowing from international and 
EU asylum law, with the objective of arriving at a coherent set of standards ready for 
use by national asylum courts.  
One question that will be looked at in this exercise is whether the standards on 
judicial scrutiny and evidence featuring in the assessment in expulsion cases as per-
formed by the HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR, are binding on national asylum 
courts, in the sense that national courts must work in exactly the same way. Other 
questions that will be looked at are whether a hierarchy of international sources and 
supervisors exists, what to do in case of conflicting standards, and whether cross-
references are acceptable. 
A basic presumption underpinning the analysis in this chapter is that in many 
asylum cases coming before national asylum courts within the EU, both refugee pro-
tection (Articles 1 and 33 RC, Article 18 of the EU Charter) and subsidiary protection 
(Articles 7 ICCPR, 3 CAT, 3 ECHR, Articles 4 and 19 of the EU Charter) will be in-
voked in parallel, as in many EU countries both types of protection are dealt with in 
the same single procedure. Such a ‘one-stop shop’ procedure exists, for example, in 
Belgium, the Netherlands, the UK, Poland, Spain and Italy.6 As a result, all the 
treaties and instruments covered by this study are relevant to and applicable in such 
cases. (A two-step procedure exists in Ireland, where separate applications for asylum 
and for subsidiary protection are required and these applications are dealt with in 
separate subsequent procedures.7)  
7.2 National courts are ‘double bound’ by treaty obligations 
The transfer by the EU Member States to the EU of the competence to make bind-
ing rules on asylum has not affected the obligations flowing from the RC, the ICCPR, 
the CAT and the ECHR. This follows from Articles 26 and 34 VTC, read in con-
junction. Article 26 VTC states: 
 
‘Every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good 
faith’.8 
 
The Member States of the EU constitute a minority of the States parties to the RC, 
the ECHR, the ICCPR and the CAT. Article 34 VTC stipulates:  
 
 
                                                        
6  See for a description of different national procedures in the countries mentioned here Zwaan 2008, 
pp. 57-161. 
7 See CJEU, M.M. v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, 22 November 2012, C-277/11, paras. 
28, 29. 
8 Article 26 VTC. 
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‘A treaty does not create either obligations or rights for a third State without its consent.’9 
 
It follows from these provisions, read in conjunction, that national asylum courts 
within the EU Member States must comply with the procedural obligations flowing 
from the RC, the ICCPR, the CAT and the ECHR, analysed in the previous Chapters 
2-5. The transfer of powers on asylum to the EU in 1999 has not changed this.10 
The case law of both the ECtHR and the CJEU lends support to this conclusion. 
In T.I. v. the UK (2000), K.R.S. v. the UK (2008) and M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (2011), 
the ECtHR ruled that States remain responsible under the ECHR for the conse-
quences of removing asylum seekers from their territory, notwithstanding the fact 
that removal is carried out under the EU Dublin mechanism.11 In M.S.S. v. Belgium 
and Greece (2011), the ECtHR ruled that the ‘equivalent protection’ doctrine devel-
oped in its Bosphorus judgment12 did not apply.13 In its judgment in ERT v. DEP 
(1991),14 the CJEU made clear that fundamental rights form an integral part of the 
general principles of EU law and that the ECHR has special significance in this 
respect.15 To conclude, the procedural obligations on national asylum courts flowing 
from the RC, the ICCPR, the CAT and the ECHR, set out in Chapters 2-5, exist 
alongside EU asylum law, as separate obligations flowing from international law. 
National asylum courts are also bound by the procedural obligations flowing 
from the treaties via EU law. In Chapter 6, it was demonstrated how the procedural 
obligations from the treaties are incorporated into EU asylum law. Reference is made 
to sections 6.1.3.1, 6.1.4, 6.2 and 6.3. This incorporation into EU law makes the obli-
gations and standards from the treaties more important. The reason for this is that 
compliance with the obligations and standards from the treaties is now also required 
by primary binding supranational EU law, with the CJEU as the international moni-
toring court. In Chapter 6 it was also made clear that the procedural obligations and 
                                                        
9 Article 34 VTC. 
10 See for the same conclusion Battjes 2006, pp. 59-77. 
11 ECtHR, T.I. v. the UK, admissibility decision, 7 March 2000, Appl. No. 43844/98; ECtHR, K.R.S. v. 
the UK, admissibility decision, 2 December 2008, Appl.No. 32733/08; ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and 
Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09, paras. 342, 343.  
12 ECtHR, Bosphorus Hava Yollari Turizm ve Ticet Anonim Serketi v. Ireland, 30 June 2005, Appl. No. 
45036/98. This case was about a seizure by the Irish Government in 1993 of an aircraft owned by 
Yugoslav airlines, but leased to Bosphorus Airways, a Turkish company, based on an EC regulation, 
which gave effect to UN Security Council Resolutions imposing sanctions against the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia. Before the ECtHR two issues were raised, being Ireland’s responsibility 
under the ECHR and the interference with the right to property under Article 1, Protocol 1 ECHR. 
In its judgment, the ECtHR developed the ‘equivalent protection’ doctrine. It held that Ireland was 
acting as required under EU law and that this was in itself a legitimate general interest of consider-
able weight capable of serving as a justification for breaches of property rights. Bosphorus seems to 
have no implications for asylum. It is relevant in only two situations, namely where actions of the 
EU itself are being challenged or where national implementing measures are challenged and the 
Member States have no discretion whatsoever. In asylum cases the EU Member States will always 
have some discretion. See Battjes 2006, p. 75, Costello 2006, p. 107. 
13 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09,para. 340. See also 
Costello 2006, pp. 109, 121-123, Battjes 2006, p. 75. 
14 CJEU, ERT v. DEP, 18 June 1991, C-260/89. 
15 CJEU ERT v. DEP, 18 June 1991, C-260/89, paras.41 and 42. 
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standards from the ECHR form ‘bottom norms’ and that EU asylum law may offer 
more protection.16 
National asylum courts in the EU Member States are, thus, ‘double bound’ by the 
procedural obligations and standards flowing from the treaties investigated in this 
study as they are bound by the treaties and by EU law which incorporates the treaty 
obligations. 
7.3  The ‘independent and rigorous national judicial scrutiny’: sources of 
interpretation 
7.3.1  Origins 
The requirement of an ‘independent and rigorous national judicial scrutiny’ follows 
primarily from the effective remedy provisions and the procedural limbs of the refoule-
ment prohibitions contained in the international treaties studied in this book. A na-
tional judicial remedy in cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers is com-
pliant with Articles 7, 2, third paragraph, ICCPR and Article 5, second paragraph, sub 
b Optional Protocol to the ICCPR if it considers the claim for protection ‘thoroughly 
and fairly’.17 Article 3 and Article 22, fifth paragraph, CAT require an opportunity for 
‘effective, independent and impartial review’ of the decision on expulsion.18 A na-
tional judicial remedy in cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers is com-
pliant with Articles 3, 13 and 35, first paragraph, ECHR if it is able to comprise both 
substantive and procedural points and is able to quash the administrative asylum 
refusal.19 Asylum courts at national level will, thus, need to perform an ‘independent 
and rigorous scrutiny’ of the protection claim.20 Two common elements appear from 
these standards developed by the HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR. National ju-
dicial review must be: 1) thorough (rigorous, effective); and 2) independent (impar-
tial). The question is whether we can define in a more precise way what these two ele-
ments mean. 
                                                        
16 Article 52, third paragraph, of the EU Charter stipulates that: ‘In so far as this Charter contains 
rights which correspond to rights guaranteed by the Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, the meaning and scope of those rights shall be the same as 
those laid down by the said Convention. This provision shall not prevent Union law providing more 
extensive protection.’ 
17 See, for example, HRC, Dawood Khan v. Canada, 10 August 2006, No. 1302/2004, para. 5.3. 
18 See, for example, ComAT, Agiza v. Sweden, 20 May 2005, No. 233/2003. 
19 ECtHR, Baysakov v. Ukraine, 1 June 2010, Appl. No. 29031/04, para. 75; ECtHR, Abdulazhon Isakov 
v. Russia, 8 July 2010, Appl. No. 14049/08, para. 137; ECtHR, A. v. the Netherlands, 20 July 2010, 
Appl. No. 4900/06, para. 158. 
20 For example, ECtHR, Muminov v. Russia, 11 December 2008, Appl. No. 42502/06, para. 101; 
ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 2009, Appl. No. 30471/08, para. 108. 
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7.3.2  Articles 19 and 47 EU Charter: standards on national judicial 
proceedings come together 
Based on the results of the analysis conducted in the previous chapters, we may dis-
tinguish the following categories of provisions on or relevant to national court pro-
ceedings: 
- Non-refoulement provisions hosting a procedural limb; 
- Provisions guaranteeing an effective remedy at national level; 
- Provisions requiring exhaustion of effective national remedies; 
- Provisions guaranteeing access to court at national level and provisions requiring 
a fair court hearing; 
- Provisions guaranteeing due process of law at national level in cases of expulsion; 
- Other procedural provisions. 
 
Table 1 below provides an overview of these provisions. Provisions not explicitly 
covered due to lack of jurisprudence and literature are put in brackets. Table 1 below 
illustrates the phenomenon of the incorporation of existing treaty provisions into EU 
law described in Chapter 6. It illustrates that Article 18 of the EU Charter – by stating 
that respect is required for the rules of the RC – incorporates into EU law the pro-
visions on proceedings from the RC and incorporates into EU law the UNHCR’s 
positions on evidence and judicial scrutiny, as the UNHCR is the RC’s supervisor. 
Table 1 also illustrates that Article 19, second paragraph, of the EU Charter incorpo-
rates into EU law, via Articles 52, third paragraph, and 53, of the EU Charter: 
- The procedural limb of the refoulement prohibition from the ICCPR (Article 7 
ICCPR); 
- The procedural limb of the refoulement prohibition from the CAT (Article 3 CAT); 
- The procedural limb of the refoulement prohibition from the ECHR (Article 3 
ECHR). 
 
Table 1, finally, illustrates that Article 47, first and second paragraph, of the EU Char-
ter incorporates into EU law, via Articles 52, third paragraph, and 53, of the EU 
Charter: 
- The effective remedy provision from the ICCPR (Article 2, paragraph 3 ICCPR);  
- The effective remedy provisions from the CAT (Articles 12 and 13 CAT); 
- The effective remedy provision from the ECHR (Article 13); 
- The fair court hearing provision from the ICCPR (Article 14); 
- The fair court hearing provision from the ECHR (Article 6); 
- The access to court provision from the RC (Article 16).  
 
It follows from the foregoing that the requirement of an independent and rigorous 
national judicial scrutiny – originally developed within the context of the effective 
remedy provisions and refoulement prohibitions of the ICCPR, the CAT and the 
ECHR – also forms part of Articles 19 and 47 of the EU Charter.  
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Table 1: The provisions relevant to national judicial proceedings in the treaties and EU law 
Treaty or 
instrument ► 
RC ICCPR CAT ECHR EU law 
Type of 
provision ▼ 
     
      
1. Refoulement 
prohibitions 
with 
procedural 
limb 
(Article 33) Article 7 Article 3 Article 3 Article 4 Charter 
Article 18 Charter 
Article 19(2) 
Charter 
2. Effective 
remedy 
 Article 2(3) Articles 12, 13 Article 13 Article 47(1) 
Charter 
Article 39 PD 
Article 29 TPD 
(right to mount a 
legal challenge) 
Article 21(1) RCD 
(right to appeal) 
Article 19(2) DR 
(right to appeal) 
3. Exhaustion 
rules 
 Article 
5(2)(b) 
First 
Optional 
Protocol 
Article 22(5) Article 35(1)  
4. Access to 
court, fair 
court hearing 
Article 16 Article 14  Article 6 Article 47(2) 
Charter 
Article 18 Charter 
5. Due process 
of law 
Article 32 Article 13  (Article 1 
Protocol 7) 
 
6. Other 
provisions 
Article 35 
on co-
operation 
UNHCR – 
national 
authorities 
 Article 15 on 
the prohibition 
on using 
statements 
resulting from 
torture as 
evidence 
 Provisions on 
evidentiary issues 
in secondary 
asylum law: 
Article 2, sub c 
and sub e, QD on 
the standard of 
proof; 
Article 4 QD on 
the assessment of 
facts and 
circumstances; 
Article 8 PD on 
requirements for 
the examination 
of applications 
 
It also follows from the foregoing that for the purpose of defining the requirement of 
an independent and rigorous national judicial scrutiny in a more precise way, we may 
turn to a variety of sources. These are: 
- The case law of the HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR under the procedural 
limb of the refoulement prohibitions (Article 7 ICCPR, Article 3 CAT, Article 3 
ECHR); 
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- The case law of the HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR under the effective reme-
dy provisions (Article 2, paragraph 3 ICCPR, Articles 12 and 13 CAT, Article 13 
ECHR); 
- The case law of the HRC and the ECtHR under the fair court hearing provisions 
(Article 14 ICCPR, Article 6 ECHR); 
- The positions of the UNHCR concerning national judicial scrutiny and evidence 
as these positions form part of Article 16 RC on access to courts;  
- The CJEU’s case law on the principle of effective judicial protection as Article 47 
also constitutes the codification of this EU law principle (see section 6.3.2). 
 
For the purpose of defining the requirement of an independent and rigorous national 
judicial scrutiny, we may also turn to another important source of interpretation. This 
is the assessment as it is performed by the international supervisors and court, ana-
lysed in the second parts of chapters 3, 4 and 5. The standards on judicial scrutiny 
and evidence featuring in the assessment as applied by the international supervisors 
and court may help to further define what an independent and rigorous national judi-
cial scrutiny is about. 
7.3.3  Hierarchy of sources (1)? 
The question arises of whether the sources of interpretation mentioned above can be 
classified into a hierarchy. The CJEU is the international court responsible for the 
interpretation and application of EU law, which is supranational.21 It has consistently 
treated the ECHR as a special source of inspiration for EU law human rights and has 
often drawn on the ECHR in its case law.22 This special status of the ECHR and the 
ECtHR’s case law is also reflected in Article 52, third paragraph, of the EU Charter 
(see section 6.1.3.2). It would, therefore, be logical for national asylum courts to treat 
the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR as the first and most important sources of 
interpretation. At this point in time there is only limited CJEU jurisprudence on 
evidence and judicial scrutiny in asylum cases, so the case law of the ECtHR must so 
far be seen as the leading source of interpretation. 
The next source to turn to would be the UNHCR. Article 18 of the EU Charter 
requires that national courts pay due respect to the procedural provisions of the RC. 
One of these provisions is Article 35, the provision on co-operation between the 
UNHCR and national authorities. Respect for Article 35 RC as required by Article 18 
of the EU Charter carries an obligation to pay respect to the positions on judicial 
scrutiny and evidence taken by the UNHCR, discussed in Chapter 2 (see Chapter 6, 
section 6.2.1.) 
The case law of the HRC and the ComAT may be used as subsidiary or addi-
tional sources of interpretation. This follows from Article 53 of the EU Charter (see 
                                                        
21 Article 19, para. 1, TEU: ‘It shall ensure that in the interpretation and application of the Treaties the 
law is observed.’ 
22 Some examples of judgments in which this special position of the ECHR is stressed are: CJEU, 
Connolly v. Commission, 6 March 2001, C-274/99, para. 37 P; CJEU, Roquette Frères, 22 October 2002, 
C-94/00, para. 25; CJEU, Omega, 14 October 2004, C-36/02, para. 33. 
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sections 6.2.2, 6.3.1) and also from the case law of the CJEU. In a number of cases, 
the CJEU has drawn explicitly on other human rights instruments, in addition to the 
ECHR, particularly the ICCPR.23 
7.3.4  Hierarchy of sources (2): the ECtHR’s assessment as ‘role model’? 
In the second part of Chapter 5, the assessment performed by the ECtHR in cases 
concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers was analysed with the aid of the eleven 
aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny introduced in Chapter 1. It was concluded 
that, pertaining to those, the ECtHR has developed a set of precise and detailed stan-
dards. The question we will look at below is whether these standards are binding on 
national asylum courts. 
There are many reasons for national asylum courts to ensure that they offer at 
least the same level of judicial protection as the level offered by the ECtHR by 
working with at least the same standards as the ones applied by the ECtHR.24 First, 
Article 52, third paragraph, of the EU Charter stipulates that the rights contained in 
the Charter which correspond to rights in the ECHR, must be interpreted in con-
formity with their counterpart ECHR-rights as elucidated by the ECtHR. The stan-
dards on judicial scrutiny and evidence featuring in the assessment performed by the 
ECtHR in expulsion cases may be seen as standards elucidating Article 3 ECHR. In 
other words, these standards form part of Article 3. Article 19 of the EU Charter is 
the counterpart of Article 3 ECHR. Due to Article 52, third paragraph of the EU 
Charter, Article 19 of the EU Charter must be interpreted in conformity with Article 
3 ECHR. It would amount to non-compliance with Article 19 of the Charter, which 
is binding primary Union law, if national asylum courts applied standards deviating 
significantly from those applied by the ECtHR under Article 3 ECHR. 
Second, applying stricter standards at national court level may result in violations 
of Article 13 and may lead the ECtHR to declare cases admissible, in spite of the 
non-exhaustion of national remedies. In Chapter 5, examples were given in which 
this had happened: in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (2011), a violation of Article 13 
ECHR occurred because the Aliens Appeals Board applied a standard of proof which 
was much stricter than the one applied by the ECtHR.25 In Salah Sheekh v. the Nether-
lands (2007), the ECtHR did not hold non-exhaustion of national remedies against the 
applicant as the national Council of State applied a constant jurisprudential line which 
incorporated a stricter requirement of individualisation than the one applied by the 
ECtHR.26 
Third, the ECtHR has given more or less explicit messages under Article 13 
ECHR that there should not be significant differences between the judicial scrutiny 
                                                        
23 See, for example, CJEU, Dzodzi, 18 October 1990, C-197/89, para. 68; CJEU, Grant, 17 February 
1998, C-249/96, para. 44; CJEU, European Parliament v. Council, 27 June 2006, C-540/03, paras. 35-37, 
54-57.  
24 See, for the same conclusion, Battjes 2006, p. 322, Bruin 2003, Corstens (President of the Supreme 
Court of the Netherlands) 2010, pp. 166, 167, p. 386, Damen 2008, Wouters 2009, pp. 338, 339, 574. 
25 ECtHR, M..S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09, paras. 389, 390. 
26 ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04, paras. 123, 136, 148.  
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applied at national level and the judicial scrutiny offered by the ECtHR. The judg-
ments of Vilvarajah v. the UK (1991)27 and Hilal v. the UK (2001)28 at first glance give 
the impression that the ECtHR accepted a national judicial investigation which was, 
at least in name and form, not a very rigorous one. However, closer examination of 
these two judgments reveals that the ECtHR considers its own ‘rigorous scrutiny’ in 
Article 3-cases as guidance for national courts, and that it is no coincidence that the 
ECtHR uses identical terminology for both the scrutiny exercised by the Court itself 
under Article 3 (‘rigorous scrutiny’) and the scrutiny required from the national au-
thorities under Article 13 (‘independent and rigorous scrutiny’). In both Vilvarajah 
and Hilal, the ECtHR concluded that the UK judicial review did provide an effective 
degree of control over the decisions of the administrative authorities in asylum cases 
and was sufficient to satisfy the requirements of Article 13.29 The ECtHR noted in 
this connection that the UK courts examine whether the Home Secretary has 
correctly interpreted the law in relation to the grant or refusal of asylum and that, if 
the national courts are satisfied that he has made no error of law, they may, never-
theless, review the refusal of asylum in the light of the ‘Wednesbury principles ’ – an 
examination of the exercise of discretion by the Secretary of State to determine 
whether he or she left out of account a factor that should have been taken into ac-
count or took into account a factor that he or she should have ignored, or whether he 
or she came to a conclusion so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could have 
reached it. In Vilvarajah, the ECtHR took into account that the English courts had 
emphasised, in a number of judgments, their special responsibility to subject adminis-
trative decisions in the area of asylum to ‘the most anxious scrutiny’.30 
In Smith and Grady v. the UK (1999)31 – a case in which the two applicants com-
plained that investigations into their homosexuality and their discharge from the 
Royal Air Force on the ground of their homosexuality constituted violations of Ar-
ticle 8 ECHR alone and in conjunction with Article 14 ECHR – the ECtHR dealt 
with the applicants’ complaint under Article 13 ECHR about the limited national 
judicial review by contrasting the case with the cases of Soering v. the UK (1989)32 and 
Vilvarajah v. the UK (1991, author’s emphasis): 
 
‘The present applications can be contrasted with the cases of Soering and Vilvarajah (…). In 
those cases, the Court found that the test applied by the national courts in applications for 
                                                        
27 ECtHR, Vilvarajah and others v. the UK, 30 October 1991, Appl. Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 
13447/87 and 13448/87. 
28 ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99. 
29 ECtHR, Vilvarajah and others v. the UK, 30 October 1991, Appl. Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 
13447/87 and 13448/87, paras. 117-127, ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/ 
99, paras. 75-79. See also Essakkili & Spijkerboer 2005, pp. 47-51, and Simon 1992 in his article 
‘Tamils and persecution of a group’ in NJCM Bulletin 17-5 (1992), pp. 563-572.  
30 ECtHR, Vilvarajah and others v. the UK, 30 October 1991, Appl. Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 
13447/87 and 13448/87, paras. 90-91. 
31 ECtHR, Smith and Grady, 27 September 1999, Appl. No. 33985/96; 33986/96. 
32 ECtHR, Soering v. the UK, 7 July 1989, Appl. No. 1403/88. 
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judicial review of decisions by the Secretary of State in extradition and expulsion matters 
coincided with the Court’s own approach under Article 3 of the Convention.’33 
 
In Hilal v. the UK (2001), the Court considered: 
 
‘While the applicant argued that in judicial review applications, the courts will not reach 
findings of fact for themselves on disputed issues, the Court is satisfied that the national courts 
give careful scrutiny to claims that an expulsion would expose an applicant to the risk of 
inhuman or degrading treatment. The Court is not convinced that the fact that this scrutiny 
takes place against the background of the criteria applied in judicial review of administrative 
decisions, namely, rationality and perverseness, deprives the procedure of its effectiveness. The 
substance of the applicant’s complaint was examined by the Court of Appeal, and it had the 
power to afford him the relief he sought.’34 
 
And in Hatton and others v. the UK (2003) – a case concerning the acceptability under 
Article 8 ECHR of the noise and disturbance caused by night flights at Heathrow air-
port35 – the ECtHR explained once again why in Vilvarajah compliance with the pro-
cedural limb of Article 3 ECHR was assumed: 
 
‘The scope of the national review in Vilvarajah (…) was relatively broad because of the 
importance national law attached to the matter of physical integrity. It was on this basis that 
judicial review was held to comply with the requirements of Article 3.’36 
 
It follows from this case law that the ECtHR found the national judicial examination 
Articles 3- and 13-proof because, in essence, it did not differ significantly from the 
assessment performed by the ECtHR itself. In Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands (2007), 
the ECtHR was particularly clear that in cases concerning expulsion or extradition 
involving an Article 3-claim rigorous scrutiny is needed. As the considerations in the 
judgment were so elaborate on this point, the judgment gave the impression that the 
ECtHR had specifically and critically reacted to the (partially) marginal judicial review 
applied by the asylum courts in the Netherlands.37 
Fourth, protection of the subsidiary nature of the ECHR is a sound legal argu-
ment for national courts to apply the same standards as those applied by the 
ECtHR.38 If national judicial proceedings offer fewer safeguards compared to the 
proceedings in Strasbourg, it will always make sense for individuals to apply to the 
ECtHR. This runs counter to the subsidiary nature of the Convention system. Sub-
sidiarity means that citizens should be able to vindicate their rights in the national 
courts and that, however well organised, international protection of human rights can 
                                                        
33 ECtHR, Smith and Grady, 27 September 1999, Appl. No. 33985/96; 33986/96, para. 138. 
34 ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, para. 78. 
35 ECtHR, Hatton and others v. the UK, 8 July 2003, Appl. No. 36022/97. 
36 Ibidem, para. 140. 
37 ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04, para. 136; Wouters 
2009, p. 339. 
38 Battjes 2006, p. 322. 
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never be as effective as a well-functioning national system of protection.39 Subsidia-
rity of the ECHR is already under serious threat as a result of the ever-increasing 
number of applications to the ECtHR. Asylum cases are heavily responsible for this. 
ECtHR Judge Myjer estimated that, in 2006, 80 per cent of all the cases against the 
Netherlands concerned migration and a large part of this category concerned asylum 
cases.40 This sharp rise in asylum cases has continued up to the present; in their 
speeches on the occasion of the opening of the judicial year on 28 January 2011, both 
Jean-Paul Costa, President of the ECtHR, and António Guterres, United Nations 
High Commissioner for Refugees, stressed that a large proportion of the ECtHR’s 
workload concerned asylum issues.41 
When this study was embarked upon (early 2007), the highest national asylum 
court in the Netherlands, the Council of State, took the position that different stan-
dards at national and international judicial level were acceptable (as far as the credi-
bility assessment was concerned).42 In support of this position, it was argued that the 
position of national courts was different as they operated within a framework of 
checks and balances with the national executive and legislative powers and was, there-
fore, different from that of the ECtHR as international supervisor. Although this is 
true, this does not constitute a valid reason for national courts and the ECtHR to 
assess asylum cases under Article 3 ECHR in significantly different ways, as this argu-
ment does not rebut the above-mentioned reasons for working in a congruent way. 
Another argument voiced at national level in the Netherlands was that, when it 
came to the credibility assessment, the national judiciary should be careful and pay 
deference to the national executive, as the executive processed more cases and, 
therefore, had much broader experience and expertise. It would, therefore, be unwise 
if national courts always actively determined the facts independently and on their own 
account.43 This argument makes some sense, at least for the situation in the Nether-
lands and other countries where asylum claims are first examined by an administrative 
decision maker and appeals against refusals are dealt with by courts. It cannot be 
denied that in such a situation the administrative decision maker assesses all the asy-
lum cases and also sees the (obviously) deserving cases, whereas the national courts 
deal only with those cases where asylum was initially refused. However, the ECtHR’s 
approach to the credibility assessment and the application of investigative powers 
offers a very reasonable solution here, which also ensures respect for the experience 
and expertise of administrative decision makers. As was explained in the second part 
of Chapter 5, the ECtHR actively proceeds towards an independent determination of 
the facts, including credibility, and applies investigative powers to that end, in cases 
where (one of the following) triggers occur(s): insufficient national proceedings (for 
                                                        
39 Barkhuysen 1998, pp. 12 and 13. See also the annual report for 2006 of the ECtHR, p. 30. 
40 Speech by ECtHR Judge Myjer held on 21 June 2007 on the occasion of the retirement and emeritus 
status of Professor P. Boeles. 
41 ‘Chroniques Strasbourgeoises’, NJCM Bulletin 36 (2011), 2, p. 258. 
42 See the judgment of the Council of State of 5 June 2006, 200602132/1and 200602135/1, para. 2.6; it 
was stated that the immigration judge in the Netherlands is not obliged to review the administrative 
stance on flight narrative credibility in the same way as the ECtHR investigates whether or not the 
Netherlands have violated their treaty obligation under Article 3. 
43 See, for example, Lubberdink 2009. 
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example, evidence was overlooked or not taken seriously, or the assessment made at 
national level was insufficiently supported by relevant country of origin materials); 
new facts, circumstances and developments, including evidence thereof, or new infor-
mation which casts doubt on the information relied on by the government; and dis-
respect for the absolute nature of Article 3, for example, a weighing of national secu-
rity considerations against the Article 3-risk, or an incorrect application of the stan-
dard of proof or another evidentiary standard, for example, a too strict standard of 
proof or a too strict standard on individualization. National courts can easily follow 
this approach without heavily disturbing national systems of checks and balances. 
This would mean that national asylum courts would actively and independently make 
a fresh factual determination in cases of insufficient administrative proceedings (for 
example, evidence had not been properly examined by the administrative decision 
maker), in cases where at the judicial stage new facts or circumstances were invoked 
or new evidence was submitted and in cases where the national court established that 
the administrative decision maker had disrespected the absolute nature of Article 3 
ECHR by weighing national security or public order arguments against the risk, or 
had applied an incorrect evidentiary standard under Article 3. In other circumstances, 
national courts would rely on the determination of the facts made by the administra-
tive decision maker. 
It may be argued that, like the ECtHR, national courts should at least always have 
the fully free choice to determine, in each particular case at hand, whether full judicial 
scrutiny or a somewhat less intense form of judicial review is appropriate. National 
courts are the last national instances looking at cases and are as such best positioned 
to see all the relevant circumstances conditioning this choice. As Judge Martens 
stated in his separate opinion to Fischer v. Austria (1995): 
 
‘The balancing operation is far too subtle and too dependent on the specific type of subject-
matter of each case to be left to the legislature; the rule of law implies that it should be left to 
the judiciary, which should have the last word. (…) Only if the national tribunal is in principle 
competent to review completely the original decision, be it that it should be empowered to 
exercise restraint with regard to such decisions and assessments by the executive authorities 
which, in its opinion, should properly be left to their discretion.’44 
 
Finally, the workload argument is not very convincing either. There is no reason to 
fear that working in the same way as the ECtHR would mean that national courts 
would have to organise, in all pending asylum cases, fact-finding missions and hear 
witnesses, as the ECtHR did in the case of N. v. Finland (2005).45 Just like criminal 
and civil cases, some asylum cases are truly difficult and require extensive investiga-
tions, whereas other asylum cases are easy to decide and do not require much re-
search. It all depends on the individual flight narrative, the particular situation in the 
country of origin, the quantity and quality of the available evidence and the quality of 
the administrative decision. 
                                                        
44 ECtHR, Fischer v. Austria, 26 April 1995, Appl. No. 16922/90, separate opinion of Judge Martens. 
45 ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 27 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02. 
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All the arguments discussed above lead me to conclude that the standards on 
judicial scrutiny and evidence as applied by the ECtHR are, as minimum norms, bind-
ing on national asylum courts. 
7.3.5  Hierarchy of sources (3): UNHCR, HRC and ComAT as ‘role 
models’? 
In section 7.3.4, it was made clear that the ECtHR’s standards are the first source for 
national asylum courts when defining the standard of an independent and rigorous 
national judicial scrutiny. The standards developed by the UNHCR were mentioned 
as a second source, and the standards developed and applied in the case law of the 
HRC and the ComAT were mentioned as subsidiary sources of interpretation. 
It follows from the conclusions arrived at in Chapters 2, 3, 4 and 5 that the 
standards on evidence and judicial scrutiny developed and applied by the ECtHR, the 
UNHCR, the HRC and the ComAT often coincide. At the same time, there are a 
number of major differences concerning, mainly, adversariality (a relatively stricter 
stance by the HRC and the ComAT), the standard of proof (a relatively stricter 
standard applied by the HRC), the credibility assessment and the application of 
investigative powers (a relatively more active role by the ECtHR and a clear standard 
developed by the UNHCR on the required intensity of national judicial scrutiny, 
being full and independent scrutiny on facts, including credibility, and law), the evalu-
ation of evidence (concrete standards developed by the ECtHR versus the less con-
crete standards of the other international supervisors), and the weight attached to 
medico-legal reports (special position of the ComAT). When confronted with di-
verging standards, the international preference rules laid down in the VTC and in the 
treaties themselves may be of assistance to national courts. Article 30, second para-
graph, VTC stipulates: 
 
‘when a treaty specifies that it is subject to, or that it is not to be considered as incompatible 
with, an earlier or later treaty, the provisions of that other treaty prevail’.  
 
Article 5 RC states: 
 
‘Nothing in this Convention shall be deemed to impair any rights and benefits granted by a 
Contracting State to refugees apart from this Convention’.  
 
Similarly, Article 53 ECHR stipulates: 
 
‘nothing in this Convention shall be construed as limiting or derogating from any of the hu-
man rights and fundamental freedoms which may be ensured under the laws of any High Con-
tracting Party or under any other agreement to which it is a Party’.  
 
Article 5, second paragraph, ICCPR reads: 
 
‘there shall be no restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights 
recognized or existing in any State Party to the present Covenant pursuant to law, conventions, 
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regulations or custom on the pretext that the present Covenant does not recognize such rights 
or that it recognizes them to a lesser extent’.  
 
Article 16, second paragraph, CAT stipulates: 
 
‘the provisions of this Convention are without prejudice to the provisions of any other inter-
national instrument or national law which prohibit cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment or which relate to extradition or expulsion’.  
 
Finally, Article 351 TFEU reads: 
 
‘the rights and obligations arising from agreements concluded before 1 January 1958 or, for ac-
ceding States, before the date of their accession, between one or more Member States on the 
one hand, and one or more third countries on the other, shall not be affected by the provisions 
of the Treaties. To the extent that such agreements are not compatible with the Treaties, the 
Member State or States concerned shall take all appropriate steps to eliminate the incompatibil-
ities established. Member States shall, where necessary, assist each other to this end and shall, 
where appropriate, adopt a common attitude’.  
 
As Battjes has persuasively argued, ‘anterior treaties ’ must be understood as treaties 
in force before 1 May 1999, the date of the entry into force of the Treaty of Am-
sterdam by which powers on asylum were transferred to the EU, and include all the 
treaties investigated.46 Thus, in the case of conflict between obligations under EU 
asylum law and obligations flowing from the RC, the ECHR, the ICCPR and the 
CAT, which cannot be solved by conciliatory interpretation, the obligations of the 
latter treaties prevail. This preference rule is also laid down in Article 53 of the Char-
ter, which stipulates, inter alia: 
 
‘nothing in the Charter shall be interpreted as restricting or adversely affecting human rights 
and fundamental freedoms as recognised by international agreements to which the Member 
States are party’. 
 
When we read the preference rules contained in the treaties and in EU law in 
conjunction, the emerging solution for national courts is that the provision offering 
the broadest human rights protection in a specific case must prevail.47 In other 
words, in cases of diverging standards, national courts must apply those standards 
which offer the highest protection to the claimant in the particular case at hand. Such 
an approach would be fully in line with the notion laid down in Article 52, third 
paragraph, of the EU Charter that Union law may provide more extensive protection 
than the ECtHR. 
                                                        
46 See Battjes 2006, pp. 64-66. 
47 Horbach et al. 2007, p. 493. 
National courts and the independent and rigorous scrutiny 
 
 
 
377 
7.3.6  Cross-references: problematic or not? 
Is it allowed for national asylum courts to refer, at the same time, to different sources 
of interpretation when defining the requirement of an independent and effective 
national remedy? Cross-references are references to other human rights treaties or 
instruments covering the same or a similar right, and to the corresponding case law. 
Article 31, third paragraph, sub c VTC states, in short, that any relevant rules of inter-
national law applicable in the relations between the parties may be taken into account 
when clarifying a treaty.48 This provision makes cross-references possible as long as 
references are made to provisions (case law) applicable in the relations between the 
parties. Cross-references may become problematic when a regional treaty such as the 
ECHR is used for the interpretation of provisions from universal treaties such as the 
RC, the ICCPR and the CAT. Such cross-references may cause situations in which 
States that are not party to the regional treaty (as they are outside the region) never-
theless are, through case law, de facto bound by that regional treaty. In the context of 
this study, such problems are practically non-existent. This study is targeted at na-
tional asylum courts within the EU and all the EU Member States are parties to all 
the treaties covered by this study. The international supervisors often make cross-
references in their case law. To mention two examples: in Kindler v. Canada (1993)49 
the HRC referred to the judgment of the ECtHR in Soering v. the UK (1989).50 And in 
Maslov v. Austria (2008)51 – a case concerning an exclusion order for a Bulgarian 
national living in Austria in which one of the central questions before the ECtHR was 
whether in national judicial review proceedings against the exclusion order account 
must be taken of factual matters which occurred after the final decision of the 
competent authorities – the ECtHR referred to the judgment of the CJEU in Orfano-
poulos and Oliveri (2004), in which the CJEU ruled, in short, that an ex nunc assessment 
by the national judicial authorities was called for.52 
7.4  The independent and rigorous national judicial scrutiny defined 
The results of the analysis conducted in the previous chapters are now brought to-
gether with the aim of defining more exactly the requirement of an ‘independent and 
rigorous national judicial scrutiny’. The hierarchy as defined above is applied, which 
means that the case law of the CJEU and ECtHR are treated as the prime sources of 
interpretation, followed by the position of the UNHCR and the case law of the HRC 
and the ComAT, unless one of these secondary sources offers a higher standard of 
                                                        
48 Article 31(3) VTC stipulates: ‘There shall be taken into account, together with the context: a) any 
subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the interpretation of the treaty or the appli-
cation of its provisions; b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which establishes 
the agreements of the parties regarding its interpretation; c) any relevant rule of international law ap-
plicable in the relations between the parties.’ 
49 HRC, Kindler v. Canada, 18 November 1993, No. 470/1991. 
50 ECtHR, Soering v. the UK, 7 July 1989, Appl. No. 14038/88. 
51 ECtHR, Maslov v. Austria, 23 June 2008, Appl. No. 1638/03, paras. 42-44 and 82. 
52 CJEU, Orfanopoulos and Oliveri, 29 April 2004, C-482/01 and C-493/01, paras. 90-100. 
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protection. The exercise of defining the ‘independent and rigorous national judicial 
scrutiny’ is undertaken with the assistance of the eleven aspects of evidence and judi-
cial scrutiny.  
7.4.1  Standard of proof 
The standard of proof under EU asylum law, the ECHR, the RC and the CAT is the 
same: the level of risk required is a real, personal, and foreseeable risk exceeding the 
mere possibility of being subjected to proscribed ill-treatment,53 but the risk does not 
need to be certain (necessary), highly probable or beyond reasonable doubt.54 The 
case law of the HRC is stricter as a real risk means that it is a necessary and foresee-
able consequence of the expulsion that Article 7 ICCPR will be violated.55 National 
courts must stick to the first mentioned standard and not use the standard developed 
in the HRC’s case law as it is stricter. 
7.4.2  Burden of proof 
The burden of proof is shared: there is an initial burden of assertion, and, preferably, 
some corroboration, on the applicant, after which an investigative burden on the 
authorities of the State party, including the national courts, emerges.56 It is important 
to see that the applicant only bears a burden of presenting an arguable claim, not of 
proving the feared risk. The CJEU and the ECtHR, and – albeit less explicitly – also 
the ComAT have developed the notion of a gradual scale: the poorer the general hu-
man rights situation is, the less individual circumstances and corroborating individual 
evidence are required and the sooner the onus shifts to the State party.57 The EU 
Qualification Directive, the ECHR, the RC and the CAT envisage an alleviated bur-
den of proof for cases in which previous persecution or ill-treatment took place.58  
                                                        
53 See Article 2, sub paragraphs d and f of the EU Qualification Directive; ECtHR, Vilvarajah v. the 
United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, Appl. Nos. 13163/87, 13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87 and 
13448/87, paras. 108 and 111; ComAT, Haydin v. Sweden, 20 November 1998, No. 101/1997, para. 
6.5. 
54 Wouters 2009, p. 247. 
55 HRC, A.R.J. v. Australia, 11 August 1997, No. 692/1996, para. 6.8. 
56 See Article 4 of the EU Qualification Directive; for the position of the ECtHR, see for example, 
Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, Appl. No. 37201/06, para. 129; for the position of UNHCR see for 
example, paras. 195 and 196 of the UNHCR Handbook; for an example in the case law of the HRC 
see Irene Bleier Lewenhoff and Rosa Valino de Bleier v. Uruguay, 29 March 1982, No. 30/1978, para. 13.3; 
for an example from the case law of the ComAT see A.S. v. Sweden, 24 November 2000, No. 149/ 
1999, paras. 8.6, 8.7.  
57 CJEU, Elgafaji, 17 February 2009, C-465/07, para. 39; ECtHR, NA v. the United Kingdom, 17 July 
2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, paras.115-117; see also Ingelse 1999, p. 252, Nowak & McArthur 2008, 
p. 164, p. 224, Wouters 2009, p. 473, Battjes 2009, p. 82, Cox 2010, p. 392, Van Bennekom & Van 
der Winden 2011, p. 220. 
58 Article 4, fourth paragraph, EU Qualification Directive; ECtHR, Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands, 11 
January 2007, Appl. No. 1948/04. para. 147; UNHCR Handbook, para. 45; ComAT, General Com-
ment No. 1, paragraph 8, sub b and sub c, adopted on 21-11-1997, A/53/44, Annex XI. See also 
Battjes 2006, p. 227, Boeles 2009, p. 263, Wouters 2009, p. 263, Hailbronner 2010, p. 1037. 
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The notion of a shared burden of proof, developed in international asylum law, is 
also clearly present in EU asylum law in the form of the co-operation requirement 
laid down in Article 4 of the Qualification Directive. In its judgment in M.M. v. 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland (2012) the CJEU has ruled that this 
requirement of co-operation means that if, for any reason whatsoever, the elements 
provided by an applicant for international protection are not complete, up to date or 
relevant, it is necessary for the Member State concerned to cooperate actively with 
the applicant, at that stage of the procedure, so that all the elements needed to sub-
stantiate the application may be assembled. A Member State may also be better 
placed than an applicant to gain access to certain types of documents. The CJEU has 
so far not explained any further what is meant by ‘active co-operation with the 
applicant so that all the elements needed to substantiate the application may be as-
sembled.’ National courts may probably think of situations in which it is necessary to 
offer the applicant a certain (additional) period for submitting new relevant documen-
tation, of situations in which the applicant proposes that the court hears certain wit-
nesses, and situations in which the applicant submits certain documents and the court 
orders an expert authenticity examination or orders the administrative authority to do 
that. Like the ECtHR did in 2010 in Iskandarov v. Russia, the CJEU makes clear in 
M.M. that there may be specific circumstances in which the administrative or judicial 
authority is better placed than the applicant to get hold of certain types of docu-
ments. Thus, when it is much easier for the national administrative or judicial authori-
ty than for the applicant to gain access to certain relevant documentation, the burden 
of obtaining such evidence rests primarily with that authority. 
7.4.3  Relevant facts and circumstances 
Personal circumstances, such as background, gender, age, beliefs, activities, and cir-
cumstances concerning the general (human rights) situation in the country of origin, 
such as the general human rights situation, conditions in detention, the level of vio-
lence in the country and control thereof by the authorities, changes in government or 
policies, are relevant.  
It follows from the treaties and EU asylum law that a holistic and integrated ap-
proach must be taken towards the personal facts and the situation in the country of 
origin.59 
7.4.4 Required degree of individual risk 
Under EU asylum law and the ECHR, three categories of cases may be distinguished: 
1) cases of extreme general violence, where an Article 3-risk is assumed for everyone 
returning to the particular country; 2) cases of group violence; and 3) individual risk-
cases. In the third category of cases it is required that an individual risk is established, 
                                                        
59 Article 4, third paragraph, of the EU Qualification Directive; see for an example from the ECtHR’s 
case law NA v. the United Kingdom, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, para. 113; UNHCR Handbook, 
paras. 43 and 55; ComAT General Comment No. 1, para. 8; see also Battjes 2009, p. 80, Wouters 
2009, p. 264.  
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in other words, that the individual concerned has been singled out. Reference is made 
to sections 5.6.4 and 6.4.5. The HRC and ComAT have taken significant steps to-
wards incorporating the lines of theory developed by the ECtHR on situations of 
group violence.60 In classifying cases into one of these categories and determining, 
accordingly, the required amount of individual facts and evidence, national courts 
must also take into consideration that under the RC, no singling out is required. The 
UNHCR Handbook distinguishes two main kinds of status determination: the nor-
mal situation in which refugee status is determined on an individual basis and the ex-
ceptional situation in which group determination takes place whereby each member 
of the group is prima facie regarded as a refugee.61 Neither of these two situations im-
poses a strict requirement of being singled out as the risk does not necessarily need to 
be based on the personal experiences of the applicant.62 
The notion of the gradual scale as developed by the CJEU, the ECtHR and the 
ComAT is important for this aspect as well. The poorer the general human rights 
situation is, the less individual circumstances and corroborating individual evidence 
are required and the sooner the onus shifts to the State party.63 
7.4.5 Credibility assessment 
7.4.5.1  Intensity of scrutiny by national courts 
On the required intensity of scrutiny to be provided by national courts, the stances of 
the international supervisors are highly similar. The CJEU ruled in Samba Diouf (2011) 
that a thorough national judicial review on the merits of the claim is required. As 
previously stated, the ECtHR’s Zumtobel-doctrine under Article 6 ECHR requires 
that national administrative decisions can normally be challenged before a tribunal 
having full judicial jurisdiction on points of fact and points of law.64 Full jurisdiction 
also implies that the national court is able to make an independent determination of 
the disputed facts65 and of the credibility of a claimant.66 The UNHCR’s position is 
very much the same: national judges should be able to obtain a personal impression 
of the applicant, appeal or review proceedings should involve points of fact and 
points of law and national courts should be able to independently assess the credi-
                                                        
60 HRC, Kaba v. Canada, 25 March 2010, No. 1465/2006, paras. 10.1 and 10.2; ComAT, Njamba v. 
Sweden, 14 May 2010, No. 322/2007, paras. 9.5 and 9.6. 
61 UNHCR Handbook, paras. 44 and 45.  
62 See Battjes 2011, p. 20. 
63 CJEU, Elgafaji, 17 February 2009, C-465/07, para. 39; ECtHR, NA v. the United Kingdom, 17 July 
2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, paras.115-117; see also Ingelse 1999, p. 252, Nowak & McArthur 2008, 
p. 164, p. 224, Wouters 2009, p. 473, Battjes 2009, p. 82, Cox 2010, p. 392, Van Bennekom & Van 
der Winden 2011, p. 220. 
64 See, for example, ECtHR, Terra Woningen B.V. v. the Netherlands, 28 November 1996, Appl. No. 
49/1995/555/64, paras. 46 and 51-55; ECtHR, Druzstevni Zálozna Pria and others v. The Czech Republic, 
31 July 2008, Appl. No. 72034/01, para. 107; ECtHR, Koskinas v. Greece, 20 June 2002, Appl. No. 
47760/99, para. 29, ECtHR, Veeber v. Estonia, 8 November 2002, Appl. No. 37571/97, para. 70, 
ECtHR, Chevrol v. France, 13 February 2003, Appl. No. 49636/99, para. 76. 
65 See, for example, ECtHR, Koskinas v. Greece, 20 June 2002, Appl. No. 47760/99, para. 30. 
66 See, for example, ECtHR, Tsfayo v. the UK, 14 November 2006, Appl. No. 60860/00, para. 46. 
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bility of the statements of the asylum seeker (see section 2.4.5). The ComAT ruled in 
Nirmal Singh v. Canada (2011) that States parties to the CAT are obliged to provide for 
judicial review of the merits, rather than merely of the reasonableness, of decisions on 
expulsion.67 It is also useful to look at the interpretation of the term ‘impartiality’ by 
the ComAT. Impartiality as enshrined in Articles 12 and 13 CAT obliges the national 
judge to reconstruct as meticulously as possible what happened and to use his or her 
investigative powers to that end.68 Impartiality under Article 3 CAT should be inter-
preted as meaning the same thing. 
The ECtHR’s approach to credibility offers additional guidelines to national 
courts. As was said above in section 7.3.4, these guidelines constitute a reasonable 
solution which ensures respect for national systems of checks and balances, and for 
the experience and expertise of national administrative decision makers. The ECtHR 
actively proceeds towards an independent and fresh determination of the facts, in-
cluding credibility, in cases of insufficient national proceedings, new facts, circum-
stances and developments, including evidence thereof, and an incorrect application of 
evidentiary standards (for example, the standard or proof) at national level. National 
courts can easily follow this approach without heavily disturbing national systems of 
checks and balances. This would mean that national asylum courts would actively and 
independently make a fresh factual determination, including an assessment of credi-
bility, in cases of one or more of the mentioned circumstances. If such circumstances 
do not occur, national courts can rely on the determination of the facts, including the 
assessment of credibility, as made by the administrative decision maker. 
7.4.5.2  How to assess credibility? 
The ECtHR, the UNHCR, and the ComAT (and to a lesser extent the HRC) have 
developed clear standards for credibility assessment which national courts need to 
follow to live up to Articles 18 and 19 of the EU Charter. These three international 
supervisors require ‘general credibility’ (‘general veracity’), not complete accuracy and 
consistency of every single detail of the claim. The basic story – the very core aspects 
of the flight reasons – must be credible.69 The ECtHR has made clear that doubts 
about more peripheral aspects of the claim, such as statements concerning the jour-
ney to the country where asylum has been requested or statements concerning escape 
from prison or from guards do not necessarily undermine general credibility.70 The 
ECtHR and the ComAT have, furthermore, made clear that the basic story should 
normally meet a number of requirements in order to be credible: 
                                                        
67 ComAT, Nirmal Singh v. Canada, 30 May 2011, No. 319/2007, paras. 8.8, 8.9, 9. 
68 ComAT, M’Barek v. Tunisia, 10 November 1999, No. 060/1996, paras. 11.9, 11.10, 12, ComAT, 
Ristic v. Yugoslavia, 11 May 2001, No. 113/1998, paras. 9.4-9.8. 
69 See for an example from the case law of the ECtHRSaid v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 
2345/02, para. 51; UNHCR Handbook,paras. 197, 204 and UNHCR, Note on Burden and Standard of 
Proof in Refugee Claims of 16 December 1998, paras. 11, 12; see for an example from the case law of 
the ComAT Kisoki v. Sweden, 8 May 1996, No. 041/1996, para. 9.3.  
70 ECtHR, N. v. Finland (2005), 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02, paras. 154 and 155; ECtHR, Said v. 
the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02, para. 53, ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, 
Appl. No. 41827/07, para. 52. 
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- It must be sufficiently detailed;71 
- It must be internally consistent throughout the proceedings;72 numerous major 
inconsistencies73 and numerous alterations in statements may make these state-
ments incredible;74 
- It must be consistent with country information;75 
- It must be brought forward in a timely manner: late submission of statements 
may negatively affect the general credibility, particularly when no sound reason 
for it is given;76 
- The core of the flight narrative must – as much as possible – be corroborated 
with evidence.77 
 
Compared to the other supervisors, the UNHCR takes a more lenient stance on cor-
roboration with evidence as a requirement for credibility. It takes the stance that the 
absence of corroborative documents should not prevent the claim from being accept-
ed if the statements are consistent with known facts and the general credibility of the 
applicant is good.78 The UNHCR has also made clear that there is no justification for 
imposing a stricter credibility standard – stricter than the standard of general credibil-
ity – in cases where corroborating evidence is totally absent.79 As the preference rules 
require that, in the case of diverging standards, national courts apply those standards 
offering the highest level of protection, national courts must pay due respect to this 
UNHCR position.  
7.4.6 Admission of evidence 
7.4.6.1  Admission of evidence, means and sources of evidence 
Under the treaties and under EU asylum law the approach to admission and admissi-
bility of evidence is liberal. There are no procedural barriers to the admissibility of 
evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment.80 National courts must apply 
the same liberal approach to live up to their EU Charter obligations. In Chapters 2-5 
different examples of evidentiary materials were provided. Reference is made to 
sections 2.4.6.1, 3.5.6.1, 4.5.6.2, 5.6.6.2 and 6.4.6.1. 
                                                        
71 See, for example, ComAT, A.S. v. Sweden, 15 February 2001, No. 149/1999, para. 8.6. 
72 ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, para. 52. 
73 See, for example Bello v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 17 January 2006, Appl. No. 32213/04. 
74 See, for example, B. v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 26 October 2004, Appl. No. 16578/03; 
ComAT, General Comment No. 1, para. 8, sub f and sub g. 
75 See, for example, ECtHR, R.C. v. Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, para. 54; HRC, Mehrez 
Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 18 March 2010, No. 1544/2007, para. 8.7; ComAT, Chahin v. Sweden, 30 
May 2011, No. 310/2007, para. 9.4. 
76 See, for example, ECtHR, B. v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 26 October 2004, Appl. No. 16578/03; 
ComAT, X.Y. v. Switzerland, 15 May 2001, No. 128/1999, para.8.5. 
77 See, for example, ECtHR, Fazlul Karim v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 4 July 2006, Appl. No. 
24171/05; ComAT, G.T. v. Switzerland, 2 May 2000, No. 137/1999, paras. 6.5-6.8. 
78 Note on Burden and Standard of Proof in Refugee Claims of 16 December 1998, para. 10. 
79 Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands, paras. 25-27. 
80 See, for example, ECtHR, Iskandarov v. Russia, 23 September 2010, Appl. No. 17185/05, para. 107. 
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7.4.6.2  Minimum quantity and quality of evidence 
The ECtHR, the HRC and the ComAT require a significant amount of evidence with 
a direct personal bearing corroborating the core of the flight narrative, the ‘basic 
story’.81 
As opposed to this, the UNHCR has often underlined that, due to the special 
and difficult evidentiary position of the applicant for asylum, the requirement of 
evidence should not be applied too strictly.82 It has also taken the stance that com-
plete absence of supportive evidence does not automatically mean that the claim is 
unmeritorious.83 The UNHCR’s position is echoed in the fifth paragraph of Article 4 
of the EU Qualification Directive, which makes clear that under certain circum-
stances, including a genuine effort to corroborate the claim, not all the aspects of the 
applicant’s account need to be corroborated by evidence other than statements (see 
section 6.4.6.2). As the preference rules require that, in cases of diverging standards, 
national courts apply those standards offering the highest level of protection, national 
courts must pay due respect to the more lenient standards laid down in Article 4, fifth 
paragraph, of the EU Qualification Directive and to the UNHCR’s position. 
7.4.7  Appreciation and weighing of evidence 
EU asylum law and the RC do not regulate this aspect and the case law of the HRC 
and the ComAT are not very explicit and transparent on the evaluation of evidence 
(with the exception of the evaluation of medico-legal reports by the ComAT, which 
will be discussed below). The ECtHR’s case law is much more explicit and transpar-
ent and offers national asylum courts concrete guidelines for the evaluation of evi-
dence. The authenticity of submitted documents, the specificity, comprehensiveness 
and consistency of the information contained in evidentiary materials or given by 
witnesses, and the independence, reliability, objectiveness and authority of the source 
or author of the evidence determine how much probative value or weight is attach-
ed.84 In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, a number of categories of evidence were discussed in 
detail and it was demonstrated that specific and comprehensive witness statements by 
family members played an important role in the case law of the ECtHR85 and both 
                                                        
81 See, for example, ECtHR, Cruz Varas v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, para. 79; 
ECtHR, Shikpohkt and Sholeh v. the Netherlands, 27 January 2005, Appl. No. 39349/03; HRC, Mehrez 
Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 18 March 2010, No. 1544/2007; ComAT, G.T. v. Switzerland, 2 May 
2000, No. 137/1999, paras. 6.5-6.8. 
82 UNHCR Handbook, para. 202. 
83 UNHCR Handbook, paras. 196, 197, 203; Report of July 2003 ‘Implementation of the Aliens Act 
2000 in the Netherlands, UNHCR’s Observations and Recommendations’; Note on Burden and Stan-
dard of Proof in Refugee Claims of 16 December 1998, paras. 10, 20, 22; paras. 25-27 in the Submission 
in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands. 
84 See, for example, ECtHR, Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, 8 November 2005, Appl. No. 13284/04, para. 
44. 
85 See, for example, ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, para. 66. 
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Committees.86 The ECtHR has made clear that statements by family members must 
normally be supported by other, more objective, evidentiary materials.87 
Medico-legal reports form another important category of evidence, particularly in 
the case law of the ComAT. The ECtHR is generally reluctant to accept medical 
evidence (stating PTSD or other mental disturbance or disorders) as an explanation 
for tardy presentation of statements on past torture88 and inconsistencies,89 but it has 
accepted medical reports as evidence corroborating statements on past torture in a 
number of cases.90 The same goes for the HRC.91 Medico-legal reports play a parti-
cularly prominent role in the case law of the ComAT. The ComAT requires such 
reports to be drawn up by medical specialists and to conclusively identify a causal link 
between the individual’s bodily or mental injuries and the alleged past torture.92 
In a significant number of – mostly early – cases medico-legal reports were ac-
cepted as corroboration of statements on past torture,93 as an explanation for incon-
sistencies,94 gaps or vague points,95 major changes in the flight narrative96 and late 
presentation of crucial statements and evidence.97 In the ComAT’s later jurispru-
dence, medical evidence has been downgraded from decisive to supportive, but it still 
remains important and the ComAT has shown dissatisfaction over the fact that in 
national proceedings in the Netherlands, medical reports are not normally taken into 
account as evidence.98 Compared to the other supervisors, this case law of the 
ComAT clearly offers a higher degree of protection as it attaches more consequences 
to medico-legal reports in assessing the claimant’s credibility. The preference rules 
require that national courts pay due respect to this approach by the ComAT. 
                                                        
86 See, for example, HRC, Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida v. Canada, 18 March 2010, No. 1544/2007, paras. 
5.1, 8.3; ComAT, A.S. v. Sweden, 15 February 2001, No 149/1999, paras. 7.7, 8.4, ComAT, T.A. v. 
Sweden, 6 May 2005, No. 226/2003, paras. 5.5, 7.3, 7.4. 
87 ECtHR, H.L.R. v. France, 29 April 1997, Appl. No. 24573/1994, para. 42. 
88 See, for example, ECtHR, CruzVaras and others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, para. 
78; ECtHR,Nasimi v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 16 March 2004, Appl. No. 38865/02. 
89 In Hatami v. Sweden, European Commission, 23 April 1998, Appl. No. 32448/96, para. 106, the 
Commission considered that ‘complete accuracy is seldom to be expected from victims of torture’. 
No decisions or judgments of the ECtHR have been found in which this consideration was used, 
which suggests that the ECtHR is not willing to accept medical evidence to explain inconsistencies. 
90 See, for example, ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, para. 64, R.C. v. 
Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, paras. 11, 23-25, paras. 53-56. 
91 See, for example, HRC, Ernest Sigman Pillai and Laetecia Swenthi Joachimpilla v. Canada, 25 March 2010, 
No. 1763/2008, para. 11.4. 
92 See, for example, ComAT, El Rgeig v. Switzerland, 15 November 2006, No. 280/2005, para. 7.4. 
93 Ibidem. 
94 See, for example, ComAT, Kisoki v. Sweden, 8 May 1996, No. 041/1996, para. 9.3, ComAT, Haydin v. 
Sweden, 20 November 1998, No. 101/1997, para. 6.7, ComAT, C.T. and K.M. v. Sweden, 17 November 
2006, No. 279/2005, para. 7.6. 
95 See, for example, ComAT, Falcon Rios v. Canada, 23 November 2004, No. 133/1999, para. 8.5. 
96 ComAT, Ayas v. Sweden, 12 November 1998, No. 097/1997, para. 6.5, ComAT, A. v. Netherlands, 13 
November 1998, No. 91/1997. 
97 ComAT, A.F. v. Sweden, 8 May 1998, No. 089/1997, paras. 2.6 and 6.5. In this case crucial evidence 
was submitted in support of a fourth asylum application at national level. 
98 ComAT, Conclusions and Recommendations regarding the Netherlands, 3 August 2007, CAT/C/ 
NET/CO/4, para. 8. 
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In the case law of the HRC and the ComAT, significant weight is normally at-
tached to reports containing the result of inquiries conducted by embassies or mis-
sions in the countries of origin.99 
Reports on the situation in the country of origin logically play an important role 
in the case law of the international supervisors. Unlike the HRC and the ComAT, the 
ECtHR has developed a number of concrete guidelines for the evaluation of country 
reports. Reports by UN agencies and States rank highly.100 This is because United 
Nations agencies have direct access to the authorities of the country of destination as 
well as the ability to carry out on-site inspections and assessments in a manner which 
States and non-governmental organisations may not be able to do, and States have 
the ability to gather information through their diplomatic missions.101 The precise 
probative value accorded to country of origin information is not only determined by 
the source, but also very much by its specific content. The ECtHR distinguishes be-
tween more general reports on the socio-economic and humanitarian situation, on 
the one hand, and reports specifically concerning the human rights situation, with a 
focus on the risk for the particular applicant, on the other hand. The latter category 
of reports is given greater evidentiary weight.102 
7.4.8 Opportunities for presenting evidence 
All the international supervisors regard adversarial proceedings and equality of arms 
as crucial safeguards for a fair hearing at both the international level and the national 
level. The position of the HRC and the ComAT seem to be stricter compared to the 
other international supervisors, as they require that in cases concerning the expulsion 
of asylum seekers, both parties to the case must have equal access to all the docu-
ments in the case file, including documents underpinning allegations that the indi-
vidual concerned constitutes a danger to the national security of the country.103  
As opposed to this, the ECtHR has ruled in a number of cases that the use of 
secret evidence may be justified if this is strictly necessary to preserve the funda-
mental rights of another individual or to safeguard an important public interest, such 
as the protection of national security.104 In the same vein, the UNHCR takes the 
position that non-disclosure of evidence is allowed when disclosure of sources would 
seriously jeopardize national security or the security of the organisations or persons 
providing information.105 The principles concerning the use of secret evidence devel-
                                                        
99 See, for example, HRC, A.R.J. v. Australia, 11 August 1997, No. 692/1996, para. 4.6, 4.7; ComAT, 
Y.S. v. Switzerland, 14 November 2000, No. 147/1999, para. 6.6. 
100 ECtHR, NA v. the UK, 17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, paras. 121 and 122. 
101 ECtHR, Sufi and Elmi v. the UK, 28 June 2011, Appl. No. 8319/07 and 11449/07, para. 231. 
102 See, for example, ECtHR, F.H. v. Sweden, 20 January 2009, Appl. No. 32621/06, para. 92. 
103 ComAT, Sogi v. Canada, 16 November 2007, No. 297/2006; HRC, Mansour Ahani v. Canada, 15 June 
2004, No. 1051/2002. 
104 See, for example, Rowe and Davis v. the United Kingdom, 16 February 2000, Appl. No. 29801/95, para. 
61; Edwards and Lewis v. the UK, 27 October 2004, Appl. Nos. 39647/98 and 40461/98, para. 46. 
105 Fair and Efficient Asylum Procedures: A Non-Exhaustive Overview of Applicable International Standards, 2 Sep-
tember 2005, www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/432ae9204.html, last visited 18 December 2012, pp. 5 
and 6. 
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oped by the CJEU strongly resemble the ECtHR’s principles. They include the no-
tions that the use of secret evidence is permitted provided that it has a legitimate aim 
and that it is necessary;106 that the interest of the State to keep the evidence secret 
must be balanced against the individual’s right to have knowledge of this evidence 
and his procedural rights of adversarial proceedings and equality of arms;107 that the 
court examining the appeal should be able to effectively review the confidential evi-
dence on which the impugned decision is based;108 and that limitations to a party’s 
procedural rights as a consequence of the use of secret evidence should be compen-
sated by taking counterbalancing measures (compensation techniques).109 
The prohibition on the use of secret evidence in national court proceedings on 
expulsion developed by the HRC and the ComAT has so far not been reiterated in 
other cases, so that we cannot speak of a constant line in their case law. As the prohi-
bition as developed in Ahani (HRC, 2004) and Sogi (ComAT, 2007) offers a higher 
degree of protection than the standards of the CJEU, the ECtHR and the UNHCR, 
national courts must take due notice of them because the preference rules in the 
treaties so require. As a consequence, national courts must normally not allow the use 
of secret evidence and must limit its use to an absolute minimum of cases where very 
strong reasons justify non-disclosure of evidence. 
7.4.9 Judicial application of investigative powers 
Reference is made to section 7.4.5.1 on the required intensity of scrutiny by national 
courts regarding the determination of the facts. It was pointed out here that on the 
required intensity of scrutiny to be provided by national courts, the stances of the 
international supervisors are highly similar: they require a thorough national judicial 
review on the merits of the claim (CJEU, Samba Diouf 2011, ComAT, Nirmal Singh v. 
Canada 2011), full judicial jurisdiction on points of fact and points of law (the 
ECtHR’s Zumtobel doctrine) and appeal or review proceedings on points of fact and 
points of law (UNHCR). Reference was also made to the interpretation of the term 
‘impartiality’ by the ComAT under Articles 12 and 13 CAT, which obliges the na-
tional judge to reconstruct as meticulously as possible what happened and to use his 
or her investigative powers to that end.110 
The ECtHR is the most active when it comes to the determination of the facts. 
In a significant number of cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, it has 
played a very active role in the gathering and verification of facts and circum-
                                                        
106  See, for example, CJEU, Aalborg Portland and others v Commission, 7 January 2004, Joined Cases C-
204/00 P etc, para 68; CJEU, Kadi and Al Barakaat v Council and Commission, 3 September 2008, 
Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, para. 342. 
107  See, for example, CJEU, Varec, 2008, C-450/06, para 51; CJEU, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and 
Commission, 3 September 2008, Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, para. 344.  
108  See, for example, CJEU, Mobistar, 13 July 2006, C-438/04, para 40; CJEU, Organisation des 
Modjahedines du peuple d’Iran v. Council, 12 December 2006, T-228/02, para. 155. 
109  See, for example, CJEU, Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council and Commission, 3 September 2008, Joined 
Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P, para. 344. 
110 ComAT, M’Barek v. Tunisia, 10 November 1999, No. 060/1996, paras. 11.9, 11.10, 12, ComAT, 
Ristic v. Yugoslavia, 11 May 2001, No. 113/1998, paras. 9.4-9.8. 
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stances.111 The preference rules dictate that national courts take the ECtHR as their 
role model as a more active role in the determination of the facts offers a higher 
degree of protection than a more deferential approach (taken generally by the HRC): 
a more active role by the Court implies more intense judicial scrutiny. In order to de-
termine the facts, the ECtHR may apply at any stage in the proceedings any investiga-
tive measure which it considers capable of clarifying the facts, including inviting a 
party or parties to submit additional evidence, hear witnesses and experts, order ex-
pert opinions, hold fact-finding missions and on-site investigations.112 The ECtHR 
has clarified that it will particularly obtain materials on conditions in the country of 
origin proprio motu when the applicant or a third party provides reasoned grounds 
which cast doubt on the accuracy of the information relied on by the respondent 
government.113 
In this section, special attention must also be drawn to the UNHCR’s role as ex-
pert or witness in court proceedings. In Chapter 2 it was demonstrated that, on the 
basis of Article 35 RC and Article 21, first paragraph, sub c of the EU Procedures 
Directive, national courts may invite the UNHCR to participate in national court 
proceedings as an expert or witness who can advise the court on a particular aspect of 
a pending asylum case, or advise the court on the question of whether or not the 
claimant is a refugee. In sections 2.5.2 and 2.5.3 it was shown that the UNHCR has 
made submissions to the ECtHR in a significant number of cases and also issued 
statements (positions) in the context of cases pending before the CJEU. The ECtHR 
gives considerable weight to information submitted by the UNHCR and national 
courts should do the same. An independent and rigorous national judicial scrutiny 
may in some cases imply that national courts involve the UNHCR as an expert. 
7.4.10 Time limits for the presentation of statements and evidence 
The CJEU, the ECtHR, the UNHCR and the HRC take similar positions. The core 
of these positions is that national procedural rules must be reasonable, or applied by 
the national court in a reasonable and flexible manner if the circumstances of the case 
so require.114 
                                                        
111 Examples of cases in which the ECtHR played a very active role in the determination of the facts are 
ECtHR, N. v. Finland, 26 July 2005, Appl. No. 38885/02, paras. 9, 77-116 (the Court held a fact-
finding mission), ECtHR, Shamayev and others v. Georgia and Russia, 12 April 2005, Appl. No. 36378/ 
02, para. 26, paras. 110-216 (extradition, the Court held a fact-finding mission), ECtHR, R.C. v. 
Sweden, 9 March 2010, Appl. No. 41827/07, paras. 23-25, 53 (the Court requested the applicant to 
submit to it an expert medical opinion), ECtHR, Abdolkhani and Karimnia v. Turkey, 22 September 
2009, Application No. 30471/08, para. 5 (the Court requested the UNHCR to make a submission. 
112 Rules of Court, Rule A1 in Annex 1, Rule 19, second paragraph, 1 April 2011, to be found at: 
http://www.echr.coe.int, Rules of Court.  
113 See, for example, ECtHR, Saadi v. Italy, 28 February 2008, Appl. No. 37201/06, para. 131, ECtHR, 
Ismoilov and others v. Russia, 24 April 2008, Appl. No. 2947/06, para. 120, and ECtHR, NA v. the UK, 
17 July 2008, Appl. No. 25904/07, para. 119. 
114 CJEU, Universale Bau, 12 December 2002, C-470/99, para. 76; CJEU, Santex, 27 February 2003, C-
327/00, para. 52; ECtHR, Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, 19 February 1998, Appl. No. 25894/94, paras. 
45-49, ECtHR, Jabari v. Turkey, 11 July 2000, Appl. No. 40035/98, para. 40; UNHCR Submission in 
→ 
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It follows from EU asylum law and the case law of the ECtHR, the position of 
the UNHCR and the case law of the ComAT that all relevant statements should, in 
principle, be made as early in the national procedure as possible and that belated 
statements may cast doubt on the credibility of the applicant.115 The approach to evi-
dence submitted to corroborate statements is generally more flexible. In the case law 
of the ECtHR and the HRC, the point in time at which evidentiary materials were 
submitted in national proceedings by the parties is, seen as a factor alone and in itself, 
not a relevant consideration.116 
The UNHCR has stressed that no case should be rejected solely on the basis that 
the relevant information was not presented or documents were not submitted ear-
lier.117 In the same vein, in a significant number of cases the ComAT did not see the 
tardy presentation of relevant statements and evidence as problematic and easily ac-
cepted that good reasons had been brought forward for their belated presentation.118 
Based on the preference rules, national asylum courts must pay respect to these posi-
tions of the UNHCR and the ComAT as they offer a higher degree of protection, 
compared to the ECtHR and the HRC. In line with this, it follows from Article 8, 
first paragraph, of the Procedures Directive, that Member States shall ensure that 
applications for asylum are neither rejected nor excluded from examination on the 
sole ground that they have not been made as soon as possible.119 
7.4.11 Point in time for the risk assessment 
The positions of the international supervisors on this issue are by and large identical. 
They all take the position that, in principle, an assessment ex nunc is required. The 
assessment of the risk is made on the basis of all the information available at the mo-
ment of consideration. In cases where deportation from the respondent State has al-
ready been effectuated, the point in time for consideration by the ECtHR remains the 
moment of that deportation, but the Court may, and actually does, have regard to in-
                                                        
the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands, para. 41, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/ 
454f5e484.html. HRC, Jagjit Singh Bhullar v. Canada, 13 November 2006, No. 982/2001, para. 7.3. 
115 Article 4, first paragraph, of the Qualification Directive stipulates, inter alia: ‘Member States may 
consider it the duty of the applicant to submit as soon as possible all elements needed to substantiate 
the application for international protection.’ See for an example from the ECtHR’s case law Nasimi 
v. Sweden, admissibility decision, 16 March 2004, Appl. No. 38865/02; Submission by the UNHCR in 
the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands, Appl. No. 31252/03, May 2005, www.unhcr.org/ref-
world/docid/454f5e484.html, para. 41. See an example from the ComAT’s case law ComAT, X.Y. 
v. Switzerland, 15 May 2001, No. 128/1999, para.8.5. 
116  See, for example, ECtHR, Cruz Varas and others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, 
paras. 26, 27, 29, 30, 41-46, 77, 79, ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, 
paras. 14, 18, 21, 22, 62, 63, ECtHR, Said v. the Netherlands, 5 July 2005, Appl. No. 2345/02, paras. 
28, 29, 51; HRC, Byahuranga v. Denmark, 9 December 2004, No. 1222/2003, Mehrez Ben Abde Hamida 
v. Canada, 18 March 2010, No. 1544/2007. 
117 See para. 41 in the Submission in the case of Mir Isfahani v. the Netherlands. 
118 See ComAT, V.L. v. Switzerland, 22 January 2007, 262/2005, para. 8.8, ComAT, Iya v. Switzerland, 16 
November 2007, No. 299/2006, paras. 2.6, 2.7, 2.8, 6.5, ComAT, Chahin v. Sweden, 30 May 2011, No. 
310/2007, paras. 5.5, 95. 
119 Article 8, first paragraph, of the Procedures Directive (Council Directive 2005/85/EC of 1 De-
cember 2005). 
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formation that came to light subsequent to the removal so that in fact again an ex 
nunc assessment takes place.120 The HRC has so far adopted no guidelines for situa-
tions where the removal has already taken place and the ComAT’s case law is not en-
tirely consistent. In T.P.S. v. Canada (2000), however, the ComAT explicitly took sub-
sequent facts and circumstances into consideration without any reservation.121 
7.5  Concluding remarks 
The central question in this chapter was what the findings arrived at in the previous 
chapters mean exactly for national asylum courts. The first question looked at in this 
connection was how the treaties studied in this book and EU asylum law relate to 
each other. It was concluded that national asylum courts in the EU Member States 
are ‘double bound’ by the procedural obligations and standards flowing from the 
treaties investigated in this study as they are bound by the treaties, and by the EU law 
which incorporates these treaty obligations. 
It was established that international and EU asylum require an independent and 
rigorous national judicial scrutiny. An attempt was made to define in a more precise 
way what this requirement means.  
Sources of interpretation were identified and a hierarchy of sources was created. 
It was concluded that national asylum courts must first and foremost turn to the case 
law of the CJEU and the ECtHR, next, to the UNHCR and then to the HRC and the 
ComAT as subsidiary means of interpretation. National asylum courts within the EU 
may cross-refer to these different sources of interpretation as all the EU Member 
States are parties to the RC, the ICCPR, the CAT and the ECHR. It was also con-
cluded that, when confronted with conflicting or diverging standards, national courts 
should abandon the mentioned hierarchy and opt for those standards offering the 
highest degree of protection. This is justified because the standards developed by the 
international courts and supervisors covered in this study all form part of EU asylum 
law and Article 52, third paragraph, of the EU Charter allows EU law to provide 
more extensive protection than the protection offered under the ECHR. 
The requirement of an independent and rigorous national judicial scrutiny was, 
finally, defined with the assistance of the eleven aspects of evidence and judicial scru-
tiny, introduced in Chapter 1. This resulted in a set of evidentiary and scrutiny stan-
dards ready for use by national courts. 
 
                                                        
120 See, for example, ECtHR, Cruz Varas and Others v. Sweden, 20 March 1991, Appl. No. 15576/89, 
para. 76; ECtHR, Vilvarajah and others v. United Kingdom, 30 October 1991, Appl. Nos. 13163/87, 
13164/87, 13165/87, 13447/87, 13448/87, para. 107; ECtHR, Ahmed v. Austria, 17 December 1996, 
Appl. No. 25964/94, para. 43, ECtHR, Mamatkulov and Askarov v. Turkey, 4 February 2005, Appl. 
Nos. 46827/99, 46951/99, para. 69. 
121 ComAT, T.P.S. v. Canada, 4 September 2000, No. 99/1997, paras. 15.4 and 15.5. 
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Chapter 8: Repeat cases, Dublin cases, fast-track national 
proceedings 
 
 
This chapter pays separate attention to three special types of national asylum court 
proceedings and the positions of the international supervisors regarding such pro-
ceedings. 
These three special types are briefly referred to as ‘repeat cases’, ‘Dublin cases’ 
and ‘fast-track proceedings.’  
Repeat cases are cases in which a claimant lodges a second (or third, or fourth et 
cetera) asylum application after a negative decision on a first application, often with 
the aim of submitting new evidence corroborating the claim for protection. 
In Dublin cases, an asylum application is decided upon on the basis of the EU 
Dublin Regulation 2003/343/EC.1 The EU Dublin Regulation provides criteria for 
establishing which EU Member State is responsible for the examination of an asylum 
application submitted in one of the EU Member States. The Regulation is based on 
the ‘single application’ principle, aimed at discouraging individuals from applying for 
asylum in more than one EU Member State. Based on the criteria laid down in the 
Regulation, EU Member States may decide not to examine an asylum application and 
to refer the asylum applicant to the authorities of another EU Member State.  
In fast-track proceedings, shorter than normal time limits (and sometimes also 
other special rules) apply, created with the aim of faster and more efficient processing 
of asylum claims and appeals. 
Based on my experience as a national asylum judge, I can say without any doubt 
that the most difficult and urgent questions concerning evidence and judicial scrutiny 
arise within the framework of these special types of cases. In repeat cases, asylum 
seekers often present new evidence. Sometimes, this evidence has been obtained as a 
result of long and intensive searches for witnesses, documents, and information 
about events and the situation in the country of origin. I vividly remember a repeat 
case in which an 18-year-old Iranian woman presented a significant amount of evi-
dentiary materials in corroboration of a second application for asylum. During the 
proceedings following her first asylum application she had not presented any evi-
dence corroborating her claim for protection. She had fled her country of origin in 
great haste, as a minor, and had not realised at the time that it would be asked of her 
to present evidence in corroboration of her statements. It was only after the dismissal 
of her first request for asylum that she realised that she really needed evidentiary ma-
terials to support her claim. A difficult and long search followed, resulting in witness 
statements from both individuals who had known her father – a well-known op-
ponent of the Iranian regime – witness statements from different organisations and 
country information. Following the constant jurisprudence of the highest Dutch 
                                                        
1 Council Regulation 2003/343/EC of 18 February 2003, establishing the criteria and mechanisms for 
determining the Member State responsible for examining an asylum application lodged in one of the 
Member States by a third country national, Official Journal of the EU L 50, 25 February 2003, pp. 1-10, 
last amended by Official Journal of the EU L 304, 14 November 2008, p. 83. 
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asylum court, the administration took the stance that this evidence could and should 
have been presented during the proceedings following the first application for pro-
tection. It is not only in the Netherlands that judges wrestle with the problem of evi-
dence presented in repeat cases. From Hilal v. the UK (ECtHR, 2001), it appears that 
the applicant presented crucial evidence in second national asylum proceedings and 
that neither the administrative nor the national courts attached weight to this evi-
dence because of its late presentation.2 
In Dublin cases, other evidentiary problems occur. The file of a Dublin case 
normally contains a so-called ‘claim approval’, which means that the intermediary EU 
Member State (the first EU State where the applicant applied for asylum, or the first 
EU State which was transited), approves referral of the asylum seeker back to it. The 
administrative and judicial authorities of the referring EU Member State tend to 
decide in a very speedy manner. By way of illustration: first instance asylum courts in 
the Netherlands are normally allowed a time slot of 20 court hearing minutes per 
Dublin case. It is normally assumed that the intermediary EU Member State will live 
up to its obligations under international and EU asylum law. In other words, it is as-
sumed that the asylum procedure and living conditions of (failed) asylum seekers in 
the intermediary EU country are in conformity with international and EU asylum law. 
It is very difficult for asylum seekers to prove the opposite. The case of M.S.S. v. Bel-
gium and Greece (2011),3 in which the ECtHR ruled that the asylum procedure and liv-
ing conditions of (failed) asylum seekers in Greece were not compliant with inter-
national and EU asylum law and that Belgium, by referring asylum seekers to Greece, 
had violated its obligations under Articles 3 and 13 ECHR, has a long history. In 
many cases before M.S.S., asylum seekers in different EU Member States tried to 
prove, without success, that Greece was violating its obligations under international 
and EU asylum law. They invoked alarming reports from many different sources, but 
the national authorities and the (upper) courts did not want to conclude that asylum 
seekers could not be sent back to Greece.4 
In fast-track court proceedings, particular evidentiary and investigative problems 
may occur as a result of tight time limits for filing an appeal in combination with tight 
time limits for the different stages of the court proceedings themselves, including 
limited time for reading the file and doing research, for the court hearing, and for 
preparing the judgment. 
Combinations of the types of cases discussed here may occur frequently when, 
for example, Dublin cases are processed in fast-track proceedings. This reinforces the 
mentioned evidentiary and investigative difficulties. Enough reason to explore the 
positions of the international supervisors and courts with regard to the mentioned 
                                                        
2 Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, paras. 18, 21, 22, 62, 63 
3 See ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09, paras. 352, 358.  
4 See, for the situation in Belgium, ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 
30696/09, paras.143-157. In the Netherlands, before M.S.S., the first instance court of Zwolle as-
sumed in a large number of Dublin cases that Greece was violating its obligations under Articles 3 
and 13 ECHR and that, for that reason, asylum seekers could not be transferred to Greece. For a 
long time, the judicial division of the Council of State quashed these judgments and ruled that 
Greece was living up to its obligations under international and EU asylum law.  
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three types of cases, and raise and answer the question of what these positions imply 
for national asylum courts. 
8.1  Repeat asylum cases 
8.1.1  Nova-test 
The RC, the ICCPR, the CAT, the ECHR and EU asylum law do not contain explicit 
prohibitions on a so called nova test: a national system in which subsequent asylum 
applications are subjected to a preliminary examination to assess whether new ele-
ments have arisen or new evidence has emerged which would warrant examination of 
the substance of the claim. The UNHCR has taken this stance explicitly on a number 
of occasions,5 albeit with the warning that a preliminary nova-test is only justified if 
the previous claim was considered fully on the merits.6 According to the UNHCR, 
the determination of whether new elements have arisen shall not be limited to 
changes which have occurred in the country of origin, but will also include examina-
tion of whether new evidence has emerged or whether there have been changes in 
the situation of the individual concerned that give rise to a sur place claim.7 
Both the ECtHR and the HRC have made clear that national procedural rules, 
such as time limits, must normally be complied with.8 Similarly, the ComAT has 
made clear in its case law that States parties have national procedural autonomy.9 The 
HRC has so far not explicitly expressed a position on special national procedural 
rules applying in repeat asylum cases.10 It has made clear – in other contexts (not asy-
lum) – that national procedural rules must be reasonable, and that, in cases of non-
                                                        
5 UNHCR International standards relating to refugee law, Checklist to review draft legislation of 
March 2009, section 5, UNHCR Research Project on the Application of Key Provisions of the Asy-
lum Procedures Directive in selected Member States of March 2010, p. 72;  
6 UNHCR International standards relating to refugee law, Checklist to review draft legislation of 
March 2009, section 5. 
7 UNHCR International standards relating to refugee law, Checklist to review draft legislation of 
March 2009, section 5. 
8 ECtHR, Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, 19 February 1998, Appl. No. 258/94, para. 45; ECtHR, Jabari v. 
Turkey, 2000, Appl. No. 40035/98, paras. 49, 50; HRC, Ngoc Si Truong v. Canada, 5 May 2003, No. 
743/1997, para. 7.6; Jagjit Singh Bhullar v. Canada, 13 November 2006, No. 982/2001, para. 7.3. 
9 See, for example, ComAT, Rios v. Canada, 23 November 2004, No. 133/1999. See also ComAT, 
S.P.A. v. Canada, 7 November 2006, No. 282/2005. 
10 In HRC, Hamid Reza Taghi Khadje v. the Netherlands, 15 November 2006, No. 1438/2005, the author 
had gone through a second asylum procedure in the Netherlands after his first asylum claim had 
been found incredible and had therefore been rejected. In support of his second asylum application, 
the author submitted identity documents, which he had not done during the first procedure. Before 
the HRC, the author complained about unfair national court proceedings as the court had not done 
anything with these identity documents and the decision on incredibility remained unchanged. The 
HRC did not see reason to express itself about this complaint. It noted that no order had been made 
for the forcible return of the author to Iran, and that it was not an inevitable consequence of a failed 
application for asylum that a deportation would take place (para. 6.3.) 
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compliance with those rules, the reasons for non-compliance and the other particular 
circumstances of the case must be taken into account.11 
The EU Asylum Procedures Directive contains specific provisions on repeat 
asylum cases in Article 32. These provisions give Member States the possibility to 
operate, in cases of repeat asylum claims, a special preliminary procedure aimed at 
establishing whether there are new elements or findings (a nova-test).12 Member States 
also have the possibility to further process a repeat asylum claim in which new ele-
ments or findings are submitted only if it is established that the applicant was, 
through no fault of his or her own, incapable of asserting the new elements or find-
ings in the previous procedure, in particular by exercising his or her right to an effec-
tive remedy.13 
8.1.2  Presentation of new evidence: no full and formal exclusion of 
evidence because of its late moment of presentation 
The positions taken by the UNHCR, the ECtHR and the ComAT all have in com-
mon that the presentation of new corroborating evidence within the framework of a 
repeat asylum claim is, in principle, not perceived to be problematic and detrimental 
to the claim and the claimant. The UNHCR has made clear that there may be many 
reasons why an applicant may wish to submit further evidence following the exami-
nation of a previous asylum application, and has stressed that Member States should 
not automatically refuse to examine a subsequent application on the ground that new 
elements or findings could have been raised in the previous procedure or on appeal.14 
The ECtHR’s case law features a significant number of cases in which crucial 
evidence corroborating the claim for protection was submitted only in repeat asylum 
proceedings. Examples are Hilal v. the UK (2001)15 and Bader and Kanbor (2005).16 In 
both cases, the ECtHR attached great value to this evidence without paying attention 
to the question of why it had not been submitted earlier, and concluded that an 
Article 3-risk existed. This is in line with the principle developed in Bahaddar v. the 
                                                        
11 See HRC, Ngoc Si Truong v. Canada, 5 May 2003, No. 743/1997 and Jagjit Singh Bhullar v. Canada, 13 
November 2006, No. 982/2001. 
12 Article 32, second paragraph, of the PD, stipulates: ‘Member States may apply a specific procedure 
as referred to in paragraph 3, where a person makes a subsequent application for asylum.’ 
The third paragraph stipulates: ‘A subsequent application for asylum shall be subject first to a pre-
liminary examination as to whether, after the withdrawal of the previous application or after the de-
cision referred to in paragraph 2(b) of this Article on this application has been reached, new ele-
ments or findings relating to the examination of whether he/she qualifies as a refugee by virtue of 
Directive 2004/83/EC have arisen or have been presented by the applicant.’ 
13 Article 32, sixth paragraph, stipulates: ‘Member States may decide to further examine the application 
only if the applicant concerned was, through no fault of his/her own, incapable of asserting the 
situations set forth in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of this Article in the previous procedure, in particular by 
exercising his/her right to an effective remedy pursuant to Article 39.’ 
14 UNHCR Research Project on the Application of Key Provisions of the Asylum Procedures Direc-
tive in selected Member States of March 2010, p. 74. 
15 ECtHR, Hilal v. the UK, 6 March 2001, Appl. No. 45276/99, paras. 18, 21, 22, 62, 63. 
16 ECtHR, Bader and Kanbor v. Sweden, 8 November 2005, Appl. No. 13284/04. 
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Netherlands (1998) that regard must always be had to the difficult evidentiary position 
of asylum seekers.17 
We find the same flexible approach in the jurisprudence of the ComAT. In a 
significant number of early and also later cases, the ComAT accepted tardy presenta-
tion of evidence, including presentation of new evidence corroborating a repeat asy-
lum application, without further ado and proceeded to examine whether the evidence 
sufficiently corroborated the claim.18 The ComAT seems to have become somewhat 
stricter over the years though, in the sense that in the more recent jurisprudence a 
more explicit requirement has been imposed that there must be convincing explana-
tions for tardy production of statements and evidence. Nevertheless, a significant 
number of cases demonstrate that the ComAT readily accepts explanations for tardy 
presentation of evidence as convincing.19 
The HRC requires under Article 14 ICCPR that evidence regarding the substance 
of the claim, which is submitted to national courts, must be taken into account, even 
when such evidence was presented at a late stage in national proceedings.20 
The CJEU has ruled that reasonable national time limits will normally not be 
problematic, but that there must be room for national courts to be flexible when the 
circumstances of the case so require.21 
In sum, a nova-test in repeat asylum cases is in itself not problematic from the 
viewpoint of international and EU asylum law. Given the positions of the interna-
tional supervisors and courts, national courts should not fully or formally exclude 
evidence just because it should have been presented at an earlier moment in the asy-
lum procedure. 
8.2  Dublin cases 
The CJEU, the ECtHR and the UNHCR have taken clear and highly similar positions 
concerning Dublin cases. The HRC and the ComAT have so far not expressed them-
selves on the question of what kind of judicial scrutiny is required in this particular 
category of cases.  
The CJEU made clear in its judgment in N.S. and others (2011) that it must, in 
general, be assumed that the treatment of asylum seekers in all EU Member States 
complies with the requirements of the EU Charter, the RC and the ECHR.22 This 
                                                        
17 ECtHR, Bahaddar v. the Netherlands, 19 February 1998, Appl. No. 258/94, para. 45. 
18 ComAT, Khan v. Canada, 15 November 1994, No. 15/1994; ComAT, Kisoki v. Sweden, 8 May 1996, 
No. 041/1996; ComAT, V.L. v. Switzerland, 20 November 2006, 262/2005; ComAT, Iya v. Switzer-
land, 16 November 2007, No. 299/2006; ComAT, Chahin v. Sweden, 30 May 2011, No. 310/2007. 
19 See, for example, ComAT, X.Y. v. Switzerland, 15 May 2001, No. 128/1999, para. 7.3; ComAT, H.B. 
and others. v. Switzerland, 16 May 2003, No. 192/2001, para. 6.8; ComAT, Zubair Elahi v. Switzerland, 20 
May 2005, No. 222/2002, para.6.7; ComAT, Z.K. v. Sweden, 16 May 2008, No. 301/2006, para. 8.4. 
20 HRC, Jansen-Gielen v. the Netherlands, 14 May 2001, No. 846/1999, para. 8.2. 
21 CJEU, Laub, 21 June 2007, C-428/05, para. 27; CJEU, Samba Diouf, 28 July 2011, C-69/10, paras. 
66-68. 
22 CJEU, N.S. and Others, 21 December 2011, C-411/10 and C-493/10, paras. 78-80, para. 99. 
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presumption is rebuttable.23 If, however, there are substantial grounds for believing 
that there are systemic flaws in the asylum procedure and reception conditions for 
asylum applicants in the EU Member State responsible, resulting in inhuman or de-
grading treatment within the meaning of Article 4 of the EU Charter, of asylum seek-
ers transferred to the territory of that Member State, the transfer will be incompatible 
with that provision.24 EU Member States, including the national courts, may not 
transfer an asylum seeker to the EU Member State responsible within the meaning of 
the EU Dublin Regulation where they are aware that systemic deficiencies in the 
asylum procedure and in the reception conditions of asylum seekers in that EU 
Member State amount to substantial grounds for believing that the asylum seeker 
would face a real risk of being subjected to inhuman or degrading treatment within 
the meaning of Article 4 of the EU Charter.25 
The UNHCR and the ECtHR take the position that the Dublin system does not 
absolve the EU Member States from upholding their obligations under international 
refugee and human rights law, including, in particular, Article 33 RC and Article 3 
ECHR. The national administrative and judicial authorities of the EU Member State 
intending to transfer an asylum seeker to another EU Member State under the Dublin 
Regulation cannot solely refer to this regulation without conducting any investigation 
into an alleged risk of indirect refoulement to the country of origin and conducting an 
investigation into an alleged threat of a violation of Article 3 ECHR, due to the ex-
tremely bad living conditions of the asylum seekers.26 
In its Submission in the case of M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, the UNHCR pointed 
to a number of situations in which EU Member States should consider themselves 
responsible for taking a material decision on the protection claim instead of sending 
the asylum seeker to another Dublin State: 
 
‘In UNHCR's view, Dublin II transfers should not take place when there is evidence showing: 
(1) A real risk of return/expulsion to a territory where there may be a risk of persecution or se-
rious harm; (2) obstacles limiting access to asylum procedures, to a fair and effective examina-
tion of claims or to an effective remedy; or (3) conditions of reception, including detention, 
which may lead to violations of Article 3 ECHR. In these cases, UNHCR considers a State 
should apply Article 3(2) of the Dublin II Regulation, even if it does not bear responsibility un-
der the criteria laid down in Articles 5-14of the Regulation.’27 
 
                                                        
23 CJEU, N.S. and Others, 21 December 2011, C-411/10 and C-493/10, para. 104. 
24 CJEU, N.S. and Others, 21 December 2011, C-411/10 and C-493/10, para. 86. 
25 CJEU, N.S. and Others, 21 December 2011, C-411/10 and C-493/10, para. 94. 
26 See, for the UNHCR’s position, UNHCR Submission in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 5.1. The 
UNHCR Submission can be found at: http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4c19e7512.html. See 
for the position of the ECtHR for example K.R.S. v. the UK, 2 December 2008, Appl. No. 32733/08, 
under “B. The responsibility of the United Kingdom.”; ECtHR, T.I. v. the UK, admissibility decision, 
7 March 2000, Appl. No. 43844/98; ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 
30696/09. See for a more detailed analysis of this case Van Bennekom and Van der Winden 2011, 
pp. 99-103, and Battjes 2011. 
27 UNHCR Submission in M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, para. 5.2. 
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In M.S.S., the ECtHR clarified what kind of investigation is required from the 
authorities of the EU Member State intending to expel an asylum seeker under the 
Dublin Regulation. The ECtHR explained that the investigation should follow two 
steps. The first step is a presumption that the authorities of the intermediary EU 
Member State will respect their international obligations in asylum matters: 
 
‘The Court must therefore now consider whether the Belgian authorities should have regarded 
as rebutted the presumption that the Greek authorities would respect their international obli-
gations in asylum matters, in spite of the K.R.S. case-law, which the Government claimed the 
administrative and judicial authorities had wanted to follow in the instant case.’28 
 
The second step entails an investigation into the quality of the asylum procedure in 
the intermediary EU Member State. This second step is to be undertaken where there 
is an arguable claim and materials have become available which contain certain 
indications that the intermediary EU Member State may, in practice, not respect its 
international obligations:  
 
‘When they apply the Dublin Regulation, therefore, the States must make sure that the inter-
mediary country's asylum procedure affords sufficient guarantees to avoid an asylum seeker 
being removed, directly or indirectly, to his country of origin without any evaluation of the 
risks he faces from the standpoint of Article 3 of the Convention.’29 
 
In addition to this, the second step entails an investigation into the living conditions 
of (failed) asylum seekers in the intermediary country when materials have become 
available pointing out problems in that respect.30 In the case of M.S.S, the applicant 
alleged that because of the conditions of detention and existence to which asylum 
seekers were subjected in Greece, by returning him to that country in application of 
the Dublin Regulation the Belgian authorities had exposed him to treatment pro-
hibited by Article 3 ECHR.31 
The applicant does not bear the entire burden of proof. Situations may arise in 
which the national authorities of the EU Member State intending to transfer, in-
cluding national courts, are aware or could have been aware of deficiencies in the 
intermediary EU Member State: 
 
‘In these conditions the Court considers that the general situation was known to the Belgian 
authorities and that the applicant should not be expected to bear the entire burden of proof. 
(…) The Court considers that at the time of the applicant’s expulsion the Belgian authorities 
knew or ought to have known that he had no guarantee that his asylum application would be 
seriously examined by the Greek authorities.’32 
                                                        
28 ECtHR, M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 21 January 2011, Appl. No. 30696/09, para. 345. 
29 Ibidem, para. 342.  
30 Ibidem, paras. 342-358. 
31 Ibidem, para. 362. 
32 Ibidem, paras. 352, 358. See also Battjes 2011: in his extensive comments to the judgment he stresses 
this notion of a shared burden in 6.2.1, calling this a ‘spectacular turn’ as in other (not Dublin) cases 
→ 
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This resembles the CJEU’s approach that EU Member States’ authorities, including 
the national courts, may not transfer an asylum seeker to the responsible EU Member 
State when they are aware of systemic deficiencies in the asylum procedure and in the 
reception conditions of asylum seekers in that EU Member State.33 This, too, implies 
that the applicant should not be expected to bear the entire burden of proof and that 
the national authorities, including national courts, have a responsibility of their own 
to investigate the quality of living conditions and the asylum procedure in the inter-
mediary EU Member State. 
We may conclude that, in cases of the expulsion of asylum seekers under the 
Dublin Regulation, the expelling EU Member State’s authorities, including the na-
tional courts, are, to a certain extent, allowed to presume that the authorities of the 
intermediary EU Member State will respect their international obligations. With Van 
Bennekom and Van der Winden (2011), I infer from M.S.S. that, at the same time, 
the ECtHR has clearly put a firm restriction on the presumption of treaty compli-
ance.34 As soon as (some) information to the contrary becomes available – either be-
cause the applicant has submitted this information or because the authorities are 
familiar with it or should be familiar with it – the national authorities must assess 
whether the asylum procedure in the intermediary EU Member State affords ‘suffi-
cient guarantees’ and whether living conditions violate Article 3 ECHR. 
8.3  Fast-track proceedings 
On the issue of fast-track national proceedings, the stances of the international 
supervisors and courts are, in fact, identical. The UNHCR, the ECtHR and the CJEU 
have pointed out that they are not opposed to fast-track proceedings as it is in the 
interests of both the asylum seeker and the State that a decision is taken as soon as 
possible.35 The CJEU has emphasised that under the EU Asylum Procedures Direc-
tive, EU Member States enjoy national procedural autonomy and are, therefore, free 
to accelerate the processing of asylum applications, as long as they live up to their 
obligations flowing from the Directive: 
 
‘Thus, the organisation of the processing of applications for asylum is, as stated in recital 11 to 
Directive 2005/85, left to the discretion of Member States, which may, in accordance with 
their national needs, prioritise or accelerate the processing of any application, taking into ac-
count the standards provided for by the directive, without prejudice, in the words of Article 
23(2) of the directive, to an adequate and complete examination.’36 
 
                                                        
it is required that the applicant adduces evidence capable of proving that there are substantial 
grounds to believe that a real risk exists. 
33 CJEU, N.S. and Others, 21 December 2011, C-411/10 and C-493/10, para. 94. 
34 Van Bennekom & Van der Winden 2011, p. 103. 
35 UNHCR Statement on the right to an effective remedy in relation to accelerated asylum procedures, 
paras. 5, 6 and 7, http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4bf67fa12.pdf; ECtHR, I.M. v. France, 2 
February 2012, Appl. No. 9152/09, para. 142; CJEU, Samba Diouf, 28 July 2011, C-69/10, para. 30. 
36 CJEU, Samba Diouf, 28 July 2011, C-69/10, para. 30. 
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The HRC has stressed in its case law under Article 14 ICCPR that the procedural 
practice applied by national courts to determine the facts and to admit, exclude, and 
evaluate evidence is a matter for those courts to determine, in the interests of 
justice.37 The ComAT has also stressed national procedural autonomy when it comes 
to the determination of the facts.38 
At the same time, the UNHCR, the ECtHR, the HRC and the ComAT have all 
seriously warned that setting short time limits for the examination of asylum claims 
and sacrificing key procedural safeguards for the sake of speed may not allow asylum 
seekers the opportunity to adequately substantiate their claims and may result in a 
more cursory review of relevant facts, leading to flawed decisions.39 
Both the UNHCR and the ECtHR have emphasised that fast-track proceedings 
are generally only suitable for certain categories of cases. The UNHCR mentions as 
suitable ‘clearly abusive’ and ‘manifestly unfounded’ cases, and also ‘obviously well-
founded cases’.40 The ECtHR speaks of ‘clearly unreasonable’ and ‘manifestly ill-
founded’ cases, as well as repeat asylum applications after a first asylum application 
has been processed under normal proceedings.41 The ECtHR has also made clear that 
it is opposed to a practice of automatic registration of claims under a fast-track na-
tional procedure on procedural grounds, without taking into consideration the nature 
or merits of the claim.42 
The CJEU has, furthermore, warned in its judgment in Petrosian (2009) that the 
safeguards of national judicial protection should never be sacrificed to speed: 
 
‘(...) it is clear that the Community legislature did not intend that the judicial protection guar-
anteed by the Member States (...) should be sacrificed to the requirement of expedition in pro-
cessing asylum applications’.43 
 
In line with this, the CJEU stressed in Samba Diouf (2011) that, where fast-track 
proceedings are applied, the national court must at all times remain able to perform a 
thorough review on the merits of the claim.44 
                                                        
37 For example, HRC, Anni Äärelä and Jouni Näkkäläjärvi v. Finland, 7 November 2001, No. 779/1997, 
para. 7.3. 
38 See, for example, ComAT, A.R. v. Netherlands, 14 November 2003, No. 203/2002; ComAT, Rios v. 
Canada, 23 November 2004, No. 133/1999. 
39 UNHCR Statement on the right to an effective remedy in relation to accelerated asylum procedures, 
para. 6; ECtHR, I.M. v. France, 2 February 2012, Application. No. 9152/09, paras. 144-160; HRC, 
Concluding Observations on the Netherlands, 25 August 2009, UN doc. CCPR/C/NLD/CO/4, 
para. 9; HRC, Concluding Observations and Recommendations on Latvia of 6 November 2003, 
CCPR/CO/79/LVA; ComAT, Conclusions and Recommendations regarding Finland, 21 June 
2005, CAT/C/CR/34/FIN, para. 4.b, ComAT, Conclusions and Recommendations regarding 
France, 3 April 2006, CAT/C/FRA/CO/3, para. 6; ComAT, Conclusions and Recommendations 
regarding the Netherlands, 3 August 2007, CAT/C/NET/CO/4, para. 7; ComAT, Conclusions and 
Recommendations regarding Norway of 5 February 2008, CAT/C/NOR/CO/5; ComAT, Conclu-
sions and Recommendations regarding Latvia, 19 February 2008, CAT/C/LVA/CO/2, para. 8. 
40 UNHCR Statement on the right to an effective remedy in relation to accelerated asylum procedures, 
paras. 5, 6 and 7. 
41 ECtHR, I.M. v. France, 2 February 2012, Appl. No. 9152/09, para. 142. 
42 Ibidem, para. 141. 
43 CJEU, Petrosian, 29 January 2009, C-19/08, para. 48. 
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It may be concluded that fast-track asylum court proceedings are not problematic 
per se. What is important is that, when operating such proceedings, national courts 
remain able to perform a thorough review on the merits of the asylum claim. It must 
also be remembered that fast-track court proceedings may deprive asylum seekers of 
the opportunity to substantiate the claim for protection. If a national court estimates 
that, as a result of operating fast-track proceedings, a thorough review on the merits 
cannot take place or that the asylum seeker is deprived of the opportunity to 
substantiate his or her claim, that court must have possibilities to reroute the case 
into normal or prolonged proceedings which offer more room for further judicial 
investigations or further substantiation of the claim by the asylum seeker. 
 
                                                        
44 CJEU, Samba Diouf, 28 July 2011, C-69/10, paras. 56, 61. 
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Epilogue: Open letter to my colleagues in national courts 
in the EU 
 
When I embarked upon this research project, some people within and outside my 
District Court of Amsterdam were highly surprised by the subject. They commented 
that I was surely not going to find in international and EU asylum law any standards 
on judicial scrutiny and evidence. The results of this research demonstrate that the 
opposite is true: international and EU asylum law contain many specific standards on 
the intensity of judicial scrutiny to be applied by national courts, as well as standards 
on evidence. In this epilogue, I wish to highlight the main discoveries resulting from 
this research and, based on these research results, provide a number of guidelines for 
the future. 
For me, a very important discovery was the added value of EU asylum law. This 
added value is first of all the transformation in legal status of existing standards on 
evidence and judicial scrutiny contained in international asylum law by virtue of their 
incorporation into EU law, via Articles 18, 19, 47 and 52(3) of the EU Charter. This 
is a transformation from non-binding principles into more important rules which 
must be respected (the standards developed by the UNHCR), from intergovernmen-
tal international law into binding primary supranational EU law (the standards devel-
oped by the ECtHR) and from intergovernmental international law into important 
sources of inspiration for binding EU law (the standards and principles developed by 
the HRC and the ComAT). As a result of this incorporation of existing international 
law standards on evidence and judicial scrutiny into EU law, national asylum courts 
can no longer ignore, disregard or discard these standards, as that would amount to a 
violation of the EU Charter, which is binding primary supranational EU law.  
The added value of EU asylum law is also that Article 6 ECHR on a fair hearing 
is – via Article 47 of the Charter – now fully applicable to national asylum court pro-
ceedings. This study has demonstrated that Article 6 ECHR contains important 
specific standards on the intensity of judicial scrutiny to be applied by national courts. 
Article 6 ECHR also contains important specific standards on handling evidence. 
This study has revealed that international and EU asylum law require national 
asylum courts to perform an ‘independent and rigorous scrutiny’ of the protection 
claim (ECtHR), a ‘thorough and fair examination of the claim’ (HRC), an ‘effective, 
independent and impartial review on the merits of the claim’ (ComAT), ‘appeal or 
review proceedings on points of fact, including credibility, and points of law’ 
(UNHCR) and a ‘thorough review on the merits of the claim’ (CJEU). Article 6 
ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter require that asylum refusals can be chal-
lenged before a tribunal having full judicial jurisdiction on points of fact and points 
of law. This full jurisdiction under Articles 6 ECHR and 47 of the EU Charter means, 
inter alia, that the national court is able to make an independent determination of the 
disputed facts and of the credibility of a claimant (e.g. ECtHR, Tsfayo v. the UK). Full 
jurisdiction also means that the national court examining the case is not precluded 
from determining ‘the central issue in dispute’ (ECtHR, Sigma Radio Television Ltd v. 
Cyprus).  
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Thus, the common denominator emerging from international and EU asylum law 
is independent, impartial, full and rigorous national judicial scrutiny. This standard 
requires national courts to examine evidence submitted by applicants in a careful and 
serious manner. Second, independent, impartial, full and rigorous national judicial 
scrutiny requires that national courts are able to make an independent and fresh de-
termination of the facts and that, if necessary in order to clarify the facts, these courts 
undertake judicial investigations. Below, I will highlight both aspects by discussing 
those research findings which were true eye-openers for me.  
 
Evidence presented by the applicant 
 
The HRC, the ComAT, the ECtHR and the CJEU have all made clear that evidence 
presented by the applicant for asylum must be taken seriously and examined carefully 
by the national authorities. The recent ECtHR judgment in Singh v. Belgium (2012) 
forms the perfect illustration: the applicants provided copies of pages from Afghan 
passports and copies of UNHCR documents, but the national authorities did not 
make any effort to investigate these documents as they found it incredible anyway 
that the applicants were of Afghan nationality.  
The national authorities must also seriously and carefully examine medical evi-
dence (medico-legal reports, but also short notes from first line doctors). If such re-
ports leave doubts, national authorities, including national courts, must take addi-
tional investigative measures to further clarify the facts. Medico-legal reports play a 
particularly prominent role in the case law of the ComAT. Provided that such reports 
are drawn up by medical specialists and conclusively identify a causal link between the 
individual’s bodily or mental injuries and the alleged past torture, such reports may 
serve as corroboration of statements on past torture, and as an explanation for incon-
sistencies, gaps or vague points, major changes in the flight narrative and the late 
presentation of crucial statements and evidence. The approach of the international 
supervisors towards medical evidence stands in sharp contrast to practice in the 
Netherlands where generally medico-legal reports presented to corroborate past tor-
ture are not given probative value. 
The ECtHR, the HRC and the ComAT have, in a significant number of cases, 
attached serious probative value to witness statements by family members of asylum 
claimants. This stands in sharp contrast with the national approach practised in the 
Netherlands that such statements do not stem from objective sources and, therefore, 
cannot have probative value.  
In the case law of the ECtHR, the HRC, and the ComAT, and in the positions of 
the UNHCR, the point in time at which evidentiary materials are submitted in pro-
ceedings by the parties is – seen as a factor alone and in itself – not a relevant con-
sideration. In a significant number of cases dealt with by the ECtHR and the 
ComAT, crucial evidence was submitted for the first time in the context of repeat na-
tional asylum proceedings. The international supervisors did not see this as prob-
lematic per se. This flexible approach to the moment of presentation of evidence 
stands in sharp contrast with national judicial practice in a number of EU countries, 
among them the Netherlands, to discard evidence on the ground that it was not sub-
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mitted earlier. This practice is no longer tenable as it is at odds with the far more flex-
ible international standard. 
Another important finding arrived at in this study concerns the required quantity 
of evidence. It is clear that, in order to win a case before the HRC, the ComAT and 
the ECtHR, the core aspects of the flight narrative need to be corroborated with 
substantial evidentiary materials. However, these international supervisors do not 
require evidence in support of the travel route, which is seen as a more peripheral, 
and not central, aspect. Similarly, they do not, as a hard and fast rule, require evidence 
of the stated identity and nationality. Given the position of these three international 
supervisors, and given the emphasis the UNHCR has constantly placed on the diffi-
cult evidentiary position of asylum seekers, the question rises whether it is tenable to 
require evidence in corroboration of more than the core of the flight narrative. In the 
Netherlands, evidence is required in corroboration of identity, nationality, travel route 
and flight narrative. Like the UNHCR stated in its Submission in Mir Isfahani v. the 
Netherlands, I would conclude that this practice is not tenable. 
 
Independent fresh determination of the facts, judicial investigations 
 
As has been said above, Article 6 ECHR and Article 47 of the EU Charter require 
that asylum refusals can be challenged before a tribunal having full judicial jurisdic-
tion on points of fact and points of law. This full jurisdiction means, inter alia, that the 
national court is able to make an independent determination of the disputed facts and 
of the credibility of a claimant (e.g. ECtHR, Tsfayo v. the UK). It also means that the 
national court examining the case is not precluded from determining ‘the central issue 
in dispute’ (ECtHR, Sigma Radio Television Ltd v. Cyprus). 
Marginal national judicial review of the credibility of asylum seekers’ accounts 
will, in many cases, be at variance with the full jurisdiction requirement flowing from 
Articles 6 ECHR and 47 of the EU Charter, as it will preclude the national court 
from determining ‘the central issue in dispute’. In many asylum cases, the fear to be 
persecuted or ill-treated upon expulsion to the country of origin is fully based on the 
flight narrative: facts that allegedly took place in the country of origin in the past 
which the applicant fears to be repeated if he or she returns to the country of origin, 
given the situation there. If the national court is allowed to only marginally assess the 
credibility of the alleged past facts, and the fear for the future risk is fully based on 
these past facts, how can that court truly independently determine the central issue in 
dispute: the feared future risk? Marginal judicial review of the credibility of the flight 
account will arguably be less problematic in those asylum cases where, next to the 
flight narrative, there are also so called sur place activities in the country of refuge. Pro-
vided that the national court is able to fully and independently assess the risk which 
may emanate from such sur place activities, it will arguably be less problematic that 
that court does not fully independently assess the credibility of the stated past facts 
(the flight narrative). Not all asylum cases contain such a sur place component, though. 
Independent, impartial, full and rigorous national judicial scrutiny requires an 
active judicial approach towards fact finding and evidence. The interpretation of im-
partiality by the ComAT under Articles 12 and 13 is very helpful in this respect. In 
cases of allegations or suspicions of internal torture, the requirement of impartiality 
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enshrined in Articles 12 and 13 obliges the national judge to reconstruct as meticu-
lously as possible what actually happened and to use his or her investigative powers if 
that may help to come as close as possible to the truth. Impartiality of national asy-
lum courts may be interpreted as meaning the same thing as impartiality under Arti-
cles 12 and 13. That would mean that national asylum courts must act impartially and 
must, therefore, make their own independent, thorough search for the truth and ap-
ply investigative powers to that end. Compared to internal torture cases, it may in-
deed be much more difficult for national asylum courts to find the truth. Unlike in 
internal torture cases, courts will not readily be able to conduct on site investigations, 
to check prison records and hear witnesses in prisons, etc. That does not mean, how-
ever, that it not possible to use other investigative powers, such as searching for addi-
tional information on the situation in the country of origin, seeking expert opinions, 
hearing individuals from the same country of origin as witnesses.  
The interpretation of impartiality by ComAT is in line with the ECtHR’s 
Zumtobel-doctrine under Article 6 ECHR, which requires that national administrative 
courts are able to make an independent determination of the disputed facts and of 
the credibility of a claimant; it also fits well with the active fact finding and evidence 
gathering role played by the ECtHR in a significant number of cases concerning ex-
pulsion of asylum seekers, and with the position of UNHCR that national judges 
should be able to obtain a personal impression of the applicant, that court proceed-
ings should involve points of fact and points of law and national courts should be 
able to independently assess the credibility of the statements of the asylum seeker. 
This interpretation of impartiality stands in sharp contrast to the notion some-
times expressed in national Dutch jurisprudence, that first instance judges are not 
allowed to use the investigative powers they possess under the General Administra-
tive Law Act, as it is held to be the task of the asylum seeker to present the facts and 
the evidence and it is not up to the judge to ‘help’ him or her in fulfilling this task. 
The ComAT’s interpretation of impartiality makes clear that active judicial investiga-
tions have nothing to do with helping one of the parties, but are a matter of inde-
pendence and impartiality. 
A clear expression of the requirement of impartiality is that under Article 8, 
second and third paragraph, of the EU Asylum Procedures Directive and under the 
ICCPR, the CAT and the ECHR particular responsibility for shaping clarity on the 
general human rights situation in the country of origin lies with the national 
authorities, including the judicial authorities.  
 
I cannot conceal that some findings I arrived at in this study disappointed me. The 
HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR have, so far, not developed elaborate and cohe-
rent doctrinal positions on the intensity of the scrutiny with which they themselves 
determine the facts in expulsion cases concerning asylum seekers. The case law of 
these three supervisors demonstrates that, in certain cases, they rely on the respon-
dent State party’s determination of the facts, including the credibility assessment, 
whereas in other cases they make a fully independent determination of the facts of 
their own account. It is not always clear why a certain choice for one or other in-
tensity of scrutiny is made. The case law of the ECtHR is the clearest in this respect 
as we may at least infer from it that there seem to be three triggers which make that 
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the ECtHR actively proceeds towards an independent determination of the facts, 
including credibility, and applies investigative powers to that end. These triggers are, 
in short: (1) insufficient national proceedings (evidence was overlooked or not taken 
seriously); (2) new facts, circumstances and developments, including evidence thereof; 
and (3) disrespect for the absolute nature of Article 3 (or an incorrect application of 
another evidentiary standard such as a too strict requirement of individualization). To 
be honest, I had expected more elaborate doctrinal positions on the intensity of 
scrutiny applied by the HRC, the ComAT, and the ECtHR. 
At the same time, an important discovery was that the HRC, the ComAT and the 
ECtHR at least always have the free choice to apply an intense and full factual scru-
tiny or, instead, rely on the facts as presented by the respondent State. I have argued 
– with reference to ECtHR-judge Martens’ opinion – that national asylum courts 
should similarly at least have this free choice to apply, in the specific cases coming 
before them, either full factual scrutiny or a somewhat more deferent approach to-
wards the determination of the facts. National first instance asylum courts should not 
be under an absolute obligation to apply a marginal judicial review regarding credi-
bility assessments. Such an obligation forces national asylum courts into a position 
which is very far from the judicial discretion, determined by and available to the 
HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR to apply either a very intense scrutiny or a some-
what more deferential type of review. Such an inflexible obligation threatens the in-
dependence and impartiality of the national judiciary and the subsidiary nature of the 
international human rights systems. 
It was equally disappointing to discover that the conclusions in the views of the 
HRC and the ComAT are in many cases ultra-brief and offer no clear linkage be-
tween facts and conclusions. Many views offer little to no guidance to national courts 
on the burden of proof, the requirement of individualisation, the assessment of credi-
bility, and the admission and evaluation of evidence. I discovered a number of rea-
sons which may explain this. Especially the HRC and the ComAT have limited meet-
ing time and are multidisciplinary and are not composed of lawyers only. On top of 
that, the HRC has only a limited body of asylum case law on which to draw. Al-
though these reasons created understanding, I found it difficult and disappointing to 
see that these important international treaty supervisors did not provide clearer 
guidance to national courts. Given this result, I would like to make a plea to the HRC 
and the ComAT to try and come up with more elaborate considerations on the men-
tioned issues of evidence and on the intensity of judicial scrutiny they themselves ap-
ply. It is crucial for national asylum courts to receive clearer guidance from the HRC 
and the ComAT on the mentioned aspects of evidence. Only then will they be able to 
live up to their treaty obligations. 
It is my strong conviction that independent, impartial and thorough national judi-
cial scrutiny, including thorough judicial investigations aimed at finding the truth, are 
of utmost importance in national asylum court proceedings, as most fundamental 
human rights are at stake there and the determination of the facts and the credibility 
assessment in such proceedings is a very difficult task. It is also my strong belief that 
thorough judicial investigations aimed at finding the truth have nothing to do with 
helping one of the parties to the case, but have to do with independence and im-
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partiality of the judiciary. International and EU asylum law provide support for these 
personal convictions. 
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch) 
 
GRONDIG ONDERZOEK VERSUS MARGINALE TOETSING 
 
STANDAARDEN VOOR RECHTERLIJKE TOETSING EN BEWIJSSTANDAARDEN IN 
INTERNATIONAAL EN EUROPEES ASIELRECHT 
 
Twee arresten van het Europees Hof voor de Rechten van de Mens (EHRM) vorm-
den de directe aanleiding om dit onderzoek te starten. Het betrof de zaken Said tegen 
Nederland (2005) en Salah Sheekh tegen Nederland (2007). Uit deze arresten sprak duide-
lijk dat het EHRM ontevreden was over het onderzoek door de nationale rechter in 
Nederland in zaken betreffende de uitzetting van asielzoekers. Deze ontevredenheid 
baarde mij als nationale rechter zorgen. Samen met mijn collega Willem van Benne-
kom van de Rechtbank Amsterdam, waar ik net begonnen was te werken als vreem-
delingenrechter na voltooiing van de RAIO-opleiding, heb ik toen een aantal bekende 
arresten van het EHRM inzake de uitzetting van asielzoekers geanalyseerd om pre-
ciezer te kunnen zien hoe dit internationale hof de risicotaxatie maakt. Ik ontdekte 
significante verschillen tussen de rechterlijke praktijk op internationaal niveau en onze 
eigen nationale werkwijze. Ten eerste leek de intensiteit of de grondigheid van het 
rechterlijk onderzoek te verschillen. Het leek erop dat het EHRM volledig onafhan-
kelijk en zelfstandig de feiten vaststelde en het risico taxeerde. De Nederlandse natio-
nale vreemdelingenrechters daarentegen dienden het standpunt van verweerder (de 
IND) met betrekking tot de geloofwaardigheid van de door de asielzoeker gepresen-
teerde feiten in het verleden terughoudend oftewel marginaal te toetsen. Ten tweede 
werden bewijsvraagstukken, zoals de toelating van bewijs en de waardering daarvan, 
op geheel verschillende wijze benaderd en opgelost op internationaal en nationaal 
niveau. Ik raakte geintrigeerd door de resultaten van dit kleinschalige onderzoek. Ik 
wilde graag in nog meer detail onderzoeken welke lessen getrokken zouden kunnen 
en moeten worden uit het EVRM waar het gaat om de intensiteit van de rechterlijke 
toetsing en bewijskwesties. Daarnaast wilde ik graag uitzoeken of andere relevante 
internationale verdragen en EU (asiel)recht concrete instructies bevatten omtrent be-
wijsvraagstukken en omtrent de intensiteit van rechterlijk onderzoek die geboden 
hoort te worden op nationaal niveau. Mijn wens om onderzoek hiernaar te doen werd 
sterk gevoed door het feit dat in het nationale debat uiteenlopend werd gedacht over 
de vraag of verschillen in toetsing door de nationale en de internationale rechter 
aanvaardbaar waren, terwijl de argumentatie voor de uiteenlopende posities (althans 
voor mij) niet geheel overtuigend was. Mijn wens om onderzoek te doen werd nog 
groter toen ik de resultaten van mijn kleinschalige onderzoek deelde met een aantal 
collega-rechters binnen de Internationale Associatie van Asielrechters. Hierdoor 
ontdekte ik dat niet alleen nationale rechtbanken in Nederland tegen de vraagstukken 
zoals hierboven beschreven aanliepen. Ook in een aantal andere EU lidstaten 
(bijvoorbeeld Polen en Griekenland) bleken problemen te bestaan met betrekking tot 
de intensiteit van het rechterlijk onderzoek en bewijs in asielzaken.  
Het hoofddoel van deze studie is te onderzoeken wat internationaal en Europees 
asielrecht eisen van de nationale rechter op het gebied van: 
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1) de vereiste intensiteit van het rechterlijk onderzoek, en 
2) bewijsvraagstukken, zoals bijvoorbeeld de bewijsstandaard en de bewijslast, de 
toelating en waardering van bewijs, termijnen voor het indienen van bewijsmate-
riaal. 
 
De onderzoeksvragen luiden als volgt: 
- Welke bepalingen van internationaal en EU asielrecht reguleren de nationale 
asielberoepsprocedure bij de rechter? 
- Bevatten deze bepalingen concrete normen omtrent de vereiste intensiteit van het 
rechterlijk onderzoek op nationaal niveau? 
- Bevatten deze bepalingen concrete normen voor bewijsvraagstukken, zoals de 
bewijsstandaard en de bewijslast, de toelating en waardering van bewijs, termijnen 
voor het indienen van bewijsmateriaal? 
- Welke standaarden en beginselen passen de internationale hoven en verdragstoe-
zichthouders zelf toe waar het gaat om de intensiteit van hun onderzoek, en hoe 
benaderen deze hoven en verdragstoezichthouders bewijsvraagstukken? 
- Zijn deze standaarden en beginselen maatgevend of bindend voor nationale asiel-
rechters? 
- Hoe verhouden de gevonden normen zich tot elkaar en welke norm moet wor-
den gekozen in geval van uiteenlopende of conflicterende normen? 
 
Om te onderzoeken welke maatstaven worden toegepast door de internationale ho-
ven en toezichthouders worden in deze studie elf aspecten (vraagstukken) van bewijs 
en rechterlijk onderzoek gebruikt. Het gaat om de volgende aspecten: 
- Bewijsstandaard: wat is de maatstaf of het criterium voor het beoordelen van een 
mogelijk risico van refoulement? 
- Bewijslast: wie moet bewijzen dat aan dit criterium is voldaan? 
- Relevante feiten en omstandigheden: welk soort feiten en omstandigheden zijn 
nodig om tot het bestaan van een risico te concluderen? 
- Vereiste mate van individueel risico: in welke mate moet een asielzoeker indivi-
dueel risico aannemelijk maken? 
- Beoordeling van geloofwaardigheid: analyseert het internationale hof of de toe-
zichthouder de geloofwaardigheid op onafhankelijke en zelfstandige wijze? Hoe 
analyseert het internationale hof of de toezichthouder de geloofwaardigheid van 
de verklaringen van verzoeker? 
- Toelating van bewijs, soorten bewijsmateriaal, minimale hoeveelheid en kwaliteit 
van bewijs: welke middelen en bronnen van bewijs kunnen worden ingebracht 
om het relaas te onderbouwen of ontkrachten? Hoeveel bewijs is vereist om de 
verklaringen van de asielzoeker te onderbouwen? Hoe hoog moet de kwaliteit 
van het bewijsmateriaal zijn? 
- Waardering en weging van bewijs: hoe worden verschillende soorten bewijs ge-
wogen en gewaardeerd? Bestaat er een zekere hiërarchie in de waardering van be-
wijs in de zin dat aan bepaalde bronnen een sterkere bewijswaarde wordt toege-
kend dan aan andere? 
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- Mogelijkheden of kansen voor het aandragen van bewijs: hebben beide partijen 
dezelfde mogelijkheden om bewijs te presenteren en om te reageren op bewijs 
aangevoerd door de andere partij? 
- Toepassing van rechterlijke onderzoeksbevoegdheden: gebruikt het internationale 
hof of de toezichthouder onderzoeksbevoegdheden (uit eigen beweging of an-
derszins)? Zo ja, in welke situaties? 
- Termijnen voor het aanvoeren van verklaringen en het indienen van bewijsstuk-
ken: op welk moment in de procedure moet de asielzoeker de relevante verkla-
ringen aanvoeren en het stavende bewijs overleggen? 
- Moment van risicotaxatie: van welk moment gaat het internationale hof of de 
toezichthouder uit bij de inschatting van het risico? 
 
Deze studie omvat het Verdrag betreffende de Status van Vluchtelingen en het Pro-
tocol betreffende de Status van Vluchtelingen (Vluchtelingenverdrag, 1951, en het 
Vluchtelingenprotocol, 1967), het Internationale Verdrag inzake Burger en Politieke 
Rechten (IVBPR, 1966), het Anti-Folterverdrag (AFV, 1984), het Europees Verdrag 
voor de Rechten van de Mens en de Fundamentele Vrijheden (EVRM, 1950), primai-
re wetgeving van de Europese Unie relevant voor asiel, alsmede een aantal secundaire 
instrumenten van de EU zoals de EU Kwalificatierichtlijn en de EU Procedurericht-
lijn. 
UNHCR documentatie en literatuur zijn de belangrijkste bronnen voor de inter-
pretatie van de bepalingen in het Vluchtelingenverdrag. De jurisprudentie van het 
Mensenrechtencomité, het Comité tegen Foltering, het EHRM en het HvJEU, als-
mede literatuur, vormen de belangrijkste bronnen voor respectievelijk hoofdstuk 3 
(IVBPR), hoofdstuk 4 (AFV), hoofdstuk 5 (EVRM) en hoofdstuk 6 (EU asielrecht).  
Na de introductie in hoofdstuk 1 behandelt hoofdstuk 2 het Vluchtelingenver-
drag, gevolgd door het IVBPR in hoofdstuk 3 en het AFV in hoofdstuk 4. Hoofdstuk 
5 spitst zich toe op het EVRM en hoofdstuk 6 is gewijd aan EU asielrecht. Hoofd-
stuk 7 bespreekt de consequenties van de gevonden normen en maatstaven voor na-
tionale asielrechters. Dit hoofdstuk poogt de verschillende internationale en EU-rech-
telijke maatstaven voor de intensiteit van rechterlijk onderzoek en bewijs te integreren 
tot een samenhangend geheel. Het probeert ook een antwoord te vinden op de vraag 
of de maatstaven inzake rechterlijk onderzoek en bewijs zoals toegepast door de in-
ternationale hoven en toezichthouders bindend zijn voor nationale asielrechters en of 
nationale asielrechters een rolmodel kunnen kiezen uit de verschillende internationale 
hoven en toezichthouders. Een andere vraag waarop in hoofdstuk 7 wordt ingegaan 
is wat moet gebeuren in gevallen van uiteenlopende of conflicterende normen. 
Hoofdstuk 8 besteedt afzonderlijk aandacht aan de positie van de internationale toe-
zichthouders en hoven ten aanzien van drie specifieke soorten zaken en procedures: 
Dublinzaken, herhaalde asielaanvragen en versnelde nationale procedures. In de 
epiloog aan het einde van dit boek worden de belangrijksteresultaten van het onder-
zoek belicht en worden concluderende opmerkingen gemaakt. 
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Bepalingen in internationaal en EU asielrecht over, of relevant voor, nationale 
gerechtelijke asielprocedures 
Het Vluchtelingenverdrag (VLV) 
Het Vluchtelingenverdrag bevat een aantal bepalingen die relevant zijn voor nationale 
gerechtelijke procedures. Dit zijn artikel 16 over toegang tot de rechter, artikel 32 
over uitzetting op grond van nationale veiligheid en openbare orde, alsmede de te 
volgen procedure in geval van uitzetting, en artikel 35 over samenwerking van natio-
nale autoriteiten met de UNHCR. In hoofdstuk 2 stond de vraag centraal wat deze 
artikelen betekenen voor de onderzoeksvragen. Artikel 16 Vluchtelingenverdrag ver-
eist dat vluchtelingen vrije toegang hebben tot de nationale rechter. Artikel 32 vereist 
dat de beslissing om een vluchteling uit te zetten voldoet aan de regels van een be-
hoorlijk proces. In de literatuur wordt verschillend gedacht over de vraag of deze 
twee bepalingen van toepassing zijn op procedures omtrent het vaststellen van de 
vluchtelingenstatus en refoulement. In deze studie is om verschillende, in hoofdstuk 2 
uiteengezette, redenen gekozen voor een dynamische interpretatie van deze bepalin-
gen, wat leidt tot de conclusie dat beide bepalingen inderdaad van toepassing zijn op 
zulke gerechtelijke procedures. 
Artikel 16 Vluchtelingenverdrag is allereerst een non-discriminatiebepaling. Het 
houdt in dat van vluchtelingen niet mag worden geëist dat zij aan meer of strengere 
ontvankelijkheidsvereisten voldoen dan eigen onderdanen. De artikelen 16 en 32 
Vluchtelingenverdrag kunnen worden geïnterpreteerd met behulp van de standpun-
ten van de UNHCR over bewijsvraagstukken en rechterlijk onderzoek in nationale 
gerechtelijke asielprocedures. De UNHCR heeft concrete normen en beginselen ont-
wikkeld ten aanzien van tien van de in dit onderzoek centraal staande elf aspecten van 
bewijs en rechterlijk onderzoek. Deze zijn hieronder genoemd in de rubriek ‘Stand-
punten van de internationale hoven en toezichthouders over de elf aspecten van be-
wijs en rechterlijk onderzoek’. Bezien in samenhang met artikel 21, paragraaf 1, sub e 
van de EU Procedurerichtlijn houdt artikel 35 Vluchtelingenverdrag in dat de 
UNHCR bevoegd is om zijn standpunt kenbaar te maken in bij de rechter aanhangige 
asielberoepszaken. De standpunten van de UNHCR kunnen langs verschillende 
wegen de nationale gerechtelijke procedure binnen komen: de UNHCR kan op eigen 
initiatief zijn standpunt aan de nationale rechtbank kenbaar maken, het initiatief om 
de UNHCR naar zijn mening te vragen kan van een partij uitgaan, of de nationale 
rechter kan de UNHCR uitnodigen om deel te nemen aan de procedure. Op grond 
van de artikelen 16 en 35 Vluchtelingenverdrag, gelezen in samenhang, kunnen natio-
nale rechters de UNHCR uitnodigen deel te nemen aan de nationale gerechtelijke 
procedure als deskundige of getuige die de rechter kan adviseren over een specifiek 
aspect van een zaak of die een standpunt kan geven over de vraag of een verzoeker al 
dan niet als vluchteling moet worden aangemerkt. 
Het Internationaal Verdrag voor de Burgerlijke en Politieke Rechten (IVBPR) 
Uit de bepalingen van het IVBPR over nationale (gerechtelijke) procedures vloeien 
een aantal concrete verplichtingen voort voor nationale asielrechters. Op grond van 
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artikel 2 lid 3 en artikel 7 IVBPR moeten de nationale autoriteiten, en dus ook natio-
nale rechters, een verzoek om bescherming grondig en eerlijk overwegen. Het Men-
senrechtencomité is echter in het algemeen terughoudend met het toetsen van na-
tionale (gerechtelijke) asielprocedures aan dit vereiste. Het Mensenrechtencomité ver-
zuimt vaak om daadwerkelijk in te gaan op de specifieke procedurele problemen die 
worden aangedragen door individuele klagers. Deze passieve houding heeft te maken 
met het feit dat het Mensenrechtencomité de vaststelling en beoordeling van feiten en 
bewijsmateriaal primair ziet als een verantwoordelijkheid van de nationale autoritei-
ten. Het Mensenrechtencomité mengt zich daar normaal gesproken niet in. Als ge-
volg hiervan zal het Mensenrechtencomité de nationale rechtsgang niet snel als on-
voldoende bestempelen op grond van argumenten die te maken hebben met de vast-
stelling van de feiten. De voorzichtige aanpak van het Mensenrechtencomité kan ook 
verklaard worden vanuit de beperkte onderzoeksmogelijkheden en de beperkte tijd 
voor de behandeling van zaken. De zaak Pillai en Joachimpillai t. Canada (2011) vormt 
mogelijk een keerpunt in de richting van strenger toezicht op de naleving van proce-
durele eisen die uit het IVBPR voortvloeien. In die zaak concludeerde het Mensen-
rechtencomité dat door nationale autoriteiten meer aandacht had moeten worden be-
steed aan de stellingen van de klagers dat zij in hun land van herkomst waren gemar-
teld. Het Mensenrechtencomité concludeerde op grond van dit gebrek aan aandacht 
dat de nationale (gerechtelijke) procedure onvoldoende waarborgen bood. Verdere ju-
risprudentie moet worden afgewacht om daadwerkelijk te kunnen concluderen dat 
het Mensenrechtencomité voortaan strikter toeziet op de naleving van de procedurele 
IVBPR-eisen. De zaak Mansour Ahani t. Canada (2004) heeft laten zien dat het Men-
senrechtencomité in sommige gevallen zijn terughoudende aanpak laat varen. In die 
zaak schonden de nationale rechters de fundamentele beginselen van gelijke wapens 
van partijen en een procedure op tegenspraak. Het Mensenrechtencomité vond dat 
de nationale uitzettingsprocedure, waaronder de gerechtelijke procedure, in Ahani 
met onvoldoende waarborgen was omkleed aangezien de minister niet alle stukken 
waarop de uitzettingsbeslissing was gebaseerd aan Ahani ter beschikking had gesteld. 
De geheim gehouden stukken bevatten informatie waarin Ahani als een gevaar voor 
de Canadese nationale veiligheid werd bestempeld. De nationale rechter had dit ge-
brek vervolgens niet hersteld in de gerechtelijke procedure waarin de beslissing tot 
uitzetting werd aangevochten. 
Nationale gerechtelijke procedures zullen normaal gesproken niet op basis van 
nationale procedurele regels onverenigbaar zijn met het vereiste van grondig en eerlijk 
onderzoek naar het verzoek om bescherming, mits deze procedurele regels redelijk 
zijn en niet automatisch en op mechanische wijze worden toegepast. Nationale rech-
ters mogen daarnaast niet zonder meer hun oordeel vormen op basis van precedent-
werking. 
Het Mensenrechtencomité heeft in het kader van artikel 14 IVBPR geoordeeld 
dat de door de nationale rechter toegepaste procedurele praktijk met betrekking tot 
de vaststelling van de feiten en de toelating, uitsluiting, weging en waardering van be-
wijs een aangelegenheid is van de nationale rechter. Anders dan het EHRM, heeft het 
Mensenrechtencomité in het kader van artikel 14 IVBPR tot op heden (nog) geen 
doctrine ontwikkeld over de vereiste intensiteit van toetsing door de rechter in be-
stuursrechtelijke zaken. In een aantal zaken die niet gingen over uitzetting van asiel-
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zoekers, heeft het Mensenrechtencomité in het kader van artikel 14 IVBPR geoor-
deeld dat de nationale rechter de beginselen van gelijke wapens voor partijen en te-
gensprakelijkheid had geschonden. In die zaken liet het Mensenrechtencomité haar 
terughoudendheid ten aanzien van het beoordelen van nationale procedures varen en 
oordeelde het dat de nationale gerechtelijke procedure niet eerlijk was geweest. Uit 
deze zaken blijkt duidelijk dat het Mensenrechtencomité het beginsel van gelijke 
wapens voor partijen en het beginsel van tegensprakelijkheid ziet als de ware essentie 
van een eerlijke procedure. De principes die het Mensenrechtencomité heeft 
ontwikkeld in het kader van artikel 14 IVPRB lijken sterk op de besproken beginselen 
die zijn ontwikkeld in het kader van artikel 2, paragraaf 3, artikel 7 en artikel 13 
IVBPR. 
Het Anti Folterverdrag (AFV) 
De artikelen 3 en 22 lid 5, tweede deel AFV vereisen de mogelijkheid tot een doeltref-
fende, onafhankelijke en onpartijdige beoordeling van de uitzettingsbeslissing, voor-
afgaand aan de daadwerkelijke uitzetting. Het Comité tegen Foltering is, vergelijkbaar 
met het Mensenrechtencomité, doorgaans terughoudend geweest met het onderwer-
pen van nationale (gerechtelijke) procedures aan grondig onderzoek naar de naleving 
van de procedurele vereisten van het AFV. In meer recente jurisprudentie heeft het 
Comité tegen Foltering echter duidelijk gemaakt dat het voor een doeltreffende, 
onafhankelijke en onpartijdige nationale procedure zoals vereist door artikel 3 AFV 
noodzakelijk is dat gerechtelijke procedures de mogelijkheid bieden tot onderzoek 
naar de essentie van de zaak en de garantie bieden van gelijkheid van wapens voor 
partijen en een proces op tegenspraak. In de zaak Sogi t. Canada (2007) oordeelde het 
Comité tegen Foltering dat alle documenten in het dossier aan verzoeker ter beschik-
king gesteld hadden moeten worden, ook de documenten die ten grondslag lagen aan 
de aantijging dat Sogi een gevaar vormde voor de nationale veiligheid van Canada. 
Anders gezegd zag het Comité tegen Foltering tegenspraak en gelijkheid van partijen 
in Sogi als absolute rechten en accepteerde het niet dat nationale veiligheidsbelangen 
het achterhouden van bepaald bewijsmateriaal rechtvaardigden. 
In zaken waarin het gaat om aantijgingen of vermoedens van interne foltering 
(foltering in het verleden in het land van de klager zelf) verplicht het vereiste van on-
partijdigheid uit de artikelen 12 en 13 AFV de nationale rechter tot grondige waar-
heidsvinding, zo nodig door middel van toepassing van onderzoeksbevoegdheden. 
Voor de duiding van de term onpartijdigheid in de zin van artikel 3 AFV kan aanslui-
ting worden gezocht bij deze interpretatie van de term onpartijdigheid. Dat zou bete-
kenen dat nationale asielrechters onpartijdig moeten optreden en daartoe op onaf-
hankelijke en diepgaande wijze aan waarheidsvinding moeten doen met behulp van 
hun onderzoeksbevoegdheden.  
Artikel 15 AFV verbiedt het gebruik van verklaringen ingegeven door foltering 
als bewijsmateriaal in elke procedure, behalve in strafzaken tegen personen die be-
schuldigd worden van foltering, bewijs voor deze beschuldiging. Het Comité tegen 
Foltering heeft zich nog niet uitgesproken over de betekenis van artikel 15 in asiel-
zaken. 
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Het Europees Verdrag voor de Rechten van de Mens en de Fundamentele 
Vrijheden (EVRM) 
In zaken over de uitzetting van asielzoekers voldoet een nationale beroepsprocedure 
bij de rechter aan de vereisten van de artikelen 3, 13 en 35, paragraaf 1, als in deze 
procedure materiële en procedurele punten aan de orde kunnen komen en als de 
rechter in staat is om de weigering van het bestuursorgaan om bescherming te verle-
nen te vernietigen. 
De procedurele tak van artikel 3, bezien in samenhang met artikel 13 en artikel 
35, eerste lid EVRM vereisen dat de nationale autoriteiten, waaronder nationale recht-
banken, een adequate beoordeling verrichten van het verzoek om bescherming. Bij de 
beoordeling van de vraag of de nationale procedure(s) inderdaad adequaat was (wa-
ren), neemt het EHRM in aanmerking of de asielzoeker is gehoord (meermaals), of 
hij of zij is bijgestaan door professionele rechtshulp, of de nationale autoriteiten daad-
werkelijk in staat zijn geweest om de asielzoeker te zien, horen en bevragen, en om de 
door hem of haar verstrekte informatie en bewijs te beoordelen alvorens een beslis-
sing te nemen. Het EHRM neemt hierbij ook in aanmerking of de nationale autoritei-
ten in voldoende mate gebruik hebben gemaakt van zowel nationale landeninformatie 
als landeninformatie uit andere betrouwbare en objectieve bronnen. 
De zaken R.C. tegen Zweden (2010) en Singh en anderen tegen België (2012) hebben 
duidelijk laten zien dat de nationale authoriteiten, inclusief de nationale rechter, zorg-
vuldig en serieus moeten kijken naar bewijs dat is ingediend door de asielzoeker. 
Wanneer dat bewijs vragen onbeantwoord laat, dan moeten de nationale autoriteiten, 
waaronder de rechtbanken, proberen om antwoorden te vinden door onderzoeksbe-
voegdheden in te zetten. Dit dient vooral te gebeuren wanneer nader onderzoek op 
eenvoudige wijze kan worden verricht, zoals het geval was in de zaak Singh en anderen 
tegen België. In die zaak hadden de nationale autoriteiten eenvoudig bij de UNHCR na-
vraag kunnen doen naar de betekenis van de door de verzoekers ingebrachte kopieën 
van documenten van de UNHCR waarbij verzoekers waren erkend als vluchteling. 
De nationale autoriteiten lieten dit echter na. Om te voldoen aan het criterium van 
een onafhankelijk en grondig onderzoek moet er dus daadwerkelijk diepgaand onder-
zoek worden verricht door de nationale autoriteiten, inclusief de nationale recht-
banken. 
Bestendige lijnen in nationale jurisprudentie mogen niet doorkruisen dat een indi-
viduele, op de zaak toegesneden, feitelijke beoordeling van de essentie van de zaak 
plaatsvindt. Uit Bahaddar tegen Nederland (1998) en Jabari tegenTurkije (2000) volgt bo-
vendien dat in de nationale regelgeving neergelegde termijnen en andere procedurele 
regels normaal gesproken moeten worden nageleefd, maar dat deze niet zo kort mo-
gen zijn en niet zo star mogen worden toegepast dat een asielzoeker in feite geen 
reële mogelijkheid meer heeft om zijn verzoek te onderbouwen. 
Tot slot betekent een onafhankelijk en grondig onderzoek ook dat de nationale 
autoriteiten de juiste bewijsstandaarden hanteren in het onderzoek naar het gevreesde 
risico in de zin van artikel 3 EVRM. Zo volgt bijvoorbeeld uit het arrest M.S.S. tegen 
België en Griekenland (2011) dat het de nationale rechtbank niet is toegestaan om, bij-
voorbeeld, een strengere bewijsstandaard te hanteren dan de standaard die het 
EHRM zelf toepast. Om te kunnen voldoen aan het vereiste van onafhankelijk en 
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grondig onderzoek is het daarom voor nationale rechtbanken van groot belang om te 
weten hoe de bewijsstandaarden die het EHRM hanteert er exact uitzien. In deel 2 
van hoofdstuk 5 zijn die bewijsstandaarden nader onderzocht. 
 
Uit vaste jurisprudentie van het EHRM volgt dat artikel 6 lid 1 EVRM niet van toe-
passing is in uitzettingszaken. Toch is artikel 6 EVRM om twee redenen wel degelijk 
relevant voor nationale gerechtelijke asielprocedures. Ten eerste heeft het EHRM 
sinds de uitspraak in Kudla t. Polen (2000) geoordeeld dat de vereisten van artikel 13 
EVRM gezien moeten worden als een versterking van de vereisten van artikel 6 lid 1 
EVRM, zodat de vereisten ontwikkeld in het kader van artikel 6 lid 1 EVRM in feite 
ook deel uitmaken van artikel 13 EVRM. Ten tweede bepaalt de jurisprudentie van 
het EHRM in het kader van artikel 6 lid 1 in grote mate de inhoud van artikel 47 lid 2 
EU Handvest, dat het recht op een eerlijk proces vastlegt. Artikel 47 lid 2 EU Hand-
vest is in het algemeen van toepassing in asielzaken. 
Artikel 6 lid 1 EVRM vereist dat beslissingen van bestuursorganen in beginsel 
aangevochten kunnen worden bij een rechtbank met volledige bevoegdheid op het 
gebied van de feiten en het recht. Volledige bevoegdheid omvat ook de bevoegdheid 
om onafhankelijk en zelfstandig de betwiste feiten en de geloofwaardigheid van een 
verzoeker vast te stellen, en de bevoegdheid om informatie gebruikt door de bestuur-
lijke autoriteiten of door de andere partij kritisch te bejegenen. Artikel 6 lid 1 EVRM 
verplicht nationale rechters er ook toe om een betekenisvol onderzoek te verrichten 
naar de stellingen, argumenten en bewijsstukken aangevoerd door partijen. Als blijkt 
dat dit niet gebeurd is, ofwel vanwege gebrekkig onderzoek naar door partijen aan-
gevoerd bewijs ofwel doordat geen gebruik is gemaakt van onderzoeksbevoegdheden 
teneinde betwiste feiten op onafhankelijke wijze vast te stellen, dan kan dit bij het 
EHRM leiden tot de conclusie dat de gerechtelijke procedure in strijd met artikel 6 lid 
1 EVRM niet eerlijk was. Gedeeltelijke in plaats van volledige bevoegdheid van de 
nationale rechter is in uitzonderingsgevallen toegestaan onder artikel 6 lid 1 EVRM. 
Allereerst is de specifieke inhoud van de zaak hierbij van belang. In een aantal zaken 
waarbij de inhoud raakte aan de klassieke uitoefening van bestuurlijke discretionaire 
bevoegdheden, zoals ruimtelijke ordening, werd een meer beperkte bevoegdheid van 
de nationale rechter geaccepteerd door het EHRM. Gedacht kan ook worden aan 
zaken waarin complexe technische analyses zijn uitgevoerd of waarin belangrijke di-
plomatieke vraagstukken centraal staan. In die zaken waarin het EHRM gedeeltelijke 
(beperkte) bevoegdheid van de nationale rechter accepteerde, werd daarnaast voldaan 
aan een aantal andere criteria: het ging in de nationale gerechtelijke procedure hoofd-
zakelijk om vragen van recht en niet zozeer om feitelijke zaken, de administratief-
rechtelijke procedure die voorafging aan de procedure bij de nationale rechter was 
omgeven met veel artikel 6-waarborgen, en het onderzoek bij de nationale rechter 
was ondanks de beperkingen wel doeltreffend, in die zin dat het daadwerkelijk kri-
tisch onderzoek omvatte naar de procedurele kwesties die verzoeker naar voren 
bracht.  
Ik heb om de volgende redenen beargumenteerd dat het logisch zou zijn om ar-
tikel 3-zaken betreffende de uitzetting van asielzoekers in de categorie zaken te plaat-
sen die volledig rechterlijk onderzoek op nationaal niveau behoeven. Allereerst staat 
in asielzaken, in tegenstelling tot bijvoorbeeld zaken over ruimtelijke ordening, het le-
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ven en de veiligheid van het individu op het spel. Artikel 3 is een fundamenteel, abso-
luut recht waarvan niet kan worden afgeweken in bijzondere situaties zoals oorlog. 
Ten tweede zullen de meeste asielzaken niet van complexe technische aard zijn, en 
slechts in enkele gevallen zullen belangrijke diplomatieke zaken op het spel staan. Ten 
derde versterken de vereisten van artikel 13 EVRM die van artikel 6 EVRM. Het ver-
eiste uit artikel 13 EVRM dat in uitzettingszaken een individueel, zaakspecifiek en fei-
telijk onderzoek naar de inhoud moet worden verricht, kan dus als een versterking 
worden gezien van het uit artikel 6 EVRM volgende vereiste dat de nationale rechter 
volledig bevoegd is te oordelen over feiten en recht. 
Artikel 6 lid 1 EVRM vergt verder dat partijen gelijk behandeld worden ten aan-
zien van de toelating, uitsluiting en beoordeling van bewijs. De vereisten van een pro-
cedure op tegenspraak en gelijkheid van wapens van partijen zijn echter niet absoluut. 
Het niet openbaren van bewijsmateriaal kan gerechtvaardigd zijn waar dit strikt nood-
zakelijk is voor het beschermen van de fundamentele rechten van een ander of een 
belangrijk algemeen belang zoals nationale veiligheid. Als een nationale rechter toe-
staat dat bepaald bewijs niet aan een partij wordt geopenbaard, moet deze wel specia-
le handelingen verrichten ter compensatie. Dit betekent dat de nationale rechter op 
zijn minst zelf het geheim gehouden bewijs bestudeert en dat, waar mogelijk, aanvul-
lende compenserende maatregelen worden getroffen. 
Het asielrecht van de Europese Unie (EU) 
Sinds het Verdrag van Lissabon (1 december 2009) heeft de EU een eigen, bindend 
mensenrechtendocument met de status van primair EU recht in de vorm van het 
Handvest van de Grondrechten van de Europese Unie. Nu de EU bevoegd is bin-
dende regelgeving over asiel uit te vaardigen en deze regelgeving ook daadwerkelijk 
tot stand is gekomen, zullen asielzaken vrijwel altijd binnen de reikwijdte van het EU 
recht vallen. Het gevolg hiervan is dat het Handvest normaliter van toepassing zal 
zijn. Op grond van artikel 18 Handvest moeten nationale asielrechters de procedurele 
voorschriften van het Vluchtelingenverdrag en de in hoofdstuk 2 besproken stand-
punten van de verdragstoezichthouder, de UNHCR, over bewijs en toetsing door de 
nationale rechter in acht nemen. Het is niet langer mogelijk de standpunten van de 
UNHCR af te doen als niet bindend, nu dit een schending oplevert van artikel 18 
Handvest, dat primair bindend EU recht is.  
De standaarden over procedures, bewijs en rechterlijk onderzoek die voortvloei-
en uit het EVRM – besproken in hoofdstuk 5 – komen via de artikelen 19, 47 en 52 
lid 3 EU Handvest het EU recht binnen en worden daarvan onderdeel. Deze integra-
tie in het EU recht brengt met zich dat normen van intergouvernementeel internatio-
naal recht transformeren tot supranationaal EU recht dat voorrang heeft op al het na-
tionale recht van EU lidstaten. Op basis van de preambule van het Handvest, artikel 
78 VWEU en artikel 53 Handvest vormen de standaarden over procedures, bewijs en 
rechterlijk onderzoek die voortvloeien uit het IVBPR en het AFV – besproken in de 
hoofdstukken 3 en 4 – belangrijke aanvullende bronnen bij de interpretatie van artikel 
19 lid 2 en artikel 47 Handvest. 
Artikel 47 Handvest is – naast evenkniebepaling van de artikelen 6 en 13 EVRM 
– ook de codificatie van het binnen het EU recht ontwikkelde beginsel van effectieve 
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rechtsbescherming. In het kader van het beginsel van effectieve rechtsbescherming 
zijn vijf verschillende standaarden ontwikkeld voor de intensiteit van rechterlijk on-
derzoek, die corresponderen met vijf verschillende categorieën van zaken. Deze stan-
daarden variëren van marginaal rechterlijk toezicht zonder feitenonderzoek (procedu-
res over personeelszaken) tot een grondig, integraal en ex nunc rechterlijk onderzoek 
naar feiten, recht en proportionaliteit (zaken betreffende inperkingen van fundamen-
tele vrijheden van EU burgers, hun familieleden-derdelanders en Turkse werknemers 
en hun familie die rechten hebben onder Besluit 1/80 of rechten voortvloeiend uit de 
Associatieovereenkomst zelf). Vooralsnog weten we niet welke standaard het HvJEU 
zal hanteren ten aanzien van asielzaken. Mijn inschatting is dat het HvJEU de meest 
indringende standaard voor rechterlijk onderzoek van toepassing zal achten op asiel-
zaken. Ten eerste vanwege de sterke gelijkenis tussen asielzaken en zaken omtrent in-
perkingen van fundamentele vrijheden van EU burgers. Beide soorten zaken gaan 
over fundamentele rechten of vrijheden. Ten tweede lijkt de meest indringende stan-
daard op het soort rechterlijk onderzoek dat door het EHRM is uitgevoerd in een 
aanzienlijk aantal zaken over uitzetting van asielzoekers in het kader van artikel 3 
EVRM. De meest indringende standaard lijkt daarnaast ook op het vereiste van vol-
ledige bevoegdheid ten aanzien van feiten en recht, en het vereiste van onafhankelijk 
en grondig rechterlijk onderzoek, die volgen uit de artikelen 6 en 13 EVRM. In het 
recente arrest in de zaak Samba Diouf (2011) oordeelde het HvJEU dat de finale be-
slissing op een asielverzoek onderworpen moet kunnen worden aan een grondige in-
houdelijke beoordeling door de nationale rechter. Dit arrest laat dus zien dat de uit-
gesproken verwachting niet enkel denkbeeldig is.  
De bepalingen in secundair EU recht over rechtsmiddelen moeten geïnterpre-
teerd worden in samenhang met de hogere regeling van artikel 47 Handvest en het 
daarin vervatte hogere algemene beginsel van effectieve rechtsbescherming. Uit de 
wetsgeschiedenis van de bepalingen in secundair EU recht over rechtsmiddelen volgt 
dat er verschilende pogingen zijn gedaan om nationale rechters weg te houden van 
negatieve beslissingen dan wel de intensiteit van de rechterlijke toetsing te vermin-
deren. Door de noodzaak van interpretatie conform hogere regelgeving moet echter 
vastgesteld worden dat die pogingen tevergeefs zijn ondernomen.  
Secundair EU asielrecht geeft geen uitputtende regeling voor alle mogelijke be-
wijsvraagstukken. Het bevat echter wel specifieke bepalingen over een aantal van de 
elf aspecten van bewijs en rechterlijk onderzoek, zoals de bewijsstandaard en de be-
wijslast. In hoofdstuk 6 werden deze bepalingen geïnterpreteerd met behulp van juris-
prudentie van het HvJEU in zowel asielzaken als andere zaken, en met behulp van de 
standaarden ontwikkeld door de UNHCR, het Mensenrechtencomité, het Comité te-
gen Foltering en het EHRM, aangezien artikel 78 VWEU vereist dat secundair EU 
recht in overeenstemming is met het Vluchtelingenverdrag alsmede de andere rele-
vante verdragen (zijnde het IVBPR, het AFV en het EVRM). 
In hoofdstuk 6 werd geconcludeerd dat het EU asielrecht op drie manieren toe-
gevoegde waarde heeft. Ten eerste zorgt het EU asielrecht voor een transformatie 
van bestaande standaarden over bewijs en rechterlijk onderzoek die voortvloeien uit 
internationaal asielrecht. Deze bestaande standaarden transformeren van niet binden-
de beginselen tot belangrijkere regels die gevolgd moeten worden (dit geldt voor de 
normen ontwikkeld door de UNHCR via artikel 18 Handvest), van intergouverne-
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menteel internationaal recht tot supranationaal primair EU recht (de standaarden ont-
wikkeld door het EHRM via de artikelen 19 en 47 Handvest) en van intergouverne-
menteel internationaal recht tot belangrijke inspiratiebronnen voor de uitlegging van 
bindend EU recht (de standaarden ontwikkeld door het Mensenrechtencomité en het 
Comité tegen Foltering via artikelen 19 en 47 Handvest).  
Ten tweede zijn de standaarden ontwikkeld door het EHRM in het kader van 
artikel 6 EVRM nu van toepassing in asielzaken, aangezien zij deel uitmaken van ar-
tikel 47 Handvest.  
Ten derde heeft het systeem van rechterlijk toezicht op de naleving van EU 
asielrecht een sterke aanvullende werking ten opzichte van de individuele klachten-
procedures van het IVBPR, het AFV en het EVRM. De preliminaire procedure voor 
het HvJEU biedt nationale rechters de mogelijkheid vragen te stellen aan het HvJEU 
gedurende de nationale gerechtelijke procedure. Op deze wijze kunnen mensenrech-
tenschendingen in een veel vroeger stadium voorkomen worden. 
Standpunten van de twee internationale hoven en de verdragstoezichthouders 
over de elf aspecten van bewijs en rechterlijk onderzoek 
Bewijsstandaard 
De bewijsstandaard onder het EU asielrecht, het EVRM, het Vluchtelingenverdrag en 
het AFV is dezelfde: het vereiste risico is een daadwerkelijk, persoonlijk en voorzien-
baar risico dat verder gaat dan alleen de mogelijkheid tot onmenselijke behandeling. 
Het risico hoeft echter niet zeker of onvermijdelijk, hoogst waarschijnlijk of zonder 
gerede twijfel te zijn. De jurisprudentie van het Mensenrechtencomité is strikter aan-
gezien een daadwerkelijk risico daar betekent dat schending van artikel 7 een onver-
mijdelijk en voorzienbaar gevolg is van de uitzetting. 
Bewijslast en de verplichting tot samenwerking 
Zowel de in dit boek besproken verdragen als het EU asielrecht voorzien in een ge-
deelde bewijslast. Op de asielzoeker rust allereerst de last om zijn relaas naar voren te 
brengen en om met enig onderbouwend bewijs te komen. Vervolgens rust op de na-
tionale autoriteiten, inclusief de nationale rechter, een onderzoeksplicht. Het HvJEU 
en het EHRM hebben, net als op minder expliciete wijze het Comité tegen Foltering, 
hierbij de notie van de glijdende schaal ontwikkeld: hoe slechter de algemene mensen-
rechtensituatie in een land, des te minder individuele omstandigheden en stavend be-
wijsmateriaal nodig zal zijn en hoe eerder de bewijslast verschuift van de aanvrager 
naar de nationale autoriteiten. De EU Kwalificatierichtlijn, het EVRM, het Vluchte-
lingenverdrag en het AFV voorzien daarnaast ook in een lichtere bewijslast in zaken 
waar al eerder vervolging of onmenselijke behandeling plaatsvond. 
De notie van de gedeelde bewijslast heeft in het EU asielrecht een bijzondere 
vorm gekregen. Dit is het vereiste van samenwerking dat is neergelegd in artikel 4 van 
de EU Kwalificatierichtlijn. In het arrest M.M. tegen de Minister voor Justitie, gelijkheid en 
rechtshervorming van Ierland (2012) heeft het HvJEU geoordeeld dat dit vereiste van sa-
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menwerking het volgende betekent. Indien, om welke reden dan ook, de door de aan-
vrager verstrekte elementen niet volledig zijn, of niet up-to-date of relevant, dan die-
nen de nationale autoriteiten actief samen te werken met de aanvrager in die betref-
fende fase van de procedure, opdat alle elementen die noodzakelijk zijn om de aan-
vraag te onderbouwen kunnen worden vergaard. De nationale autoriteiten kunnen 
soms in een betere positie zijn dan de aanvrager om toegang te krijgen tot bepaalde 
soorten documenten. Het HvJEU heeft tot op heden niet verder uitgelegd wat wordt 
bedoeld met ‘actieve samenwerking met de aanvrager opdat alle elementen die be-
nodigd zijn om de aanvraag te onderbouwen kunnen worden vergaard’. Nationale 
rechtbanken kunnen hierbij wellicht denken aan situaties waarin het nodig is om de 
aanvrager een extra termijn te gunnen voor het inbrengen van nieuwe relevante docu-
menten, aan situaties waarin de aanvrager voorstelt dat de rechtbank getuigen hoort 
en aan situaties waarin de aanvrager documenten heeft overgelegd en de rechtbank 
een onderzoek naar de authenticiteit daarvan gelast of verweerder opdraagt om een 
dergelijk onderzoek uit te voeren. Net zoals het EHRM deed in het arrest Iskandarov 
tegen Rusland (2010), heeft het HvJEU in M.M. uitgelegd dat zich specifieke omstan-
digheden kunnen voordoen waarin de administratieve autoriteiten of de rechtbank in 
een betere positie is dan de aanvrager om toegang te krijgen tot bepaalde documen-
ten. Dit betekent dat wanneer het voor verweerder of voor de rechtbank veel een-
voudiger is dan voor de aanvrager om aan bepaalde relevante documenten te komen, 
de last om die documenten te verkrijgen en in te brengen ook op die autoriteit rust. 
Relevante feiten en omstandigheden 
Wat dit punt betreft komen de onderzochte verdragen en het EU asielrecht sterk 
overeen. Relevant zijn zowel persoonlijke omstandigheden zoals bijvoorbeeld achter-
grond, geslacht, overtuigingen en activiteiten als omstandigheden die zien op de alge-
mene (mensenrechten-)situatie in het land van herkomst, zoals detentieomstandig-
heden, de mate van geweld in het land en de controle van de overheid daarover en 
veranderingen in regering of beleid. Uit de onderzochte verdragen en het EU asiel-
recht volgt dat de persoonlijke feiten en de situatie in het land van herkomst zoveel 
mogelijk holistisch moeten worden benaderd: ze moeten worden bezien in elkaars 
licht, als een geheel. 
Vereiste mate van individueel risico 
Onder het EVRM en het EU asielrecht kan onderscheid worden gemaakt naar drie 
soorten situaties en daarmee zaken: 1) situaties van extreem algemeen geweld, waarin 
een artikel 3-risico wordt aangenomen voor iedereen die terugkeert naar het be-
treffende land; 2) situaties van groepsgeweld en 3) situaties waarin het gaat om een 
individueel risico. In zaken uit de derde categorie is het vaststellen van een individueel 
risico vereist. Dit betekent dat het betreffende individu aannemelijk dient te maken 
dat alleen hij of zij risico loopt. Uit de jurisprudentie van zowel het Mensenrechten-
comité (Kaba v. Canada, 2010 en Joachimpillai v. Canada, 2011) alsook het Comité tegen 
Foltering (Njamba tegen Zweden, 2010, en Bakatu-Bia tegen Zweden, 2011) volgt dat deze 
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beide verdragstoezichthouders in belangrijke mate de door het EHRM ontwikkelde 
doctrine over groepsgeweld hebben overgenomen. 
Bij het onderbrengen van zaken in één van de drie genoemde categorieën en het 
in overeenstemming daarmee vaststellen van de vereiste hoeveelheid persoonlijke fei-
ten en bewijs moeten nationale rechters ook in aanmerking nemen dat het Vluchtelin-
genverdrag geen individualisering vereist. Het UNHCR-handboek onderscheidt in 
hoofdzaak twee manieren om de vluchtelingenstatus vast te stellen: de normale situ-
atie waarin vluchtelingenstatus wordt vastgesteld op individuele gronden, en de uit-
zonderlijke situatie waarin de vluchtelingenstatus wordt vastgesteld voor een groep, 
waarbij elk lid van die groep prima facie als vluchteling wordt gezien. Geen van deze 
situaties stelt een strikte individualiseringseis aangezien het risico niet per se gebaseerd 
hoeft te zijn op persoonlijke ervaringen van de verzoeker. 
Beoordeling van de geloofwaardigheid: intensiteit van (rechterlijk) onderzoek 
uitgevoerd door het EHRM en de andere verdragstoezichthouders, 
standpunten van het HvJEU en de UNHCR 
Het Mensenrechtencomité en het Comité tegen Foltering benadrukken vaak hun sub-
sidiaire rol als het gaat om het vaststellen van de feiten, daarbij inbegrepen de beoor-
deling van de geloofwaardigheid van de asielzoeker. Dit is een logisch gevolg van het 
feit dat deze verdragstoezichthouders de vaststelling van de feiten primair als een ver-
antwoordelijkheid zien van de autoriteiten van de staat en zij zelf – met name het 
Mensenrechtencomité – slechts beperkte onderzoeksbevoegdheden hebben ten aan-
zien van de feiten. Het lijkt erop dat twee situaties in het bijzonder zorgen voor een 
meer onafhankelijke vaststelling van de feiten door het Comité tegen Foltering. Dit is 
allereerst de situatie waarin in de nationale (gerechtelijke) procedure het absolute ka-
rakter van het refoulementverbod is miskend en er een weging heeft plaatsgevonden 
van het risico enerzijds en nationale veiligheids- of openbare orde-aspecten ander-
zijds. Daarnaast de situatie waarin de autoriteiten van de staat bepaalde belangrijke 
feiten of bewijsstukken niet meegenomen hebben in de beoordeling. In vergelijking 
met beide Comités is het EHRM actiever waar het gaat om het vaststellen van de fei-
ten. In een aanzienlijk aantal zaken over de uitzetting van asielzoekers was het EHRM 
zeer actief in het verzamelen en verifiëren van feiten en omstandigheden en maakte 
het EHRM ook een eigen zelfstandige beoordeling van de geloofwaardigheid van de 
verklaringen van de asielzoeker. Het EHRM stelt onafhankelijk en zelfstandig de fei-
ten, geloofwaardigheid inbegrepen, vast in zaken waarin de procedure op nationaal 
niveau niet adequaat is geweest, in zaken waarin nieuwe feiten, omstandigheden of 
ontwikkelingen aan het licht zijn gekomen, inclusief bewijs daarvan, en in zaken 
waarin in de nationale procedure het absolute karakter van het refoulementverbod is 
miskend en er een weging heeft plaatsgevonden van het risico enerzijds en nationale 
veiligheids- of openbare ordeaspecten anderzijds, dan wel dat anderszins een of meer-
dere bewijsstandaarden onjuist zijn toegepast (bijvoorbeeld de bewijsstandaard of de 
vereiste mate van individualisering). 
In tegenstelling tot de Comités en het EHRM ontvangen het HvJEU en de 
UNHCR geen individuele klachten. Het HvJEU en de UNHCR hebben echter wel 
duidelijke standpunten ingenomen betreffende de intensiteit van het rechterlijk on-
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derzoek dat uitgevoerd moet worden door de nationale asielrechter. Het HvJEU oor-
deelde in Sambia Diouf (2011) dat een grondige beoordeling van de inhoud van het 
verzoek vereist is. De UNHCR is de mening toegedaan dat de beoordeling door de 
nationale asielrechter zowel kwesties van feiten als kwesties van recht dient te omvat-
ten en dat de nationale rechter onafhankelijk de geloofwaardigheid van de verkla-
ringen van de asielzoeker moet kunnen vaststellen. 
 
Beoordeling van de geloofwaardigheid: hoe beoordelen het EHRM en de 
andere internationale verdragstoezichthouders de geloofwaardigheid? 
Het EHRM, de UNHCR en het Comité tegen Foltering (en in mindere mate het 
Mensenrechtencomité) hebben duidelijke criteria ontwikkeld voor het vaststellen van 
de geloofwaardigheid. Deze internationale toezichthouders eisen ‘algemene geloof-
waardigheid’ (‘algemene waarheidsgetrouwheid’), geen complete nauwkeurigheid en 
consistentie ten aanzien van ieder detail van het gestelde. Dit betekent dat het basis-
verhaal – de kern van de vluchtredenen – geloofwaardig dient te zijn. Het EHRM 
heeft duidelijk gemaakt dat twijfels over marginale onderdelen van het verhaal, zoals 
verklaringen over de reis naar het land waar asiel is aangevraagd of verklaringen over 
ontsnappingen uit de gevangenis of aan bewakers, niet direct afdoen aan de algemene 
geloofwaardigheid. Het EHRM en het Comité tegen Foltering hebben verder duide-
lijk gemaakt dat het basisverhaal aan een aantal vereisten moet voldoen om geloof-
waardig te zijn: 
- Het moet voldoende gedetailleerd zijn; 
- Het moet innerlijk consistent zijn tijdens de gehele procedure; talrijke relevante 
inconsistenties en vele wijzigingen in verklaringen kunnen die verklaringen onge-
loofwaardig maken; 
- Het moet aansluiten bij informatie over het land van herkomst; 
- Het moet tijdig naar voren worden gebracht: laat met nieuwe verklaringen komen 
kan van negatieve invloed zijn op de algemene geloofwaardigheid, vooral wan-
neer hiervoor geen goede reden wordt gegeven; 
- De kern van het vluchtverhaal moet – zoveel mogelijk – gestaafd worden met be-
wijs. 
 
In vergelijking met de andere toezichthouders neemt de UNHCR een flexibeler 
standpunt in waar het gaat om onderbouwend bewijs als eis voor geloofwaardigheid. 
De UNHCR stelt zich op het standpunt dat de afwezigheid van stavend bewijsmate-
riaal niet in de weg mag staan aan toewijzing van het verzoek als de verklaringen 
overeenkomen met bekende feiten en de aanvrager algemeen geloofwaardig is. De 
UNHCR heeft ook duidelijk gemaakt dat er geen rechtvaardiging te bedenken valt 
voor het hanteren van een strengere geloofwaardigheidsmaatstaf die uitstijgt boven 
de standaard van de ‘algemene geloofwaardigheid’ in zaken waarin stavend bewijs 
geheel ontbreekt. 
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Toelating van bewijs: middelen en bronnen 
De onderzochte verdragen en het EU asielrecht voorzien in een flexibel regime waar 
het gaat om de toelating van bewijs. Er zijn in feite geen procedurele drempels voor 
de toelating van bewijs. Wat betreft de weging van bewijs zijn er evenmin vooraf 
vastgestelde formules. In de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 5 zijn verschillende voorbeel-
den van bewijsmateriaal gegeven. 
Minimale hoeveelheid en kwaliteit van bewijs 
Het Mensenrechtencomité, het Comité tegen Foltering en het EHRM vereisen een 
aanzienlijke hoeveelheid persoonlijk bewijs ter onderbouwing van de kern van het 
vluchtverhaal.  
Hiertegenover staat de UNHCR, die vaak heeft benadrukt dat het vereiste van 
bewijs niet te strikt moet worden toegepast, gezien de bijzondere en lastige bewijs-
positie van de asielzoeker. De UNHCR heeft ook het standpunt ingenomen dat een 
algeheel gebrek aan stavend bewijs nog niet meteen betekent dat het verzoek om be-
scherming kansloos is. Het standpunt van de UNHCR heeft zijn weerslag gevonden 
in artikel 4 lid 5 van de EU Kwalificatierichtlijn. Deze bepaling maakt duidelijk dat 
onder bepaalde omstandigheden, onder meer bij een reële poging van de asielzoeker 
om zijn verzoek om bescherming te staven, niet alle aspecten van het verhaal onder-
bouwd hoeven te worden met bewijsmateriaal anders dan de eigen verklaringen. 
Waardering en weging van bewijs 
Het Vluchtelingenverdrag en het EU asielrecht reguleren dit aspect niet en de juris-
prudentie van het Mensenrechtencomité en het Comité tegen Foltering is niet erg ex-
pliciet en eenduidig over de waardering van bewijs (met als uitzondering het Comité 
tegen Foltering over de waardering van medisch-juridische rapporten). De jurispru-
dentie van het EHRM is veel explicieter en duidelijker en biedt nationale asielrechters 
concrete richtlijnen voor de waardering en weging van bewijs. De authenticiteit van 
de overgelegde documenten, de precisie, de begrijpelijkheid en de consistentie van de 
informatie in het bewijsmateriaal en de onafhankelijkheid, betrouwbaarheid, objectivi-
teit en het gezag van de bron of de auteur van het bewijs bepalen hoeveel bewijs-
kracht of gewicht er wordt toegekend.  
In de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 werd een aantal categorieën bewijsmateriaal in meer 
detail besproken en werd duidelijk gemaakt dat specifieke en begrijpelijke getuigen-
verklaringen van familieleden een belangrijke rol spelen in de jurisprudentie van het 
EHRM en de beide Comités. Het EHRM heeft duidelijk gemaakt dat verklaringen 
van familieleden in beginsel gesteund moeten worden door ander, meer objectief be-
wijsmateriaal.  
Medisch-juridische rapporten vormen een andere belangrijke categorie bewijsma-
teriaal, met name in de jurisprudentie van het Comité tegen Foltering. Het EHRM 
lijkt in het algemeen niet bereid om medisch bewijs, waarin staat dat sprake is van 
PTSS of een andere psychische stoornis, te accepteren als een reden voor inconsis-
tenties en het laat inbrengen van verklaringen over marteling in het verleden. Wel 
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heeft het EHRM, evenals het Mensenrechtencomité en het Comité tegen Foltering, 
medische rapporten in een aanzienlijk aantal zaken geaccepteerd als bewijs van mar-
teling in het verleden. Het Comité tegen Foltering vereist dat medisch-juridische rap-
porten opgesteld zijn door medisch specialisten en dat daarin geconcludeerd wordt 
dat een causaal verband bestaat tussen de fysieke of mentale verwondingen van het 
individu en de gestelde marteling. In veel – vooral wat oudere – zaken heeft het Co-
mité tegen Foltering medisch-juridische rapporten geaccepteerd als onderbouwing 
voor marteling in het verleden en daarnaast ook als verklaring voor inconsistenties, 
hiaten, vaagheden en ongerijmde wendingen in het vluchtverhaal, alsmede voor het 
laat inbrengen van cruciale verklaringen en bewijsstukken. Het lijkt erop dat in de 
meer recente jurisprudentie van het Comité tegen Foltering medisch bewijs is gede-
gradeerd van beslissend naar ondersteunend. Niettemin blijft medisch bewijs belang-
rijk en het het Comité tegen Foltering heeft in dit verband haar onvrede geuit over 
het feit dat medische rapporten in Nederlandse nationale gerechtelijke procedures in 
beginsel niet meegenomen worden als bewijs.  
In de jurisprudentie van het Mensenrechtencomité en het Comité tegen Foltering 
wordt in het algemeen veel bewijskracht toegekend aan rapporten die het resultaat 
bevatten van onderzoek uitgevoerd door ambassades of missies in herkomstlanden. 
Rapporten over de situatie in het land van herkomst spelen logischerwijs een 
belangrijke rol in de jurisprudentie van alle internationale toezichthouders. Het 
EHRM heeft een aantal concrete richtlijnen ontwikkeld voor het evalueren van lan-
denrapportages. Rapporten van organisaties, organen en agentschappen die onderdeel 
uitmaken van de VN, almede rapporten van staten, staan hoog aangeschreven. De 
reden hiervoor is dat VN-organen, organisaties en agentschappen vaak directe toe-
gang hebben tot de autoriteiten van het land van herkomst, alsmede mogelijkheden 
om ter plaatse inspecties en analyses uit te voeren. Staten hebben de mogelijkheid om 
informatie te verzamelen via diplomatieke posten. De precieze bewijskracht die wordt 
toegekend aan informatie over het land van herkomst wordt niet alleen bepaald door 
de bron, maar uiteraard ook door de specifieke inhoud ervan. 
Mogelijkheden voor het presenteren van bewijs 
Alle internationale toezichthouders zien een proces op tegenspraak en gelijke wapens 
voor partijen zowel op internationaal niveau als op nationaal niveau als cruciale waar-
borg voor een eerlijk proces. De houding van het Mensenrechtencomité en het Co-
mité tegen Foltering lijkt op dit punt strikter te zijn dan die van de andere internatio-
nale toezichthouders, aangezien de beide Comités hebben geëist dat waar het gaat om 
de uitzetting van asielzoekers beide partijen gelijke toegang moeten hebben tot alle 
documenten uit het dossier, inclusief documenten die een aantijging onderbouwen 
dat het betreffende individu een gevaar vormt voor de nationale veiligheid. Het ver-
bod van het Mensenrechtencomité en het Comité tegen Foltering op het gebruik van 
geheim bewijsmateriaal in nationale gerechtelijke uitzettingsprocedures is nog niet 
herhaald in andere zaken, dus we kunnen nog niet spreken van vaste jurisprudentie. 
Hier tegenover staat het EHRM dat in meerdere zaken geoordeeld heeft dat het 
gebruik van geheim bewijsmateriaal gerechtvaardigd kan zijn als dit strikt noodzake-
lijk is ter bescherming van de fundamentele rechten van een ander of ter bescherming 
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van een belangrijk algemeen belang zoals de nationale veiligheid. De UNHCR neemt 
een vergelijkbaar standpunt in door te stellen dat het niet openbaren van bewijs toe-
gestaan is als de openbaring van bronnen een ernstig gevaar zou opleveren voor de 
nationale veiligheid of de veiligheid van organisaties of personen die de informatie 
leveren. Het EHRM vereist dat de nationale rechter compenserende maatregelen treft 
als hij of zij accepteert dat bepaald bewijs niet wordt geopenbaard aan de andere 
partij. De principes voor het gebruik van geheim bewijs ontwikkeld door het HvJEU 
lijken in sterke mate op de principes ontwikkeld door het EHRM. 
Toepassing van (rechterlijke) onderzoeksbevoegdheden 
Het Mensenrechtencomité en het Comité tegen Foltering benadrukken vaak hun sub-
sidiaire rol in het vaststellen van de feiten van de zaak. Beide Comités, in het bijzon-
der het Mensenrechtencomité, hebben en gebruiken slechts enkele onderzoeksbe-
voegdheden. Het EHRM, een volwaardig internationaal gerechtshof, heeft een groot 
aantal onderzoeksbevoegdheden tot zijn beschikking. In een aanzienlijk aantal zaken 
heeft het EHRM zeer actief bijgedragen aan het verzamelen en verifiëren van feiten 
en omstandigheden. Het EHRM kan in elke fase van de procedure elke onderzoeks-
maatregel instellen die het nodig acht ter verduidelijking van de feiten. Het EHRM 
gaat er met name toe over uit eigen beweging materiaal te verkrijgen over de omstan-
digheden in het land van herkomst als de klager of een derde partij gegronde redenen 
aanvoert om te twijfelen aan de juistheid van de informatie waar de staat zich op 
beroept. 
Wat betreft de vereiste intensiteit van het onderzoek door nationale rechters zijn 
de standpunten van alle in dit onderzoek betrokken internationale toezichthouders in 
grote mate gelijk aan elkaar: ze vereisen een volledig nationaal rechterlijk onderzoek 
naar de inhoud van het verzoek (zie bijvoorbeeld HvJEU, Samba Diouf 2011; Comité 
tegen Foltering, Nirnal Singh t. Canada 2011). Een dergelijk rechterlijk onderzoek be-
tekent dat de rechter volledig bevoegd is om te beslissen over feitelijke kwesties en 
rechtsvragen (de Zumtobel-doctrine van het EHRM). Verwezen werd in dit verband 
naar de interpretatie van de term ‘onpartijdigheid’ door het Comité tegen Foltering 
onder de artikelen 12 en 13 AFV. Het vereiste van onpartijdigheid brengt met zich 
mee dat de nationale rechter zo nauwkeurig mogelijk probeert te reconstrueren wat er 
is gebeurd en hiertoe zijn of haar onderzoeksbevoegdheden inzet. 
Termijnen voor het inbrengen van verklaringen en bewijs 
Het HvJEU, het EHRM, de UNHCR en het Mensenrechtencomité nemen vergelijk-
bare posities in. De kern hiervan is dat nationale procedureregels redelijk moeten zijn, 
of op een redelijke en flexibele wijze toegepast moeten worden als de omstandighe-
den van de zaak hiertoe nopen. Uit het EU asielrecht en de jurisprudentie van het 
EHRM, het standpunt van de UNHCR en de jurisprudentie van het Comité tegen 
Foltering blijkt dat alle relevante verklaringen in beginsel zo snel mogelijk in de na-
tionale procedure moeten worden ingebracht en dat verlate verklaringen afbreuk kun-
nen doen aan de geloofwaardigheid van de verklaringen van de asielzoeker. De bena-
dering ten aanzien van ondersteunend bewijs is in het algemeen flexibeler. In de ju-
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risprudentie van het EHRM, het Mensenrechtencomité en het Comité tegen Folte-
ring is het moment waarop bewijs in de nationale gerechtelijke procedure werd inge-
bracht door partijen als op zichzelf staande factor niet van groot belang. 
De UNHCR heeft benadrukt dat een zaak niet mag worden afgewezen op de 
enkele grond dat de relevante verklaringen of documenten niet eerder zijn ingebracht. 
Ook het Comité tegen Foltering vond het in een aanzienlijk aantal zaken niet proble-
matisch dat verklaringen en bewijs pas op een laat moment in de nationale procedure 
werden ingebracht. In die zaken accepteerde het Comité tegen Foltering vrij gemak-
kelijk dat gegronde redenen waren aangevoerd voor het op een laat moment in-
brengen van verklaringen en bewijs. De mildere aanpak van de UNHCR en het Co-
mité tegen Foltering heeft zijn weerslag gevonden in artikel 8 lid 1 EU Procedure-
richtlijn, dat van lidstaten vergt dat asielaanvragen niet verworpen worden of uitge-
sloten van onderzoek enkel vanwege het feit dat deze niet zo snel mogelijk zijn inge-
diend. 
Moment van risicobeoordeling 
De standpunten van alle in deze studie onderzochte internationale toezichthouders 
hieromtrent zijn grotendeels identiek. Allemaal vergen ze in beginsel een ex nunc be-
oordeling: de beoordeling van het risico vindt plaats op basis van alle beschikbare 
informatie op het moment dat de risicotaxatie wordt gemaakt. In zaken waarin uit-
zetting uit de betrokken staat al heeft plaatsgevonden, blijft het moment voor de be-
oordeling volgens het EHRM het moment van die uitzetting, maar het EHRM kan 
wel informatie in aanmerking nemen die pas na de uitzetting aan het licht is gekomen 
en doet dit ook geregeld, waardoor het in feite alsnog neerkomt op een ex nunc beoor-
deling. Het Mensenrechtencomité heeft vooralsnog geen richtlijnen ontwikkeld voor 
situaties waarin de uitzetting al heeft plaatsgevonden en de jurisprudentie van het 
Comité tegen Foltering is niet geheel consistent. Echter, in T.P.S. t. Canada (2000) 
nam het Comité tegen Foltering expliciet en zonder voorbehoud nieuwe feiten en 
omstandigheden mee in de afweging. De benadering lijkt daarmee op die van het 
EHRM. 
Integratie van de onderzoeksresultaten: nationale rechtbanken en het 
onafhankelijke grondige onderzoek 
Waar de hoofdstukken 2 tot en met 6 erop gericht waren te ontdekken welke ver-
plichtingen volgen uit internationaal en EU asielrecht met betrekking tot de intensiteit 
van rechterlijk onderzoek en bewijs, spitste hoofdstuk 7 zich toe op de onderlinge 
verhouding van de verdragen en EU asielrecht. Geconcludeerd werd dat het overdra-
gen van de bevoegdheid om bindende regels omtrent asiel op te stellen van de lidsta-
ten aan de EU geen effect heeft gehad op de verplichtingen voortvloeiend uit het 
Vluchtelingenverdrag, het IVBPR, het AFV en het EVRM. Nationale asielrechters in 
EU lidstaten zijn in feite ‘dubbel gebonden’ door de verplichtingen die volgen uit de 
in deze studie onderzochte verdragen. Zoals hoofdstuk 6 heeft laten zien, zijn natio-
nale rechters namelijk gebonden aan de verdragen op zich enerzijds, en aan EU recht 
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dat dezelfde verdragsverplichtingen incorporeert anderzijds, zoals hoofdstuk 6 liet 
zien. 
In hoofdstuk 7 is vervolgens geprobeerd om de verplichtingen en standaarden 
die volgen uit internationaal en EU asielrecht te integreren tot een samenhangend 
geheel. Het doel van deze exercitie was om tot een gebruiksklaar en coherent stelsel 
van standaarden voor bewijs en rechterlijk onderzoek te komen dat eenvoudig zou 
kunnen worden gebruikt door nationale asielrechters. Uitgangspunt bij deze integra-
tiepoging was dat in veel asielzaken die voor de nationale rechter komen zowel vluch-
telingrechtelijke bescherming (de artikelen 1 en 33 Vluchtelingenverdrag, artikel 18 
EU Handvest) als subsidiaire bescherming (de artikelen 7 IVBPR, 3 AFV, 3 EVRM 
en artikelen 4 en 19 EU Handvest) worden ingeroepen. Daardoor zijn alle verdragen 
en instrumenten behandeld in dit onderzoek relevant en van toepassing op zulke za-
ken. De integratiepoging resulteerde in een gemene deler: geconcludeerd werd dat in-
ternationaal en EU asielrecht een ‘onafhankelijk en grondig nationaal rechterlijk on-
derzoek’ vereisen. Dit vereiste van een onafhankelijk en grondig nationaal rechterlijk 
onderzoek werd vervolgens verder uitgewerkt met behulp van de volgende bronnen: 
-  de jurisprudentie van het Mensenrechtencomité, het Comité tegen Foltering en 
het EHRM onder de bepalingen inzake doeltreffende rechtsmiddelen en de pro-
cedurele tak van de refoulement-verboden; 
-  de standpunten van de UNHCR over nationaal rechterlijk onderzoek en bewijs; 
-  de jurisprudentie van het HvJEU over effectieve rechtsbescherming; 
-  de beoordeling zoals uitgevoerd door het Mensenrechtencomité, het Comité 
tegen Foltering en het EHRM in zaken over uitzetting van asielzoekers; deze 
beoordeling werd in het tweede deel van de hoofdstukken 3, 4 en 5 onderzocht. 
 
Er is een hiërarchie in deze bronnen aangebracht: geconcludeerd werd dat nationale 
asielrechters allereerst de jurisprudentie van het HvJEU en het EHRM dienen te 
raadplegen, vervolgens de standpunten van de UNHCR en tenslotte de jurisprudentie 
van het Mensenrechtencomité en het Comité tegen Foltering als subsidiaire interpre-
tatiebronnen. Ook werd geconcludeerd dat kruisverwijzingen niet problematisch zijn: 
nationale asielrechters binnen de EU kunnen verwijzen naar de verschillende hier-
boven genoemde interpretatiebronnen aangezien alle lidstaten partij zijn bij het 
Vluchtelingenverdrag, het IVBPR, het AFV en het EVRM. Ook werd de vraag be-
handeld wat te doen in geval van uiteenlopende of zelfs conflicterende standaarden. 
Onder verwijzing naar de voorrangsregels in de verschillende verdragen en het EU 
recht is betoogd dat wanneer nationale asielrechters geconfronteerd worden met uit-
eenlopende of conflicterende standaarden, zij de vastgestelde hiërarchie moeten laten 
varen en moeten kiezen voor die standaard die de aanvrager de meeste bescherming 
biedt. Om deze aanpak te verdedigen werd ook verwezen naar artikel 52 lid 3 EU 
Handvest, dat toestaat dat EU recht verdergaande bescherming biedt dan die gebo-
den door het EVRM. 
Het vereiste van een onafhankelijk en grondig nationaal rechterlijk onderzoek 
werd uiteindelijk nader gedefinieerd aan de hand van de elf aspecten van bewijs en 
rechterlijk onderzoek zoals geïntroduceerd in hoofdstuk 1. Dit resulteerde in een set 
standaarden voor bewijs en rechterlijk onderzoek dat door nationale rechters gebruikt 
kan worden. 
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Herhaalde asielaanvragen, Dublinzaken en versnelde nationale procedures 
In hoofdstuk 8 werd onderzoek gedaan naar de standpunten van de internationale 
hoven en toezichthouders ten aanzien van drie bijzondere categorieën van zaken en 
procedures: herhaalde asielaanvragen (zaken waarin een verzoeker een tweede, derde 
of volgende asielaanvraag ingediend heeft na een negatieve beslissing op een eerste 
aanvraag), Dublinzaken (zaken waarin op een asielaanvraag is beslist op grond van 
EU verordening 2003/343/EC) en versnelde nationale procedures (procedures waar-
in kortere termijnen en soms ook andere speciale regels gehanteerd worden om asiel-
aanvragen en beroepen tegen afwijzingen sneller en efficiënter af te kunnen doen).  
Ten aanzien van herhaalde asielaanvragen werd geconcludeerd dat, bezien vanuit 
internationaal en EU asielrecht, een novumtoets op zichzelf niet problematisch is. 
Een tweede conclusie ten aanzien van herhaalde asielaanvragen was dat, gezien de 
standpunten van de internationale toezichthouders en hoven, nationale rechtbanken 
bewijs niet formeel of volledig mogen uitsluiten enkel omdat het op een eerder mo-
ment in de nationale procedure had moeten worden ingebracht. 
In zaken waarin asielzoekers op basis van de Dublinverordening worden overge-
dragen aan een andere EU lidstaat mogen de autoriteiten van de overdragende lid-
staat, inclusief de nationale rechtbanken, tot op zekere hoogte uitgaan van het inter-
statelijk vertrouwensbeginsel en op grond daarvan aannemen dat de autoriteiten van 
de andere lidstaat hun internationale verplichtingen zullen naleven. Tegelijkertijd heb-
ben zowel het EHRM als het HvJEU dit beginsel expliciet en stevig aan banden ge-
legd. Zodra (enige) informatie wijzend in de richting van het tegendeel beschikbaar is 
gekomen – omdat de verzoeker deze informatie heeft aangedragen, ofwel omdat de 
autoriteiten ermee bekend zijn of behoren te zijn – moeten de nationale autoriteiten 
van de overdragende lidstaat beoordelen of de asielprocedure van de overnemende of 
terugnemende lidstaat voldoende waarborgen biedt en of de leefomstandigheden al-
daar (g)een schending opleveren van artikel 3 EVRM. 
Wat betreft versnelde nationale procedures werd vastgesteld dat de standpunten 
van de internationale toezichthouders en hoven identiek zijn. Versnelde (gerechte-
lijke) asielprocedures zijn op zichzelf geoorloofd. Het is echter belangrijk dat natio-
nale rechtbanken bij het behandelen van zulke zaken de mogelijkheid behouden om 
de inhoud van het asielverzoek grondig te beoordelen. Versnelde procedures kunnen 
asielzoekers de mogelijkheid ontnemen hun verzoek om bescherming te onderbou-
wen. Als een nationale rechtbank tot het oordeel komt dat als gevolg van de toe-
passing van de versnelde procedure een grondige beoordeling van de inhoud niet 
langer kan plaatsvinden, of dat de asielzoeker geen kans heeft gekregen zijn of haar 
verzoek te onderbouwen, dan dient de rechtbank de mogelijkheid te hebben om de 
zaak te verwijzen naar de gewone of uitgebreide(re) procedure die meer ruimte biedt 
voor verder rechterlijk onderzoek of voor een nader onderbouwing van het verzoek 
door de asielzoeker. 
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Epiloog 
In de epiloog ben ik teruggekomen op de belangrijkste onderzoeksresultaten en licht-
te ik hun relevantie toe, waarbij ik een aantal malen heb verwezen naar het contrast 
met de vaste nationale rechterlijke praktijk in Nederland.  
Ik heb daarnaast ook mijn teleurstelling geuit over het feit dat het Mensenrech-
tencomité, het Comité tegen Foltering en het EHRM tot nu toe geen uitgebreide en 
coherente doctrinaire standpunten hebben ontwikkeld over de intensiteit van het 
rechterlijk onderzoek waarmee zij zelf de feiten vaststellen in zaken over de uitzetting 
van asielzoekers. Daar komt bij dat de conclusies in de beslissingen van het Mensen-
rechtencomité en het Comité tegen Foltering vaak zeer kort zijn en geen duidelijke 
koppeling bevatten tussen feiten en conclusies. Deze beslissingen bevatten dikwijls 
geen duidelijke richtlijnen voor nationale rechters ten aanzien van een aantal bewijs-
vraagstukken, zoals de bewijslast, het vereiste van individualisering, het waarderen 
van bewijs (beide Comités) en het beoordelen van de geloofwaardigheid (met name 
het Mensenrechtencomité). Op grond van deze bevinding heb ik een pleidooi gericht 
aan het Mensenrechtencomité en het Comité tegen Foltering om te komen tot uitge-
breidere overwegingen over de genoemde bewijsvraagstukken en ook explicieter uit 
te leggen welke intensiteit van onderzoek zij zelf toepassen en op grond waarvan. 
Hierdoor zouden deze internationale toezichthouders betere gidsen voor nationale 
rechters worden. Nationale rechters zouden hierdoor beter toegerust zijn om hun 
verdragsverplichtingen na te leven. 
Ik heb tot slot geconcludeerd dat internationaal en EU asielrecht steun bieden 
voor mijn persoonlijke overtuiging dat een onafhankelijk en grondig nationaal rech-
terlijk onderzoek, waaronder grondige rechterlijke waarheidsvinding, van groot be-
lang is in nationale asielprocedures. Grondig rechterlijk onderzoek heeft niets te 
maken met het willen helpen van een van de partijen. Het heeft wel te maken met de 
onafhankelijkheid en onpartijdigheid van de rechterlijke macht. 
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RIGOROUS SCRUTINY VERSUS MARGINAL REVIEW 
 
STANDARDS ON JUDICIAL SCRUTINY AND EVIDENCE IN INTERNATIONAL AND EUROPEAN 
ASYLUM LAW 
 
Introduction 
 
Two judgments of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) formed the im-
mediate reason for embarking upon this research project. These were Said v. the Neth-
erlands (2005) and Salah Sheekh v. the Netherlands (2007). It appeared from these judg-
ments that the ECtHR was dissatisfied with the level of judicial scrutiny offered at 
national level in the Netherlands in cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers. 
This dissatisfaction troubled me as a national asylum judge. Together with a colleague 
from the Amsterdam Court where I worked, I analysed a number of well-known 
judgments of the ECtHR in expulsion cases concerning asylum seekers to find out in 
a more precise way how this international Court assessed the risk. I discovered sig-
nificant differences between the judicial practice applied at international level and our 
own national judicial practice. First, the intensity or thoroughness of the judicial scru-
tiny applied seemed to be different. It seemed that the ECtHR fully independently 
and on its own account determined the facts of the case and assessed the risk, where-
as national asylum courts in the Netherlands had to pay deference to the position of 
the administration concerning the credibility of the past facts as stated by the asylum 
seeker. Second, issues of evidence, such as the admission and evaluation of evidence, 
were approached and resolved in very different ways at international and national 
level. This small-scale investigation, conducted in 2006 and early 2007, made me 
anxious to find out in a more precise way what lessons on both aspects – intensity of 
judicial scrutiny and evidence – could and should be drawn from the ECHR. I also 
became anxious to find out whether other relevant international treaties and EU 
asylum law contained concrete instructions on evidentiary issues and on the level of 
judicial scrutiny to be offered at national level. My wish to do research into these 
questions was strongly fed by the fact that in the national debate in the Netherlands 
at the time, different positions were voiced on the question of whether differences 
between the scrutiny offered by national judges and the scrutiny applied at the inter-
national level were acceptable or not, while the arguments underpinning these posi-
tions were not fully convincing (to me at least). This anxiety became stronger when I 
shared the results of my small-scale investigation with some of my colleagues, first in-
stance court judges, in the International Association of Refugee Law Judges (IARLJ) 
and found out that it was not only in the Netherlands that national courts encoun-
tered the issues described above, but that similar issues with regard to the intensity of 
judicial scrutiny and evidence also existed in a number of other EU countries (for 
example, Belgium and Poland). That is how this research project was born.  
The main objective of this study is to explore what international and EU asylum 
law require from the national asylum judge as to: 1) the required intensity of the judi-
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cial scrutiny to be applied; and 2) evidentiary issues, such as the standard and burden 
of proof, the admission and evaluation of evidence and time limits for submitting 
evidence. The research questions are as follows: 
- Which provisions of international and EU asylum law regulate national judicial 
asylum proceedings?  
- do the provisions regulating national judicial asylum proceedings contain con-
crete norms about the required intensity of judicial scrutiny to be offered at na-
tional level? 
- do these provisions contain concrete norms on evidentiary issues, such as the 
standard and burden of proof, the admission and evaluation of evidence and time 
limits for submitting evidence? 
- What standards and principles do the international courts and treaty monitoring 
bodies apply concerning their own judicial scrutiny, and how do they approach 
evidentiary issues?  
- are the standards and principles as applied by the international courts and treaty 
monitoring bodies normative or binding on national asylum courts? 
- How do the found norms (inter)relate, and what should be done in cases of 
divergence or conflict? 
 
In this study eleven aspects (or issues) of evidence and judicial scrutiny are used as a 
research tool to discover the standards applied by the international courts and treaty 
monitoring bodies. These are: 
- Standard of proof: what is the standard or criterion used to measure whether 
there is a risk of refoulement?  
- Burden of proof: who has to prove that the standard has been met?  
- Relevant facts and circumstances: what kinds of facts and circumstances are 
necessary to conclude that a risk exists?  
- Required degree of individual risk: to what degree must an applicant be singled 
out?  
- Credibility assessment: does the international court or supervisor independently 
and on its own account assess credibility? How does the international court or 
supervisor assess the credibility of the claimant’s statements?  
- Admission of evidence, sources of evidence, minimum quantity and quality of 
evidence: what means and sources of evidence can be brought in to substantiate a 
claim or to refute a claim? How much evidence is required to corroborate the 
applicant’s statements? What quality of evidence is required? 
- Appreciation and weighing of evidence: how are different types of evidence 
weighed and appreciated? Is there a certain hierarchy in the appreciation of evi-
dence, in the sense that certain sources are given more value than others? 
- Opportunities for presenting evidence: do both parties have the same opportuni-
ties and chances to present evidence and to react to the evidence presented to the 
other party?  
- Judicial application of investigative powers: does the international court or super-
visor apply investigative powers (of its own motion or otherwise)? If so, in which 
situations does this happen?  
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- Time limits for the presentation of statements and evidence: at what moment in 
the proceedings must the claimant submit the relevant statements and corrobo-
rating evidence?  
- Point in time for the risk assessment: at what point in time does the international 
court or supervisor assess the risk?  
 
This study covers the Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the Protocol 
relating to the Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention or RC, 1951, and the Ref-
ugee Protocol or RP, 1967), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
(ICCPR, 1966), the Convention against Torture (CAT, 1984), the European Conven-
tion for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR, 1950), 
European Union primary legislation on asylum and a number of secondary EU law 
instruments such as the EU Qualification Directive and the EU Procedures Directive. 
UNHCR documentation and literature formed the main source of interpretation 
of the provisions contained in the RC. The case law of the HRC, the ComAT, the 
ECtHR and the CJEU, as well as literature, formed the main source for respectively 
Chapters 3 (ICCPR), 4 (CAT), 5 (ECHR) and 6 (EU asylum law). After the intro-
duction in Chapter 1, Chapter 2 covers the RC, followed by the ICCPR in Chapter 3 
and the CAT in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 is dedicated to the ECHR. Chapter 6 deals with 
EU asylum law. Chapter 7 discusses the consequences of the found norms and stan-
dards for national asylum courts. It attempts to integrate the different international 
and EU law standards on national judicial scrutiny and on evidence into a coherent 
whole. It also raises and tries to answer the question of whether the standards on 
evidence and judicial scrutiny as applied by the international supervisors and courts 
are binding on national asylum courts, whether national asylum courts can choose, 
from among the international supervisors, a ‘best role model’, and what to do in cases 
of conflicting or diverging standards. Chapter 8 pays separate attention to the posi-
tions of the international supervisors with regard to three special types of cases and 
the corresponding national asylum court proceedings: Dublin cases, repeat cases and 
fast-track national court proceedings.In the Epilogue at the end of this book, the 
highlights of this study are revisited and some concluding remarks are made. 
Provisions in international and EU asylum law governing national asylum 
court proceedings 
The RC 
The RC contains a number of provisions relevant to national asylum court proceed-
ings. These are Article 16 on access to courts, Article 32 on expulsion on grounds of 
national security and public order and the procedure to be followed in cases of ex-
pulsion, and Article 35 on co-operation of national authorities with the UNHCR. In 
Chapter 2 the content of these provisions was explored in relation to the research 
questions. Article 16 RC requires that refugees have free access to national courts. 
Article 32 requires that the decision to expel a refugee is taken in accordance with due 
process of law. In literature, different positions are taken on the question of whether 
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these two provisions apply to contemporary judicial proceedings concerning the de-
termination of refugee status and refoulement. In this study, a dynamic interpretation of 
these provisions was adopted, which led to the conclusion that both provisions do 
apply to such judicial proceedings. Article 16 RC is primarily a non-discrimination 
provision. It entails that refugees should not be required to meet extra, or more strin-
gent, admissibility conditions which do not apply to nationals in similar court pro-
ceedings. Articles 16 and 32 RC may be interpreted with the aid of the UNHCR’s po-
sition on issues of evidence and on judicial scrutiny in national judicial asylum pro-
ceedings. The UNHCR has developed concrete standards and principles with regard 
to ten of the eleven aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny. They are listed below 
under the heading ‘Positions of the international courts and treaty monitoring bodies 
on the eleven aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny’. 
Article 35 RC, in conjunction with Article 21, first paragraph, sub c, of the EU 
Procedures Directive, entails that the UNHCR is entitled to make submissions to na-
tional courts in individual asylum appeal cases. The UNHCR’s submissions may enter 
the national court proceedings via different avenues: on its initiative, on the initiative 
of a party to the case or by invitation of the national court. On the basis of Articles 
16 and 35 RC, seen in conjunction, national courts may invite the UNHCR to parti-
cipate in national court proceedings as an expert or witness who can advise the court 
on a particular aspect of a case or submit its opinion on the question of whether or 
not the claimant is a refugee. 
The ICCPR 
The ICCPR’s provisions on national proceedings impose a number of obligations on 
national asylum courts. Under Articles 2, third paragraph, 7, and 13 ICCPR national 
authorities, including national courts, are required to consider the claim thoroughly 
and fairly. However, the HRC is generally reluctant to put national asylum court pro-
ceedings to a rigorous test of compliance with this requirement. It often fails to re-
spond in a meaningful way to the specific procedural problems raised by authors of 
individual communications. This passive position is linked to the fact that the HRC 
regards the determination and evaluation of facts and evidence as matters for the 
national courts. The HRC itself will normally not engage in that. As a consequence of 
this, the HRC will not easily find national judicial remedies ineffective for reasons 
having to do with the determination of the facts. The HRC’s hands-off approach may 
also be explained by its limited investigative possibilities and limited meeting time. 
The case of Pillai and Joachimpillai v. Canada (2011) may mark a turning point towards 
firmer monitoring of procedural ICCPR compliance. In that case the HRC concluded 
that more attention should have been paid to the authors’ allegations of past torture, 
and that the failure of the national authorities to do so made the national proceedings 
defective. However, more jurisprudence must be awaited before firmly drawing the 
conclusion that the HRC has begun to monitor procedural ICCPR compliance in a 
stricter way. The case of Mansour Ahani v. Canada (2004) has shown that the HRC is 
incidentally prepared to give up its hands-off approach if national authorities breach 
the key principles of equality of arms and adversarial proceedings. The HRC found 
the national expulsion proceedings in Ahani to be defective under Article 13 ICCPR 
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as the Minister did not provide Ahani with all the materials – including secret infor-
mation that Ahani was a danger to Canada’s national security – on which the expul-
sion decision was based and the national courts did not correct this unfairness in the 
procedure. National procedural rules will normally not render national proceedings 
incompliant with the requirement of a thorough and fair examination of the claim, 
provided that such rules are reasonable and provided that they are not applied in an 
automatic and mechanical way. National courts must also be careful in automatically 
relying on steady jurisprudential lines. 
Within the framework of Article 14 ICCPR, the HRC has ruled that the proce-
dural practice applied by national courts to determine the facts and to admit, exclude, 
weigh and evaluate evidence is a matter for those courts to determine. Unlike the 
ECtHR, the HRC has (so far) not developed a doctrine regarding the required inten-
sity of national judicial scrutiny in administrative law cases. In a number of cases not 
concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, the HRC concluded that there had been 
a breach by national courts of the principles of equality of arms and adversarial pro-
ceedings. In those cases, the HRC relinquished its deference to national procedural 
autonomy and overtly criticised the national court proceedings for being unfair. It is 
obvious from these cases that the HRC regards equality of arms and adversarial pro-
ceedings as the very essence of fair proceedings. The principles developed by the 
HRC within the framework of Article 14 ICCPR strongly mirror those developed 
within the context of Articles 2, third paragraph, 7 and 13 ICCPR. 
The CAT 
Articles 3 and 22, fifth paragraph, second part, CAT require an opportunity for 
effective, independent and impartial review of the decision on expulsion, prior to the 
expulsion itself. Just like the HRC, the ComAT has generally been reluctant to submit 
national remedies, including court proceedings, to a rigorous procedural CAT com-
pliance test. However, in more recent jurisprudence the ComAT has made clear that 
in order to qualify as an effective, independent and impartial national remedy, as re-
quired by Article 3 CAT, national judicial remedies must make it possible to look at 
the substance, the merits, of the case, and must guarantee equality of arms and 
adversarial proceedings. In the case of Sogi v. Canada (2007), the ComAT required that 
all the documents in the file be disclosed to the claimant, including those under-
pinning the allegation that Sogi constituted a threat to Canada’s national security. In 
other words, in Sogi the ComAT treated adversariality and equality of arms as an 
absolute right and did not tolerate that national security interests justified non-
disclosure of part of the evidentiary materials. 
In cases where there are allegations or suspicions of internal torture, the re-
quirement of impartiality enshrined in Articles 12 and 13 CAT obliges the national 
judge to reconstruct as meticulously as possible what actually happened and to use his 
or her investigative powers to that end. Impartiality under Article 3 CAT may be in-
terpreted as meaning the same thing as impartiality under Articles 12 and 13 CAT. 
That would mean that national asylum courts must act impartially and must, there-
fore, make their own independent, thorough search for the truth and apply investiga-
tive powers to that end. Article 15 CAT prohibits the use of statements made as a re-
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sult of torture as evidence in any proceedings, except in criminal proceedings against 
a person accused of torture as evidence of the very fact that this statement was made. 
The Committee has so far not dealt with Article 15 in the context of asylum. 
The ECHR 
In cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, a national judicial remedy is 
compliant with Articles 3, 13 and 35, first paragraph, if it is able to comprise both 
substantive and procedural points and is able to quash the administrative decision 
upholding refusal of a protection claim. The procedural limb of Article 3, Article 13, 
and Article 35, first paragraph, ECHR require the national authorities, including the 
national courts, to conduct an adequate examination claim for protection. In assess-
ing whether national proceedings are adequate, the ECtHR takes into consideration 
whether an applicant was heard (several times), whether he or she was assisted by ap-
pointed counsel, whether the national authorities had the benefit of seeing, hearing 
and questioning the applicant in person, and of assessing directly the information and 
documents submitted by him or her, before deciding the case. The ECtHR also takes 
into account whether the assessment of the national authorities was sufficiently sup-
ported by both national materials as well as materials originating from other reliable 
and objective sources. The cases of R.C. v. Sweden (2010) and Singh and Others v. Bel-
gium (2012) have clearly illustrated that the national authorities, including the review-
ing courts, must carefully and seriously examine evidence submitted by the applicant. 
When and if such evidence leaves questions unresolved, the national authorities, in-
cluding the reviewing courts (or reviewing authorities) must apply investigative 
powers in order to further clarify facts. This is particularly necessary when it is rather 
easy to make further inquiries, as was the case in Singh and Others v. Belgium, where the 
national authorities could easily have made inquiries with the UNHCR. Decisive is 
the thoroughness of the investigations undertaken at national level, including the 
investigations of the involved national court(s). 
Constant national jurisprudential lines may not normally bar an individual, case-
specific and factual examination on the merits. It follows from Bahaddar v. the Nether-
lands (1998) and Jabari v. Turkey (2000) that time limits and other procedural rules laid 
down in national law – although they must normally be adhered to – should not be so 
short, or applied so mechanically or inflexibly, as to deny an applicant for asylum a 
realistic opportunity of proving his or her claim.  
Finally, independent and rigorous scrutiny also means that the correct evidentiary 
standards and principles are to be applied by the national court in assessing the Ar-
ticle 3-risk. As was shown above, it follows from M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece (2011) 
that the national court is not allowed to apply, for example, a stricter standard of 
proof than the one applied by the ECtHR. For national courts to comply with the 
requirement of independent and rigorous scrutiny it is, therefore, essential to know 
exactly what these evidentiary standards are. Part 2 of this chapter explores the evi-
dentiary standards applied by the ECtHR. 
It has been constant case law of the ECtHR that Article 6, first paragraph, ECHR 
does not apply to expulsion. Article 6 ECHR is, nevertheless, relevant for national 
asylum court proceedings for two reasons. First, since its judgment in Kudla v. Poland 
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(2000), the ECtHR has held that the requirements of Article 13 ECHR should be 
considered as ‘reinforcing’ those of Article 6, first paragraph, ECHR, so that the re-
quirements developed under Article 6, first paragraph, ECHR in fact also form part 
of Article 13 ECHR. Second, the case law of the ECtHR under Article 6, first para-
graph, defines to a large extent the content of Article 47, second paragraph, of the 
EU Charter, containing the right to a fair hearing. Article 47, second paragraph, of 
the EU Charter will normally apply in asylum cases. 
Article 6, first paragraph, ECHR requires that administrative decisions can gen-
erally be challenged before a tribunal having full jurisdiction on points of law and 
points of fact. Full jurisdiction includes the power to make an independent determi-
nation of the disputed facts and of the credibility of a claimant, and the power to 
critically question advisory information used by the administrative decision maker or 
the other party. Article 6, first paragraph, ECHR also places national courts under a 
duty to conduct a proper examination of the submissions, arguments and evidence 
adduced by the parties. If no proper examination was conducted by the national 
court, either because it did not properly examine party evidence or because it did not 
use its investigative powers in order to determine disputed facts independently, this 
may lead the ECtHR to conclude that the national proceedings were unfair and in 
violation of Article 6, first paragraph, ECHR. Limited instead of full jurisdiction of 
national courts is exceptionally permitted under Article 6, first paragraph, ECHR. 
First, the particular subject-matter of the proceedings is of importance. In a number 
of cases where the subject-matter came within the classical exercise of administrative 
discretion, such as land planning, limited judicial scrutiny at national level was ac-
cepted by the ECtHR. One may also think of cases in which complex technical as-
sessments are made and cases where important diplomatic issues are at stake. In 
those cases where the ECtHR found limited national court jurisdiction acceptable, 
other conditions were met as well: the national proceedings centered around points 
of law and not around factual issues, the preceding administrative procedure(s) was 
governed by many Article 6-safeguards and the national judicial scrutiny review was, 
although limited, nevertheless meaningful in the sense that it entailed real scrutiny of 
the procedural points raised by the applicant. I have argued that it would seem logical 
to place Article 3-cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers in the category of 
cases which require full national judicial scrutiny on points of fact and points of law, 
for the following reasons. First, as opposed to, for example, land planning cases, in 
asylum cases the life and safety of the individual are at stake. Article 3 ECHR is a fun-
damental, absolute and non-derogable right. Second, most asylum cases will not be of 
a highly technical nature, and in only a very limited number of cases will important 
diplomatic issues be at stake. Third, the requirements of Article 13 ECHR reinforce 
those of Article 6 ECHR. The requirement flowing from Article 13 ECHR that in ex-
pulsion cases an individual, case-specific, factual examination on the merits of the 
claim has to take place, can be seen as reinforcing the requirement for full jurisdiction 
on points of fact and points of law following from the Zumtobel doctrine under Ar-
ticle 6 ECHR. 
In addition to this, Article 6, first paragraph, ECHR requires that the parties are 
treated equally with regard to the admission, exclusion and evaluation of evidence. 
The requirements of adversariality and equality of arms are not absolute, though. 
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Non-disclosure of evidentiary materials may be justified if this is strictly necessary to 
preserve the fundamental rights of another individual or to safeguard an important 
public interest, such as the protection of national security. If a national court allows 
that certain evidence is not disclosed to a party, it must follow special proceedings to 
counterbalance these difficulties. This means, at least, that the national court itself 
examines the secret evidence, and that, if possible, additional counterbalancing meas-
ures are taken. 
EU asylum law 
Since the Treaty of Lisbon (1 December 2009) the EU has had its own legally binding 
bill of human rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU, with the status of 
primary binding EU law. Asylum cases will almost always be within the scope of 
Union law, so the Charter will normally apply to them. By virtue of Article 18 of the 
EU Charter, national asylum courts must pay due respect to the procedural provi-
sions of the RC and the positions taken by the UNHCR, the RC’s supervisor, dis-
cussed in Chapter 2. It may be argued that it is no longer possible to set the positions 
taken by UNHCR aside as non-binding as that would amount to non-compliance 
with Article 18 of the Charter which is binding primary Union law. The standards on 
procedures, on evidence and on judicial scrutiny flowing from the ECHR – discussed 
in Chapter 5 – have been incorporated into EU law via Articles 19, 47 and 52, third 
paragraph, of the EU Charter. This incorporation into EU law entails that these 
standards transform from intergovernmental international law into supranational EU 
law which takes precedence over all national law. By virtue of the Charter’s Preamble, 
Article 78 TFEU and Article 53 of the EU Charter, the standards on procedures, on 
evidence and on judicial scrutiny flowing from the ICCPR and CAT – discussed in 
Chapters 3 and 4 – form important additional sources of interpretation of Articles 19, 
second paragraph, and 47 of the Charter. 
Article 47 of the EU Charter is – as well as being the mirror of Articles 6 and 13 
ECHR – also the codification of the EU law principle of effective judicial protection. 
Within the framework of the principle of effective judicial protection, five different 
standards of intensity of judicial scrutiny for different categories of cases have been 
developed, varying from a very light judicial touch with no factual review (cases about 
staff matters) to an intense, full and ex nunc judicial scrutiny on facts, law and propor-
tionality (cases concerning restrictions of fundamental freedoms of EU citizens, their 
third-country national family members and Turkish workers and their family mem-
bers who enjoy the rights of Decision 1/80 or rights flowing from the Association 
Agreement). As yet we do not know which of these standards will be applied by the 
CJEU in cases concerning asylum. It is my estimation that the CJEU will apply the 
most intense standard of judicial scrutiny. First, due to the strong parallel between 
asylum cases and cases concerning restrictions of fundamental freedoms of EU citi-
zens. Both categories of cases concern fundamental freedoms or rights. Second, the 
most intense standard comes very close to the type of judicial scrutiny performed by 
the ECtHR under Article 3 ECHR in a significant number of asylum cases, and also 
to the full jurisdiction requirement and the rigorous scrutiny requirement flowing 
from, respectively, Articles 6 and 13 ECHR. The recent judgment in the case of 
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Samba Diouf (2011), in which the CJEU ruled that the final decision on an asylum 
claim must be the subject of a thorough review on the merits by the national court, 
shows that this expectation is not entirely imaginary. The provisions regarding judicial 
review in secondary EU asylum law must be interpreted in accordance with the high-
er ranking Article 47 of the Charter and the higher ranking general principle of effec-
tive judicial protection. The attempts to keep national courts away from asylum re-
fusals or to water down the intensity of judicial scrutiny over such decisions, which 
are reflected in the texts of these provisions, were therefore made in vain. 
Secondary EU asylum law does not provide an exhaustive regulation for all pos-
sible issues of evidence. It does, however, contain specific provisions regarding a 
number of the eleven aspects of evidence, such as the standard and burden of proof. 
In Chapter 6, these provisions were interpreted with the aid of the jurisprudence of 
the CJEU in both asylum cases and other areas, and with the aid of the standards 
developed by the UNHCR, the HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR, as Article 78 
TFEU stipulates that secondary EU asylum legislation must be in accordance with 
the RC as well as the other relevant treaties. 
It was concluded in Chapter 6 that EU procedural asylum law offers added value 
in three ways. First, it causes a transformation in legal status of existing standards on 
evidence and judicial scrutiny contained in or flowing from international asylum law. 
These existing standards transform from non-binding principles into more important 
rules which must be respected (the standards developed by the UNHRC via Article 
18 of the Charter), from intergovernmental international law into binding primary 
supranational EU law (the standards developed by the ECtHR via Articles 19 and 47 
of the Charter) and from intergovernmental international law into important sources 
of inspiration for binding EU law (the standards and principles developed by the 
HRC and the ComAT via Articles 19 and 47 of the Charter).Second, the standards 
developed by the ECtHR under Article 6 ECHR are now applicable to asylum cases 
as they form part of Article 47 of the EU Charter. Third, the system of judicial super-
vision over EU asylum law has a strong complementary value. The preliminary proce-
dure before the CJEU offers national courts the possibility to refer questions to the 
CJEU pending the national judicial proceedings. In this way, violations of human 
rights may be prevented or redressed at a much earlier stage. 
Positions of the international courts and treaty monitoring bodies on the 
eleven aspects of evidence and judicial scrutiny 
Standard of proof 
The standard of proof under EU asylum law, the ECHR, the RC and the CAT is the 
same: the level of risk required is a real, personal, and foreseeable risk exceeding the 
mere possibility of being subjected to proscribed ill-treatment, but the risk does not 
need to be certain or necessary, highly probable or beyond reasonable doubt. The 
case law of the HRC is stricter as a real risk means that it is a necessary and foresee-
able consequence of the expulsion that Article 7 ICCPR will be violated. 
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Burden of proof, the notion of co-operation 
Under EU asylum law and the treaties included in this study the burden of proof is 
shared: there is an initial burden of assertion, and, preferably, some corroboration, on 
the applicant; after which an investigative burden on the authorities of the State party, 
including the national courts, emerges. The CJEU and the ECtHR, and – albeit less 
explicitly – also the ComAT have developed a notion of a gradual scale: the poorer 
the general human rights situation is, the less individual circumstances and corrobo-
rating individual evidence are required and the sooner the onus shifts to the State 
party. The EU Qualification Directive, the ECHR, the RC and the CAT envisage an 
alleviated burden of proof for cases in which previous persecution or ill-treatment 
took place.  
The notion of a shared burden of proof, developed in international asylum law, is 
also clearly present in EU asylum law in the form of the co-operation requirement 
laid down in Article 4 of the Qualification Directive. In its judgment in M.M. v. 
Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, Ireland (2012) the CJEU has ruled that this 
requirement of co-operation means that if, for any reason whatsoever, the elements 
provided by an applicant for international protection are not complete, up to date or 
relevant, it is necessary for the Member State concerned to cooperate actively with 
the applicant, at that stage of the procedure, so that all the elements needed to sub-
stantiate the application may be assembled. A Member State may also be better 
placed than an applicant to gain access to certain types of documents. The CJEU has 
so far not explained any further what is meant by ‘active co-operation with the appli-
cant so that all the elements needed to substantiate the application may be assem-
bled’. National courts may probably think of situations in which it is necessary to 
offer the applicant a certain (additional) period for submitting new relevant documen-
tation, of situations in which the applicant proposes that the court hears certain wit-
nesses, and situations in which the applicant submits certain documents and the court 
orders an expert authenticity examination or orders the administrative authority to do 
that. Like the ECtHR did in 2010 in Iskandarov v. Russia, the CJEU makes clear in 
M.M. that there may be specific circumstances in which the administrative or judicial 
authority is better placed than the applicant to get hold of certain types of docu-
ments. Thus, when it is much easier for the national administrative or authority than 
for the applicant to gain access to certain relevant documentation, the burden of ob-
taining such evidence rests primarily with that authority. 
Relevant facts and circumstances 
The positions on this aspect are highly similar under the different treaties and EU 
asylum law. Personal circumstances, such as background, gender, age, beliefs, activi-
ties, and circumstances concerning the general (human rights) situation in the country 
of origin, such as conditions in detention, the level of violence in the country and 
control thereof by the authorities, changes in government or policies, are relevant. It 
follows from the treaties and EU asylum law that a holistic and integrated approach 
must be taken towards the personal facts and the situation in the country of origin: 
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the personal facts must be seen in the light of the general situation in the country of 
origin; all the facts and circumstances must be seen as a whole. 
Required degree of individual risk 
Under EU asylum law and the ECHR, three categories of cases may be distinguished: 
1) cases of extreme general violence, where an Article 3risk is assumed for everyone 
returning to the particular country; 2) cases of group violence and 3) individual risk 
cases. In the third category of cases it is required that an individual risk is established, 
in other words, that the individual concerned has been singled out. The HRC and 
ComAT have taken significant steps towards incorporating the lines of theory devel-
oped by the ECtHR on situations of group violence. In classifying cases into one of 
these categories and determining, accordingly, the required amount of individual facts 
and evidence, national courts must also take into consideration that under the RC, no 
singling out is required. The UNHCR Handbook distinguishes two main kinds of 
status determination: the normal situation in which refugee status is determined on an 
individual basis and the exceptional situation in which group determination takes 
place whereby each member of the group is prima facie regarded as a refugee. Neither 
of these two situations poses a strict requirement of being singled out as the risk does 
not necessarily need to be based on the personal experiences of the applicant. 
Credibility assessment: intensity of scrutiny applied by the ECtHR and the 
international supervisors, positions of the UNHCR and the CJEU 
The HRC and the ComAT often stress their subsidiary role when it comes to the de-
termination of the facts of the case, including assessment of the credibility of the 
claimant. This is a logical consequence of the fact that these bodies consider the de-
termination of the facts as primarily a matter for the authorities of the States parties 
and that they (particularly the HRC) have limited fact finding instruments. It seems 
that two triggers in particular make the ComAT proceed towards an independent de-
termination of the facts. A first trigger is that in the national proceedings the absolute 
nature of Article 3 CAT was not respected and a weighing took place of, on the one 
hand, the risk and, on the other hand, aspects of national security or public order. A 
second trigger is that the State party’s authorities have not taken into consideration 
important facts or evidence. Compared to both Committees the ECtHR is more ac-
tive: in a significant number of cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, the 
ECtHR played a very active role in the gathering and verification of facts and circum-
stances, including the assessment of the credibility of the claimant. The ECtHR 
actively proceeds towards an independent and fresh determination of the facts, in-
cluding credibility, in cases of insufficient national proceedings, new facts, circum-
stances and developments, including evidence thereof, and an incorrect application of 
evidentiary standards (for example, the standard or proof, the required level of in-
dividualisation) at national level. 
Unlike the Committees and the ECtHR, the CJEU and the UNHCR do not re-
ceive individual claims, but both supervisors have taken clear positions on the inten-
sity of the scrutiny to be applied by national asylum courts. The CJEU ruled in Samba 
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Diouf (2011) that a thorough national judicial review on the merits of the claim is 
required; the UNHCR has taken the position that appeal or review proceedings 
should involve points of fact and points of law and national courts should be able to 
independently assess the credibility of statements by the asylum seeker. 
Credibility assessment: how do the ECtHR and the international supervisors 
assess credibility? 
The ECtHR, the UNHCR, and the ComAT (and to a lesser extent the HRC) have 
developed clear standards for credibility assessment. These international supervisors 
require ‘general credibility’ (‘general veracity’), not complete accuracy and consistency 
of every single detail of the claim. The basic story – the very core aspects of the flight 
reasons – must be credible. The ECtHR has made clear that doubts about more 
peripheral aspects of the claim, such as statements concerning the journey to the 
country where asylum is requested or statements concerning escape from prison or 
from guards do not necessarily undermine the general credibility. The ECtHR and 
the ComAT have, furthermore, made clear that the basic story must meet a number 
of requirements in order to be credible: 
- It must be sufficiently detailed; 
- It must be internally consistent throughout the proceedings; numerous major 
inconsistencies and numerous alterations in statements may make these state-
ments incredible; 
- It must be consistent with country information; 
- It must be brought forward in a timely manner: late submission of statements 
may negatively affect the general credibility, particularly when no sound reason 
for it is given; 
- The core of the flight narrative must – as much as possible – be corroborated 
with evidence. 
 
Compared to the other supervisors, the UNHCR takes a more lenient stance with re-
gard to corroboration with evidence as a requirement for credibility. It takes the 
stance that the absence of corroborative documents should not prevent the claim 
from being accepted if the statements are consistent with known facts and the general 
credibility of the applicant is good. It has also made clear that there is no justification 
for imposing a stricter credibility standard – stricter than the standard of general cred-
ibility – in cases where corroborating evidence is totally absent. 
Admission of evidence: means and sources 
Under the studied treaties and under EU asylum law the approach towards the ad-
mission and admissibility of evidence is liberal. There are no procedural barriers to 
the admissibility of evidence or pre-determined formulae for its assessment. In 
Chapters 2-5 different examples of evidentiary materials were provided. 
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Minimum quantity and quality of evidence 
The HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR require a significant amount of evidence with 
a direct personal bearing corroborating the core of the flight narrative, the ‘basic 
story’. 
As opposed to this, the UNHCR has often underlined that due to the special and 
difficult evidentiary position of the applicant for asylum, the requirement of evidence 
should not be applied too strictly. It has also taken the stance that complete absence 
of supportive evidence does not automatically mean that the claim is unmeritorious. 
The UNHCR’s position is echoed in the fifth paragraph of Article 4 of the EU 
Qualification Directive, which makes clear that under certain circumstances, including 
a genuine effort to corroborate the claim, not all aspects of the applicant’s account 
need to be corroborated by evidence other than statements. 
Appreciation and weighing of evidence 
EU asylum law and the RC do not regulate this aspect and the case law of the HRC 
and the ComAT are not very explicit and transparent on the evaluation of evidence 
(with the exception of the evaluation of medico-legal reports by the ComAT). The 
ECtHR’s case law is much more explicit and transparent and offers national asylum 
courts concrete guidelines for the evaluation of evidence. The authenticity of submit-
ted documents, the specificity, comprehensiveness and consistency of the informa-
tion contained in evidentiary materials, and the independence, reliability, objective-
ness and authority of the source or author of the evidence determine how much pro-
bative value or weight is attached.  
In Chapters 3, 4 and 5, a number of categories of evidence were discussed in 
more detail and it was demonstrated that specific and comprehensive witness state-
ments by family members played an important role in the case law of the ECtHR and 
both Committees. The ECtHR has made clear that statements by family members 
must normally be supported by other, more objective, evidentiary materials.  
Medico-legal reports form another important category of evidence, particularly in 
the case law of the ComAT. The ECtHR is generally reluctant to accept medical evi-
dence (stating PTSD or other mental disturbance or disorder) as an explanation for 
tardy presentation of statements on past torture and inconsistencies. The ECtHR, the 
HRC and the ComAT have accepted medical reports as evidence corroborating state-
ments on past torture in a significant number of cases. The ComAT requires that 
medico-legal reports are drawn up by medical specialists and conclusively identify a 
causal link between the individual’s bodily or mental injuries and the alleged past 
torture. In a significant number of – mostly early – cases the ComAT accepted medi-
co-legal reports as corroboration of statements on past torture, and as an explanation 
for inconsistencies, gaps or vague points, major changes in the flight narrative and 
late presentation of crucial statements and evidence. In the ComAT’s later jurispru-
dence, medical evidence has been downgraded from decisive to supportive, but still 
remains important and the ComAT has shown dissatisfaction over the fact that in 
national proceedings in the Netherlands, medical reports are not normally taken into 
account as evidence.  
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In the case law of the HRC and the ComAT, much probative weight is normally 
attached to reports containing the result of inquiries conducted by embassies or mis-
sions in countries of origin. 
Reports on the situation in the country of origin logically play an important role 
in the case law of all the international supervisors. The ECtHR has developed a num-
ber of concrete guidelines for the evaluation of country reports. Reports by UN or-
gans, organisations and agencies and reports by States rank highly because United 
Nations agencies have direct access to the authorities of the country of destination as 
well as the ability to carry out on-site inspections and assessments. States have the 
ability to gather information through their diplomatic missions. The precise probative 
value accorded to country of origin information is not only determined by the source, 
but also by its specific content. 
Opportunities for presenting evidence 
All the international supervisors regard adversarial proceedings and equality of arms 
as crucial safeguards for a fair hearing at international level and at the level of national 
court proceedings. The positions of the HRC and the ComAT seem to be stricter 
compared to the other international supervisors, as the HRC and the ComAT have 
required that in cases concerning the expulsion of asylum seekers, both parties to the 
case must have equal access to all the documents in the case file, including documents 
underpinning allegations that the individual concerned constitutes a danger to the 
national security of the country. The prohibition on the use of secret evidence in na-
tional court proceedings on expulsion developed by the HRC and the ComAT has so 
far not been reiterated in other cases, so we cannot speak of a constant line in their 
case law. As opposed to this, the ECtHR has ruled in a number of cases that the use 
of secret evidence may be justified if this is strictly necessary to preserve the funda-
mental rights of another individual or to safeguard an important public interest, such 
as the protection of national security. In the same vein, the UNHCR takes the posi-
tion that non-disclosure of evidence is allowed when disclosure of sources would se-
riously jeopardize national security or the security of the organisations or persons 
providing the information. The ECtHR requires that national courts, when accepting 
that evidence is not disclosed to the other party, must take counterbalancing meas-
ures. The principles developed by the CJEU concerning secret evidence strongly mir-
ror the ECtHR’s principles. 
Judicial application of investigative powers 
The HRC and the ComAT often stress their subsidiary role when it comes to the de-
termination of the facts of the case. Both Committees, but particularly the HRC, have 
at their disposal and apply only a limited number of investigative powers. The 
ECtHR, a fully-fledged international court, has a wide array of investigative powers at 
its disposal. In a significant number of cases concerning the expulsion of asylum 
seekers it has played a very active role in the gathering and verification of facts and 
circumstances. The ECtHR may apply at any stage in the proceedings any investiga-
tive measure which it considers capable of clarifying the facts. It will particularly 
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obtain materials on conditions in the country of origin proprio motu when the applicant 
or a third party provides reasoned grounds which cast doubt on the accuracy of the 
information relied on by the respondent government. 
As regards the required intensity of scrutiny to be provided by national courts, 
the stances of the international supervisors are highly similar: they require a thorough 
national judicial review on the merits of the claim ( see, for example, CJEU, Samba 
Diouf 2011, ComAT, Nirmal Singh v. Canada 2011), full judicial jurisdiction on points 
of fact and points of law (the ECtHR’s Zumtobel doctrine) appeal or review proceed-
ings on points of fact and points of law (UNHCR). Reference was also made to the 
interpretation of the term ‘impartiality’ by the ComAT under Articles 12 and 13 CAT, 
which obliges the national judge to reconstruct as meticulously as possible what hap-
pened and to use his or her investigative powers to that end. 
Time limits for the presentation of statements and evidence 
The CJEU, the ECtHR, the UNHCR and the HRC take similar positions. The core 
of these positions is that national procedural rules must be reasonable or applied by 
the national court in a reasonable and flexible manner if the circumstances of the case 
so require.  
It follows from EU asylum law and the case law of the ECtHR, the position of 
the UNHCR and the case law of the ComAT that all relevant statements should, in 
principle, be made as early in the national procedure as possible and that belated 
statements may cast doubt on the credibility of the applicant. The approach towards 
evidence submitted to corroborate statements is generally more flexible. In the case 
law of the ECtHR, the HRC and the ComAT, the point in time at which evidentiary 
materials were submitted in national proceedings by the parties is, seen as a factor 
alone and in itself, not a relevant consideration.  
The UNHCR has stressed that no case should be rejected solely on the basis that 
the relevant information was not presented or documents were not submitted earlier. 
In the same vein, in a significant number of cases the ComAT did not see the tardy 
presentation of relevant statements and evidence as problematic and rather easily ac-
cepted that good reasons had been brought forward for the belated presentation of 
statements and evidence. The more lenient positions of the UNHCR and the 
ComAT are echoed in Article 8, first paragraph, of the EU Procedures Directive, un-
der which Member States must ensure that applications for asylum are neither reject-
ed nor excluded from examination on the sole ground that they have not been made 
as soon as possible. 
Point in time for the risk assessment 
The positions of the international supervisors on this issue are by and large identical. 
They all take the position that, in principle, an assessment ex nunc is required. The 
assessment of the risk is made on the basis of all the information available at the 
moment of consideration. In cases where deportation from the respondent State has 
already been effectuated, the point in time for the consideration by the ECtHR re-
mains the moment of that deportation, but the Court may, and actually does, have 
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regard to information that came to light subsequent to the removal so that in fact 
again an ex nunc assessment takes place. The HRC has so far adopted no guidelines 
for situations where the removal has already taken place and the ComAT’s case law is 
not entirely consistent. In T.P.S. v. Canada (2000), however, the ComAT explicitly 
took subsequent facts and circumstances into consideration without any reservation. 
This resembles the ECtHR’s approach. 
Integrating the results: national courts and the independent and rigorous 
scrutiny 
Whereas Chapters 2-6 were aimed at discovering the procedural obligations and stan-
dards flowing from international asylum law and EU asylum law, Chapter 7 focused 
on their implications for national asylum courts. The first question looked at in Chap-
ter 7 was how the treaties and EU asylum law related to each other. It was concluded 
that the transfer to the EU by the EU Member States of the competence to make 
binding rules on asylum had not affected the obligations flowing from the RC, the 
ICCPR, the CAT and the ECHR. National asylum courts in the EU Member States 
were in fact ‘double bound’ by the procedural obligations and standards flowing from 
the treaties investigated in this study as they were bound by the treaties as such on the 
one hand, and, on the other hand, bound by EU law which incorporated the treaty 
obligations, as was demonstrated in Chapter 6. 
Next, an attempt was made to integrate into a coherent whole the procedural 
obligations and standards flowing from international and EU asylum law, with the 
objective of arriving at a coherent set of standards ready for use by national asylum 
courts. A basic presumption underpinning this integration exercise was that in most 
asylum cases coming before national asylum courts, both refugee protection (Articles 
1 and 33 RC, Article 18 of the EU Charter) and subsidiary protection (Articles 7 
ICCPR, 3 CAT, 3 ECHR, Articles 4 and 19 of the EU Charter) were invoked. As a 
result, all the treaties and instruments covered by this study were relevant and appli-
cable in such cases. The integration exercise resulted in a common denominator: it 
was concluded that international and EU applications for asylum required an ‘inde-
pendent and rigorous national judicial scrutiny’. The requirement for independent 
and rigorous national judicial scrutiny was then further defined with the aid of the 
following sources:  
-  The case law of the HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR under the respective ef-
fective remedy provisions and the procedural limbs of the non-refoulement pro-
visions; 
- The position of the UNHCR concerning national judicial scrutiny;  
- The CJEU’s case law on the principle of effective judicial protection; 
- The assessment as performed by the HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR, analysed 
in the second part of Chapters 3, 4 and 5. 
 
A hierarchy of these sources was created: it was concluded that national asylum 
courts must first and foremost turn to the case law of the CJEU and the ECtHR, 
next, to the UNHCR and then to the HRC and the ComAT as subsidiary means of 
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interpretation. It was also concluded that cross-references were not problematic: 
national asylum courts within the EU could cross-refer to these different sources of 
interpretation as all the EU Member States were parties to the RC, the ICCPR, the 
CAT and the ECHR. Finally, the question of conflicting or diverging standards was 
addressed. With reference to the preference rules contained in the different treaties 
and EU asylum law, it was argued that when confronted with the problem of con-
flicting or diverging standards, national asylum courts should abandon the established 
hierarchy and opt for those standards offering the highest degree of protection. To 
justify this approach, reference was also made to Article 52, third paragraph, of the 
EU Charter which allows EU law to provide more extensive protection than the pro-
tection offered under the ECHR. 
The requirement of an independent and rigorous national judicial scrutiny was, 
finally, defined with the assistance of the eleven aspects of evidence and judicial scru-
tiny, introduced in Chapter 1. This resulted in a set of evidentiary and scrutiny stan-
dards ready for use by national courts. 
Repeat cases, Dublin cases and fast-track national proceedings 
Chapter 8 explored the stances of the international courts and treaty monitoring 
bodies on three special categories of cases: repeat cases (cases in which a claimant had 
lodged a second or third et cetera asylum application after a negative decision on a first 
application), Dublin cases (cases in which an asylum application was decided upon on 
the basis of the EU Dublin Regulation 2003/343/EC), and fast-track national pro-
ceedings (proceedings in which shorter than normal time limits and sometimes also 
other special rules applied, created with the aim of faster and more efficient pro-
cessing of asylum claims and appeals). With regard to repeat cases it was concluded 
that a nova test was, in itself, not problematic from the viewpoint of international and 
EU asylum law. A second conclusion concerning repeat cases was that, given the 
positions of the international treaty monitoring bodies and courts, national courts 
should not fully or formally exclude evidence only because it should have been pres-
ented at an earlier moment in national asylum proceedings. 
In cases of the expulsion of asylum seekers under the Dublin Regulation, the 
expelling EU Member State’s authorities, including the national courts, were, to a 
certain extent, allowed to presume that the authorities of the intermediary EU Mem-
ber State would respect their international obligations. At the same time, the ECtHR 
and the CJEU had clearly put a firm restriction on this presumption of treaty com-
pliance. As soon as (some) information to the contrary became available – either be-
cause the applicant had submitted this information or because the authorities were 
familiar with it or should have been familiar with it – the national authorities of the 
referring EU Member State had to assess whether the asylum procedure in the inter-
mediary EU Member State afforded sufficient guarantees and whether living condi-
tions violated Article 3 ECHR. 
It was, finally, established that, on the issue of fast-track national proceedings, the 
stances of the international treaty monitoring bodies and courts were identical. Fast-
track asylum court proceedings were not problematic as such. What was important 
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was that, when operating such proceedings, national courts remained able to perform 
a thorough review on the merits of the asylum claim. Fast-track proceedings could 
deprive asylum seekers of the opportunity to substantiate their claim for protection. 
If a national court estimated that, as a result of operating fast-track proceedings, a 
thorough review on the merits could not take place or that the asylum seeker had 
been deprived of the opportunity to substantiate his or her claim, that court needed 
to have the possibility to reroute the case into normal or prolonged proceedings 
which offered more room for further judicial investigations or further substantiation 
of the claim by the asylum seeker. 
Epilogue 
In the Epilogue, I revisited the main research findings and explained their impor-
tance, sometimes by referring to their contrast with standing national jurisprudential 
practice in the Netherlands. I also expressed my disappointment at the fact that the 
HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR had so far not developed elaborate and coherent 
doctrinal positions on the intensity of the scrutiny with which they themselves deter-
mined the facts in expulsion cases concerning asylum seekers, and at the fact that the 
conclusions in the views of the HRC and the ComAT were often ultra-brief and of-
fered no clear guidelines to national courts on a number of evidentiary issues, such as 
the evaluation of evidence (both HRC and ComAT) and the credibility assessment 
(particularly the HRC). Based on this I made a plea to the HRC and the ComAT to 
try to come up with more elaborate considerations on the mentioned issues of evi-
dence and on the intensity of judicial scrutiny they themselves applied, so that na-
tional courts would receive clearer guidance and would be better equipped to live up 
to their treaty obligations. 
I concluded by arguing that international and EU asylum law provide support for 
my personal conviction that an independent and thorough national judicial scrutiny, 
including thorough judicial investigations aimed at finding the truth, is of utmost im-
portance in national asylum court proceedings, and that thorough judicial investiga-
tions aimed at finding the truth have nothing to do with helping one of the parties to 
the case, but have to do with independence and impartiality of the judiciary. 
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Propositions  
To the thesis Rigorous Scrutiny versus Marginal Review by Dana Baldinger 
 
1. International and EU asylum law require an independent and thorough national judicial 
scrutiny comprising facts and law. National courts must be able to make an independent 
determination of the disputed facts and of the credibility of a claimant. National courts 
must also be able to use investigative powers whenever they consider this necessary to 
bring further clarification to the facts. National courts may never be precluded from de-
termining ‘the central issue in dispute’.  
 
2. Thorough national judicial investigations aimed at finding the truth have nothing to do 
with helping one of the parties, but have to do with judicial independence and impartiali-
ty. 
 
3. Marginal national judicial review of the credibility of asylum seekers’ accounts will often 
be at variance with the full jurisdiction requirement flowing from Articles 6 ECHR and 
47 of the EU Charter, as it will preclude the national court from determining ‘the central 
issue in dispute’. 
 
4. The HRC, the ComAT and the ECtHR have the free choice to apply an intense and full 
factual scrutiny or, instead, rely on the facts as presented by the respondent State. Na-
tional asylum courts should similarly at least have a fully free choice to apply, in the spe-
cific cases coming before them, either full factual scrutiny or a somewhat more deferent 
approach towards the determination of the facts. 
 
5. The standards on judicial scrutiny and evidence as applied by the ECtHR in cases con-
cerning the expulsion of asylum seekers are, as minimum norms, binding on national asy-
lum courts. Whenever a particular standard developed by the UNHCR, the HRC, the 
ComAT or the CJEU offers higher protection to the asylum seekers, national asylum 
courts must use the standard offering the highest protection. 
 
6. The HRC, the ComAT, the ECtHR and the CJEU have all made clear that evidence, 
including medical evidence, presented by the applicant for asylum must be taken seriously 
and examined carefully by the national authorities, including national courts. Singh v. Bel-
gium (ECtHR, 2012) is the perfect illustration of this principle. 
 
7. Unfortunately, many views of the HRC and the ComAT offer little to no guidance to 
national asylum courts on the burden of proof, the assessment of credibility, and the ad-
mission and evaluation of evidence. It is crucial for national asylum courts to receive 
clearer guidance from the HRC and the ComAT on those aspects of evidence. Only then 
will national asylum courts be truly able to live up to the obligations accepted by the 
States Parties to relevant treaties.  
 
8. EU law causes a transformation in legal status of existing standards on evidence and 
judicial scrutiny contained in international asylum law by virtue of their incorporation in-
to EU law, via Articles 18, 19, 47, 52(3) and 53 of the EU Charter of Fundamental 
Rights. This is a transformation from non-binding principles into more important rules 
which must be respected (the standards developed by the UNHCR), from intergovern-
mental international law into binding primary supranational EU law (the standards devel-
oped by the ECtHR) and from intergovernmental international law into important 
sources of inspiration for binding EU law (the standards developed by the HRC and the 
ComAT). National asylum courts can no longer disregard or discard these standards, as 
that would amount to a violation of the EU Charter, which is binding primary suprana-
tional EU law. 
 
9. The added value of EU asylum law is also that Article 6 ECHR on a fair hearing is – via 
Article 47 of the Charter – now fully applicable to national asylum court proceedings. Ar-
ticle 6 ECHR contains important specific standards on the intensity of judicial scrutiny to 
be applied by national courts, as well as standards on handling evidence. 
 
10. Under international and EU asylum law, there are no procedural barriers to the admissi-
bility of evidence. 
 
11. Given the positions of the HRC, the ComAT, the ECtHR and the UNHCR on the 
required quantity of evidence, national (judicial) practices demanding evidence in corrob-
oration of more than the core of the flight narrative are not allowed. 
 
12. In repeat asylum cases a nova-test is in itself not problematic from the viewpoint of 
international and EU asylum law. National courts, however, should not fully or formally 
exclude evidence just because it should have been presented at an earlier moment, in a 
previous asylum procedure. In a significant number of cases dealt with by the ECtHR 
and the ComAT, crucial evidence was submitted for the first time in the context of re-
peat national asylum proceedings, and the ECtHR and the ComAT did not regard this as 
problematic per se. 
 
13. The CJEU (N.S. and Others, 2011) and the ECtHR (M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece, 2011) have 
put a firm restriction on the presumption of treaty compliance in Dublin cases. As soon 
as information to the contrary becomes available – either because the applicant has sub-
mitted this information or because the national authorities are familiar with it or should 
be familiar with it – the national authorities, including the courts, must assess whether the 
asylum procedure in the intermediary EU Member State affords ‘sufficient guarantees’ 
and whether living conditions are compliant with the ECHR and EU law. 
 
14. When processing asylum appeals in fast-track national judicial proceedings, national 
courts must be aware that the safeguards of national judicial protection should never be 
sacrificed to speed. The national court must at all times remain able to perform a thor-
ough review on the merits of the claim. 
 
15. Under international and EU asylum law, reasonable national time limits for submitting 
statements and evidence will normally not be problematic. However, there must be room 
for national courts to be flexible when the circumstances of the case so require. 
 
16. Under international and EU asylum law, belated presentation of evidence corroborating 
statements is seen as one among many other relevant factors. Belated presentation of ev-
idence is – as a factor alone and in itself – not problematic 
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This book explores what international and EU law require from the national asylum 
judge with regard to the required intensity of the judicial scrutiny to be applied, and with 
regard to evidentiary issues, such as the standard and burden of proof, the assessment 
of credibility, the required level of individualisation, the admission and evaluation of 
evidence, opportunities for presenting evidence and time limits for submitting evidence. 
To that end, an analysis is made of the provisions on national (judicial) proceedings 
contained in the Refugee Convention, the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights, the UN Convention against Torture, the European Convention on Human 
Rights, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU and a number of secondary EU 
law instruments, such as the EU Qualification Directive and the EU Asylum Procedures 
Directive, with a particular focus on issues of evidence and judicial scrutiny. In addition, 
the assessment as performed by the UN Human Rights Committee, the UN Committee 
against Torture and the European Court of Human Rights in cases concerning the 
expulsion of asylum seekers is analysed, again with a particular focus on issues of 
evidence and judicial scrutiny.
This research has revealed that international and EU law contain many specific 
standards on the intensity of judicial scrutiny to be applied by national asylum courts, as 
well as standards on evidence. It has also revealed that it has become in fact impossible 
for national asylum courts to ignore or discard these standards, as that would amount 
to a breach of Articles 18, 19 and 47 of the EU Charter on fundamental rights and thus a 
violation of primary binding EU law. An important common denominator following from 
international and EU law is that national asylum courts must perform an independent, 
impartial and rigorous national judicial scrutiny of asylum refusals. Independent, 
impartial and rigorous national judicial scrutiny implies, inter alia, that national courts 
examine evidence submitted by applicants in a careful and serious manner. It also 
requires that national courts are able to make an independent and fresh determination 
of the disputed facts and that - if necessary in order to clarify the facts - these courts 
undertake judicial investigations. 
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